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Abstract
The aim of the present study is to investigate how and why a country facing issues 
that needed to be tackled nationwide chose to decentralise political power and financial 
resources when it moved from military rule to redemocratisation. Furthermore, the study 
examines whether the decision to decentralise taken in Brazil in the period 1981-1991 has 
changed the allocation of public expenditure at sub-national level, especially to education. By 
analysing the decision to decentralise and its results at the sub-national level, the study 
embodies both an upstream and a downstream approach.
The upstream approach encompasses the topics related to decentralisation in the 
Brazilian Constituent National Assembly that sat from 1987 to 1988. Research sources are 
based on the archives of the Constituent National Assembly and on interviews with key 
political leaders in Congress and practitioners. The decision to decentralise is analysed in three 
dimensions: the relationship between political parties and the State; intra- and inter-party 
competition; and regional cleavages.
The downstream approach comprises three case studies: the state of Bahia, its capital, 
Salvador, and its most industrialised municipality, Campari. The political analysis is based on 
(a) interviews with politicians in executive and in legislative positions, and officials and (b) 
newspaper material as a complementary source. The financial performance is based on the 
analysis of expenditure extracted from balance sheets.
This study fills four gaps in political-science and public-administration works on 
contemporary Brazil. First, it deepens the understanding of how and why Brazil became such 
a decentralised nation. Second, it links the analysis of political and financial resources. Third, 
it highlights differences between levels of government in their experiences with 
decentralisation. Fourth, it investigates the impact of decentralisation on political 
arrangements and on education expenditure.
The results suggest that in Brazil there was a lack of social consensus on what was to 
be achieved by decentralisation. They suggest that decentralisation fosters democracy but its 
impacts on policy results have so far been limited. The evidence further implies that 
decentralisation and democratisation bring about a fragmentation of power without necessarily 
disintegrating previous political coalitions or changing the way public resources are spent. 
These findings indicate that various political and economic factors influence the outcomes of 
decentralisation, thus exposing the limits of decentralisation on policy results.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
After the political opening and the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution Brazil 
became one of the most decentralised nations in the world in terms of the distribution of fiscal 
resources and political power. After two decades of military rule the political opening brought 
to the fore deep concerns regarding democratic values in which political, financial and 
administrative decentralisation played an important role. There were also concerns with the 
improvement of welfare policies and of social democracy. These concerns emerged in Brazil 
and in Latin America when the so-called Western democracies were showing their 
disillusionment in the possibilities of their political systems finding solutions to increasing 
political, social and economic predicaments (Langton, 1978; Dunleavy, 1980a). Conversely 
in the 1980s Latin American countries in general, and Brazil in particular emphasised the 
importance of formal political institutions and the relevance of social democracy, as ways of 
legitimising and stabilising their struggle to rebuild their democratic institutions. All these 
concerns were expressed in the 1988 Constitution, in which political and financial 
decentralisation to sub-national governments and their politicians were achieved, as were 
several measures improving social rights. The 1988 Constitution was commended to the 
people as restoring the federation and political democracy, by decentralising political and 
financial resources, and as improving social democracy. However, various constraints made 
it difficult to achieve the constitutional mandates and to trigger solutions to the above- 
mentioned concerns. The outcomes of decentralisation are clear at the federal level, which is 
experiencing financial constraints and facing difficulties in building governing coalitions. At 
the sub-national level, however, the results are still not clear, especially when each particular 
state and municipality is analysed.
This study examines the background to the adoption of the present political and 
financial arrangements in Brazil, how these arrangements operated in practice and their 
consequences to welfare policies, taking education as an example. These themes have more 
than an intrinsic interest since they deal directly with the introduction of new conflicts not only 
in intergovernmental relations and in the federation, but also in the distribution of power and 
goods to different groups in society. Decentralisation and intergovernmental relations on the 
one hand, and democratisation, which produced the driving force for decentralisation, on the
14
other, are the topics addressed in this study. Because the two former topics are influenced by 
the type of territorial political arrangement adopted in each country a discussion on the 
theoretical formulations of federalism has been introduced in this chapter.
1.1 State of the Field
1.1.1 Democratisation
Brazil's redemocratisation has received much scholarly attention in political science 
literature \  A great deal is known about the first stages of the political opening, theoretically, 
comparatively and empirically, as well as about the reasons for the demise of the military 
regime. We need not spend much time discussing government performance during the military 
or during the first civilian administrations since they have been analysed in the context of the 
political opening and in subsequent works on Brazilian politics2. Some of these works provide 
a set of propositions for the study of the transformation or the demise of authoritarian 
regimes; others are detailed analyses of specific countries or analyses of the Brazilian case 
within the newly restored democracies of Latin America or Southern Europe. These studies 
have stressed two aspects of the Brazilian transition: a process with no rupture from the 
previous regime and a transition which took an exceptionally long time. The importance of 
these studies lies not only in the discussion of that period but also in the furtherance of our 
understanding of the polity of Brazil and Latin America. However, although they looked at 
the political opening after the event, they did not mention the main issues, problems and trade­
offs caused by redemocratisation. An exception to this omission was McDonough's (1981) 
study of Brazilian elites, showing that they are neither unideological nor unidimensional 
ideologues. Their belief systems are complex but patterned, that is, muldimensional, and 
subject to deep cleavages. McDonough showed that because the politics of the Brazilian elites 
has no recognizable centre or dominant legitimising strain, the movement away from
1 Most of the works on Brazil's return to democracy refer to it as a democratisation process based on the 
argument that before 1989, elections under democratic rule, although contested, did not have the level of 
participation necessaxy for democracy to exist (Bethell, 1994: 3). In this study the word redemocratisation has 
been chosen because, despite the recognition of the pertinence of the above-mentioned argument, the struggle of 
Brazilian society against military rule was focused on the return to democracy as it had been between 1946 and 
1964.
2 Among the most important works published in English and in Portuguese about the political opening in the 
1970s and 1980s are those by Baloyra (1987); Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1989); Dimenstein et al. (1985); Ethier 
(1990); Goes and Camargo (1984); Koutzii (1986); Martins (1986); Munck (1989); O'Donnell, Schmitter, and 
Whitehead (1986); Selcher (1986); Skidmore (1989); Smith (1987); and Stepan (1989).
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authoritarianism was liable to be confusing and highly experimental This assertion, which the 
study refers to as the 'lack of a national project', in the analysis of the constitution-making 
process, and to the 'lack of a social consensus', when discussing the decision to decentralise, 
was valid not only for the transition but also for the events which followed it. Another reason 
not to spend much time on the above-mentioned period lies in the definition of transition. As 
Pickvance (1993: 1) put it, a transition can continue for only a determinate period, until an 
endstate is reached, after which the transition is finished3. The issues analysed in this study 
are not treated as issues of the transition but rather as issues of democratic consolidation 4.
In the late 1980s the literature on Brazil's political system began to focus on the new 
issues caused by redemocratisation and on the prospects for democratic consolidation. These 
studies have concentrated either on macro political and economic issues or on actors and 
institutions emerging or gaining more visibility after the end of the transition. These studies 
riied light on the political and economic problems of redemocratisation in Brazil and in Latin 
America, especially on the following issues. First, the threats surrounding redemocratisation 
and the trade-offs in the construction of democratic institutions in Latin America 
(Mainwaring, O'Donnell and Valenzuela, 1992). Second, the problems redemocratisation 
brought for Brazil's govemability (Kinzo, 1993; Lamounier, 1990). Third, the role played by 
inflation in constraining democracy (Whitehead, 1989). Fourth, the difficulties in designing 
a new economic model (Philip, 1990 and 1993; Whitehead, 1992).
The issues of the democratic consolidation have also been addressed in Santos's (1993) 
study on the problems of a new political agenda caused by redemocratisation: broader 
participation; more institutionalisation of political competition; the overcoming of the 
obstacles to collective action; institutional integration; and autonomous planning in a global 
world. A similar agenda was earlier developed by Reis (1988), in which cleavages between 
democratic institutions and forms of clientelism, coronelismo (politics based on the local 
political boss) and populism were stressed. O'Donnell (1988) emphasised the high degree of 
continuity for both actors and practices from the previous regime: the military, the bureaucrats
3 On the other hand, Pickvance (1993) called attention to the dangers of such a rigid definition.
4 Some authors have labelled this stage of Latin American redemocratisation as the second transition. 
According to this view a second transition begins with the inauguration of a democratic government and ends - 
if all goes well - with the establishment of a consolidated democratic regime. In the second transition the 
democratic empowerment of those who are elected as well as the democratic accountability of political actors are 
still incomplete (O’Donnell 1992).
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and clientelism. He called our attention to the fact that those actors and practices were 
incompatible with democracy, citizenry and accountability. Through research carried out 
under the supervision of Jaguaribe (1985) came the awareness that Brazil's huge social 
inequalities called for the need to implement social democracy together with political 
democracy. We also know a little more about the strengthening of democratic institutions 
through Keck's (1992) research on the Workers' Party; about the paths of the right after the 
transition (Campello de Souza, 1992); about the problems faced by the Judiciary in the 
democratic consolidation (Sadek, 1995); and about the ongoing lack of unification among the 
Brazilian elites (Bruneau, 1992)5.
We also know much about how some traditional political practices may jeopardise the 
consolidation of democratic institutions. Because this study suggests that State clientelism is 
one element which cements the political system at the three levels of government and delays 
the effects of political change on public policies, especially on education expenditure, a brief 
comment on the state of knowledge regarding clientelism is needed. The use of patronage by 
the governments to build governing coalitions is not new in Brazil. The country has provided 
a rich literature on the subject6. Studies on patronage were conducted within a framework 
of the relationship between State and society. The majority of these studies have treated 
patronage as part of studies on intergovernmental relations in Brazil There is enough 
evidence to show the existence of patronage in Latin America and in other poor regions of 
the world, and to show that clientelism plays a role in intensifying social inequality. The issue 
addressed in this research is, therefore, not its reality but its implications in a given political 
environment, namely, a democratic and fragmented regime, and for a given policy, such as
5 An important contribution is Lehmann's (1990) discussion about Latin America's popular organisations vis-a- 
vis political clientelism after redemocratisation. Another line of research, particularly dear to North-American 
scholars, deals 'with the influence of religion in politics. See Bruneau (1982), Della Cava (1976), Ireland (1991), 
Mainwaring (1986;1987) and Mainwaring and Wilde (1989).
6 The main studies about the influence of patronage in the country’s political system are by Cintra (1979), 
Duarte (1939), Nunes Leal (1977), Oliveira Vianna (1949), Pang (1979) and Queirdz (1976). Another line of 
research focused on die influence of patronage on the civil service (Daland, 1963; Geddes, 1990). Schmitter 
(1971) provided a seminal analysis of die ambiguities brought about by the combination of corporatist privileges, 
which emerged with industrialisation, with die maintenance of clientelistic interests. Schwartzman (1988) showed 
the influence of clientelism on the way the State operates. Campello de Souza (1976) assessed the use of 
clientelism by the political parties to counterbalance a centralised State structure. Greenfield (1972), Henfrey 
(1981) and Shirley (1972) focused on patron-client relationship in three Brazilian states, Minas Gerais, Bahia and 
Sao Paulo, and Hutchinson (1966) on the importance of cultural and spiritual factors as a major explanation for 
clientelism.
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education.
1.1.2 Decentralisation and Intergovernmental Relations
Although there is a vast literature on redemocratisation, the same cannot be said of 
decentralisation, which is an old, but less studied, issue in Brazil. Because the country has 
historically experienced more centralisation than decentralisation, and because experiences of 
decentralisation have generally been limited to the granting of financial resources to local 
governments, works on the effects of decentralisation on broader patterns of political and 
financial performances have not yet become a line of academic research1. The reason for the 
lack of scholarly attention is that political and financial decentralisation were the result of the 
1988 Constitution and, therefore, of redemocratisation. Because of its relative novelty, and 
the country's centralised tradition, lines of academic research have still to be built up 8.
On the other hand, decentralisation, or rather centralisation, and federalism have been 
partially addressed in works on intergovernmental relations under the theoretical formulations 
of political science, political sociology and public administration. Studies of intergovernmental 
relations in Brazil have traditionally not been limited to the analysis of the relationships 
between governmental units in the federal system, but have tended to incorporate two other 
approaches: (i) the relationship between the State and society, a division common in 
discussions of authoritarianism; and (ii) how the distribution of territorial power influences 
political arrangements and pacts. Most of these studies, however, were conducted before the 
advent of the redemocratisation and decentralisation. The effects of the political and financial 
decentralisation promoted by the 1988 Constitution on federalism and on intergovernmental 
relations have not received scholarly attention.
Works focused on the political arrangements before 1964 tended towards a 
dichotomic view of the relationship between levels of government and between State and 
society without capturing their interdependence9. Some of those studies viewed territorial
7 Morns and Lowder's (1992) book about decentralisation in Latin America focuses on its economic and 
demographic aspects. In only one chapter, about Mexico, the political-institutional dimension of decentralisation 
is discussed.
8 An exception is the work developed by a group at the University of Campinas which has been exploring the 
influence of decentralisation on policy results (Castro, 1992). However, Campinas's research analyses policy 
results in the state of Sao Paulo and is focused on the health care programme.
9 For a detailed discussion of those studies, see Medeiros (1986).
cleavages in Brazil as following a pattern in which the State dominated society, and the 
federal government the sub-national units, as in Faoro's (1958) classical work. Another 
approach saw society as dominated by private interests and the State as the result of 
compromises between local and regional interests, as in the works of Duarte (1939), Freyre 
(1964), Oliveira Vi arm a (1949) and Queiroz (1976). A variant of the latter school of thought 
is represented by Nunes Leal's (1977) influential work focusing on the municipality to explain 
the power of local patrons, the coroneis. Nunes Leal showed the contradictions behind the 
adoption of modem forms of political representation such as universal suffrage, in a milieu of 
poverty, centralisation of power and resources at the state and federal levels and of decadent, 
private local power. Coronelismo was, in Nunes Leal's interpretation, a political system based 
on a compromise between a declining private power and a strong public power. Because the 
municipalities were financially weak, the coroneis were able to survive with the complacent 
backing of the state government. Nunes Leal's great merit was to emphasise the differences 
between the municipality as an institution and the coroneis as their patrons. Until then they 
had been treated as the same phenomenon. Despite Nunes Leal's contribution to the 
understanding of local politics and interests, his study was also guided by the dichotomic 
approach between local politics on the one hand and state and federal politics on the other 10.
During the 1970s some works attempted to overcome the dichotomic approach, 
mainly those by Balan (1974), Cardoso (1975) and Uricoechea (1980). However, they still 
stressed the predominance of the State versus society, and of the centre versus the periphery. 
In the 1980s four major works by Ames (1987), Bursztyn (1985), Medeiros (1986) and 
Schwartzman (1988) incorporated the interdependence of local, regional and national politics 
into their views of the relationships between State and society and between levels of 
government in their political arrangements within the federation. However, because these 
researches were developed before the constitutional espousal of decentralisation, they no 
longer capture the current trends in Brazilian politics.
In the early 1990s, when the effects of decentralisation became more visible, some 
studies began to mention the issue. Lamounier (1993: 119) called attention to the dangers to 
govemability encouraged by the current 'federative structure'. Chalmers, Campello de Souza 
and Boron (1992: 8) mentioned the importance of a knowledge of the links between local and
10 For a criticism of both school of thoughts, see Cammack (1981) and Uricoechea (1980).
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central authorities for a better understanding of the role of the right in influencing politics and 
in dealing with the State. Medeiros (1991) acknowledged the reality of decentralisation and 
focused on its importance for institution building. Although calling our attention to the issue, 
these studies deal with it in excessively broad terms.
There have been considerable efforts from international financial organisations to 
analyse the financial aspects of Brazil's decentralisation. There have been works by economists 
discussing the political economy of inflation and the constraints blocking economic growth, 
in which the role of sub-national governments is briefly assessed (Bresser Pereira, 1993a; 
Franco, 1993; Haddad, 1995). However, studies based on an understanding of the reasons 
which caused Brazil to become such a decentralised nation and the effects of decentralisation 
on the political and financial systems and on policy results at the sub-national level are still 
absent. Despite the absence of academic research on the influence of decentralisation in 
shaping Brazil's current political system, the issue of decentralisation and of intergovernmental 
relations has been in the media and on the political agenda since the beginning of the 1990s. 
As a result of the political salience of the topic, the federal government has been calling for 
a hew federal pact1, meaning more involvement of the sub-national spheres in service delivery. 
The absence of academic research on decentralisation and on intergovernmental relations after 
redemocratisation does not mean, however, that the initial results of a decade of 
decentralisation cannot be analysed.
1.1.3 Federalism
The Brazilian experience of federalism has been studied from several disciplinary 
angles: law; fiscal federalism as an aspect of macro-economics and of public administration; 
history; and political science and political sociology. Legal studies have been of little use in 
understanding Brazilian federalism because they are not based on political and social 
frameworks but are restricted to its legalistic aspects, as shown by the works of Meirelles 
(1985) and Pontes de Miranda (1970) n .
The financial aspects of federalism and its implications for public administration have 
received great scholarly attention. Historical overviews of Brazilian fiscal federalism and its 
consequences for public administration have been made by IBAM (1975), Mahar (1976) and
11A more sociological approach was made by Comparato (1985), but he focused on the relationship between 
the three branches of the State and not on how federal principles influence political arrangements.
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Sherwood (1967). The 1970s and early 1980s saw an extensive discussion of the 
consequences for fiscal federalism, intergovernmental relations and public administration of 
financial centralisation under the military. Two Brazilian institutions, IB AM and IPEA, the 
latter a federal government think-tank and the former a private organisation for local 
government studies, were the most active 12. The journal Revista de Finangas Publicas was 
the main forum for these studies and debates.
The impact of the 1988 reform introduced by the Constitution has received 
considerable attention from international financial organisations, especially the IMF and the 
World Bank. Under their umbrella empirical studies on federal finances were conducted by 
Bomfim and Shah (1991), Shah (1991) and Tanzi et aL (1992). The United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean sponsored Afonso's (1994) study, which 
encompassed the finances of the three levels of government. Comparative works on 
intergovernmental fiscal relations in developing countries were also developed under the 
auspices of those institutions (Shah, 1994).
We owe to these studies, focused on fiscal federalism, access to up-dated information 
on the federal government's expenditure and revenue. They filled the gap in the lack of 
empirical studies since 1988, but because they focus on financial performance within the 
framework of the economic literature on fiscal federalism, they view Brazil's fiscal 
decentralisation as having a negative impact on economic growth and on the country's need 
for fiscal austerity, except in the case of Afonso (1994). On the other hand, the branch of 
these works focusing on the financial and administrative side of decentralisation, such as those 
under the auspices of IBAM, tend to neglect the political dimension of decentralisation. A new 
line of research is being conducted by IBAM, focusing on the limits of Brazilian financial 
decentralisation if financial disparities among municipalities are not addressed (Lordello de 
Mello, 1991; Bremaeker, 1994). Although important in calling our attention to Brazil's intra- 
and inter-regional financial disparities, which are not considered in the works sponsored by 
the international financial organisations, IBAMs studies focus exclusively on local finances 
and on the problems caused by fiscal arrangements to the local administrations, but they do 
not examine the political dimension.
12 See, among others, Barbosa de Araujo, Horta and Considera (1973); Gon9alves (1978); IBAM (1974 and 
1976); Longo (1981) and Rezende (1984).
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Historians have provided the most fertile grounds for our knowledge of Brazilian 
federalism, especially in understanding the political pacts behind the adoption of new 
economic and social paradigms which were expressed in the country's territorial distribution 
of power and in its Constitutions. Their contributions are mentioned in detail in Chapter 2, but 
Camargo (1993), Carvalho (1993), Fausto (1986) and Love (1993) filled a great gap in our 
knowledge of the evolution of federalism throughout the country's history 13.
Political-science and political sociology works on the importance of decentralisation 
for the federal system are in their infancy and so far only brief articles (Selcher, 1989) and 
conference papers (Medeiros, 1991) have been produced. This study attempts to fill the gap 
in the academic literature by analysing the impact of decentralisation on Brazil's political, 
financial and federal systems following the 1988 Constitution.
1.2 The Study
The previous section showed what we already know about the topics developed in this 
study. It showed also what we still need to know. We do not yet know how decentralisation, 
which strengthened regional and local politicians, has shaped and influenced the consolidation 
of democracy, the political system and the political agenda. We do not know either how 
decentralisation has affected the federation, intergovernmental relations and its impact upon 
policy results.
Based on the puzzle of why a country facing many unresolved issues that needed to 
be tackled nationwide chose to decentralise financial and political resources, this study thus 
enquires into:
(1) How and why the decision to decentralise political power and financial
resources was taken; and
(2) Whether the present decentralisation under democratic rule changed the
allocation of public expenditure at sub-national level, especially to education.
Detailed research questions are as follows:
(i) why did decentralisation occur to such an extent in Brazil?
13 At the beginning of the book he edited about federalism in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, Cannagnani (1993) 
emphasised die lack of knowledge about the different forms that federalism has assumed in Latin America after 
almost 200 years of existence. He suggested that the federal trends in hose three countries expressed a tension 
between localism and the centralisation of power. A different view was earlier espoused by Elazar (1972: 79), who 
saw Latin American federalism as the 'primary modem manifestation of feudalistic federalism with jefes and 
caudillos replacing counts and dukes'.
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(ii) was decentralisation treated as a political or an economic issue (or both)?
(iii) what is the role played by state and local politicians in democratic consolidation?
(iv) how are fiscal austerity and decentralisation reconciled?
(v) has decentralisation changed the ways in which regional and local political elites
operate?
By analysing the decision to decentralise and its results at the sub-national level, the 
study embodies both an upstream and a downstream approach. The upstream approach 
analyses the decision-making process in decentralisation. The downstream approach 
investigates the results of decentralisation and redemocratisation at the sub-national leveL The 
latter approach is based on the assumption that decentralisation and redemocratisation would 
change the allocation of revenues at the sub-national level, especially to education. The reason 
for choosing education is twofold. First, in both developed and developing countries there 
is a recognition of the major role education plays in the development process. In developing 
countries education is seen as a way to build citizenship, to promote social mobility, and as 
essential to the upgrading of the country's position in the international market. Second, in 
Brazil, access to good education is seen as an indicator of a democratic society; thus 
improvements on education and redemocratisation became an 'elective affinity 14.
This study discusses decentralisation and redemocratisation as issues affecting power 
relations and introducing new conflicts not only to intergovernmental relations and to the 
federation but also to the distribution of power and goods amongst different groups in society. 
The mam issue addressed is whether decentralisation and redemocratisation have changed the 
way local and regional goods (political and material) and services are distributed amongst 
different groups and whether they have changed political practices. The study argues that 
decentralisation fosters democracy but its impacts on policy results have so far been limited. 
Furthermore, although decentralisation and redemocratisation may bring about a 
fragmentation of power, they may not disintegrate old political coalitions or change the 
allocation of public resources. Thus, this research suggests that at the national level 
decentralisation and redemocratisation have led the country towards what this study calls a 
'paralysed competitive arena', in which decisions and players cancel each other out. Their
14 As defined by die Oxford Dictionary 'elective affinity means 'a tendency to act on or be concerned with some 
things rather than others'.
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effects on the federal system have brought about what this study refers to as a 'peripheralised 
federalism'/in which sub-national issues prevail over national ones.
At the sub-national level this research argues that decentralisation and 
redemocratisation have caused diversity in the way the political system operated. At the state 
level the political system has developed mechanisms to counterbalance the country's 
fragmented polity. On the allocation of revenues this study argues that changes in the political 
regime and in the distribution of political and financial resources were not necessarily followed 
by more expenditure on education. At the local level the municipalities have little room for 
the improvement of social services, either because they are financially dependent on other 
institutions or because they shelter the very poor who have priorities other than education. 
State clientelism is one element cementing the political system at the three levels of 
government and delaying the effects of political change on public policies. The Constituent 
National Assembly, where the decision to decentralise was taken, reflected the lack of a social 
consensus on what was to be achieved by decentralisation.
The main argument developed throughout this study is, in a nutshell: since
redemocratisation there has been an enduring tension between national and sub-national 
interests, with the latter prevailing without the relinquishing of the former. This tension has 
created a 'peripheralised federalism’ and a 'paralysed competitive arena1. Nevertheless, national 
issues polarise the political agenda, and policy results at the sub-national level are generally 
ignored.
This research provides a step forward in filling four gaps in political-science and 
pubfic-admmistration works on contemporary Brazil First, it deepens the understanding as 
to how and why Brazil became such a decentralised nation. Second, it links the analysis of 
political and financial resources. Third, it highlights differences between levels of government 
in their experiences with decentralisation. Fourth, through three case studies the research 
investigates the impact of political and financial decentralisation on political arrangements and 
on education expenditure.
The method developed throughout the study is empirical, drawing lessons from a 
unique experiment in simultaneously reconciling redemocratisation and decentralisation within 
a new federalist experiment. The study relies on the foundations of three theoretical 
frameworks to explain the data and the findings beyond the events from which they were 
derived. Therefore, a theoretical review of intergovernmental relations, decentralisation and
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federalism is presented in the following section.
1.3 State of the Art
Federal political systems are based on political and social theories of federalism. The 
existence of a federal system implies some degree of co-operation between the federal 
government and the governments of the member units or the component units of the 
federation. This is why intergovernmental relations and the degree of decentralisation between 
governmental units are of crucial importance for a better understanding of how a federal 
system works in practice. Hence political-science and public-administration literatures has 
become interested not only in theories of federalism and their application to constitutions and 
legislation, but also with how federal systems actually operate. Of particular importance is 
how central and sub-national levels of governance relate to each other, how power, financial 
resources and responsibilities are shared, how conflict and disputes are resolved, and to what 
extent central and sub-national governments operate in the national interest in the tackling of 
problems.
Discussions on federalism, decentralisation and intergovernmental relations within a 
federation are often troubled by problems of definition. These difficulties will be discussed 
below. The concept of federalism is distinguished from the concepts of intergovernmental 
relations and of decentralisation because: (i) it encompasses more than the relationship 
between governmental units in a federal system by involving principles about those 
relationships as well as the distribution of power; and (ii) although federalism is usually 
accompanied by decentralisation, that is, substantial autonomy for members of the federation, 
it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for decentralisation 15. Furthermore, 
federalism is concerned with broader questions not usually dealt with by frameworks of 
intergovernmental relations and decentralisation, especially in the case of how federal 
principles influence political and financial arrangements. The clarification of the distinctions 
between those three concepts allows this study to build up its support on a three-tier structure 
based on the theoretical foundations of those three topics.
1.3.1 Intergovernmental Relations (IGR)
13 This view is advocated by Lijphart (1984) but not by Elazar (1979: 14) who prefers the expression 
'contractual non-centralisation' on the grounds that decentralisation implies the existence of a central government 
that can decentralise or recentralise as it desires. Lijphart (1984: 176) contested Elazar’s term on the grounds that 
it is synonymous with the federal principle of a guaranteed central-regional division of power which implies that 
the component units cannot be taken away without their consent.
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The emergence of the nation-state as a dominant feature of political and economic life 
has expanded the role of governments and increased concerns regarding the distribution of 
governmental power. Therefore, intergovernmental relations have become a separate field of 
research, both in federal and in unitary countries. In federal countries the main question with 
which intergovernmental studies are concerned is: how do central and sub-national 
governments work to solve shared problems? Throughout this century highly complex sets 
of machinery and of linkages in intergovernmental relations have been developed 16. However, 
most of the theoretical contributions about IGR in federal countries are based on the 
experiences of the three most studied federations, the USA, Canada and Australia, being, 
therefore, an Anglo-Saxon view of the issue. Furthermore, a great number of studies have 
tended to treat IGR as related to service delivery, financial stringencies and regulatory 
measures, as suggested by Wright (1990: 154-5).
There are no great conflicts in the concept of intergovernmental relations, as opposed 
to the unfinished (and highly ideological) discussion around the concept of local 
government17. IGR is the study of relationships between different levels of government. This 
apparently simple definition hides a much-disputed struggle between several branches of the 
social sciences on how to approach IGR studies. Smith (1985: 91-8) summarised the 
advantages of each approach as follows. First, the historical-legal approach focuses on 
institutional and procedural changes which may be made to alter the distribution of power 
between levels of government. Second, the community-politics approach emphasises that 
changes in IGR may be neutralised by their political and economic contexts. Third, 
interorganisational studies call attention to the multi-dimensional nature of IGR and the power 
resources which can be utilised when governments interact. Smith (1985: 98) has provided 
a sharp criticism of each of these approaches, although signalling their merits. The problem 
with studies based on these approaches is that they tend to isolate conflicts between levels of 
government from other political conflicts in society. Hence Smith (1985: 98) suggested that 
a study of IGR should be placed within a framework of conflicting interests and that
Intergovernmental relations will then reflect alliances between national and local political
interests which cause conflict within, as well as between, levels o f government.
16 See Dunleavy (1980b), Jones (1979) and Rhodes (1980).
17 For a review of the theories of local politics and local government, see Stoker (1988).
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Calls for the need for a theoretical shift in the political science approach to IGR have 
been made to overcome what Elazar (1987a) saw as an obsolete theoretical orientation, 
namely the view of IGR from the logic of the centre-periphery or pyramidal models. He called 
for a new model able to incorporate discussion of the likely constituent elements of the 
federation and whether they would be primarily administrative vehicles or polities. Elazar 
(1987a: 19) argued that as the constituent units of modem states become more powerful 
politically the line between 'sovereign' and sub-national polities becomes blurred. Hence this 
study has developed the interpretation of the data and findings in its IGR dimension in line 
with the propositions of Smith (1985) and Elazar (1987a). By doing so this study argues that, 
as is tme of IGR everywhere, a pattern emerges whereby groups with less power and 
resources are pitted against groups struggling to upgrade their position 18. However, this game 
is not dichotomic but rather a continuum Following these theoretical formulations, the 
understanding of how conflicts are channelled become more relevant to this study's 
development than the investigation of administrative or legal arrangements.
Given the existence in countries like Brazil of a triple federalism, the same framework 
of analysis cannot always be applied to the states and the municipalities 19. Although the 
frameworks of Smith and Elazar are broad enough to encompass the three territorial units of 
governance, we still need to narrow the search to theoretical formulations able to capture the 
differences between sub-national units in countries where the municipalities are not a creation 
of the states and are not under their subordination 20. Therefore, there are some peculiarities 
which distinguish, in theoretical terms, IGR when related to the states from those related to 
the municipalities in some federal countries 21. Moreover, some federal countries, such as
18 Gagnon (1993: 21) pointed out that the idea too often expressed, especially in North-American literature, 
that federalism pits government against government should be reconsidered. However, the study argues that for 
IGR the idea is valid and it is one of the bases of the distinction between federalism and IGR
19 Triple federalism is an expression coined by Lordello de Mello to label Brazilian federalism, given the 
salience of the sub-national units, especially the municipalities, in the federation.
20 In the USA and in Germany there is a general agreement that local government is subordinate to the state 
as local government in a unitary system is subordinate to the national government For the USA case, see the 
United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1982) and for Germany see Gunlicks 
(1986).
21 Stenberg (1994:135) noted that because the states are the middle tier in the federal system, they experience 
vertical and horizontal pressures and are eyed by both the local and the federal governments as a way out of their 
own problems.
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post-1988 Brazil and Canada since 1982 (Marshall, 1988), have seen an unprecedentedly 
political, financial and constitutional strength in their states, which calls for a need to develop 
sharper frameworks of analysis to distinguish the role of the states from that of the 
municipalities.
Two different theoretical approaches are thus used in this study concerning its IGR 
dimension. For the states' role in IGR the theoretical foundation comes from the view of IGR 
as a combination of structure and process, which are continually interacting (Anton, 1989: 
230). Furthermore, as Chapman (1993: 71) developed the approach,
these patterns o f  interaction become quasi-institutional, legitim ated by use or sometimes by  
legislation or executive fia t. The actors are continuously involved in mutual transfers 
creating thereby an additional se t o f  structures and  processes, extra-constitutional and, in 
many cases, extra-parliamentary. These processes are policy-oriented and  problem-centred, 
arising  a t specific times fro m  particular issues, y e t  remaining, in one guise o f  another, to 
establish another pa ttern  o f  IGR.
What follows from the quotation above is that federations are conflict-ridden. However the
resolution of conflicts does not imply that solutions rest on a rational allocation of
responsibilities, of revenues, or of merely adversarially-based intergovernmental relations. As
Chapman (1993: 76) put it, conflicts should not be seen as simply a national and sub-national
conflict but as an entanglement across those systems.
For the role of the municipalities in IGR the study follows the same direction as that
suggested above, but sharpens the particular position of the municipalities by relying on Page's
(1991) concept of political localism and centralism Political localism is defined by Page
... as the influence that local po litica l elites have in national decision-m aking arenas in so  
f a r  as these affect the locality, (p. 42)
Political localism assumes two forms: (i) direct relationship with national politicians and 
officials; and (ii) the indirect influence of collective, usually national, organisations. The 
greater the influence of local interests, the greater the degree of political localism Brazilian 
municipalities would be closer to what Page found to be the mainstream pattern in Southern 
European countries (Italy, Spain and France) which enjoy a high degree of political 
localism 22.
22 Page developed two dimensions as a way to approach comparative studies in unitary countries: legal and 
political localism and centralism, following a framework earlier suggested by Mackenzie (1954). He considered 
it inappropriate to apply this approach to federal systems because of the existence of constitutionally guaranteed 
autonomy, given that his framework concedes local government as being subordinate. This study argues, however,
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One aspect of this study could not be solved by the above-mentioned theoretical 
approaches to IGR. The literature on IGR tends to use the word 'influence' when referring 
to the mechanisms used by levels of government in their IGR. The study has opted to use the 
word 'influence' but also the word Veto' when referring to post-1988 Brazil, and to players 
in the decision-making process as Veto players'. 'Veto power1 and Veto players' are used after 
Tsebelis's (1993: 6) development of the concept which stems from the idea of'checks and 
balances' in the North-American constitution. Veto player1, in Tsebelis words, is an individual 
or collective actor whose agreement is required for a policy decision. The reason for this 
choice is that the structures and processes of IGR are beginning to be rebuilt in Brazil to cope 
with the relative novelty of redemocratisation, decentralisation and the weighted role of sub­
national governments in the federation. Therefore structures and processes are interwoven and 
entangled but mechanisms based on 'influence' have not yet frilly emerged. The Brazilian 
federal government is more likely to opt for open confrontation, although compromising when 
Veto players' come to the fore, leaving the sub-national units and their parliamentary 
representatives in a position more of Veto' than of'influence'.
1.3.2 Decentralisation
Although decentralisation policies are currently being implemented in a number of 
countries, the concept of decentralisation is vague since it is used in a number of different 
ways and in different contexts (Conyers, 1987; Fesler, 1965). As Samoff (1990) has pointed 
out, while some authors are primarily concerned with administrative deconcentration, as a 
means of improving government performance and thus of implementing development 
programmes, for others the primary concern is with political decentralisation involving a more 
effective transfer of decision-making authority to the previously under-represented grass roots 
groups. The view of decentralisation as a merely administrative process has been widely 
challenged by the political science literature. Even in unitary states, on which Smith's (1985) 
influential book is based, it has been recognised that
It might he conventional to consider decentralization as an administrative concept, and  even 
evaluate it and discuss change as i f  it is a  matter to be settled  by technical arguments about 
optimum areas, administrative efficiency and m anagerial perform ance. B ut the outcomes in 
the fo rm  o f  working federations or systems o f  regional and  local governm ent are the result 
o f  po litica l forces in conflicts (Smith, 1985: 201).
that Page's cautions are adequate to only one dimension of his framework, namely, the legal, but the political 
dimension can be properly applied in federal countries.
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Decentralisation has become a fashionable goaL It is not difficult to explain the reasons 
for its popularity. As Cuerbelo, cited by Slater (1989), has pointed out,
The popularity o f  the concept o f  decentralization can be linked to a  combination o f  elements - 
its am biguity, its capacity to conceal more than it reveals, its identification with long- 
established sentiments, its forcib le  justification fro m  purely  technocratic po ints o f  view and  
the po litica l instrum entality that it potentia lly engenders.
Furthermore, the excessive power of central governments became a target for both the left and 
the right of the political spectrum. Another reason for the popularity of the concept is that 
despite the recognition that the term 'decentralisation' disguises a complex and highly varied 
set of phenomena, it is in the name of decentralisation that current changes in constitutional, 
financial and intergovernmental relations are taking place.
The literature on decentralisation is vast and deals with different aspects of 
decentralisation, given the looseness of the concept. This broadness and looseness make a 
comprehensive review difficult and calls for concentration on perspectives closer to this 
study’s approach to decentralisation as an attempt to develop a sharper definition of the 
concept. Decentralisation is a polysemic concept and can be implemented in different ways. 
Decentralisation has different meanings according to ideologies (Slater, 1989; Smith, 1985) 
and a wide appeal regardless of ideology or political theory (Fumiss, 1974). Decentralisation 
implies discussion of power relations and conflicts (Pickvance and Preteceille, 1991). In the 
Third World decentralisation is a concept with an ideological attraction (Smith, 1985), 
especially as a reaction against processes promoting centralisation. The latter concept is more 
likely to be found in Latin America but not for reasons usually mentioned in the literature, e.g. 
ethnic or religious conflicts or territorial disaggregation.
The shift of power from central government by means of decentralisation has been 
advocated extensively as a way to strengthen local government. Decentralisation has an 
economic-political meaning, Le. the location of economic decisions, encompassing levels of 
government, the capitalist class as a role, and consumers (Wolman, 1990: 29). Therefore, to 
talk about decentralisation in general terms does not mean much. It is important to analyse 
the context in which it happens.
There are several problems in the theoretical formulation of decentralisation. First, 
analytical frameworks have tended to focus on the slogan 'think globally, act locally1 (Stren,
1992), and, therefore, have ignored the importance of other institutions in shaping politics and
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policies. They focus attention on two opposite domains: the international and the local This 
polarisation tends to ignore a whole range of problems which remain under the political 
domain of other spheres, such as the states. Focusing on the states allows the understanding 
of processes which remain too general at the national level or too specific at the local level 
The lack of integration of all the levels of government prevents the literature from addressing 
sharper questions on policy results under decentralised regimes23. Second, decentralisation 
has often meant, especially in European and North-American literature, a redirection to 
markets and to local actors (Bennett, 1990), thus narrowing its theoretical formulations to a 
neo-liberal view.
Third, because theoretical formulations of decentralisation outside the literature on 
development have been made taking into account the realities of the so-called industrialised 
countries, their bases are difficult to apply to developing countries24. Marxist analysis, for 
instance, which explains centralisation and decentralisation as corresponding to the global 
trends of capitalist development, has been proved inadequate, given that diverging trends are 
not so clearly linked to current political regimes. One example is that both France and the 
USA have recently favoured decentralisation, whereas Britain has taken the path of 
centralisation (Preteceille, 1991: 123). For the opposite theory, the public choice, 
decentralisation is seen as being effective in limiting the ability of government officials to over­
supply outputs. Therefore, the most important institutional forms are local government 
systems and federalist arrangements (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 120). The basis for the 
public choice preference for decentralisation Hes in the citizens' or consumers' 'exit' option, Le. 
if a municipality does not fulfil their needs, they move to an area where their preferences are 
satisfied. These two approaches to decentralisation are difficult to apply in developing 
countries, let alone the problems caused by the rigidity of their ideological foundations. The 
former because of the prominent role the State has always played in Third World countries 
and because, as Mouzelis (1986) pointed out, there is no Marxist theory of Third World
23 In the USA it is recognised that the states are the less studied institution, both theoretically and empirically 
(Osborne, 1988; Stenberg, 1985).
24 A Brazilian scholar Vieira (1967) outlined some assumptions for a decentralisation theoiy in an attempt to 
incorporate the characteristics of developing countries to theories developed in the industrialised nations. Those 
outlines, however, although dealing with the phenomenon as a continuum, were too deterministic, because they 
were based on the assumption that the country's environment was die main element in the facilitation or 
prevention of decentralisation.
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politics, given that the theory does not consider the role of political clientelism in shaping the 
political system. The latter because Third World citizens, or poor citizens anywhere, are not 
likely to have the freedom to choose residences on the basis of anything other than 
employment. Third World studies of migration always point to the strength of employment 
in decision-making concerning the migration target.
Decentralisation refers also to two other theoretical concepts: governance and 
development. Within the concept of governance, decentralisation has a long tradition. It is 
concerned with the extent to which power and authority should be dispersed through the 
geographical hierarchy of the State, and the institutions and processes through which such 
dispersal occurs. Within the concept of governance, decentralisation is generally associated 
with local government. As Smith (1985) has pointed out, many of the arguments for 
decentralisation follow the liberal argument in favour of democratic local government, which 
is claimed to be good not only for national democracy but also in providing benefits at the 
local levels. It is assumed that institutions under local government will be democratic and 
ensure political equality, and be accountable as well as responsive. From this approach 
decentralisation policies are usually presented and debated in the technical language of 
administrative efficiency or constitutional principles, whereas they represent political 
objectives that are rarely made explicit.
Decentralisation has become the central focus of the literature on development. It has 
grown since the 1970s, focusing on decentralisation as part of the reduction of the role of the 
State in Third World countries. Rondinelli and Cheema (1983) and Rondinelli et al. (1989) 
are the most quoted 25. By and large the development literature is based on the liberal 
normative assumptions of decentralisation, and the focus is on decentralisation as a tool for 
development. It is common to distinguish between different forms of decentralisation, namely 
deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatisation (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983). The 
emphasis on decentralisation in the development debate is linked to the broadening of the 
concept of development beyond economic growth to comprise growth-with-equity and 
emphasising the basic needs of the poor.
At a theoretical level several problems not addressed by the literature of development
25 Discussions about the role of decentralisation for Third World countries have generated heated debates 
between Rondinelli (1990) and Slater (1990).
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can be raised. First, for almost every principle of decentralisation, one can find an equally 
plausible contradictory principle. Second, the advantages and limitations are seldom discussed, 
and rationales or promises of decentralisation are usually put forward in normative terms 
without relating them to the broader political and economic context, let alone the political 
objectives, thus depoliticising the debate. Third, the language used in the literature is that of 
'efficiency1, 'effectiveness' and 'control', bringing two additional limitations: (i) it implicitly 
suggests that centralised States are not 'efficient' and/or 'effective' and (ii) it treats 
decentralisation as a policy granted from central to sub-national units. Fourth, the literature 
ignores intermediate levels of government and centres on the relationship between central and 
local government26. Fifth, a theory of development has to explain not only the reasons for 
the development of countries but also the reasons for their under-development. Sixth, it has 
been generally recognised that there are no guarantees that benefits will be distributed 
equitably by decentralised structures (Prudhomme, 1994; Slater, 1989; and Smith, 1985).
A review of the literature on decentralisation shows the difficulties in finding limits to 
bound the concept of decentralisation. Some say it involves discussion of theories of the State 
(Smith, 1985), others that it involves the concepts of politics, power and space (Slater, 1989), 
about popular participation and local democracy (Borja, 1987), and about the democratisation 
of service delivery (Hoggett and Hambleton, 1987). How to measure decentralisation is 
considered to be a bottleneck (Smith, 1985, Slater, 1989, Levin, 1991).
Current literature on decentralisation is likely to be based on the experiences of two 
analytical models. There are considerable scholarly works which focus on the USA 
experience, especially since the Reagan administration, and on Canada, which emphasise the 
administrative and the financial aspects of decentralisation, of federalism and of 
intergovernmental relations, and are especially concerned with service delivery (Brown-John, 
1988) 21. A second approach is taken by the scholarly works based on the French experience 
of the 1980s which promoted a wide decentralisation programme within a unitary state, with 
its official proclamation of 'taking power from the state and giving it back to the citizen'
“ Harris's (1983) discussion on Latin American countries, although citing the Brazilian experience, does not 
make a single reference to die states or the peculiarities of centralisation and decentralisation in federal countries.
27 Brown-John (1988: 1) begins the book he edited by defining power within the context of 
centralisation/decentralisation as 'the constitutional and practical capacity to deliver public goods and services'.
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(Preteceille, 1991: 123) 28. The French debate emphasises the right-left axis of the topic and 
encompasses decentralisation in the context of the restructuring of the State 29. These two 
approaches to decentralisation, although contributing to the broadening of our knowledge of 
the topic, are too centred on the experiences of the above-mentioned countries in which the 
decision to decentralise was taken by the centre.
1.3.2.1 Decentralisation as a Political Process
Decentralisation in this study is seen through three dimensions: (i) in how 
decentralisation is set in the political agenda; (ii) through its decision-making process; and (iii) 
in how it affects the allocation of public expenditure at the sub-national leveL Hence 
decentralisation is not viewed through its administrative or economic dimension, nor as 
something granted from above, nor as a matter of service delivery. There is no need to escape 
politics, to rationalise the discussion and practice. Furthermore, we need to know why 
decentralisation has generally promised more than it has delivered, both in the political system 
and in policy results.
Thus, this study limits the scope of its theoretical discussion of decentralisation by 
following its upstream and downstream approaches. It pursues two main aspects of 
decentralisation. First, intergovernmental, or a decentralisation of governance and power from 
the federal to sub-national level Second, the allocation of resources to a sub-national level. 
This approach may shed light on the country’s power structure and on the quota of power 
enjoyed by each group and each level of government. Both aspects of decentralisation can 
provide a sharper definition of political decentralisation, which implies that sub-national units 
of government become part of the decision-making process both at the national and sub- 
national levels, either by deciding on policies affecting their jurisdiction or by vetoing national 
policies. This definition implies that centralisation-decentralisation is a continuum rather than 
a dichotomy.
As mentioned above, the need for such an approach is based on the assumption that
28 Other European unitaiy countries, such as Italy, Spain, Holland and Belgium, have adopted several 
decentralised measures. For a comprehensive analysis of decentralisation in all European countries, see Debbasch 
(1981).
29 The literature developed both theoretically and empirically by the French is vast. For a historical analysis, 
see Frege (1986) and Schmidt (1990); for details of the reform and its first consequences, see Vie (1982); for a 
discussion on the consequences of die reform for local power, see Terrazzoni (1987); for the juridical implications, 
see Aubry (1992); and for the reform as part of a broad urban reform, see Preteceille (1988).
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decentralisation affects power relations and introduces new conflicts both in
intergovernmental relations and in the distribution of power and goods to different groups in
society. In theoretical terms the main issues to address when discussing decentralisation rest
on the following questions: (i) how and why the decision was taken; (ii) whether it changes
the way local and regional goods (political or material) and services are distributed between
different groups; and (iii) whether decentralisation has changed political practices.
It might seem paradoxical to discuss decentralisation while searching for a pattern in
policy results, given that the very aim of decentralisation is to guarantee sub-national units
room to decide outcomes and to reduce central control of outputs and results.
Decentralisation allows priorities to be decided away from the centre. The paradox is resolved
by bringing back this study's initial puzzle, namely, the search to answer the question as to
what makes countries facing issues that need to be tackled nationwide choose to decentralise.
Hence this study has developed an interpretation of the data and findings in its
decentralisation dimension partially relying on Grindle and Thomas's (1991) analytical
framework. They centred their framework on the role of decision makers, the choices they
make, and the factors that influence those choices. They defined their framework as:
D ecision  makers are no t sim ply fo rced  by events, interest group pressures, or external 
agencies to make particular choices. Moreover, solutions to any given se t o f  po licy problem s 
are no t obvious because the impact o f  policy cannot always be known in advance, because 
the logic o f  economics and  the logic o f  politics frequen tly  do no t coincide, and  because real 
costs are imposed on specific groups in society when policies and  institutions are altered. A ll 
po licy  choices thus involve uncertainty and  r isk  I f  these assertions are valid, and  i f  po licy  
elites are relevant to defining the content o fpublic-policy - i.e., i f  they are no t sim ply fo rced  
to act in predetermined ways or have no choice but to accept certain courses o f  action  - then 
die dilemmas and choices they confront are critical to understanding po licy  change. (Grindle 
and Thomas, 1991:2).
Grindle and Thomas argued that in the literature spanning political science, political 
economy and policy science, a large number of questions about processes of change remain 
unanswered, in particular, how agenda setting, decision making and implementation occur. 
Thus, there is little theory to explain how issues of reform come to the attention of decision 
makers and how the reform of policies and institutional arrangements becomes part of the 
agenda. They argued that the factors which affect decisions to whether or not policies will be 
pursued, altered, reversed, or sustained, are generally left unexplained, because 
implementation is often considered to be a matter of effective administration, not of political 
processes.
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Thus, this study partially relies on Grindle and Thomas's theoretical framework by 
incorporating the following approaches to decentralisation. First, decentralisation- 
centralisation is seen within the context of institutional reform brought about by changes in 
the political regime. In the Brazilian case decentralisation was adopted as a result of 
redemocratisation and as a way of legitimising a new political regime. It was intended to 
redress perceived errors in previous and existing policy and in institutional arrangements, 
particularly those within the federation. Second, instances of the Brazilian decentralisation 
reform are taken as the unit of analysis, and the interrelated processes of agenda setting, 
policy making and implementation are seen as a critical arena for understanding the factors 
that can account for how, why, and when policy and institutional changes occur. Third, 
Grindle and Thomas's analytical framework assumes decision makers account for reform, but 
that does not isolate them from influences that originate outside the centre of the political 
arena where the decision is taken. Fourth, the characteristics of particular reforms determine 
the type of conflict and opposition that surround the decisions and their implementation.
However, Grindle and Thomas's framework relies on some assumptions that do not 
conform with this study's approach. Instead of seeing those differences as a limitation, this 
study argues that the applicability of Grindle and Thomas's model can be tested and expanded 
by this research's approach. The differences between the two approaches are as follows. First, 
Grindle and Thomas built their framework by analysing the role of policy elites (decision 
makers and policy managers) within government. Their case studies of seven developing 
countries are reported from inside government decision-making processes. This study, on the 
contrary, analyses a country where the decision to adopt a new policy, namely 
decentralisation, was not taken within government, but outside it, i.e. in Congress during a 
constituent assembly. Therefore, in this study parliamentarians were the decision makers and 
became the policy elite referred to by Grindle and Thomas.
Second, Grindle and Thomas's approach, although recognising the influence exerted 
over policy elites by social pressures and interests, suggests that in many developing countries 
those interests and pressures are not well organised or effective in setting public agendas. The 
Brazilian case shows the opposite, Le. how pressures and interests coming from those who 
would be the main beneficiaries of the decision to decentralise were highly organised, either 
in their political domain (governors and mayors' associations) or in their technical domain 
(think-tanks, private organisations and practitioners).
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Third, Grindle and Thomas's model suggests that the skills, values and experiences of 
policy elites shape perceptions of which problems need to be addressed, and how they should 
be addressed. At this point we face a problem of terminology: if we call Brazilian constitution- 
makers the policy elite who took the decision to decentralise, then the assumption is valid, 
given the high number of politicians who had previous experience either in sub-national 
political positions or as experts in fiscal matters. But if we consider policy elites as those non­
elected individuals who also participated in the decision to decentralise (think-tanks, private 
organisations and practitioners), then their skills were surpassed by the politicians' view of 
how far decentralisation should go.
Fourth, the model suggests that
no ta b ly  absent in m ost discussions o f  po licy  making in developing countries are elected  
representatives (Grindle and Thomas, 1991: 62).
This was not the case in this study's analysis, given that the decision making and details of 
how decentralisation was to work were dealt with by elected representatives. Maybe this 
feature is the most important contribution of the Brazilian case to Grindle and Thomas's model 
and to the theories of decentralisation in general: in the case studied the decision to 
decentralise was taken by elected representatives and by sub-national politicians and not by 
the central government. Furthermore, the decentralisation of political and financial power 
became constitutionally guaranteed.
1.3.3 Federalism
The literature on federalism faces two initial obstacles: (i) the need to distinguish 
federalism from federation; and (ii) disputes around the essential characteristics of a federal 
State. In its broadest sense the word federalism refers to the linking of people and institutions 
by mutual consent for a specific purpose, without the sacrifice of their individual identities 
(Harman, 1992: 337). Federalism was also defined by Burgess (1993a: 8) as a value concept, 
the recommendation and the promotion of support for federation. Federation, as defined by 
King (1982: 77),
is an institutional arrangement, taking the fo rm  o f  a  sovereign state, a n d  distinguishedfrom  
o th er  su ch  states by the fa c t  that its central governm ent incorporates regional units in its 
decision procedure on som e constitutionally entrenched basis.
Therefore, the logic of federations is federalism, which is the ideological perception of what 
follows from federalising. More than a semantic difference, the need to distinguish federation
37
and federalism is important, given (i) the enormous variety in the practice of federal principles 
within each federation and (ii) the emergence of forms of federalism in countries and in 
institutions which are not a federation - Belgium and the European Community are the most 
debated examples. Federalism, as a political device, can be viewed more narrowly as a form 
of organisation in which power is dispersed as a means of safeguarding individual and local 
liberties, as defined by Harman (1992: 337).
The second obstacle in discussing federalism comes from a much-disputed debate on 
its essential characteristics. Stewart (1984) mentioned that there are 497 literal as well as 
figurative representations of federalism The most known characteristics are those developed 
after Elazar's (1984) classical definition of federalism as 'self-rule through shared rule', which, 
in the words of Hawkins (1991: 72), sets down a fundamental operational principle of 
American federalism and constitutional-institutional design. Therefore, most of the 
characteristics of federalism have been developed through Elazar’s two dimensions: 
constitutional design and power-sharing, being largely based on the North-American 
experience. Although recognising this influence as a limitation, the study relies on Duchacek's 
(1987: 192) effort to summarise the essential features of federalism based on several 
contributions from specialists. According to Duchacek's summary, federalism contains two 
basic elements:
... p o litica l authority is territorially divided between two autonomous sets o f  separate  
ju r isd ic tio n s , one national and the other provincial, which both operate directly upon the 
people. Second, the existence o f  a single, indivisible ye t com posite fe d e ra l nation is 
sim ultaneously asserted.
Despite presenting limitations, such as the exclusion of countries which have opted for a triple 
federalism, because the feature is based on the North-American model, and because of the 
over-emphasising of the territorial feature of the federation, Duchacek's definition and Elazar's 
concept of federalism are the starting points to guide the discussion30.
For this study's purpose, three dimensions of federalism are further developed: (i) the 
territorial basis of federalism; (ii) the relationship between federalism and the concept of 
consociational democracy, which centres on what Frognier (1982: 190) has called the
30 This North-American view of federalism has its critics. Gagnon (1993: 16) has suggested that North- 
American and Canadian scholars tend to view federalism in a hierarchical way, with the central government 
controlling the principal levers of power, relegating the provinces to an auxiliary role without much clout A good 
example of an empirical work which views federalism more as a bargaining and less as a hierarchical 
manifestation is Liebschutz's (1991) study on the state of New York.
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'conflict-pacification problem'; and (iii) federalism as a political ideology. These three
dimensions will be discussed in this section, introducing the features of the Brazilian case.
The territorial dimension deals with the formal distribution of power in the federations
within institutional arrangements 'to fulfil the need to ensure a flexible balance between the
obvious need for unity (and direction) and the equally obvious need to preserve diversity (and
participation)' as Duchacek (1987: 17) put it. The need to investigate the territorial dimension
of federalism arises from the fact that federalism does not evolve in a void. The dynamics of
political economy, party politics and political culture should be added to other territorial
manifestations of federalism such as power-sharing within the Legislature and between levels
of government, the role of the Judiciary, the allocation of fiscal revenues and responsibilities
and the constitutional guarantees of the federation's component units. All these aspects should
be seen in the constitutional design but also in operational practice, and, most of all, we should
question what was behind the definition of the way the federation was to work, Le. which
interests, values and pacts prevailed when changes occurred in the federation. These aspects
are considered throughout this study.
The second dimension is the relationship between federalism and consociational
democracy. Both concepts share several common characteristics because they are designed
as means of associating potentially conflicting entities in a political whole. The relationship
between federalism and consociational democracy is particularly important for this study's
development because, as pointed out by Frognier (1982: 211),
P roblem s crea ted  by a  fed era l reform in a consocialionalist state can be view ed as a 
struggle, not only between new elites and consociational ones, bu t also separately within the 
latter.
For this study, the struggle referred to by Frognier goes beyond the boundaries of a federal 
reform to encompass an entire constitutional reform Moreover, the struggle among elites is 
amplified by the origin of some reforms, such as those destined to change political regimes 
without rupture like that of BraziL
At this point one must introduce some features of the Brazilian federation since 
redemocratisation. This study follows the avenue opened by Lamounier (1993). He argued 
that most analysts of Brazilian political history would react with disbelief at the suggestion 
that the country's institutional structure has anything similar to those of the consociational 
democracies as defined by Lijphart (1984), to which the hyper-developed Switzerland,
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Belgium and Holland belong. Lamounier (1993: 118) listed the reasons why some can claim 
as absurd that Brazil post-1988 could have become a consociational democracy: a country 
with two long dictatorial regimes, in which the distribution of wealth is one of the worst in 
the world, and a nation deep rooted in a patriarchal society. At the same time, the 
consociational model of democracy was a response to the division of society along ethnic, 
linguistic, and religious cleavages, which have never been important in Brazil's political 
agenda. Lamounier claimed, however, that one of the axes of the Brazilian political system 
has become excessively consociational, which he viewed, at least when he wrote his article, 
with pessimism because of the lack of adequate counterweights to deal with the ensuing 
fragmentation and blockades.
On the other hand, Lamounier gave reasons for his placing Brazil closer to the 
understanding of democracy as a system which blocks the power of the majority (the 
consociational model) than to the opposite concept, the majoritarian model, more concerned 
with identifying an electorally authorised majority capable of implementing a governing 
programme. IBs reasons are as follows: since the 1930s Brazil has had a system of 
proportional representation; a multi-party system from which ministries are selected; the 
federative regime; a bicameral system in which both houses of Congress are strong; and a rigid 
and detailed Constitution. Lamounier (1993: 124) argued that the 1988 Constitution 
unequivocally reinforced the consociational style, in which stimulated pluralism and diluted 
power were seen to be intrinsically good. Lamounier’s way of coping with what he considered 
the excessive consociational character of the representative sub-system, comprising the 
electoral process, the party structure, certain aspects of the internal organisation of Congress 
and the existent federative organisation was the adoption of the parliamentary system 
Without it, affirmed Lamounier, those features become dangerous from the perspective of 
govemability.
This study relies partially on Lamounier's observations about the similarities of the 
present Brazilian political structure with the consociational model This study also agrees with 
his diagnosis of the problems which such a feature has brought to the decision-making 
process. The disagreement with Lamouniefs view lies in his solution, parliamentarianism, and 
on his pessimistic view of future developments of such features. The problems listed by 
Lamounier, which this study refers to as bringing about a 'paralysed competitive arena', are 
not seen as a feature of the entire political system The reason for this disagreement lies in the
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fact that the findings in the case studies discussed in this research suggest that the 'paralysed
competitive arena' is not a feature of the entire political system, but is restricted to the federal
government. Moreover, the existence of a 'paralysed competitive arena' is not credited to the
institutional features of the Brazilian political system but rather to (i) the number of problems
inherited by the federal government when the military regime came to an end; and (ii) the lack
of a national project to address social, economic and financial constraints31.
The third dimension to be introduced is the concept of federalism as a political
ideology. This concept was developed by Burgess (1993b) filling a gap in the federalism
literature, more concerned with the practicalities of territorial and governmental arrangements.
Burgess (1993b: 104) defined political ideology for the purpose of his argument as Values,
attitudes, beliefs and interests which combine to furnish action with purpose and commitment'.
This definition does not imply the inclusion of moral principles such as 'freedom' and
'democracy1, but rather that Values' reflect interests. Therefore, the advocacy of federalism is
the pursuit of self-interest. The importance of introducing the notion of federalism as political
ideology lies in the fact that
Change and development remain the most difficult aspects to explain and understand in the 
study o f federal political systems, but the notion of federalism as political ideology can 
provide a useful route into this complicated area (Burgess, 1993b: 104).
Burgess's contribution opened the way for an investigation of the motivations behind 
the promotion of each federalism, given that they vary enormously. Each federalism, not only 
each federation, incorporates a range of economic, political and socio-cultural attributes which 
intermingle to produce complex patterns of interests and identities. Therefore, each federalism 
is driven by a leitmotif although this leitmotif may express itself in different ways within a 
federation according to a particular set of interests in a given historical time. The North- 
American federalism was, and continues to be, dominated by the pursuit of 'checks-and- 
balances' mechanisms. In Canada, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Central Africa and 
Switzerland the leitmotif has been the preservation of linguistic, racial and religious minorities 
(Gagnon, 1992: 25). In Germany the driving force has been first to build and later to
31 One could argue that, for obvious reasons, Brazil only built up consensus towards addressing its problems 
during the country's two dictatorships. However, it should be remembered that between 1946 and the late 1950s, 
especially during the Dutra and the Kubitschek administrations, in which similar institutional features existed, this 
consensus, although having its opponents, was able to prevail. Both Presidents governed within the rules of the 
democratic game and through intense negotiations with Congress and sub-national politicians. Furthermore, 
Kubitschek introduced a daring programme of economic reforms during his term in office.
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consolidate institutions able to respond to the defeat of the first German democracy in 1933 
and to Nazi dictatorship (Sontheimer, 1988: 231). Australia has been marked by Rilke's 
(1964) statement that he could not understand why Australians bother with federalism. The 
leitmotif of Australian federalism has been credited as being the commercial advantages of a 
common market (Else-Mitchell, 1983: 2) and/or to a federalism in which the strength of state 
centres of power tends to check centralising forces (Rydon, 1993: 230).
Carmagnani(1993: 399) saw the driving force of federalism in Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico as the need to reconcile the tensions between two antagonistic forces: localism and 
centralisation. For the Argentinians, suggested Schapira (1992), federalism has a strong 
resonance in the collective memory because it belongs to the people's political and cultural 
vocabulary and is part of the nation's identity. The leitmotif of Argentinean federalism was, 
and continues to be, the struggle of the provinces against the power of Buenos Aires 
(Schapira, 1992). This study argues that the driving force of Brazilian federalism has always 
been the need to accommodate the demands of conflicting elites and to cope with great 
regional inequalities.
It is not a coincidence that as soon as Latin American countries returned to a 
democratic order, calls for a more decentralised federation were heard in Argentina and in 
Brazil. Hence federalism and decentralisation become political and ideological devices to bring 
to the fore the demands of regional and local interests once the rules of the democratic game 
are restored. Moreover, in the Brazilian case, since 1988 the states could, for the first time, 
enjoy a financial strength correspondent to their political strength. Bringing to the fore the 
demands of the component units of the Brazilian federation led to what this study calls a 
'peripheralised federalism', in which sub-national interests prevail over national ones. 
However, federalism as a value has remained in this 'peripheralised federalism' because the 
federal government has not relinquished its importance in the federation, neither has it become 
an absent player in the political arena.
This study fills some gaps in the literature above-reviewed. First, it brings a non- 
European and a non-Anglo-Saxon view to discussions of intergovernmental relations, 
decentralisation and federalism. Second, it deepens our understanding of how political and 
institutional reforms come into the political agenda. Third, it furthers an understanding of the 
relationships between the process of decision making and the implementation of a given 
policy and how decentralisation affects power relations. Fourth, its discussion of
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intergovernmental relations, decentralisation and federalism is centred on the relationship 
between political and financial arrangements in a fragmented polity. Fifth, it strengthens the 
point that the implementation of policies depends more on political and economic factors than 
on administrative and financial ones alone. By relying on different aspects of the literature on 
intergovernmental relations, decentralisation and federalism this study follows the general 
view that political analyses are inherently multi-theoretical activities (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 
1987: 336). The study is thus in line with the view that empirical research plays a decisive role 
in improving our knowledge of how complex social and political processes operate.
1.4 Instruments and Procedures of the Study
This study is developed within a deductive-inductive perspective and practice. 
Different types of primary and secondary sources and instruments are used to develop the 
study's upstream and downstream approaches. In particular, the empirical evidence comes 
mainly from fieldwork conducted in November and December 1992 and from April to June 
1993. Newspaper material is used as a complementary source. Although the study is a work 
on Brazil, there are brief comparative references to other countries which serve mainly to 
highlight the peculiarities of the former.
For the upstream approach, which encompasses the decision to decentralise taken by 
the Brazilian Constituent National Assembly which sat from 1987 to 1988, the research 
sources are the following. First, the archives of the Constituent National Assembly for four 
sub-committees and three committees dealing directly with the decision to decentralise. 
Second, the database from PRODASEN, the branch of the Senate accountable for Congress's 
informational technology, which provides information about the results of the 1,021 roll-call 
votings of the final stages of the Constituent Assembly, from which 115 roll-calls are selected 
for this study. The database is then disaggregated by party affiliation and by region to show 
how each of the 559 delegates voted on selected roll-calls. Third, PRODASEN* s database 
also provides information on the content of the 340 proposals presented by the government 
and by parliamentarians to enact the constitutional provisions and to change the constitutional 
mandates focused on this study’s topic. Fourth, semi-structured interviews with party leaders, 
rapporteurs and members of the sub-committees and committees of the Constituent National 
Assembly provide qualitative information on the decision to decentralise and also a better 
understanding of the political momentum Fifth, interviews with upper-level practitioners who 
acted as technical assistants to the Constituent National Assembly.
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The decision to decentralise is analysed in three dimensions: (i) the relationship 
between political parties and the State; (ii) intra- and inter-party competition; and (iii) regional 
cleavages. These three dimensions are developed to shed light on the basic conflicts and 
cleavages in the constitutional debate given that analyses, based exclusively on party 
composition, cannot explain fully the outcomes of political decisions in Brazil
The downstream approach comprises three case studies, which examine whether the 
decision to decentralise has changed the way in which the political system operates at the sub­
national level and whether it has changed the allocation of public expenditure at the sub­
national level, especially to education. The case studies are the state of Bahia, its capital, 
Salvador, and its most industrialised municipality, Cama9ari32. The case studies allow for a 
'pre-experimental' treatment of the phenomena analysed. They provide an opportunity to 
highlight the differences between levels of government in their experience with 
decentralisation.
The political analysis of the three case studies is based on the following sources. First, 
interviews with politicians in executive and legislative positions at the state and local levels 
as well as in Congress 33. No politician in the state legislature was selected for interview 
because most who are now in Congress started their careers at the state-level legislature and 
state deputies are most involved with micro-politics, whereas this study's approach to state 
and local politics intends to discuss its macro issues. Second, interviews with officials of the 
state government and of the two municipalities.
The financial performance of the three levels of government is analysed through two 
different sources. For the federal government and for the twenty-six states and their capitals, 
which are analysed in Chapters 2 and 5, secondary sources are used. For the three case 
studies, the data come from balance sheets covering the period 1981-1991.
The variety of research sources is particularly useful since the subject is not well 
developed in Brazil, especially the relationship between political and financial resources and
32 All Brazilian municipalities have the same legal status. The official definition of the municipalities, the 
municipio, encompasses municipal and district areas, as well as rural and urban ones, although they vary 
enormously in every aspect This study uses the words municipality and/or local government when referring to 
them.
33 Despite many efforts to interview the main figure in Bahia politics, Antonio Carlos Magalhaes, those in 
charge of his diary did not make an appointment for an interview. This gap was filled by interviewing his son, who 
is also a politician, other politicians who belong to his political group and by his press interviews.
the new role that sub-national politicians play on the national and sub-national scenes. 
However, some aspects of the method call for further explanation. On the political side of the 
study, there are certain difficulties in reconstructing the political momentum of the decision 
to decentralise. The interviewees were asked to recall events which occurred some years ago. 
When the interviews were carried out, parliamentarians were (and still are) more worried 
about changing the constitutional mandates and in 'correcting the excesses of the 1988 
Constitution', as many referred to them, than to analysing events that now belong to the past. 
Therefore, the interviewees had a tendency to talk more about what they thought should be 
changed than about why and how the change happened. The second restriction involves 
Bahia's politicians, both in executive and in legislative positions. Most have never been 
interviewed before for academic proposes and some were too cautious in judging their allies. 
The reason for this is that scholarly attention in Brazil has not yet focused on topics and on 
politicians who are more related to the state and local polity.
Some aspects of the financial resources need to be further clarified. Because of the 
features of the Brazilian tax system, to be detailed in Chapter 2, data on public finances vary 
according to the method developed by each work. This study tries as much as possible to rely 
on few sources to avoid discrepancies in the figures. This problem is more likely to occur 
with figures at the federal level, because, as we detail in Chapter 2, the federal tax system is 
composed of resources from taxes and from the so-called social and economic contributions. 
Some secondary sources take into account only tax resources and expenditure, and others 
incorporate some of the contributions, at least the most representative financially. The 
differences between these two methods are not possible to measure, given that the collection 
of taxes and contributions varies for a wide range of reasons, including the country's economic 
performance, the achievements of each particular sector, more or less effort in tax collection 
and changes in the indexation rules and in the methodology of public accounts.
Second, Brazil has historically had high rates of inflation, particularly in the decade 
under analysis. Inflation contaminates public finances as much as any other financial indicator. 
Moreover, the decade was marked by economic instability, several stabilisation plans and high 
interest rates, which affected public finances in different ways. Therefore, public revenue and 
expenditure are subjected to such a diverse mix of economic and institutional pressures, and 
to constant changes in the tax system, that any work based on Brazilian public finances 
requires extra caution. For these reasons this study avoids relying on currency-based figures
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and opts to present them as a percentage of total values in order to partially overcome the 
above-mentioned problems and to avoid choosing one exchange rate, given that those rates 
are manipulated for economic reasons. Likewise, data based on balance sheets are subject to 
the same problems. These problems show the limits in using public finances as the only tool 
for the analysis of public policies. This study takes the figures derived from public accounts 
as a complementary source to other qualitative and quantitative data. Therefore, the analysis 
of the sub-national expenditure presented in Chapters 5 to 7 is intended to guide discussion 
on expenditure priorities as defined by the governing elites and their commitments to 
investment in education. On the other hand, the time-series analysis presented in Chapters 5 
to 7 has proved useful in tracking changes along a centralisation-decentralisation continuum
By detailing the study's instruments and procedures, this research provides the ways 
through which the findings of this investigation can be assessed or replicated. However, the 
significance of particular findings needs to be assessed in the light of their typicality. The 
findings of this study cannot automatically be replicated elsewhere, and generalisations call 
for caution for the following reasons.
First, no scholarly work has yet focused on these three case studies or on financial and 
political decentralisation as a result of redemocratisation. Therefore, the question of typicality 
per se has to be answered by other researches, given that this study is a first attempt to build 
an analysis by placing those cases together.
Second, with the decision to decentralise having been taken by the Constituent 
National Assembly there are enough grounds for some generalisations, given that previous 
Brazilian constitutions, as well as those of some other countries, have either 
'constitutionalised1 the issue of political and financial decentralisation-centralisation or have 
at least debated it in the course of their processes of constitution building. However, no work 
dealing specifically with the decision to decentralise taken in the course of a constitutional- 
making process could be identified.
Third, with the three case studies, despite the existence of a wide range of conditions 
varying from individual characteristics to national and international ones which interact to 
shape each particular historical moment in each particular area or country, the findings of the 
study can be assessed as a 'pre-experimental' treatment of the impact of decentralisation on 
the polity and on expenditure allocations. However, the replication of those findings, even in 
the same country, requires caution, given that the political and financial features of Bahia,
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Salvador and Camasari do not assume the same pattern throughout either time or space. 
There is need for further investigation of the phenomena in each particular area. Only then can 
more accurate generalisations be made on the effects of decentralisation in a given country 
or in a cross-sectional analysis comparing the effects of decentralisation across countries.
1.5 Organisation of the Study
The assumption that decentralisation and redemocratisation have deeply changed the 
ways in which politics and public finance operated needs to be proved. Chapter 2 provides 
data and analyses on the impact of the two phenomena upon the federal government. The 
chapter provides a background to a better understanding of the study's research questions by 
analysing the federal government's financial predicaments after decentralisation and 
redemocratisation and by discussing how political pacts for intergovernmental relations, 
decentralisation and federalism have been made throughout the country's republican histoiy. 
By relying on the theoretical formulations of federalism, the study suggests that most of those 
frameworks do not provide convincing explanations of the Brazilian experience of federalism 
The use of a theoretical framework which incorporates the view of intergovernmental 
relations as a conflict-ridden territory allows the study to argue that the movements made by 
the federal government in reaction to its financial and political constraints show that although 
it has become the most vulnerable partner in the federation, it should not be seen as powerless 
but rather as an actor who holds the power to counter its political and financial constraints. 
It is argued that pressures coming from outside Congress and the sub-national governments 
are as much a burden on federal finances as are the two former. The chapter concludes that 
the strengthening of sub-national governments and Congress fostered by the 1988 
Constitution has resulted in a federal government that alone cannot deliver solutions to 
national problems.
Brazil's historical as well as current economic, financial and political conditions are the 
bases for analysis in the following chapters. Chapter 3, together with Chapter 4, provides an 
empirically-based analysis to address the puzzle of why a country facing many unresolved 
issues which needed to be tackled nationwide chose to decentralise financial and political 
resources. It answers part of the study's upstream approach question as to how the decision 
to decentralise political power and financial resources was taken in the in itial stages of the 
constitution-making process. The chapter focuses on understanding the m ech anism s of 
Brazilian constitution-making through the analysis of both its process and substance. Chapter
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3 is an attempt to explain the nature of political decision-making in the milieu of regime 
change. Furthermore, it provides a unique opportunity for the literature on policy-making by 
analysing a case where the decision to decentralise was taken by legislators. The chapter 
builds on the unique experiences and insights of participants in the reform decision at its early 
stages, discusses the contextual factors that surrounded the consideration of this particular 
policy, analyses the criteria politicians applied in making decisions on changes, and assesses 
the role of regime change in influencing the decision and the design of new policies. The 
chapter shows the problems created by a constitutional reform in a consociational state in 
which the interests of new and old elites come to the fore, thus amplifying the number of 
players in the decision-making process. The chapter concludes by arguing that Brazilian 
constitutional engineering was centred on efforts to legitimise the return to democratic order 
through the promulgation of a constitution rooted in mechanisms of popular and societal 
participation rather than on worries about policy results or on building a social consensus of 
what was to be achieved through decentralisation.
Chapter 4 moves from the general context of the political environment and events at 
the early stages to the intermediate and final stages of the constitution-making process. The 
chapter furthers an understanding of how political and institutional reforms became a decision 
and why decisions were taken. In each of these aspects the approach focuses on the links 
between what occurred within the Constituent National Assembly and the three dimensions 
through which the decision is analysed, Le., the relationship between political parties and the 
State; intra- and inter-party competition; and regional cleavages. A contribution to the above­
reviewed theories is forwarded by exploring the mechanisms used by sub-national politicians 
to influence the outcome of a given policy and to veto those which they identified as reducing 
their advantages. The chapter shows the extent to which structures and processes, extra­
constitutional and extra-parliamentary, act to influence and to veto policy decisions. It brings 
to empirical testing the assumption that the characteristics of particular reforms determine the 
type of conflict and opposition that surround their decision and their implementation. It also 
questions the view that a decision to decentralise is an administrative matter put forward by 
central government, by showing how the federal government was an absent player in the 
decision to decentralise. The chapter builds a preliminary bridge between the study’s upstream 
and downstream approaches by examining the mam results of decentralisation, both in the 
fiscal system and in the balance of power of what has become a consociational democracy.
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The chapter concludes that the lack of a national project and of a consensus on what was to 
be achieved through decentralisation brought fragmentation and postponements to the 
political system However, the federal government found ways to build governing coalitions 
and to cope with a fragmented political system The chapter argues that financial 
decentralisation to sub-national governments has only partial responsibility for the federal 
government's predicaments and that Congress's increasingly-assertive role is an important 
element in fostering power fragmentation.
Chapter 5 acts as a bridge between the analysis of the decision-making process and 
the implementation of a given policy. By analysing the political and financial performance of 
sub-national governments in a federal country which has been decentralised and 
redemocratised, the chapter paves the way for the study's downstream approach. It answers 
the question as to whether the present decentralisation under democratic rule has changed the 
allocation of public expenditure in the twenty-six states and their capitals, especially their 
allocation to education. It deepens the empirical evidence by discussing the theoretical 
formulations (introduced in the previous chapter) and argues that both decentralisation and 
redemocratisation have improved the power and the revenues of sub-national governments, 
but their effects on policy results have, with some exceptions, so far been limited. It discusses 
the extra-constitutional and extra-parliamentarian mechanisms used by the state governments 
in their relationships with other levels of government and the forms that local politicians have 
developed for playing the intergovernmental relations game. The chapter shows the role of 
State clientelism in implementing policies at the sub-national level and in defining expenditure 
priorities. Above all, the chapter brings to the fore the initial results of the implementation of 
a given policy, showing its conflicting effects and confirming the assumption that policy 
results are more the result of political and economic processes than of effective administration.
Chapter 6 gives a case study of one Brazilian state, Bahia, to provide the 'pre- 
exp eiimental' character of the research and to search for illustrations to support the assertions 
made earlier. Bahia was chosen because the state's economic development is in an 
intermediate stage between the wealthiest and the poorest Brazilian states. Conversely, in 
political terms Bahia has become a very influential state on the national scene, thus being a 
good case with which to 'test' the assumptions and frameworks discussed above. Of particular 
importance is the argument suggested by the study of Bahia that political fragmentation 
brought about by redemocratisation and decentralisation does not necessarily imply a
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'paralysed competitive arena' is the likely feature of the entire political system. On the other 
hand, it also suggests that the political fragmentation typical of the consociational democracy 
has upgraded the state leaders to a position of influence and veto on national issues. This 
chapter, as much as the one which it precedes, shows the limits of decentralisation on policy 
results.
Chapter 7, on two Bahian municipalities, provides further empirical evidence on the 
effects of decentralisation and redemocratisation on policy results. It deepens the answer to 
the question as to whether decentralisation and redemocratisation have changed the pattern 
of expenditure at the local level This research argues on the grounds of these two cases that 
there are a number of unresolved problems which need to be tackled outside the local level 
and which prevent local governments from playing a more active role in their constituencies. 
The framework of analysis based on the degree of political localism discussed above proves 
to be an avenue with two directions. Local politicians influence and/or veto policies which 
affect their constituencies but they are constrained by other external forces. These external 
forces are not always reconciled with the local politicians' views of their role in the local 
political scene.
Chapter 8 concludes by restating the main findings of the previous chapters and by 
discussing them within the theoretical frameworks of intergovernmental relations, 
decentralisation and federalism. The study's results suggest that in Brazil there was a lack of 
social consensus on what was to be achieved through decentralisation. They suggest that 
decentralisation fosters democracy but its impact on policy results have so far been limited. 
The evidence further implies that decentralisation and redemocratisation bring about a 
fragmentation of power without necessarily disintegrating the previous political coalitions or 
changing the way public resources are spent These findings indicate that various political and 
economic factors influence the outcomes of decentralisation, thus reinforcing the argument 
of the importance of political and economic factors to policy results.
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Chapter 2 Decentralisation and Redemocratisation: Impact on
Intergovernmental Relations and on Federal Finances 1
Introduction
Redemocratisation and decentralisation have changed the way in which politics and 
public finance operated. Both events deeply affected the federal government, which is 
experiencing financial constraints and feeing difficulties in building governing coalitions. These 
constraints and difficulties have challenged the role of the State, mainly the federal Executive, 
which has been the leading economic and political actor since the early 1930s. The 
strengthening of sub-national governments fostered by the 1988 Constitution resulted in a 
federal government that cannot on its own deliver solutions to economic, political and social 
problems, given that Congress and sub-national governments are now important political 
actors capable of negotiating within current constraints. This new situation has raised key 
questions as to the role of the federal government in two directions: (i) in the federation, i.e. 
in the country’s territorial power-sharing and (ii) in carrying on leading economic and social 
policies, especially those related to macro-economic stabilisation and to the provision of 
economic growth and social services.
This chapter discusses the impact of decentralisation and redemocratisation upon 
intergovernmental relations and federal finances within the context of Brazilian federalism. 
Because federal finances are under strong pressures and constraints, this chapter focuses 
primarily on its current performance. Works focusing on the importance of fiscal issues in the 
Brazilian economy became an area of research in the early 1980s. However, up-dated 
disaggregated information on the financial performance of the federal government is scant2. 
Despite Brazil's high degree of fiscal decentralisation, only international financial organisations 
have incorporated the issue as a research area (Afonso, 1994; Bomfim and Shah 1991; Shah, 
1991; Tanzi et aL, 1992). Furthermore, works based on the political importance of fiscal 
arrangements are so far absent. However, the debate over the federal government's financial
1 An earlier version of this chapter was previously published. See Souza (1994).
2 Exceptions are one work by IPEA (1992a), although limited to the 1985-90 period, and an unpublished 
database from the Centro de Estudos de Economia e Govemo da Fundagao Getulio Vargas, CEEG/FGV. Each 
of these sources adopts a different methodology for the classification of expenditure and for the calculi of federal 
transfers to the sub-national levels.
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constraints vis-a-vis sub-national strength is in both the media and the political agenda, but 
because of the lack of more detailed studies the issue has been subjected to distortions and 
misinformation.
The chapter provides a background for a better understanding of the study's research 
questions by analysing the federal government's financial predicaments. It proceeds in six 
sections. Section 1 discusses Brazilian federalism and its federation in a historical context as 
a way to understand current intergovernmental relations and the country's centralised and 
decentralised movements. Section 2 examines the financial aspects of decentralisation caused 
by redemocratisation, in which are emphasised the consequences for the federal government 
of the revenue-sharing introduced in 1988, as well as the distribution of jurisdiction among 
governmental units. The section closes with an overall discussion of the federal government's 
current fiscal constraints. Section 3 analyses the strategies adopted by the federal government 
to cope with decentralisation. Section 4 offers some conclusions.
2.1 Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations in Brazil: A Historical Overview
The strength gained by sub-national governments and the difficulties faced by the 
federal government in building governing coalitions and in overcoming its financial constraints 
can be better understood by discussing the evolution of Brazilian federalism and its federation 
in line with the distinction of both concepts as proposed by Burgess (1993b). Major political 
and territorial pacts built up throughout the country's history had their expression in the 
Brazilian Constitutions, which became an important source for an understanding of Brazilian 
federalism.
The Constitution of the modem nation-state contains three main elements: (i) the 
establishment of the principal institutions of government and the relationships among these 
institutions; (ii) provision for a distribution of governmental power over the nation's territory; 
and (iii) the provision of a compendium of the fundamental rights and duties of citizens. All 
the Brazilian Constitutions promulgated since the country became a Federal Republic in 1891 
have contained these three elements but have put more emphasis on (iii), where economic, 
social and political rules are stressed as much, if not more, than legal or procedural rights. 
Since 1934 Brazil's Constitutions have always been more like political programmes reflecting, 
on the one hand, the struggle between conflicting political groups and, on the other, the search 
for consensus.
In its first republican Constitution Brazil adopted federalism as a way of sharing
political power and constituted itself as a federation. Many scholars, like Lewandowski 
(1990), saw Brazilian federalism at that time as a mere copy of the North-American 
Constitution. Others saw Brazil as a decentralised unitary country (Ferreira Filho, 1983) or 
as a 'mock federal' State (Hennessy, 1989: 16). These interpretations fail to take into 
consideration that Brazilian federalism and the federation have always been a way to 
accommodate the contradictory regional powers that struggled for hegemony3. However, the 
balance of power in the Brazilian federation has oscillated between federally-centralised 
policies, with few constitutional powers allocated to the states, and considerable autonomy 
for local government, as shown in Table 2.1. These oscillations arose in part because of the 
historical difficulties of state building after colonial independence, a point stressed by most of 
the analysts of Brazilian history (Camargo, 1993). The political and institutional transitions 
in most nation-states, including those in Latin America, happened with deep transformations 
and ruptures from the preceding regime, but in Brazil these transitions generally occurred 
whilst maintaining many characteristics of the preceding regime. The types of federalism 
presented in Table 2.1 are related to the distribution of power between levels of government, 
and are connected to political and financial strength. The type termed 'power sharing' means 
that the 1988 Constitution intended to establish more egalitarian relations between federal, 
state and local governments.
Table 2.1 Federalism in Brazilian Constitutions
Type of federalism 1891 1934 1937 1946 1967/69 1988
Centralised 
(Central Government) X X X X
Centralised 
(State Government) 
Localist
X
X X
Power Sharing X
Reviewing Brazilian federalism from the viewpoint of intergovernmental relations, one 
can say that the country started in 1891 as an 'isolated' federation in the sense that there were 
few constitutional and practical links between the levels of government. This isolation ceased 
in the 1930s, when Brazil launched its project for the creation of an urban-industrial society, 
starting what became known as the Brazilian Developmental State, meaning that the State was 
the leading political and financial actor in economic and social issues. This project caused
3 Few scholars share Ames's (1994) and Camargo's (1993) view that Brazil is truly a federation because 
the states have been important political actors since independence.
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political, economic, and social transformations. This period inaugurated a deep association 
between political power and social and economic development. During Getulio Vargas's 
dictatorship, when the 1937 Constitution was in force, the federal government struggle 
started, to achieve federal hegemony against the states. The next stage began with the 1946 
Constitution, which started the Brazilian version of 'cooperative1 federalism, based on 
revenue-sharing between levels of government, Le. sub-national governments were granted 
a share in federal taxes. With the military regime that came together with the advent of what 
ODonnell (1973) called the bureaucratic-authoritarian State, the federation underwent deep 
transformations, with reverberations in the roles played by the three levels of government4.
2.1.1 The 1891-1937 Period: From Isolation to Centralisation
Heated debates about the territorial division of power started in Brazil long before the 
end of colonial rule. As Carvalho (1993) commented, these debates were focused on the 
relationship between federalism and centralisation, on the one hand, and freedom and tyranny, 
on the other. Carvalho showed that the major aim behind the republican movement was that 
of federalism and not that of freedom, although, together with decentralisation, they were 
presented as synonymous. We owe to historians the rescuing of these debates that free Brazil 
from the accusation that its federalism was a mere copy of the North-American one without 
any 'native' reason 5. These debates showed that Brazil accomplished one of the requisites 
behind the existence of a federation, Le. federations differ from a political order emerging 
from accident or force because their creation demands some calculated activity (Ostrom, 
1984).
The 1891 Constitution, promulgated by a National Assembly, held after the republic 
had been set up, had as structural principles: (i) federalism, (ii) a presidential system, and (iii) 
political liberalism. The reasons supporting the adoption of federalism have been pointed out 
by many scholars, including Love (1993) and Schwartzman (1988)6. Although those scholars 
stressed different aspects of the federal arrangement, they agree that Brazilian politics at that
4 For an account of intergovernmental relations in Brazil throughout its seven Constitutions, see Souza
(1992).
5 Lewandowski (1990:26) argued that the Brazilian federation never fully recovered from the artificiality 
of its institution, contrary to what took place in the USA and in Switzerland. The argument is based on the fact 
that Brazil moved from the unitary to the federal system without the intermediate stage of a confederation.
6 Specific states' interests and positions regarding federalism in its early stages have been analysed by 
Levine (1978), Love (1971; 1980), Pang (1979) and Wirth (1977).
54
time was a confrontation between factions of regional elites because their control of state 
politics was now aggrandised by the introduction of elections for both legislative and 
executive positions at the three levels of government. Likewise, since the interests of regional 
elites often depended on decisions at the federal level, schemes of mutual support began to 
develop, although regional elites, notably from Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais, were the 
dominant partners. This period was properly identified by Duchacek (1970) as a variant of an 
'oligarchic federation' because of the advantages enjoyed by the component units. Those 
advantages included a variety of civil militias supported by landowners in localities to 
guarantee order without the need for military intervention. The hegemony of the states of Sao 
Paulo and Minas Gerais in that period became known as the politics of cafe com leite (coffee- 
and-milk) after their main economic activities. However, Congress was the locus in which 
regional conflicts were expressed. The intensity of those conflicts was evaluated by President 
Campos Sales as preventing him from governing. As a response, Campos Sales sealed an 
agreement with the governors of Sao Paulo and Minas to minimise the effects of regional 
conflicts in Congress. This agreement became known as the politico dos govemadores, the 
'governors' politics’. According to the agreement each of these two states would alternately 
govern Brazil At the state level the political system was dominated by the oligarchies and by 
the institutionalisation of coronelismo, Le. the pact between the public powers and leaders of 
the interior who controlled and supplied votes from their local domains 7. However, the 
weakness of the central government did have its opponents. In the 1920s several rebellions 
led by the tenentes, the middle ranks of the army, broke down in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo 
and Rio Grande do SuL As Fausto (1986: 822) described those rebellions, the movement was 
against the oligarchic system and the political reform they advocated was based on the need 
to widen central government's sphere of action and the expansion of education, along with 
other social reforms and vague nationalistic measures.
For intergovernmental relations the 1891 Constitution determined that the federal 
government would intervene in state affairs only if a public disaster occurred. Only in rare 
cases would there be any federal intervention in the state. Despite this, Love (1993: 202) 
noted that federal intervention in the states was frequent. The fiscal system established by the
7 An interpretation of the intergovernmental relations based on coronelismo was made by Cintra (1979) 
and Nunes Leal (1977).
1891 Constitution accomplished the decentralised promise of the republican slogan: 
'centralisation, secession; decentralisation, unity1, making the Brazilian federation at that time 
much more decentralised fiscally than their Argentinean and Mexican counterparts (Love, 
1993: 186). The share of the states and municipalities in the national revenue increased from 
34% in 1907 to 49% in 1930, although significant increases were registered only in the states 
of Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul (Mahar, 1976: 243). Judicial disputes 
between states were common because of the looseness of the fiscal rules (Love, 1993: 186). 
Maybe the least 'federal' aspect of the 1891 Constitution was the absence of measures 
addressing the issue of fiscal justice between uneven units. The tension behind the designing 
of an appropriate balance between revenue within governmental units is common in any 
federation. Moreover, this question encompasses two fundamental aspects: (i) the balance 
between levels of government, known as vertical balance; and (ii) the balance between units 
with different economic and social features, known as horizontal balance. Financial and 
economic resources were channelled first to Sao Paulo and Minas, and later, at least until the 
1960s, to Sao Paulo alone. Therefore, the Brazilian federation was bom under the aegis of the 
concentration of resources not in the centre but in a few states, thus institutionalising the 
country's regional inequalities. As pointed out by Selcher (1989: 183) referring to the 1988 
Constitution,
Brazilian federalism  w ill also continue to have to accommodate the awkwardness caused by
such  a  high concentration o f  votes and human and economic resources in one state, Sao
Paulo.
Brazil's experience of'isolated' federalism ended in 1930 with a revolution led by 
Vargas. The 1930 Revolution has been analysed as a result of regional disputes for the 
Presidency and as the endorsement of the oligarchic feature of the federation (Camargo,
1993). The revolutionary movement was motivated by the fret that President Washington Luis 
broke the rule which sustained the 'coffee-and-milk' politics by trying to impose a candidate 
from Sao Paulo to replace him, who was also a paulista. Given the government's control of 
the votes in the interior, the small number of voters, mainly concentrated in Sao Paulo, and 
the practice of electoral fraud, the President could easily elect his candidate. The reaction 
against the permanence of the paulistas came from the states of Minas, Paraiba and Rio 
Grande do SuL Vargas, who was defeated in the Presidential race by the paulista candidate, 
came to power in November 1930 by an armed rebellion 'which led to intervention by the
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military to overthrow the First Republic, as the previous regime became known.
One of Vargas's first measures was to write off the states’ debt to the federal 
government, including Sao Paulo's enormous debt to sustain the value of coffee, therefore 
pacifying regional discontents (Love, 1993). In 1932, before the promulgation of the new 
constitution, the Vargas government sponsored an electoral reform which lowered the voting 
age to 18, gave women the right to vote and introduced the secret ballot. The latter was the 
first attempt to provide for the supervision of honest elections in Brazil, as suggested by 
Bethell (1994: 7). The 1932 Electoral Code promoted a great change in the features of the 
federation by increasing the political representation of smaller and weaker regions in 
Congress. Initially conceived to counteract the power of few states over the whole country, 
this principle remains as one of the bases of Brazilian federalism, both as a conceptual value 
and as an empirical device.
The 1934 Constitution, promulgated as a result of the 1930 Revolution, was based on 
an alliance among the four biggest constituencies: Minas, Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul and 
Bahia (Camargo, 1993: 311). It was influenced by the 1919 Weimar Constitution, with 
economic and social provisions. It contained many references to economic principles and 
prescribed rules about families, civil servants, and social rights, setting the bases for economic 
modernisation and for welfare measures. It set the bases for what Camargo (1993) called the 
coiporatist federation as opposed to the oligarchic federation, the latter sustained by 
clientelism and neopatrimonialism 8.
Intergovernmental relations expanded with the increase in the possibilities of forms of 
federal help to the states. The localist character of the 1934 Constitution is shown by several 
provirions for municipalities, breaking 'isolated' federalism and introducing a triple federalism. 
Triple federalism meant that the three levels of government were subjected to a constitutional 
treatment, a formula different from the North-American one, in which the municipalities are 
a creation of the states. It meant that the municipalities were to become partners in the federal 
pact. For the first time 'own revenues' were prescribed to the municipalities, and the states had 
to riiare with them half of the revenue from the then Tax on Industry and Professions. Triple 
federalism, an expression coined by Lordello de Mello, has been maintained in all the
8 The Constitution established worker representatives in Congress, where 200 representatives were to 
be elected and 50 chosen by their unions, which were legally controlled by the federal government. This measure 
was never put into practice but shows the strong corporatist character of Vargas's proposals.
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Brazilian Constitutions ever since9.
The 1934 Constitution had a short life. It was consumed by the ambiguities between 
measures increasing economic intervention and social rights, on the one hand, and the 
strengthening of regional elites and Congress on the other. The tension between the demands 
for economic and social modernisation and the demands of the oligarchies was explicit in the 
1934 Constitution, thus exposing its intrinsic contradiction.
The Constitution of 1937, which followed, was conceded by Vargas after the military 
coup that occurred in the middle of the presidential campaign. The coup was commended to 
the people as necessary to create new institutions to combat communism and the oligarchies, 
the latter nourished by the impossibility of decreasing the importance of regional interests in 
Congress (Camargo, 1993). The coup inaugurated what became known as the Estado Novo, 
the New State. The most symbolic act against the oligarchies, but also against the principles 
of the federal system, was made by Vargas when he publicly burned the state flags. The coup 
was aimed at building a political and administrative unity to push economic and social 
modernisation. Vargas, now a dictator, closed down Congress and the state legislatures and 
replaced all elected governors by 'intervenors' appointed by him 10. As suggested by Bethell 
(1994: 8), Vargas was hostile to what he called liberal democracy, because for 100 years it 
had meant elite, oligarchical politics with heavy doses of corruption and fraud.
The 1937 Constitution allowed the federal government in forcing unilateral retirement 
on civil and military servants, setting the basis for the role of the federal government in 
pushing economic modernisation through the State apparatus. The exclusive jurisdiction of 
the federal government on hydro-electric resources was established by the Constitution as a 
way to build industrial infrastructure, given that the lack of infrastructure was identified as a 
weakness paralysing Brazilian development. The legal and institutional framework for such 
a transformation was set up by the Conselho da Economia Nacional (National Economic 
Commission) created by the Constitution. This commission held a great amount of power and 
made decisions about the most sensitive tasks in which the State became involved. Among its 
tasks was to set up rules about capital-labour relationships, thus creating a virtual Labour
9 Brazilian municipalities, however, do not have a Judiciary system of their own.
10 'Intervenor* is the title given to those who are appointed by the federal government when a federal 
intervention in a state is declared. During the Vargas period the 'intervenor* had both executive and legislative 
powers in the state's jurisdiction.
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Court of Justice bom outside the Judiciary.
For intergovernmental relations the Constitution reflected Vargas's attempt to achieve 
federal hegemony. There were various examples: (i) a state unable over three years to finance 
its services should be transformed into a 'territory1 n ; (ii) federal interventions in the states 
were expanded and Vargas used them as a way to break state oligarchies by nominating 
'intervenors' with no relation to the state political life. There appeared for the first time in a 
Constitution a federal competence to legislate on public health. This and other similar 
measures enabled the State to maintain a strong presence in the construction of an urban- 
industrial society and, simultaneously, the adoption of welfare measures. On the other hand, 
it inaugurated the well-known populist practices in Brazil, as analysed by Camargo (1979), 
and increased the corporatist trend of the previous period 12. It might seem paradoxical, but 
not unusual considering the Bismarckian experience, that a Constitution written under a 
dictatorship contained so much emphasis on social policies and workers' rights. This paradox 
can be explained for two reasons. First, Brazilian dictatorships have always been concerned 
with their legitimacy. Second, Vargas was committed to industrialising the country and was 
influenced by the interventionist model developed by some scholars and some Latin American 
organisations like the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). But 
to industrialise it was necessary to create a politically-controlled working-class and improve 
their social conditions.
Sub-national governments lost their fiscal power to the federal level through the 
extinction of sub-national taxes and the expansion of the basis of federal taxes. The 
importance of the federal government was also increased by the creation of several state- 
owned companies under its jurisdiction. However, the most important measure adopted by 
the 1937 Constitution was to grant the federal government the jurisdiction to regulate external 
and inter-state exchange rules. This measure was decisive for the adoption of the new 
economic paradigm, Le. the urban-industrial society, by the fiscal unification of the territory. 
By denying the states, Le. the regional oligarchies, the right to prescribe the most important
11 The 'territory1 is an intermediate level of government between the state and the municipality. It is 
supported by die federal government until it achieves enough economic and political development to have its own 
taxes and elected political bodies, when it can then become a state.
12 Contrarily to what happened in Europe, especially in France and England, social and workers' rights 
were introduced in Brazil by die government during Vargas's dictatorship. Welfare provisions overcame by 
govemmental's concessions and not by the struggles of the working-class or the political parties.
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aspect of their economic life, namely the definition of their external and internal trade rules, 
Vargas paved the way for industrialisation. Nevertheless, horizontal imbalances remained. 
Mahar(1976: 255) observed that by 1945 the states of Sao Paulo, Minas and Rio Grande do 
Sul together held more than 70% of the total amount of state finances. The Vargas period 
started the trend of levying the federal government's main tax revenue in the South and in the 
South-East and of spending it in the North and in the North-East, while subsidies and the 
state-owned companies concentrated in the South and the South-East.
2.1.2 The 1946-1964 Period: Centralisation and Localism
The EstacLo Novo's experience ended in October 1945 when Vargas was overthrown 
by his War Minister after pressures from the military and the liberals called for the installation 
of a liberal democracy. Vargas had been preparing the call for competitive elections by 
supporting a popular movement known as the queremismo, meaning We Want Vargas'. The 
movement called for a constituent assembly and for Vargas's candidacy for the Presidency 
through competitive elections. The call to democratise the country was a result of the world­
wide wave of democratisation at the end of World War H  As a result, Brazil's major cities 
experienced unprecedented mass political mobilisation pushed, on the one hand, by the 
communist party, the PCB, and on the other by the queremistas. Because the military and the 
liberals were not sure about Vargas's intentions, they decided to overthrow him and to call for 
direct elections to the Presidency. The 1945 election was seen by Bethell (1994: 10) as the 
first reasonably free, fair and competitive election held in Brazil. General Dutra was the 
winner. In the following year elections were held for Congress and Vargas was elected 
Senator. In 1950 he won the Presidential election and governed Brazil under democratic rule 
until 1954, when he committed suicide as he was about to be overthrown by the military.
As a result of democratisation the 1946 Constitution emerged, promulgated by a 
Constituent Assembly. Liberal ideals, especially the rejection of the federal government's 
intervention in the economy, were the main concern of the constitution-makers. However, 
liberal intentions did not last long, given the increasing demands for rapid economic growth 
under the aegis of the State. The 1946 Constitution ended up repeating most of the measures 
adopted in 1934, with some adaptation. It kept most of the social, nationalist and corporatist 
measures introduced by Vargas. Because democracy and decentralisation have traditionally 
been associated in Brazil, local government's revenues were increased, with the aim of 
decreasing its dependence upon the states. The states, however, did not become absent
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players. As shown by Ames (1987: 218), when the presidential administrations of Vargas and 
Kubitschek increased spending under the aegis of the 1946 Constitution, powerful state-level 
politicians dominated Congress's Budget Committee and took control of the new resources.
The 1946 Constitution expanded the opportunities for federal intervention in the 
states, but with different goals from the preceding Constitutions because these interventions 
were mostly to preserve democratic rules. It enabled federal intervention to prevent any state 
measure that might damage local autonomy. This Constitution was, simultaneously, 
centralised in favour of the federal government and localist because it increased local finances 
and tried to decrease the state's influence over local activities. Between 1949 and 1958 the 
municipalities' share in public sector expenditure increased to 7.2% and 8.1% as compared 
to 6.4% in 1947 (Mahar, 1976: 261). The states not only lost several taxes to the 
municipalities but had to share revenue with them The most important aspect of the 1946 
Constitution for fiscal federalism was the introduction of the principle of intergovernmental 
fiscal cooperation between levels of government through the scheme of revenue-sharing from 
higher to lower territorial units of government. The 1946 Constitution promoted the first 
attempt to address the issue of vertical imbalance, by increasing local revenues, although at 
the expenses of the states. Horizontal balance was partially introduced through the earmarking 
of federal revenues to be applied in the North and in the North-East. However, the scheme 
created for the participation of sub-national units in the federal revenue did not take into 
account the economic, social and financial differences among units, because transfers were 
to be made on a uniform baas. Despite efforts to overcome vertical and horizontal imbalances, 
Mahar (1976: 266) showed that they had limited effect, because of the disproportional growth 
in the federal activities, of the increase in the number of new municipalities, inflation and the 
non-payment of federal quotas to sub-national units.
The 1946 Constitution has been, so far, Brazil's longest-lasting constitution. Its 
measures, and the democratic regime which it regulated, survived several political crises, 
including Vargas's suicide, the resignation of President Quadros in 1961 and the acceptance 
of Quadros's Vice-President Goulart, despite the hostility of the military and the entrepreneurs 
by quickly changing the constitution to introduce the parliamentary system Under the 1946 
Constitution Brazil saw its dreams of economic development, democracy and decentralisation 
come true. Die aim of the popular movement for redemocratisation which started in the 1980s 
was to bring back those dreams and principles.
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2.1.3 The 1964-1985 Period: A Centralised Federation
The collapse of democracy in Brazil in 1964 has received a reasonable amount of 
scholarly attention (Santos, 1986; Skidmore, 1967). Among several explanations for the 1964 
military coup, was an important one that the coup was motivated by the extreme paralysis of 
the decision-making process within Congress (Santos, 1986). The same argument regarding 
Congress's responsibility for governmental paralysis was used by Vargas in the 1930s, when 
Congress resisted the introduction of his welfare legislation, and by Campos Salles, when he 
introduced 'governors' politics' to cope with a Congress cut across by regional disputes. This 
time Congress and the country’s paralysis stimulated the radicalism of both the conservatives 
and the left. The latter proposed radical economic and social changes, such as land reform, 
several nationalist measures, the legalisation of the communist party and the right for illiterates 
to vote. The conservatives, who included part of the urban middle class, started to encourage 
a military solution if this was the only way of preventing changes endorsed by the left. 
Furthermore, as mentioned by Bethell (1994: 11), important political actors were no longer 
willing to make the compromises necessary to ensure democracy's survival
The political crisis was followed by an economic one, characterised by the decrease 
of investment, foreign capital and profits, with an increase in inflation rates. Moreover, the 
import-substitution model seemed over and a consensus for a new economic paradigm was 
difficult to achieve. As the internal political environment did not allow a clear option, the 
government was forced towards ambiguous policies. There was acknowledgment of what was 
labelled the non-economic constraints of the crisis, where fiscal predicaments, education and 
land distribution were considered the most important. However, the Brazilian political and 
economic elites were not able to design a minimum agenda of consensus. Hence, a favourable 
environment was rapidly created for the military coup. When the military came to power, 
public policies were reshaped to achieve economic stabilisation through the recovery of 
investments and loans and to strengthen the public apparatus both administratively and 
fiscally.
The military did not immediately issue a new Constitution, despite changing several 
constitutional provisions by amendments to the 1946 Constitution. Only on 24 January 1967 
was the military Constitution promulgated, and in 1969 it was again changed through 
Constitutional Amendment No. 1 issued on 17 October. The 1967/69 Constitution, together 
with the 1966 fiscal reform law, boosted the centralisation of public finance and of political
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power, unprecedented in the country's history 13. In October 1968, Institutional Act No. 5 
was issued by the military under the terms of which power was centralised in the presidency 
to an unprecedented degree 14. Competitive elections were forbidden for federal and state 
executive positions and for the state capitals and for municipalities considered 'national 
security areas' or 'mineral sites'. A strong censorship of the media, the suspension of the 
political rights of politicians, intellectuals, workers and political militants, the weakening of 
the Legislature and the imposition of two political parties were attempts to foster a break with 
the corporatist and populist State cut across by regional demands. Nevertheless, state and 
local governments, and their politicians, continued to play an important role under centralised 
rule. As noted by a few scholars and politicians, sub-national governments were used by the 
military to legitimise the regime and to build up coalitions for the regime's survival (Ames, 
1987; Jobim, 1990; Medeiros, 1986). These approaches were new in intergovernmental 
analysis in Brazil, which had tended to see state and local governments as totally dominated 
and manipulated from the federal leveL
The 1967/69 Constitution introduced an interrelation between development and 
national defence, opening the way to the so-called militarisation of policies. In 
intergovernmental relations it expanded the instances in which the federal government could 
intervene in the states. It prohibited the adoption of any policy, economic or financial plan, 
against principles stated by federal laws, therefore betraying the federalism principle as Elazar 
(1987b: 10) put it as 'self-rule plus shared rule'. The 1967/69 Constitution opened the door 
to an increasing role for domestic capital, allowing investment in many services which had 
been previously under public responsibility. The strong presence of domestic private capital 
was mainly evident in the provision of social services. Many public funds were created, like 
FAS - Fundo de Agao Social (Social Action Fund), with subsidised funding allocated to the 
private sector to build private schools and hospitals. This policy was adopted following the 
military government's diagnosis that domestic capital had few investment opportunities 
compared with State and foreign capital.
The tax system underwent a deep change. Revenues were centralised in the federal
13 The legal instruments of fiscal reform were Constitutional Amendment No. 18 issued on December 
1965 and Law 5,172 issued on October 1966. The reform was put into force in 1967.
14 For an analysis of the role of the military in Brazilian politics until the political opening, see Philip
( 1985).
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sphere and redistributed through participation funds which took into account regional 
disparities, thus furthering horizontal balance. Apart from the participation funds the scheme 
of negotiated grants was considerably increased. Fiscal reform aimed at concentrating fiscal 
authority at the federal level The diagnosis of the fiscal constraints and the argument 
supporting fiscal centralisation were pointed out by Graham (1987: 11). The diagnosis was 
that the earlier commitment to collective responsibility, through shared powers with Congress, 
and to the amelioration of conditions of poverty, through social policy and populist rhetoric, 
had led to unrestrained public spending. The remedy was to bring inflation under control and 
to get the country back onto a course of expansionary economy through stable growth. Much 
effort has been expended by scholars and practitioners in evaluating the effects of fiscal 
centralisation on federalism, on the federation and on intergovernmental relations. Such 
studies can be divided into two clusters. On the one hand, those which concentrated on the 
analysis of the fiscal accounts, and showed that the financial position of the municipalities had 
improved in the period, as opposed to that of the states (Graham, 1987; Mahar, 1976; Serra 
and Afonso, 1991). Although penalised in their tax resources, the states kept room to 
manoeuvre because they were used by the military as providers of legitimacy (Medeiros, 
1986). One variant of these studies concentrated on designing schemes to enable the transfer 
of federal responsibilities to sub-national levels (Rezende et aL, 1984). On the opposite side, 
some studies eyed the political and financial dependence of sub-national governments as a 
total breakdown of the federation and of federalism (Lordello de Mello, 1976 and most of 
IBAM's publications in that period) or at least as an example of formalistic federation, 
masking the reality of a unitary state (Lewandowski, 1990; Selcher, 1989).
By the end of the 1970s, the fissures in the military regime became more apparent. Its 
demise has been widely analysed, both in its political and economic components, as mentioned 
in Chapter 1. Since 1979 inflation had accelerated from an average of 40% a year in the 1970s 
to 100% a year in 1979-81. The economic dynamism of the country in the 1970s was replaced 
by an increase in the price of imports, by the reduction of external loans and by the rise in 
interest rates in the international financial markets, all affecting public finances. After 1983 
Brazil began a period of economic stagnation, with GDP rates of growth below the historic 
average, with the reduction of the traditional sources of foreign loans, and with difficulties 
over refinancing its external debt. The military began to allow direct elections for the 
governorships and to calm down pressures from local governments by gradually increasing
64
their revenues. The events listed above had reverberations in the balance of power between 
levels of governance because there were fewer resources to accommodate their cleavages. 
Financially and economically weak, the military started to lose the support of those who had 
backed the regime: conservative politicians in Congress and in sub-national governments, 
entrepreneurs and segments of the middle class.
Redemocratisation started in 1985, and the Diretas-Ja15 movement came to represent 
the symbol for the struggle for democracy. Democracy entailed political, fiscal and 
administrative decentralisation, along with better public services, economic growth and 
income redistribution. All these demands received special treatment in the 1988 Constitution. 
The political ideal was to improve the conditions of the population, mainly the poor, who 
were largely excluded from the benefits created during the military regime. There was, then, 
a feeling that the country had succeeded in the task of economic modernisation, but it was a 
conservative modernisation, since it did not incorporate the demands of the poor. The 1988 
Constitution was intended to end the authoritarian regime, to set the basis of 
redemocratisation and to restore the federation.
As discussed in Chapter 1, given the existence of a vast theoretical literature on 
federalism, it is difficult to summarise the much-disputed essential characteristics of a federal 
state. Nevertheless, in a free interpretation of contributions to this debate, this study argues 
that in Brazil many of the characteristics of federalism and of a federation have been 
maintained, although subjected to the country's needs in different historical periods. Brazil's 
past federalism can be described as a permanent struggle against authoritarianism and 
centralisation. This study argues that despite the swing of the federal pendulum, federalism 
remained a constitutional commitment, a political ideology and a mechanism of political 
negotiation in a country with vast territorial dimensions and with regional diversity and 
disparity. Now that the emotion surrounding the last authoritarian regime is past, it is possible 
to explore Duchacek's (1991: 25) challenge to also look at the existence of federal practices 
which have developed in authoritarian systems despite their commitment to centralisation. In 
several periods Brazil would not fulfil the wide, and sometimes too ideal or too formalistic, 
range of features which characterise federalism and a federation. The country would not pass
15 The Diretas-Ja was a movement led by a wide grouping of civilian organisations calling for the popular 
election of the President It intended to put pressure on Congress to approve a constitutional amendment proposed 
by the federal deputy Dante de Oliveira.
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all Duchacek's (1987) ten yardsticks for testing the existence of a federal country. Only a few 
units preceded the federal nation; participation of the states in the decisions of the Union was 
legally reduced in 1968 when the military introduced one hionic' senator per state, nominated 
by an electoral college dominated by the government's party, although the other two senators 
remained popularly elected; there were several provisions allowing federal intervention in the 
states on the grounds of vague reasons; and for long periods Brazil was not a pluralist 
democracy16.
However, if one looks at the Brazilian federation more through Lijphart's (1984) 
framework of consociational democracy and his discussion about the relationship between 
federalism and his consensual model, Brazil could pass the test. Sometimes more, and at 
other times, less there has been a 'constitutional guaranteed division of power between the 
three governing units'. Even the authoritarian regimes provided the country with a 'written 
constitution'. 'Bicameralism' has always been maintained. The 'right of the component units 
to be involved in the process of amending the federal constitution but to change their own 
constitutions unilaterally1 has been maintained because Congress was kept open during most 
of this time. However, the latter characteristic was probably the most transgressed one, 
because constitutional amendments without Congress's approval had been widely used during 
the two dictatorships. Since 1932 there has been a 'disproportionally strong representation of 
the smaller1 and weaker 'component units in the federal chamber*. Whereas for Lijphart's fifth 
characteristic of federalism, namely a 'decentralised government', this is the mam issue 
addressed in this study through the analysis of the role of sub-national governments and their 
politicians during the political opening and democratic consolidation.
Furthermore, the federal commitment can be felt throughout Brazil's republican history 
mainly from the following aspects. First, by the room to manoeuvre enjoyed by sub-national 
demands, although not always visible through legal and fiscal measures. Second, by 
Congress's traditional role in defending regional interests, although not always legitimate and 
many times motivated by 'pork barrel' and clientelist needs. Third, by the consolidation of a 
political culture, as referred to by Duchacek (1987), and of a political ideology, as referred 
to by Burgess (1993b), through the adherence of regional identities to a unified nationalism 
(Camargo, 1993). Fourth, by the strength quickly regained by Congress and sub-national
16 Burgess (1993a: 7) discussed the relationship between federalism and pluralism. He argued that, 
although some authors see federalism as a form of pluralism, there is no such thing as a pluralist state.
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governments when authoritarian periods ended, which means they were not deprived of power 
under the previous regime. Brazil's different experiences with its federation exposes the 
capacity of federations to adjust and to adapt to new forces which, in Burgess's (1993a: 10) 
words, acquire political salience. Nonetheless, federalism as a Value concept', as mentioned 
in Chapter 1, has always been the essence of the Brazilian federation. This Value concept' 
became fully expressed with redemocratisation and was constitutionally guaranteed in 1988, 
as is explained throughout this study.
2.1.4 The Role of the Judiciary in the Federation
For some authors (e.g. Finer, 1949) the logic of a federal system supposes the 
existence of two independent sets of courts, one at the federal level and one at the federated 
level, although others find it a minor criterion (Duchacek, 1987). Because after 1988 judicial 
decisions in Brazil assumed a prominent role in interpreting constitutional mandates, especially 
those on the fiscal system, the role of the Judidaiy in the federation should be briefly assessed. 
Furthermore, the role of the Judiciary in Brazil is a poorly researched area, other than from 
the legalistic viewpoint, and its importance for federalism is generally ignored 17.
Even before the strength of the Judiciary caused by the 1988 Constitution, Brazil and 
Mexico were listed, together with the USA, as the only federal countries with two parallel 
networks of courts, although only the USA's system was considered fully developed 
(Duchacek, 1987: 252). The Brazilian system differs from the North-American one in that 
the latter allows any court to interpret the constitutionality of legal and administrative. 
measures, with the exception of a few matters (Duchacek, 1987). In other countries there is 
a monopoly for the interpretation of the Constitution placed on a Constitutional Court, which, 
in legal terms, does not belong to the Judiciary but is above it (Duchacek, 1987). In Brazil 
the system is a mixture of these two. The constitutionality of the administrative acts of any 
of the three governmental units can be questioned in any court. However, the constitutional 
validity of any law can be questioned only in the high courts, either in state courts or in the 
Federal Superior Tribunal. After 1988 the latter enjoyed the juridical-political attribution 
typical of a Constitutional Court, but it also judges, as a court of exceptional appeal, cases 
decided by the other courts. A third body was created by the 1988 Constitution, the Superior 
Tribunal of Justice. According to Article 105, HI of the 1988 Constitution, this court, among
17 One exception is research carried out by IDESP under the coordination of Tereza Sadek, although it 
focuses on the relationship between the Judiciary and society and on the problems faced by the institution.
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other attributes
...judges, in special appeal, cases decided by the Federal Regional Tribunals or by courts 
in the states, whenever the original decision goes against a federal law or treaty; or whenever 
itjudges valid an act or law o f a local government in the face of a federal law; or if  it gives 
to a federal law a divergent interpretation from that of another court.
These three spheres of judicial review are part of the Judiciary Branch. When disputes 
are about the division of power at different governmental levels, the power to arbitrate lies 
exclusively with the Federal Superior Tribunal The 1946 Constitution was the first to 
introduce the mechanism of judicial review 18. Cases of representation for unconstitutionality 
were, until 1988, the exclusive responsibility of the Attorney-General of the Republic. By 
contrast, under the 1988 Constitution there are nine institutions entitled to the right of 
representation: the Presidents of the Republic, of the Senate, of the Chamber of Deputies and 
of the state legislatures; the state governors; the Attorney-General of the Republic; the 
Brazilian Bar Association; a political party which has a member in Congress; and a trade 
union, a confederation or a national professional association.
Other constitutional measures were introduced in 1988 which further increased the 
importance and the independence of the Judiciary as an arbitrator between levels of 
government and between the Executive and the Legislative Branches when compared to the 
1967/69 Constitution. The latter prevented the Judiciary from having its own budget, meaning 
its financial independence, and from deciding about its internal administrative affairs. The 
existence of governors and mayors of the main cities elected indirectly, the emphasis on 
negotiated grants as an important source of sub-national revenue, and the existence of a 
Legislature with restricted functions prevented the sub-national units and the Legislature from 
bringing their conflicts to the Judiciary.
Although the 1988 Constitution increased the power, the jurisdiction and the 
independence of the Judiciary, several problems hamper its performance. First, Brazilian 
constitutions have traditionally been too analytical and concerned with issues that would be 
better placed in ordinary laws. Therefore, much of the interpretation of the many vague or 
complex mandates are left to the Judiciary which is a non-elected body. Second, by 
broadening the legislative powers of control and inspection and by giving the Legislature the 
power to amend any bill from the Executive and, at the same time, by granting the Executive
18 The main judicial disputes between levels of government are summarised in Horta (1989).
the right to legislate by means of provisional decrees, the Constitution placed on the Judiciary 
the burden of controlling and mediating conflicts between powers elected by popular vote. 
Third, the major areas of contention have so far been between the federal Executive and 
Congress and between the former and the states. Intergovernmental disputes have been 
motivated by constant changes in the tax system The Judiciary has tended to decide those 
disputes in favour of the sub-national levels. Sadek (1995) noted that confrontations between 
the Executive and Congress have happened so many times since the promulgation of the 1988 
Constitution that the Federal Superior Tribunal has become one of the main political actors 
in Brazil and has constantly been forced to decide against either the Executive or the 
Legislature. Fourth, there has been great dissatisfaction with the work of the Judiciary, as 
shown by Sadek's research (1995). The most visible problem is its heavy structure and lack 
of agility, which has been increased by the growing number of actions for unconstitutionality. 
Sadek (1995: 163) reported that, according to the former president of the Federal Superior 
Tribunal Sidney Sanches, in two years over 500 legal actions for unconstitutionality were 
brought before the Tribunal, as compared to just over 1,000 in the previous twenty years.
The role of the Judiciary has become crucial in overcoming the federal government's 
financial problems. The federal Executive has not counted on the Judiciary's help in its 
relationship with the sub-national governments. Just as in the USA during Roosevelt's New 
Deal and in Canada's recent experience, both mentioned by Duchacek (1987: 258), Brazil's 
high constitutional court has shown that its political commitment rests more on the sub­
national than on the federal level because its decisions generally favour the former.
2.2 The Impact of Decentralisation upon the Federal Government
The 1988 Constitution deeply changed intergovernmental relations and the federation. 
Two points of the 1988 Charter were of particular importance: (i) fiscal reform and (ii) 
common responsibilities between the three levels of government.
2.2.1 The Fiscal Role of the Federal Government
The Brazilian fiscal system has experienced many changes in the last two decades, all 
related to the achievement of economic or political goals. After the fiscal reform of 1966, 
where centralisation was the aim and result, the military regime started to adopt more flexible
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measures, especially that of increasing local revenue 19 but the most far-reaching change 
occurred with the 1988 Constitution. The tension between local and regional needs for 
expenditure and federal restriction had always been 'solved' through direct or indirect federal 
grants to state and local levels. Subsidies and tax relief that the federal government grants to 
the private sector can be considered as indirect grants because, although they are not directly 
allocated to any specific sub-national government, they always result in an allocation of 
national resources to the local economy. Social and economic infrastructural developments 
carried out by the federal government in local and state territories may be considered indirect 
grants as well.
Direct grants consist of the following: (i) constitutional grants; (ii) negotiated grants, 
made informally, through bilateral political negotiations; (iii) Central Bank guarantees on state 
and local government borrowing; (iv) the role of the Central Bank in regularly bailing out 
banks owned by the various states. These banks were used as a kitty by the state government 
and frequently got into difficulties20.
The B razilian tax system separates taxes and contributions. The main difference is that 
a tax has to follow the constitutional mandate which requires that changes in its levy should 
only be put into force in the following fiscal year through a constitutional amendment, 
whereas the rates of contributions can be changed by ordinary law, to take effect ninety days 
afier its promulgation. Only the federal government is allowed to institute contributions. The 
only exception to federally exclusive jurisdiction is the contribution levied by sub-national 
governments on the salaries paid to their civil servants which are destined to finance their 
welfare and pension systems. According to clause 149 of the 1988 Constitution, contributions 
are of three categories: social, economic and professional Contributions comprise taxes paid 
by employers on payroll, invoices and profits plus taxes paid by employees and by lotteries. 
When contributions are levied on payroll, either when they are paid by employers or by 
employees, they are known as Payroll Tax. In 1994 there were around twelve such 
contributions and some of them make up different funds. The most important contributions 
and funds are the FGTS, PIS-PASEP, PIN-PROTERRA, CONFINS (ex-FINSOCIAL),
19 An example of these continuous changes is that during the 1967/69 Constitution, five amendments 
were made on fiscal changes (in 1975, 1977, 1980, 1983 and 1985). The fiscal amendments began with the 
military's project to return democratic rule.
20 These topics are analysed in more detail in Chapter 5.
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levied on corporations' invoices, CSLL, the employers' contributions over profits, and salario- 
educaqao (education salary). These resources are earmarked for specific expenditures such 
as the social security system, unemployment benefit, education, health and welfare 
programmes and for quangos administered by confederations of corporations. Two 
contributions, the FGTS and the PIS-PASEP, are levied by the federal government but they 
are made up of funds which belong to the workers. Contributions are not covered by the 
scheme of revenue-sharing with sub-national governments, with the exception of the salario- 
educaqao, two-thirds of which is transferred to the states and municipalities according to a 
formula established by federal law and proportional to the amount collected in each unit. 
Contributions are, however, transferred from the federal to the sub-national governments for 
specific purposes. The most important one is for the financing of the health care programme, 
called SUS, in which sub-national governments receive revenue from the federal level to 
provide health care under a decentralised scheme.
The 1988 Constitution made important changes in the fiscal system. The lack of 
political and financial strength in sub-national governments had been held responsible for the 
increase in government inefficiency and for the gap between public policies and local needs. 
Financially dominated at the federal level, sub-national governments were seen as its branch 
administration, although the political role of the state and local levels was of great importance. 
Evidence of disagreement with federal financial dominance appeared at the first popular 
election of state governors in 1982, still during the military regime. Chaos in the states 
finances' was denounced by the newly elected governors, followed by their constant pressure 
for fiscal reform with the aim of a more balanced (or decentralised) distribution of public 
revenue.
However, severe financial constraints on the federal government, because of the 
recession of the early 1980s, and the continuance of the military regime, prevented the 
realisation of the sub-national quest for a more decentralised fiscal system. The indirect 
presidential election in 1985 renewed expectations of a deeper fiscal reform. It was not a 
coincidence that fiscal reform was one of the main political commitments of the new civilian 
government. However, again, only minor changes were made. Federal government was still 
strong enough to cope with the pressure from the sub-national governments and Congress 
was under the rule of the military Constitution and did not have much room to manoeuvre 
with the pressures made by local and state politicians. The result was a quasi-reform by
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Constitutional Amendment No. 23 issued on 1 December 1983, known as the Passos Porto 
Amendment, which increased federal constitutional grants to states and municipalities. The 
Constituent National Assembly, which started sitting in 1987, became the institutional and 
political scenario of the reform. Greater financial autonomy was considered a key condition 
for federal equilibrium and for democracy.
2.2.1.1 The Impact of the 1988 Constitution on Federal Revenues
When the Constitution was promulgated, on 6 October 1988, the country's economic 
predicaments were deeper than at the beginning of the decade. The failure of the 1986 and 
1987 stabilisation plans had been followed by a reduction in public finance, bringing additional 
constraints to fiscal policy and deficit control. In addition, the proportion of net fiscal 
resources decreased during the late 1980s when compared with GDP (Figure 2.1).These 
trends worsened the distributive cleavages between levels of government because there were 
fewer resources to share and to transfer. The decrease in gross revenue from 25% of GDP 
between 1970-83 to 20% in 1989 was not because of a policy for the reduction of tax, but 
because of inflation, subsidies, tax relief and recession.
Since 1991 gross 
revenue has increased as 
compared to the late 
1980s but has remained 
stable at around 23% of 
GDP, similar to what 
was achieved during the 
1970s, when inflation 
was lower and the 
economy grew at higher 
levels21.
The financial 
resources of sub-national
21 The percentage of the gross revenue in GDP is above countries with similar economies and below 
developed countries (Afonso, 1994: 8). However, the Minister of Finance in late 1994, Ciro Gomes, complained 
about Brazil's percentage as compared to the USA's 30%, Japan's 34% and European countries' 40% (Gazeta 
Mercantile 1994).
Figure 2.1 Resources Available by Level of Government 
GDP Percentage 
1980-1991
1980 1985 1987 1989
1984 1986 1988 1991
Source: Afonso (1994: 48)
■  Municipalities 
M States 
m Federal 
□  Total
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governments further increased after the 1988 Constitution. Between 1970 and 1985 the 
federal government remained with an average of 48.5% of all public revenue, but the 1988 
Constitution inverted the figures, as shown in Table 2 .222.
Table 2.2 Distribution of Fiscal Revenue in Percentage, 1985-1993
Level of Distribution before Estimated Distribution after
Government the 1988 Constitution the 1988 Constitution
1985 1993 (*)
Share GDP Share GDP
Federal 44 .6 6.7 36.5 5.7
State 37.2 5.6 40.7 6.3
Local 18.2 2.7 22.8 3.5
Total 100.0 15.1 100.0 15.6
Source: Rezende (1990: 161)
Note: (*) 1993 was the year when the 1988 fiscal reform was completely
implemented.
Although the 1988 Constitution changed the distribution of fiscal resources between 
levels of government, the impact of these changes when compared with GDP was not too 
significant: the losses of the federal government to the sub-national level were less than 1% 
of GDP, which meant in estimated terms 8.1% of the federal revenue had the previous system 
been maintained. On the other hand, resources available to the sub-national governments 
moved from 8.7% of GDP in 1980 to 14.8% in 1991; their fiscal revenue increased from 
6.1% of GDP to 9.1% in the same period and to 7.1% in 1992 23. On the other hand, the 
federal government's tax revenue declined from 16.2% of GDP in 1980 to 13.9% in 1991, 
whereas revenue from Social and Economic Contributions has risen24.
The increase in sub-national revenues was made in several ways, one of them by the 
distribution of fiscal responsibility between levels of government, as shown in Table 2.3. 
Besides the taxes referred to in the table, the federal government may create new taxes, 
inclusive in the case of wars, and the three levels may charge a Betterment Tax when a 
property is improved because of public investment.
22 Figures presented in the table only take into account resources from taxes and do not include other 
transfers, such as those under the Social Contributions' scheme.
23 Unpublished data from the CEEG/FGV. 'Resources available' means the amount sub-national 
governments can spend after intergovernmental transfers plus their shares in transfers from the federal educational 
fund the FNDE. Despite not being an item in the budgetary classification, die use of the concept of resources 
available is more accurate than that of net revenue. Tax revenue means the revenue directly collected by the 
governments. The figures presented in the paragraph also incorporate revenues from financial operations, which 
have been an additional source of revenue given that sub-national governments invest their tax revenue and 
transfers to cope with high inflation. This is why these figures are different from those presented in Table 2.2.
24 Unpublished data from the CEEG/FGV.
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Table 2.3 Distribution of Fiscal Responsibility by Level of Government
Level of Under the 1966 Fiscal Under and After the
Government Reform 1988 Constitution
Federal .Income Tax (IR) .Income Tax (IR)
.Tax on Industrial .Tax on Industrial
Products (IPI) Products (IPI)
.Tax on Financial .Tax on Financial
Operations and Operations and
Insurance (IOF) Insurance (IOF)
.Import Tax (II) .Import Tax (II)
.Export Tax (IE) .Export Tax (IE)
.Rural Property Tax (ITR) .Rural Property Tax (ITR)
.Hydroelectricity Tax(IUEE)
.Mineral Products Tax(IUM)
.Fuel and Lubricant Tax(IULC)
.Tax on Communication Services
.Transportation Tax (IT)
.Large Fortunes(Wealth)Tax 
.Temporary Tax on Financial 
Transactions (IPMF)
State .Value-added Tax (ICM) .Value-added, Communication 
and Transportation Tax (ICMS)
.Motor Vehicles .Motor Vehicles
Registration Tax(IPVA) Registration Tax (IPVA)
.Property Transfers, .Inheritance and Gift
Inheritance and Tax (ITCMD)
Gift Tax (ITBI)
.Supplementary Capital 
Gains Tax
Municipality .Services Tax (ISS) .Services Tax (ISS)
.Urban Property Tax (IPTU) .Urban Property Tax (IPTU)
.Frontage Tax .Frontage Tax 
.Property Transfers 
.Tax on Retail Sales of 
Fuels Except Diesel (IWC)
One feature of the Brazilian tax system is its constant change. Some examples can be 
cited. Income Tax legislation has been submitted to an average of fifteen changes a year since 
1988 [Afonso, 16 April 1993] 25. The state Tax on Supplementary Capital Gains and the 
municipal Tax on Retail Sales of Fuels Except Diesel (IW C ) will be abolished on 1 January 
1996 as a result of Constitutional Amendment No. 3 approved in August 1993 26. The same 
amendment created the federal Temporary Tax on Financial Transactions (IPMF) and 
determined its extinction on 31 December 1994. The IPMF was approved by Congress after 
nine months of intense negotiations and has been the subject of several legal actions since its 
promulgation. With the extinction of the IPMF the federal government lost revenues estimated
25 When interview quotations are used in the text, they are identified by die name of the interviewee, with 
the date of the interview in brackets.
26 The state Tax on Supplementary Capital Gains was considered unconstitutional by the Superior Federal 
Tribunal on the grounds that its levying required a federal law to govern the fiscal boundaries between the states.
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at $4 billion (West Merchant Bank, 1994). To counteract this loss, in early 1995 Congress 
approved a bill proposed by the federal government to raise the rate of corporate Income Tax, 
which would raise resources estimated at $2 billion (Folha de Sao Paulo, 1995).
The trend towards the decentralisation of taxation responsibilities is best illustrated by 
the changes that took place in the domain of the Value-Added Tax (ICM). Pre-1988 
arrangements empowered the federal government to levy special taxes on communications, 
fuels, electric power, minerals and transport. However, all these five separate taxes were 
abolished by the 1988 Constitution, their baas being transferred to the state level to constitute 
the ICMS, which is the country's biggest tax and the second public revenue after Social 
Contributions 21.
The federal government now has under its exclusive responsibility the following taxes: 
(i) Inport and Export Taxes which lost importance first because of the world recession and 
more recently because of the policy of lowering trade barriers; (ii) the Tax on Financial 
Operations and Insurance (IOF) which has an erratic performance but which increases 
whenever the federal government faces more serious cash-flow problems because the 
Constitution allows the raising of its rates without congressional approval; (iii) the Large 
Fortunes Tax, which has not so far been put into force because it needs congressional 
approval, which has already been denied once; and (iv) the Social and Economic 
Contributions which have been used since the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution by the 
federal government to counteract its losses but which are earmarked for specific expenditures.
Moreover, the decade was marked by high inflation, tax evasion and some years of 
recession. The problem of inflation has been tackled through several stabilisation plans. Since 
1979 Brazil has experienced twelve stabilisation plans plus the Real Plan issued in July 1994 
28. As for recession, despite a negative performance in the five years between 1980 and 1992, 
GDP grew at 4.1% in 1993 and at 4.5% in 1994 (West Merchant Bank, 1994: 11). Tax 
evasion, however, remains a problem A CPI - Comissao Parlamentar de Inquerito 
(Parliamentary Inquiry Commission) set up by Congress estimated tax evasion at $82 billion
77 In 1990 the ICMS represented 26.5% of all taxes together, followed by the Payroll Tax, which is part 
of the Social Contributions, at 18.7% and Income Tax at 18.1%. The IPI, die second biggest federal tax, 
represented 8.4%, followed by CONFINS at 5.4%, FGTS at 5.1%, IOF at 4.5% and PIS-PASEP at 4% (Dain, 
1992: 43).
28 For an account of the twelve stabilisation plans before the Real, see Bresser Pereira (1993b).
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in 1993 (O Globo, 1994). According to a practitioner interviewed, Aurelio Nono, tax evasion
is the main problem of the fiscal system He argued that the Federal Revenue Bureau has
5,000 tax collectors, 2,000 of whom are in administrative positions, and that
the Federal Revenue Bureau knows who are the main tax evaders, but it cannot sue them for 
political reasons, given that they are either Congress members or have representatives in 
Congress. In the North-East, for instance, those who do not pay are the sugar plantation 
owners, and they are all Congress members. Other group o f evaders are the big landowners, 
and they too are in Congress 29. I f  the government had political room to sue these people, its 
revenue would double. The amount they owe is more than twice the size o f the government's 
deficit [13 May 1993].
The result of this picture and of the struggle between the federal and the sub-national 
governments has been a taxation and financial systems in complete disarray, with new taxes 
being introduced to temporarily cope with the federal government's cash-flow problems, and 
others abolished, either by the Judiciary or by the government's initiative, because of pressures 
from entrepreneurs, the media and opinion formers30.
2.2.1.2 Revenue Sharing under the 1988 Constitution
Although federal taxes were reduced, this reduction does not mean that the federal 
government decreased its amount of grants to sub-national governments. The main fiscal 
decision made by the Constituent National Assembly was to establish decentralisation through 
a wide range of federal grants to sub-national governments (Shah, 1991: 15), as shown in 
Table 2.4. The decentralisation of tax assignment decreases the federal government's control 
over the revenue it collects and gives it the burden of collecting the higher number of taxes, 
therefore risking being disapproved of by the electorate. Revenue sharing arrangements are 
specified in the 1988 Constitution, which provides strict criteria for the allocation of revenue 
to different levels of government and some guidelines on their distribution through special 
funds among units at the same level Distribution criteria are specified by parliamentary 
regulations. There is no stipulation about the final disposition of these funds by the receiving 
government, except the percentage that each level has to spend on education, i.e. the federal 
government must spend at least 18% of its revenue on education, and states and municipalities
29 Those who represent rural interests in Congress are estimated at ninety-nine members, being the 
biggest interest group in Congress (Veja, 1995: 26).
30 The ambiguities of tax legislation has led the Judiciaiy to interpret it against the government and in 
favour of the taxpayers. It is estimated that the federal government up to 1993 lost a revenue of $3 billion because 
of judicial decisions [N on6,13 May 1993]. It was reported that in 1993 350,000 legal actions were on course 
against the federal Treasury challenging the payment of $6 billion (Gazeta Mercantil, 1993).
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25% of all tax revenues and transfers.
Table 2.4 Tax Assignment in Brazil - 1990
Revenue Source Responsibility Distribution of Revenues
Base Rate Admn. Federal States Municipal
Federal (F):
Income Tax 53 . 0 24.5(a) 22.5
Personal F F, S F
Corporate F F F
Large Fortunes Tax F F F 100.0 0.0 0.0
Import Tax F F F 100.0 0.0 0.0
Export Tax F F F 100.0 0.0 0.0
Tax on Financial
Operations and
Insurance (IOF) F F F 100.0 0.0 0.0
IOF/gold F F F 0.0 30.0 70.0
Rural Property Tax F F F 50 .0 0.0 50 . 0
Tax on Industrial
Products F F F 43 .0 32.0(b) 25.0
States (S):
General Value-added
Tax S S S 0.0 75 .0 25.0
Inheritance and
Gift Taxes S S S 0.0 100 .0 0.0
Motor Vehicles
Registration Tax S S S 0.0 50.0 50.0
. Supplementary
Capital Gains Tax S S S 0.0 100.0 0.0
Municipalities (M):
Services Tax M M M 0.0 0.0 100.0
Urban Property Tax M M M 0.0 0.0 100 .0
.Tax on Retail Sales of
Fuel except Diesel M M M 0.0 0.0 100.0
.Property Transfers M M M 0.0 0.0 100.0
Source: Based on Shah (1991: 13) and Afonso (1994: 13)
Notes: (a) Includes 3% to finance programmes to be administered by Development
Banks of the North-East, North and Centre-West regions.
(b) Includes (a) plus an additional 10% of the IPI as compensation to
exporting states for loss of revenues from the ICMS on account of 
exports.
Federal revenues from Income Tax (IR) and the Tax on Industrial Products (IPI) are 
shared through participation funds established for this purpose. At the state level the fund is 
called FPE - Fundo de Participagao dos Estados and at local level it is the FPM - Fundo de 
Participagao dos Municipios. For FPE the federal government deposits 21.5% of the revenue 
collected from the IR and the IPI In determining state shares from the FPE, the fund first sets 
aside 85% for distribution to states in the North, North-East and Centre-West regions and the 
remaining 15% for the South and the South-East. The formula considers the population size 
and an inverse of per capita income. For FPM the federal government deposits 22.5%, 10% 
being to the state capitals. The distribution of the remaining 90% to other municipalities is
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also by a formula that considers population size and per capita income31.
Apart from this revenue sharing, the sub-national governments enjoy the following 
participation in the Union's revenue: (i) two-thirds of the federal fund for education, the 
FNDE, constituted with resources from the education salary, which is part of the Social 
Contributions; (ii) Income Tax deducted at source from sub-national public servants; and (iii) 
royalties for the exploitation of oil, hydroelectricity and gas32. In case the federal government 
should introduce a new tax, 20% would be shared with the states.
Despite the increase in constitutional grants, negotiated grants were still used by the 
federal government to win the support of sub-national governments. The system of negotiated 
grants was also used by the military regime to gain legitimacy and it provides additional clues 
about the important role of sub-national governments in the political system (Ames, 1987; 
Medeiros, 1986), a point to be developed in more detail in Chapter 5.
Despite the increase in sub-national finances, state and local levels still pressure the 
federal government for more fiscal resources, more grants and more financial help to their 
state commercial banks. Between 1990 and 1991 six state banks were closed by the Central 
Bank because of their high debts to the federal government and in early 1995 the Central Bank 
decided to intervene in several state commercial banks, the most important being those of Rio 
de Janeiro and Sao Paulo 33.
State and local governments also pressure for the 'federalisation' of their debts. An 
example of the 'federalisation' of state debt happened in April 1992. The federal government 
took over the $2.5 billion debt owed by Rio de Janeiro's underground in exchange for the 
political support of Rio de Janeiro state governor Brizola, a former opponent of President 
Collor. This upset other state governors who wanted similar treatment.
The federal government has reacted to these pressures in an ambiguous way. The 
Presidents had tried to create a feeling that the state and local levels were responsible for
31 See Shah (1991) for more details about formula, criteria and implementation of the FPE and FPM 
fends. In 1994 some changes were introduced into the formula. The original formula was based on the proportion 
of the population estimated by the IBGE, which was replaced by a uniform rate based on political agreements 
among regions. Afonso (1994: 73) suggested that the shares of each state and municipality did not vary 
substantially following fee introduction of fee new formula.
32 These natural resources are exploited by fee federal government's state-owned companies. None of 
these revenue sharing schemes should be considered part of fee fiscal federalism concept of horizontal balance 
because what is sent to fee receiving government is not based on its need.
33 These topics are developed in more detail in Chapter 5.
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public sector problems, which include the fiscal crisis and public deficit. On the other hand, 
and because of the increase in the power of the Legislature granted by the Constitution, the 
civilian Presidents need the state governors' support to obtain congressional approval for their 
policies because of the influence the governors exert over the state's delegation in Congress. 
Given that the Presidents have difficulties in guaranteeing a strong and stable parliamentary 
base, they need to maintain good relations with the governors who can influence state 
representation in Congress M. In a milieu of fragmentation and fragility of political parties and 
of an electoral'system of open-list proportional representation, the governors become one of 
the main players in assuring the federal government of its capacity to govern. This picture 
shows that the federal government alone is not in a position to overcome the fiscal constraints 
of Brazil's public finance.
2.2.2 Distribution of Public Responsibilities under the 1988 Constitution
With redemocratisation, political and administrative decentralisation was considered 
a key issue, together with a better distribution of social responsibility among the private 
sector, the sub-national governments and society. The objective was to create a greater degree 
of solidarity among these actors (Souza, 1989). These demands were voiced in the 1988 
Constitution, which brought important changes to the political and administrative systems, 
especially to intergovernmental relations and to the roles played by institutions like the 
Legislature. The changes in intergovernmental relations were more visible in fiscal reform than 
in the responsibilities allocated to each level of government, because the new Constitution 
emphasised common responsibilities, or concurrent powers, between the three levels of 
government. For such an innovation the Constitution established that there should be a law 
defining the rules of cooperation between the three levels of government. This law has not as 
yet been promulgated 35. The Constitution is very detailed about the mechanisms of 
intergovernmental transfers but is not explicit in defining rules for the transference of 
expenditure responsibilities. The 1988 Constitution leaves a large array of functions under the 
common responsibilities of the federal, state and local levels as shown in Table 2.5.
34 An example of former President Collor's concession was the approval by Congress at the end of 1991 
of Law 8388 proposed by the Executive to roll over state and local debts to the federal government over twenty 
years, with the option for an extension of another ten years.
33 So far neither a parliamentarian nor the federal government has presented a proposal to regulate the
subject
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Table 2.5 Expenditure Assignment in Brazil 
Responsible Level Expenditure Category
of Government
Federal only
Federal-State ■ 
Municipality 
(Shared)
State only 
Municipal only
Defence
Foreign Affairs
International Trade
Currency, banking
Use of water resources
National Highways
Planning: national and regional
Guidelines: urban development, housing, sewage, urban
transport
Postal Service
Police: federal and frontier areas
Regulation of: labour, energy, interstate commerce,
telecommunications, insurance, interstate transport, 
mining, employment, immigration, citizenship and native 
rights
Social Security
National Statistical System
Guidelines and basis for national education
Health and public assistance
Protection of the disable persons
Historical, artistic, and cultural preservation
Protection of the environment and the natural resources
Culture, Education, Science
Forests, animals, and flora protection
Agriculture, Food distribution
Housing, Sanitation
Combating poverty and social marginalisation 
Exploration of minerals and hydro-electricity 
Traffic safety
Small business improvement policies 
Tourism, Leisure
Residual powers, i.e. any subject not assigned to 
federal or municipal levels by the Constitution 
Public transport (intracity)
Pre-school and elementary education 
Preventive health care 
Land use
Historical and cultural preservation
Until the 1988 Constitution, Brazil's experience was characterised, on the one hand, 
by the strong concentration of private responsibility at the federal level, and, on the other, by 
the intense use of common responsibility, especially in the social services, where the three 
levels of government overlap in their duty for the provision of services, often leading to 
neglect However, during the military regime the final disposition of revenue was concentrated 
at the federal level, and public policies were decided by the federal government at its own 
discretion. In this sense the use of common responsibilities was a way to prevent the initiatives 
of sub-national governments that did not conform to military/technocratic wishes and to 
maintain their dependency on and loyalty to federal political and economic goals.
On the other hand, the 1988 Constitution kept the discretion to issue certain legislation
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over functions which are to be shared between the three levels under the exclusive 
responsibility of the federal government. Article 22 states that only the federal government 
can legislate on the following functions considered under the scheme of concurrent power 
hydro-electricity; transit and transport; mines and mineral activities; and guidelines for 
education. This means that despite the intense use of concurrent powers, the decision-making 
process is still centralised when it concerns the above-mentioned issues36.
The 1988 Constitution adopted other measures that further empowered sub-national 
governments: (i) the municipalities became part of the federation together with the states, a 
unique case among federal countries and this furthered triple federalism; (ii) the municipalities 
may have their own constitutional law known as Lei Organica Municipal; and (iii) the 
creation of a metropolitan region is no longer a federal issue but is under the aegis of the 
states. During the military regime, the federal government could exert a measure of control 
over the municipalities and the states through the metropolitan regions turning the taps on 
grants on or of£ which amounted to a form of federal intervention (Souza, 1985).
2.2.3 Fiscal Constraints under the 1988 Constitution
A fiscal crisis exists when public resources cannot be expanded to accomplish 
government tasks or liabilities, Le. when the financial pattern is in imbalance. In Brazil the 
State, especially the federal government, has historically had a strong participation in the 
provision of social services and in the economy, not only in its traditional role but mainly 
through direct intervention as producer and as financier. The Brazilian pattern of economic 
growth followed the classical model of the first steps of development, Le. resources were 
achieved through external loans and public investment, with consequences for public finance 
and for the fiscal system. This is why current economic constraints also reflect the fiscal crisis 
of the federal government.
Since the 1930s Brazilian public policies have focused on the aim of industrialisation 
through import substitution. Various federal enterprises were created to fill the empty spaces 
in industrial production, and to supply goods and services to the private sector. This strategy 
increased during the military regime. In the provision of social services, also since 
industrialisation, the government has had a major role in the provision of welfare benefits and 
services such as education and health, the two latter, although universal, have been used
361 am grateful to M. D'Alva Kinzo for pointing this out to me.
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mainly by the poor. In 1986 the three levels of government spent 18.3% of GDP on social 
programmes-, half of it by the federal government, which meant a per capita expenditure of 
around $400. The main item was the social security system at 43%, followed by education at 
23% (UNICAMP/NEPP, 1991: 72) 37.
Brazil's fiscal crisis can be seen in many ways, mainly: (i) in the oscillation of public 
revenue; (ii) in the increase in sub-national expenditure and (iii) in the short maturity of the 
public debt, which suggests the State's loss of credit38. One of the consequences of the fiscal 
crisis is the constraint on public investment which prevents the development of infrastructure 
and services. On the other hand, public savings have been declining since the early 1980s 
while private savings have been rising. Government savings dropped from 7% of GDP in 1973 
to -1.9% in 1988, while private savings, including those of state-owned companies, rose from 
14% in 1973 to 21% in 198839. This decline is a new trend in Brazil The 1980s and 1990s 
were also affected by the interruption in foreign investment and loans.
2.2.3.1 Sub-National Governments and Federal Fiscal Constraints
The 1988 Constitution has been blamed by the federal government, some scholars, 
many economists and by international financial institutions such as the IMF, as partially 
responsible for the fiscal crisis, because it decreased federal revenue and increased the revenue 
of the states and municipalities without transferring services and activities. In fact, 
decentralisation is the dominant characteristic of the system adopted in 1988 not only for tax 
assignments and intergovernmental transfers, but also in the case of expenditure. The 1988 
Constitution placed the Brazilian sub-national governments very close to the average of most 
industrialised federal countries, as Table 2.6 shows.
37 GDP expenditure on social programmes is not so low when compared to developed countries, as 
opposed to per capita expenditure. The USA spent in 1985 18.1% of its GDP in social programmes, with a per 
capita expenditure of $2,835 and the OECD countries spent $2,273 per capita and 25.2% of their GDP (Rose, 
1989: 83).
38 The origin of the current fiscal crisis, which began in the 1980s, is subjected to heated debate among 
economists. Haddad (1995: 17) suggested that it resulted from the government decision to take a considerable part 
of the external debt burden that would otherwise be supported by the private sector. Simonsen (1992: 7) blamed 
die domestic and external debt and inflation. Dain (1992: 35) added to these reasons the increase in subsidies and 
a bad indexation of the taxes.
39 Unpublished data from the IBGE, Central Bank and Ministry of Planning.
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Table 2.6 Total Expenditure by Level of Government in Some Federal 
Countries
Country Ending year Level of 
Central
Government 
State Local
Australia 1987 52 .8 40.4 6.8
Austria 1987 70.4 12 .7 16 . 9
Canada 1987 41.3 40.3 18 .4
Germany 1983 58 .7 21.5 19.8
United States 1987 60.3 17 .3 22 .4
Switzerland 1984 47.5 28 .3 24 .2
Brazil 1987 65.8 24 . 5 9.7
1992 56 . 0 28 . 0 16.0
Sources: Levin(1991:12)and ABRASF(1992:9)
Among developing countries, Brazil has the most decentralised fiscal system In 
Mexico, a highly centralised federation, 80% of public expenditure is controlled by the central 
government (Shah, 1991: 24-6). In India, the federal government also dominates the 
federation, undertaking 70% of expenditure in 1992. The same happens in Indonesia and 
South Africa (Boadway, Roberts and Shah, 1994: 47). In Russia the fiscal system is still under 
reform, but in 1992, 60% of the revenue collected was retained by the federal government. 
Changes are being introduced to reduce sub-national governments' share in the national 
revenue (Wallich, 1992: 33-4). In China, although the central government only undertakes 
47% of direct expenditure, the degree of local autonomy in determining expenditure is limited, 
given that local budgets are part of a consolidated budget comprising all government levels 
(Boadway, Roberts and Shah, 1994: 48).
By the time the Constitution was being written, between 1987 and 1988, the 
municipalities were much better-off than they had ever been in the past thirty years (Serra and 
Afonso, 1991), just the opposite of what the strong lobby for strengthening local government 
was arguing at that time. This trend shows the degree to which Congress was swayed by sub­
national lobbies. The states have recovered the same postion that they held in the early 1970s, 
whereas the municipalities have been the outright winners regarding the increase of tax 
revenues.
However, the approach that views fiscal decentralisation as the main or the only 
element responsible for the public deficit and fiscal crisis does not stand up to more detailed 
data and analysis. Federal government expenditure (Figure 2.2) shows that fiscal imbalance 
was a trend well before the 1988 Constitution was promulgated, especially during the 'miracle'
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years the federal deficit leapt from 4.7% of GDP in 1970 to 8.4% in 1988 (Parente, 1990: 
327).
Treasury revenue 
has been relatively 
stable, when taken as a 
percentage of GDP, but 
a marked decrease 
occurred in the 
collection of federal 
taxes, except in the 
Social Contributions.
The decrease in 
expenditure which 
occurred after 1975, 
ceased in 1988. Taking 
each element of expenditure, the most significant increase occurred in the transfers to the state 
and local level, registering almost 100% increase from 1970 to 1988, even before the stronger 
effects of the 1988 Constitution. While federal revenue remained at roughly the same level as 
during the 'miracle' years, overall spending, including the transfers to sub-national 
governments, rose steadily, which shows that the 1988 Constitution only followed the trend 
of revenue transfers to sub-national governments which already existed 41.
In addition, the federal Treasury has financial obligations to certain sectors, such as 
education, health and social security, and to regions, like the North, the North-East, and the
40 Brazilian economic growth accelerated during the 1970s, averaging close to 10% per annum and this 
growth was known as the economic 'miracle'.
41 The high increase of federal expenditure in 1988 is also explained by the extraordinary use of 
negotiated grants in the course of the constitutional process to guarantee some of the short-term demands of the 
President at that time, a point to be developed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
Figure 22  Federal Government Expenditure 
GDP Percentage 
1970-1988
ODP Percentage
1970 1975 1910 1915 1988
Year
Scarce: Parente (1990:227)
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Centre-West, according 
to constitutional 
mandates. The federal 
government has also the 
constitutional bidding to 
support the creation of 
new states. Despite not 
being a constitutional 
mandate, the federal 
government finances
several local services in 
the Federal District. 
Figure 2.3 shows the 
increased revenue
Source: Parente (1990: 234)
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transferred to sectors,
regions and sub-national governments. During the 1980s revenue transfers were very high to 
regions and sectors but dropped in 1987. In the 1989 fiscal year transfers made by the federal 
government rose to a record level, especially transfers to sub-national governments which 
represented the same amount of revenue as that transferred to regions and sectors.
2.2.3.2 Other Components of the Federal Fiscal Constraints
If the problems created by the increase in sub-national revenues are in the political 
agenda, an important component of federal fiscal constraint has not so far been scrutinised: 
the amount of subsidies and tax reliefs given to the middle class, regions and corporations, 
which explain why leading economists and ex-Finance Ministers (Domelles, 1992; Nobrega, 
1993; Rabello de Castro and Brito, 1992; Simonsen, 1992) lay sole blame on the sub-national 
governments for federal fiscal constraints. Figure 2.4 shows the estimated distribution of tax 
relief to be granted by the Treasury in 1995.
The amount of tax relief in 1995 is similar to what was granted in 1994, around 1.4% 
of GDP. The middle class benefits from Income Tax rebates on what it spends on private 
schools and private health care, family benefit and in the purchase of cars. The private sector 
gets the biggest share, and among the regions the North, where the tax-free zone of Manaus 
is located, is the overall winner. Whereas for subsidies, unpublished data from the CEEG/FGV
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show that at the beginning of the decade they were responsible for an average of 20% of 
federal expenditure. After 1985 they presented a tendency to decrease, reaching their lowest 
figure in 1989, Le. 5% of federal expenditure, but in 1991 they moved up to 7.7%. Subsidies 
are resources which will not return to the Treasury and which are transferred to economic 
sectors. They comprise artificially low prices of goods and services produced by state-owned 
companies, especially public utilities; government's purchase of imported products to supply 
the market or to decrease internal prices; advanced payments for production of goods; plus 
loans by governmental agencies at subsidised interest rates42.
The problem 
with tax relief and
Figure 2.4 Estimated Tax Relief to Individuals, Sectors and Regions 
Percentage of Total Tax Relief 
1995
Private schooling 
Health 
Metallurgy 
Computers 
North Region 
Popular cars 
Family benefit 
North-East Region 
Petrobrai 
Engines & Equipment 
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Others
Source: Veja (1995: 29)
subsidies in Brazil rests 
on the difficulty in 
withdrawing them once 
the conditions for which 
they were set up have 
changed, given 
Congress's and the 
government's sensitivity 
to pressure groups, 
especially those from corporations and regions.
Other political and financial pressures have had an impact on the fiscal system: (i) the 
compression of public tariffs for all state-owned companies in utilities like electricity, 
telephone, railway, mail, and on goods like steel; (ii) the role performed by the Legislature 
after the 1988 Constitution, when its power was considerably increased in several matters. 
Examples of their new rights are: the power to modify the budget, tax proposals and 
governmental plans; the approval of budget surpluses; the power to veto federal executive 
regulations; Senate approval of various presidential nominees, including the Central Bank's 
directors; Senate approval of all treaties and international agreements with foreign 
governments, private creditor banks and international financial agencies; the congressional
42 The BNDES, a federal government development bank, approved in 1994 subsidised loans to the 
amount of $5,9 bilhon (BNDES, 1995).
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approval of TV and radio concessions and renewals, which are used by the federal 
government to influence votes in Congress. The President lost most of the authoritarian and 
exclusive powers of the military regime.
The power to modify the budget became one of Congress's greatest influences over 
government expenditure and it is a point generally ignored by analysts with a few exceptions 
such as Franco (1993). The scheme works as follows: inflation seriously distorts the budgetary 
process. Because the budget is not indexed, the nominal growth of revenues and spending 
overtake budgeted values within a few months. The government then has to send Congress 
amendments to the budget to be able to spend 'excess revenues', which are in fact only a 
nominal excess. This means that the federal government has to negotiate budgetary revenues 
several times during the same fiscal year, giving Congress the chance to create entirely new 
expenditures in each extra-budgetary round.
Therefore, the view that the failure to decentralise responsibilities from the federal to 
sub-national government should be the only element to be blamed for the federal government's 
constraints does not stand up to a more detailed analysis. As mentioned above, this view is 
shared by leading economists and ex-Ministers of Finance and by many politicians 
interviewed during this research, but it is not supported by specialists in fiscal issues, such as 
Afonso (1994), Dain ((1992), Nono [13 May 1993], Serra [2 Feb. 1994], and Sena and 
Afonso (1993). As we will discuss in Chapter 5, there has been an unplanned and 
uncoordinated transfer of responsibilities to the sub-national levels, even if this transfer has 
not changed social policy results and is subjected to distortions.
Federal resources are also under great pressure from lobbying by the most important 
political and economic regions, leading to a kind of regional appropriation of federal 
resources. There is an unwritten agreement between the corporations and politicians of the 
North, North-East and the South-East on how to divide federal resources. The North enjoys 
the biggest share in tax reliefs. The North-East benefits from the resources available in the 
federal budget and in the biggest participation in the scheme of revenue sharing. The South- 
East gets the lion's share of the subsidies: in 1992 and 1993 the region had 44% and 43% of 
the subsidies granted by the biggest public financing institution, the BNDES (BNDES, 1995)
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1995)43. The national media tends to treat the issue of distribution of federal revenues only 
considering revenues allocated in the budget, therefore accusing the North-East of being a 
heavy burden for the country and for the federal resources u .
The fiscal problems faced by the federal government lay more in other aspects of 
Brazilian politics and its economy rather than solely in the amount transferred to the sub­
national governments or in the lack of a replacement for a role previously under the discretion 
of the federal government. Politically, three points are of relevance. First, the power gained 
by sub-national governments and Congress. These two institutions tend to have a regional and 
local view of national issues. Second, the lack of a social consensus on what was to be 
achieved by decentralisation 45. Third, the political difficulties in tackling tax evasion. 
Economically, fiscal problems are more likely to result from (i) the M ure of several 
stabilisation plans destined to bring inflation down; (ii) some years of recession; (iii) the 
difficulties of withdrawing tax relief and subsidies; (iv) the constant changes of federal taxes; 
and (v) the lack of control over the main public revenues and over public expenditure.
The fiscal crisis, however, has been directly affecting the federal government. Apart 
from the picture presented above, the federal government is responsible for the highest public 
deficit46; for the payment of high interest on external and internal debt; for the implementation 
of the Social Security System approved by the 1988 Constitution which increased pensions 
and social rights47; for the payment of the debt to contractors and suppliers, especially the 
building industry, estimated at $7 billion in 1993 (Veja, 1993: 37); for the deficit of the
43 Although politicians speak in favour of less regional inequality, subsidies go where the economic 
activity is more dynamic. During the military regime, however, the concentration of subsidies in the South-East 
and in Sao Paulo was higher. In 1974,68% of BNDES resources were provided to the South-East, and 47% to 
Sao Paulo alone. The Caixa Economica Federal, a federal state-owned bank, provided 64.5% of its funds to the 
region, and 35.4% to Sao Paulo. The Council for Industrial Development provided 77% of its resources to Sao 
Paulo (Payne, 1994: 179).
44 These points are further discussed in Chapter 5.
43 These two points are to be further discussed in the following chapters.
46 The relationship between the net debt of the public sector and GDP is not high when compared to 
other countries (47% in 1985 and 34% in 1991), but its main constraint lays in its short-term financing, in high 
interest rates and in its concentration in the hands of few creditors.
47 Between 1980 and 1990 there was an increase of 60% in the number of pensioners, while the 
population growth rate was 21% in die same period because of the universality of the benefit granted by the 1988 
Constitution. Thirty million workers pay the social security system to support 12,4 million pensioners (IPEA, 
1992b: 13).
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Financial Housing System estimated at $20 billion; and for the deficit of the workers' funds 
constituted of resources from the Social Contributions, the FGTS and the PIS-PASEP, 
estimated at $80 billion (Lundberg, 1992).
2.3 The Federal Government's Reaction
The fiscal problem faced by the federal government vis-a-vis the strength of sub­
national finances does not mean that the federal government is an absent player. It has been 
counteracting on two fronts: politically and financially. Politically, the federal government's 
reaction is concentrated on the use of federal political appointments. It has been estimated 
that the number of political appointed positions in the federal Executive is 63,570, plus the 
directorates of over 100 state-owned companies. Out of these more than 60,000 positions, 
73% are destined for civil servants and 27% are totally free for political negotiation (Folha 
de Sao Paulo, 1994). The President uses these to negotiate with Congress and regional 
leaders and to build coalitions for government. However, though negotiations take place, as 
regional and local interests conflict most of the time with national ones, the political system 
and the decision-making process are in a 'paralysed competitive arena', in which each player 
and decision cancels the other out.
The second front used by the federal government is within the fiscal system itself. The 
main weapon has been the increase in the rates of taxes and contributions which are not shared 
with the sub-national levels. Resources from the Social Contributions rose from 1.5% of GDP 
in 1980 to 4.7% in 1991 48. Only one contribution, the CSLL, based on the employers' net 
profits, which was created by the 1988 Constitution, increased its participation in the public 
sector revenue from 0.9% in 1989 to 3% in 1992. The IOF, which in 1989 accounted for 
0.7% of the public sector revenue, moved to 2.5% in 1992 (Pessoa and Malheiros, 1994: 33). 
This policy has proved successful: taxes under the scheme of transference to sub-national 
governments which represented 51% of public revenue in 1988, became 42% in 1992 
(Afonso, 1994: 51).
The second weapon is the decreasing effort in the collection of the federal taxes that 
are shared with the state and local levels. The IR, which in 1985 represented 4.6% of GDP, 
fell to 3.7% in 1992 and in 1992 the IPI collected the same amount as in 1980: 2.2% of GDP 
(Pessoa and Malheiros, 1994: 32). The IR and the IPI amounts have also decreased because
48 Unpublished data from the CEEG/FGV.
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of tax avoidances granted by the federal government to corporations, therefore decreasing 
the state and municipal participation funds (FPE and FPM)49. Transfers to the FPE and FPM 
were also penalised by the decade's high inflation50.
Another way to address federal fiscal constraints is to decrease expenditure. Since the 
Collor administration the federal government has adopted tough control over its expenditure, 
mainly through the compression of investments and payroll The compression of investments 
can be seen in the performance of the gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), an important 
variable for the analysis of expenditure because it shows not only the amount spent on 
investments but also future expenditure on current consumption. In 1970 the federal 
government was responsible for 36% of the total expenditure on GFCF, the states for 42% 
and the municipalities for 22%. In 1991, the federal government spent 18%, the states 46% 
and the municipalities 36% (Afonso, 1992a: 29). As for payroll expenditure, the compression 
of public servants' wages decreased the amount spent by the federal government on its payroll 
from 4.1% of GDP in 1970 to 3.2% in 1988 and to 2.7% in 1991 (Afonso, 1994: 45).
Other, not so successful, measures were also adopted. Soon after the promulgation 
of the Constitution, the Samey administration threatened the sub-national levels with what 
became known as Operagao Desmonte, meaning that the federal government would 
relinquish responsibilities previously under its discretion. These responsibilities would have 
been transferred to the sub-national levels, whether they were prepared for them or not. An 
outcry by governors and mayors made Congress change the 1989 federal budget in which the 
federal government had not allocated resources to services and activities previously under its 
discretion, a point to be further developed in Chapter 4. Collor tried the least successful 
strategy, namely the decreasing of sub-national revenues through changes in the Constitution. 
He sent Congress what became known as Emenddo, meaning a major constitutional 
amendment, whose most polemic provision was to increase federal revenues by decreasing 
transfers. But the Emenddo was never put to the vote.
49 One example happened in March 1992, 'Mien die federal government made an agreement with the car 
industries and their unions to reduce the payment of the IPI because die former were threatening to close 
factories. This agreement was welcomed by most political, social and economic leaders from all parts of the 
political spectrum.
50 After die promulgation of the Constitution, the federal government had forty-five days to transfer die 
FPE and the FPM Later, under pressure from sub-national governments, Congress passed a bill determining that 
transfers should be made every ten days.
During the Itamar Franco government, the creation of the temporary federal tax IPMF 
was to fall also on financial transactions made by the sub-national governments. One month 
after the law was put into force the Superior Federal Tribunal decided that the levy of the 
IPMF on sub-national transactions was unconstitutional Later, in February 1994, still under 
Itamar Franco and after tough negotiations, Congress approved the creation of the FSE - 
Fundo Social de Emergencia (Emergency Social Fund) initially conceived to decrease federal 
expenditure and to decrease federal transfers to sub-national governments although 
commended to Congress as a fund to counteract the social costs of the forthcoming 
stabilisation plan. The FSE was intended to be the key move in setting the basis for the 
government's 1994 stabilisation plan, the Real. The fund's initial proposal was to ensure that 
the government fiscal position would be kept under control through the retention of 20% of 
all federal taxes, including those transferred to sub-national governments. Congress, however, 
deeply changed the original design of the FSE by excluding from the retained taxes those 
under the scheme of transference and by earmarking most of its receipts for social 
programmes. The FSE was conceived as a temporary fund to be closed in 1995. Revenues 
accrued by the FSE were disappointing: initially intended to raise $16 billion in two years, it 
only raised $1.9 billion in 1994, meaning 0.5% of GDP (Gazeta Mercantile 1994).
Whether or not they were successful, these reactions show that the federal government 
has not relinquished its importance as a political institution, which means that competition for 
power is stronger than ever.
2.4 Conclusions
Two trends have to be considered for a better understanding of decentralisation as a 
consequence of redemocratisation. First, there are common responsibilities distributed 
between the three levels of government that have greatly changed all the previous political, 
administrative and institutional frameworks within which policies and politics were based and 
carried out. The second trend is the political and financial decentralisation that has transferred 
much power from the federal to the sub-national governments. Decentralisation is leading the 
federal system to what could be termed a 'peripheralised' federalism, where sub-national 
political elites play a key role. The data and the analyses in this chapter suggest that the federal 
government alone has limited scope in setting up the necessary adjustments in the political, 
institutional, administrative, financial and economic frameworks. State and local governments 
and the Legislature are now important political actors with whom policies have to be
91
negotiated. A new balance of power was established after the 1988 Constitution as a 
consequence of redemocratisation; thereafter diffused power became the main element of 
Brazil's political structure.
In Brazil decentralisation has always meant a movement against dictatorship and 
centralisation. However, it is the first time since Brazil launched on economic and social 
modernisation that the state level has gained financial strength itself together with the local 
level. The balance of power between the federal and sub-national governments is more 
delicate than ever. The allocation of federal revenue to state and local levels does not mean 
more federal influence over sub-national governments, but it does reflect its vulnerability. The 
expanded powers of Congress, in which governors and mayors of the main states and their 
capitals have strong influence, and the lack of political support for the civilian Presidents mean 
that the President has to negotiate and compromise himself with the sub-national governments 
every time a bill is submitted to Congress. As regional and local interests tend to conflict with 
national needs, especially in fiscal matters, the political system and the decision-making 
process are in a 'paralysed competitive arena'.
The historical view of Brazilian federalism and the current developments in the 
country's intergovernmental relations show the limits of some theoretical formulations 
reviewed above. Theories centred on the Anglo-Saxon or the European traditions are unable 
to explain why federalism in a country like Brazil was maintained as a political ideology. By 
seeing federalism and intergovernmental relations as hierarchical manifestations, these 
formulations decrease the importance of bargaining and conflict-ridden relationships as 
important elements which sustain territorial political pacts. The evidence also shows that 
centralisation-decentralisation movements should be interpreted as a continuum rather than 
as a dichotomy.
The features of a country which has used decentralisation to distance itself from a 
military regime presented in this chapter are the foundations for the analysis of Chapters 3 and 
4. They aim at understanding how and why Brazil became such a decentralised country. They 
account for the research's upstream approach and answer the puzzle of why a country cut 
across by regional inequalities and unresolved issues chose to decentralise. By investigating 
the mechanisms, procedures and the management of conflicts and alliances within the 
Constituent National Assembly, where the decision to further decentralisation was taken, 
both chapters attempt to explain a decision-making process in a milieu of regime change.
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Chapter 3 The Constituent National Assembly: The Initial Stages of the 
Decision to Decentralise
Introduction
This century has witnessed several waves of constitution-making: at the end of World 
Wars I and II; in the transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes in Southern Europe 
in the 1970s and in Latin America in the 1980s; the post-colonial constitutions of the Third 
World; and in Eastern Europe after 1989. Since 1970 Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands and 
Sweden have adopted new Constitutions. Constitution-makings are periods of political 
manoeuvring, bargaining and negotiations when political agreements and disagreements come 
to the fore with greater visibility. How the constitution drafters handle issues posed by 
conflicts and contradictions may bring insights not only on the polity at that moment but also 
on the prospects of the new order.
The Brazilian transition to democracy was a unique process of decentralisation of 
power which joined those who already had power during the military regime with a 
considerable number of new players and institutions. The outcomes of decentralisation are a 
reflection of the way the transition was conducted. Brazil's Constituent National Assembly - 
CNA had a concentration of political forces in two main parties, but that did not make the 
elaboration of the Constitution or the decision to decentralise an easy task, nor, in general, did 
any fringe political force find its demands rejected. A characteristic of the Brazilian 
constitution-making was that individual players were more important than collective ones, 
which made each drafter an extraordinary veto player. In the constitutional process, a paradox 
arose, namely the complete absence of the federal government from the discussions that 
resulted in the weakening of its political and financial power.
There are many accounts of particular constitution-making episodes and some analyses 
of the Brazilian experience. However, a specific investigation of how and why the decision 
to decentralise was taken in Brazil remains missing. Chapters 3 and 4 are intended to fill the 
blank. They account for the thesis's upstream approach and address the puzzle of why a 
country facing many unresolved issues which needed to be delivered nationwide chose to 
decentralise financial and political resources.
This chapter focuses on the understanding of the mechanisms of Brazilian 
constitution-making through the analysis of both its process and substance during the initial
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stages of the CNA. It addresses the following questions relating to the constitutional process 
based on Elstefs propositions (1993: 178). He stressed that the common concern underlying 
these issues is that of legitimacy: (i) how was the constituent assembly called into being? (ii) 
how did it regulate its internal procedures? (iii) how did individual and group interests shape 
the draft? (iv) what was the importance of extra-constitutional forces in shaping the 
constitutional text? By asking these questions this study deepens the understanding of the 
characteristics of the decentralisation reform. These characteristics are important in discussing 
the assumption developed in Chapter 1 that in its implementation the type of conflicts that 
surround a given decision shape future conflicts.
The chapter has four sections. Section 1 examines the political context and pacts 
which preceded the inauguration of the CNA. Section 2 details the initial days of the CNA, 
with references to (i) the profile of the CNA members and (ii) the way the CNA was 
structured to carry out its task. Section 3 presents the evolution of key aspects of 
decentralisation at the initial stages of the constitutional process. Section 4 offers some 
conclusions.
3.1 Political Context and Political Pacts before the Inauguration of the Constituent
National Assembly
As noted in Chapter 1, the Brazilian transition to democracy has been analysed by 
several scholars as a process without rupture with the prevailing order and as a transition that 
took an exceptionally long time. The military decision to return to democratic order has been 
explained through several reasons. The transition dated back to the early 1970s when 
President Geisel promised a 'safe and gradual' political opening up. Later events such as the 
regime's partial defeat in the 1982 elections, the recession of the early 1980s, the Diretas-Ja 
movement and the appearance of civilian leaders willing to compromise with the military’s 
demands furthered the need for political opening up. Nevertheless, the return to democracy 
was achieved within the rules and the timetable defined by those who participated in the 
military pact to govern \  The Brazilian path to redemocratisation was, therefore, similar to 
the Spanish and opposed to the Portuguese, both analysed by Hermet (1988).
1 The expression 'military pact to govern' does not mean that Brazil has a single power elite or that there were 
no disagreements about the transition itself and about its path and content, although the military nucleus of power 
was a restricted one. As pointed out by McDonough (1981) Brazil under the military was (and still is) a country 
in which inter-elite rivalries are great.
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The conditions for the emergence of a ’trustworthy' civilian leadership in a position to
negotiate the transition to democratic order came closer in the early 1980s. A ’trustful’ leader
was the strongest reason why the transition was welcomed by those who participated in the
military pact to govern. Two parties had the pre-requisites to apply, the PDS and the PMDB,
it being considered that the others were too radical On the PDS’s side, soon after the Diretas-
Ja some of its members led by Marco Maciel, Aureliano Chaves and Jose Samey formed a
Liberal Front as a dissident bloc preparing the way to the agreement to be put forward with
the PMDB. On the PMDB’s side three leaders could be considered: Tancredo Neves, Ulysses
Guimaraes and Franco Montoro 2. With his background as conciliator and negotiator, Neves
was the trusted leader of the controlled return to democratic order. Guimaraes and Neves
agreed in late 1983 that if the presidential election was to be direct, Neves would support
Guimaraes and, if defeated, Guimaraes would support Neves (Fleischer, 1990: 221).
3.1.1 Democratic Alliance: The Political Pact of the Transition
In August 1984 the Liberal Front and the PMDB signed a pact called the Democratic
Alliance and launched their political platform through the manifesto ’Pledge to the Nation’.
The pact was threefold. The first part was based on general principles; the second drew
twenty-two general guidelines for political reform and for public policies; and the third
nominated Neves and Samey as candidates for the Presidency. According to an observer of
that period, Jarbas Passarinho
Samey was rejected by Neves, who wanted other politicians to run with him. The relationship 
between them had always been bitter. Samey was the only parliamentarian who was hostile 
to Neves when Neves went to Congress's plenary for a farewell speech before his 
inauguration as governor of Minas Gerais [21 May 1993].
The pact stressed the need to bring other political parties into the alliance. Being so 
general in its goals made adherence to its principles uncontroversial for many political groups,
2 Montoro weakened his position as a presidential candidate because his influence was restricted to the state 
of S5o Paulo. Guimaraes was PMDB's elder statesman, national parly president, and the 'anticandidate1 in the 1973 
indirect election. Neves was from the state of Minas Gerais, where he always had a strong leadership and where 
he was state governor at that time. Neves had a long and 'trustworthy* career in politics as a minister during the 
Vargas government, a prim e-minister chosen by those who reacted against the inauguration of Goulart after the 
resignation of Janio Quadros, and a former senator. Neves had created a party at the beginning of the political 
opening, the PP, with the blessings of the military regime.
including those who had participated in the previous pact3. Some aspects of the pact should 
be highlighted. First, there was no reference to the role of the military in the new democratic 
order, an issue that had already been debated. Second, there was no reference to inquiries on 
corruption or on human rights abuses perpetrated by the military, both topics being subjected 
to press coverage. Third, the use of expressions like 'without resentment* shows the 
conciliatory mood of the transition. Fourth, the pact did not incorporate the demand to call 
for two elections for Congress, one to perform Congress's ordinary duties and the other to 
write the new constitution. Fifth, the strong support given to the pact by the politicians of the 
North-East, traditionally a region where the military and the conservatives held a strong 
influence. Sixth, and relevant to decentralisation, the pact stressed the need to strengthen the 
federation and to promote an effective political and financial autonomy for states and 
municipalities. Fiscal reform was promised *to relieve regional and individual inequalities'. 
Seventh, there was a commitment to call for direct elections at those levels still under indirect 
procedures, Le. the federal Executive and the mayoral positions in state capitals and in 
municipalities considered National security areas' or 'mineral sites', but no date was specified 
4. Finally, the manifesto was unclear about a new political pact to sustain a new model of 
economic, political and social developments. Everything was considered a priority and 
everyone was invited to participate. Nevertheless, the agony of the Developmental State, 
around which the preceding alliance had been made, was already clear. The Democratic 
Alliance avoided (or could not lace) the elaboration of a strategy to restructure the role of the 
State through consensus and to limit the participants in the pact.
As a result of the pact on 15 January 1985, Neves was indirectly elected President and 
Samey Vice-President against Paulo Maluf, from the PDS, with 70% of the votes of the 
electoral college 5. As Fleischer (1990: 222) noted, the Neves-Samey ticket received 312
3 There were rumours that Neves had sealed a secret pact with the military (Campello de Souza, 1989; 
Fleischer, 1990) but nothing has ever been proved. Agreements with the military were not impossible given that 
the Brazilian military were not in such distress as those elsewhere in Latin America. The presence of the military 
as important actors during the transition was recognised by Stepan (1988). Samey and Guimaraes also admitted 
that the military were active members of the transitional pact (Boeker: 1990: 227 and 286).
4 The states had been free to have direct elections since 1982.
5 Maluf s candidacy was against the military's will They wanted Mario Andreazza, a military officer and several 
times minister Maluf defeated Andreazza at the PDS's Conference to choose the candidate, partially with the votes 
of those from the Liberal Front who were still members of the PDS. The Electoral College was constituted of 
Congress members and of representatives of the states' legislatures.
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votes from the four opposition parties combined and 168 from the PDS. Without the support 
of these PDS dissidents, Neves's victory would have been impossible. The North-East gave 
the Neves-Samey ticket 155 of its 230 votes, and many of these crucial votes were from PDS 
dissidents.
The days before the inauguration were used by Neves to build up a complicated 
scheme to appoint his ministers. Neves incorporated the main political tendencies that backed 
his election. The so-called New Republic then took a clearer shape with its contradictions and 
unresolved conflicts. Later, as a result of the difficulties of a political system caught up in its 
effort to reconcile contradictory actors and events, the spectrum of political forces with niches 
of power became even broader.
However, seventy-five years old Neves was hospitalised on the eve of his 
inauguration. Thirty-seven days after he should have assumed power, Neves died. Samey's 
lack of charisma and legitimacy as a former president of the PDS, coming from a small state 
from the North-East and occupying a seat he said he did not want (and many claimed that he 
was not prepared for) made the management of the broad coalition built up around the 
Democratic Alliance almost impossible 6. As Selcher (1986: 89) argued, the pro- 
democratisation coalition faced more divisive questions in policy formation and execution, 
without the articulator who pulled it together.
When time came for calling up the CNA, the political structure in the country was in 
practice different from that of the initial stages of the political opening, especially in relation 
to the following institutions: the governorships, Congress, the military, and the bureaucracy. 
The governors had been popularly elected in 1982, this meant that regional politicians were 
well-known actors encompassed by the legitimacy of their direct election as opposed to the 
indirect election of the President. Although the 1986 elections were centred on the 
governorships, after the inauguration of the new Congress their members were surrounded 
by an expectation of making deep changes in the country to accomplish the democratic ideals 
expressed by the Democratic Alliance. The fact that Congress was not closed down during 
the military regime also gave the institution enough strength to quickly recover its place as an 
important political institution. However, both institutions, the governorships and Congress,
6 At the beginning of his term Samey's legitimacy in occupying the Presidency was questioned by the majority 
of political forces. This reaction was symbolised by the behaviour of the last military President, Joao Figueiredo, 
who refused to go to Samey's inauguration, arguing that Samey was a betrayer.
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are likely to give voice to regional and local interests, where 'parochial' decisions tend to 
prevail7.
On the other hand, the militaiy and the bureaucracy had weakened their position in the 
political game. By nature, these institutions are less open and more subjected to discipline and 
hierarchy. The militaiy, despite being the feared members of the new political pact and being 
eventually used to threaten Congress and civilian leaders, were in a distressing position given 
the economic M ures of the early 1980s and the widespread awareness of their role in the 
deterioration of the country's social conditions. The bureaucracy, after enjoying a period of 
prestige, had weakened their position in the political market8. No research has yet analysed 
this decline in depth, but there is an agreement that the bureaucracy was demoralised 
(Martins, 1991), tended to replace quality for quantity, resulting in low salaries and expertise 
9 (Abranches, 1989) and subjected to the invasion of several competing groups (Souza, 
1991a). Apart from these institutional changes, there was a high degree of social mobilisation 
towards consolidating democracy and shaping a new political order (Souza and Lamounier, 
1990: 85).
The changes in the profile of these four institutions, together with the coalitions built 
during the initial years of the transition to democracy and the development of the Democratic 
Alliance, show that the democratic transition was peculiar not only in the sense raised by 
scholars who have analysed it as a process without rupture. It was also a unique process in 
the decentralisation of power, of the creation of several unequal but competing power centres. 
This process was the result of bringing together those who already had power during the 
military regime and a considerable number of new players and institutions that had a 
secondary but crucial role during the military years, such as the Legislature and sub-national 
governments and their politicians. These new players had always been part of the political 
arena and their shadowy but important role gave them the strength and knowledge to obtain
7 'Parochial' means, in this sense, the supremacy of merely local or issues restricted in scope.
8 Brazilian bureaucracy has been widely analysed, especially its role under the military regime. See Batley 
(1983), Cardoso (1979), B. Schneider (1991) and Stepan (1971).
9 Haddad (1995) showed that in 1991 the average monthly wage for a civil servant in the Executive Branch was 
US$477. In the same year, die average monthly wages in the Legislative and Judiciary Branches were US$3,265 and 
US$3,017 respectively. In addition, salary levels in the Executive have been falling steadily, i.e. the average monthly 
salary in 1987 was US$550.
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extraordinary power.
3.2 The Calling Up of the Constituent National Assembly
As scheduled by the Democratic Alliance, the elections due on 15 November 1986 for 
Congress elected those who were going to write the new constitution. Thirty parties 
participated in those elections; twelve elected delegates. The PMDB was the overall winner 
for the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, the state legislature and for governorships 10. 
Disputes between contestants for governorships and the Cruzado Plan 11 polarised the debates 
and there were few discussions concerning the CNA.
Table 3.1 Party Composition in the Inauguration of the CNA
Party 12 Number %
PMDB 302 54 . 0
PFL 133 23 .8
PDS 38 6.7
PDT 26 4.6
PTB 19 3.4
PT 16 2.9
PL 7 1.3
PDC 6 1.1
PC do B 6 1.1
PCB 3 0.5
PSB 2 0.4
PMB 1 0.2
Total 559 100 . 0
Source: Calculation based on data from the Superior Tribunal Eleitoral.
The PMDB and the PEL together had more than two-thirds of the CNA's members. 
The opposition parties with commitments to progressive 13 demands, Le. the PT, PDT, PSB,
10 The PMDB's overall majority did not represent the victory of its party platform over others. Many authors 
(Campello de Souza, 1989; Kinzo, 1994; Lamounier and Meneguello, 1986; Mainwaring, 1992) agree that Brazil 
is a notorious case of political party underdevelopment when compared to other countries.
11 The Cruzado Plan was the second and longest economic stabilisation plan of the New Republic. It was a 
heterodox policy in the sense that it acted directly over prices, wages and the exchange rate. Inflation went from 
14% per month to almost zero because of the price freeze. The Plan caused the impression that the government 
had recovered its capacity to govern and to define economic policies, articulated around a project of economic 
development with equity. When, in December 1986, it turned out to be impossible to hold frozen prices, inflation 
exploded. The Cruzado Plan promoted a temporary income distribution that helped it gain enormous popular 
support
u The PCB changed its name to PPS after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the PDS and die PDC merged in 1993 
to constitute the PPR.
13 In the context of the CNA, die right-left axis is not the best way to distinguish political groups. This study 
opted to label the traditional group and those who had supported the previous regime as conservative and those 
who opposed authoritarian measures and had a general commitment to the increase of social rights, benefits and 
political freedom as progressive. This classification is not totally satisfactory because within the PMDB there 
were representatives of both groups. Those groups were not monolithic nor did they have a clear and articulated
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PC do B and PC, had only 9.6% of the CNA's members (Table 3.1). Apparently such a 
concentration of forces in the two parties responsible for the transition to democracy would 
make the elaboration of the Constitution an easy task. This did not happen, nor, in general, 
did the progressive forces find their demands rejected.
3.2.1 Profile of the Constituent National Assembly's Members
Who were the people elected to design the new political, social and economic map that 
would conduct the country in the years to come? The CNA had 559 members: seventy-two 
senators and 487 federal deputies in charge to draw up the seventh Brazilian constitution, 
from twenty-four states and two territories 14.
The CNA's delegates were analysed by Coelho and Oliveira (1989), Fleischer (1990), 
Folha de Sao Paulo (1987), Kinzo (1990), Rodrigues (1987) and Veja (1987). These surveys 
found that the CNA's members had the following features. First, the data destroyed the myth 
that the opposition party during the militaiy regime, the PMDB, was the overall winner of the 
CNA, given the high number of PMDB's affiliates who had previously belonged to the 
military's supporting party, the PDS. Therefore, the presence of the old regime in the two 
parties that sustained the New Republic was high. As Campello de Souza (1989: 355) put it, 
continuities can always be observed in non-revolutionary transitions, but the degree of 
continuity in the Brazilian transition is extraordinary 15. Second, the CNA had 49% new 
members, a figure comparable to turnover rates in previous sessions of the Brazilian Congress. 
High turnover rate is an important clue in an understanding of the outcomes of the CNA 
because it increases the chance of the adoption of short-term measures and perspectives. 
However, high turnover does not mean that Congress members are expelled from politics. 
They tend to run for executive positions and/or to return to Congress in the following period. 
As for their previous experience, only 135 members had no previous political experience 
before their election to the CNA. Of those with previous experience, 54% had been popularly 
elected as city council members, mayors, state deputies or governors. These figures show a
project towards the maintenance of the status quo or the scope and the length of the reforms.
14 536 members were elected on 15 November and twenty-three were already in die Senate due to the 
electoral system that keeps one-third or two-thirds of die Senators at each election, considering they have an eight- 
year term.
15 Heischer (1990:250) noted that in 1985 85% of the 50,000 federal politically appointed positions down to 
the fifth echelon were occupied by people who had held similar positions in the last three military governments.
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considerable number of politicians with ties to the state and local tiers and to the old regime. 
Third, a survey carried out by Veja (1987: 20) based on specific issues that would be debated 
in the CNA found that the members of the CNA were conservative in issues of order and 
moral values and audacious in economic and social rights reforms.
The high degree of heterogeneity of the CNA's delegates coupled with the broad 
character of the transition could lead to two possibilities: (i) either negotiations and 
compromises between groups with some ideological affinity, placing on one side the 
conservatives and on the other the progressives, leading to confrontations or (ii) negotiations 
and compromises between antagonistic ideological groups leading to consensus in certain
s
issues and leaving to the future the decisions on which consensus could not be achieved. The 
former occurred only on few specific issues and the latter was the CNA's mark. The role of 
the CNA's President Guimaraes was crucial until the very end in maintaining this delicate and 
unstable balance of consensus-building among several opposing groups and individuals.
As in many authoritarian regimes the Brazilian one was based on coalitions of 
restricted groups. If transition through a moderate leader was to ease the disintegration of the 
old coalitions, drawing limits for newcomers and avoiding the possibilities for going back to 
the old regime, these propositions were not totally met in Brazil. Both the old coalition and 
the new players came to the fore with extraordinary power. Few groups were excluded, as the 
victories and defeats of both sides in the CNA proved. The political developments were not 
able to limit the length and the number of participants in the pact. The emphasis on 
consensus-building boosted the number of players with access to political goods and to the 
decision-making process and intensified conflicts and cleavages. Structural reforms were 
difficult to tackle in such an environment. The political structure was not able to reconcile the 
different groups in the political arena and to set limits to their power. The calling of the CNA 
congested even more the agenda of the transition. Political and financial decentralisation found 
its roots in that process.
3.2.2 Actors and Events in the Initial Days
The call for the formation of the constituent assembly which would also perform the 
duties of the ordinary Congress was the first rupture between the progressives and the
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conservatives 16. It was also a chance for the progressives and those of the left to mobilise 
social movements to perform an active role in the constitution-making process. By assigning 
the task to write the new constitution to an ordinary legislature, Neves calmed the fears of 
the mflitaiy and the PEL leaders of possible radicalism in an all-powerful exclusive assembly. 
At the same time this attitude promoted the first rupture with the progressive forces which 
for nearly ten years had lobbied for an exclusive constituent assembly. The fact that it was not 
exclusive also had other consequences, such as the allowing of the participation of twenty- 
three Senators appointed in 1978 by the military and the limiting of the CNA's sovereignty 
because it could not make any amendment to the previous Constitution.
Another source of conflict was the decision taken by Neves and followed by Samey 
to create a commission to draft a constitution to be presented to the CNA for discussion. The 
Commission of Notables, as it became known, had forty-nine members and was presided over 
by Afonso Arinos, a senior and respectable jurist with reformist proposals. The Commission 
issued its report on 26 September 1986 but was formally ignored by the members of the CNA 
and by Samey, for different reasons. Congress members considered the initiative a threat 
against the sovereignty of the CNA. Samey rejected the draft because it adopted 
parliamentarianism as the new system of government, which he was against 17. The 
Commission of Notables ended up drafting a constitution which incorporated many demands 
from the progressives. It was a preview of the agenda of the CNA and of the pressures that 
the social movements were about to put to bear. Other institutions were also involved in the 
constitutional debate. As Baaklini (1992: 164) described, several university research centres, 
professional associations and unions, publishing houses, individuals, and groups published 
their own versions of what they thought the new constitution should contain.
On 28 June 1985 Samey sent to Congress the Mensagem (Presidential Message) No. 
330 (No. 48 in Congress) calling for the CNA. On 7 August the Mensagem was read at the 
Plenary. Its mam topics were: (i) the CNA should be free and sovereign, without impositions 
such as the reviewing of the republic or the federal system, both prohibited in the calls to draw
16 Many constituent assemblies have been, at die same time, ordinary legislatures. Elster (1994a: 18) lists the 
Asemblee Constituante and all later French constituent assemblies, and the constituent assemblies in Southern 
and Eastern Europe over the last two decades. Exceptions include the Federal Convention, the Frankfurt 
Parliament of 1848, and the Parliamentary Council that drafted the German Grundgesetz.
17 This rejection was only apparent because, as stressed by Haroldo Lima, leader of the PC do B, the Brazilian 
maoist party, every member of the CNA was influenced by the draft [30 April 1993].
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new constitutions under previous democratic orders; (ii) senators and federal deputies should 
be the members of the CNA, breaking the traditional review role of the Senate; and (iii) the 
elections for the CNA should coincide with elections for governorships and state legislatures.
Social movements exerted strong pressure to prevent the CNA from not having the 
only role in the drawing of the constitution. Many debates took place, and one amendment 
was put to the vote to launch a plebiscite to decide whether the CNA should be an exclusive 
legislature or an ordinary one. Thousands of letters and cables arrived in Congress calling for 
the former alternative. The debates at the Plenary started in October and the final amendment 
was approved only on 27 November 1985, through Constitutional Amendment No. 26 18.
The work of the CNA started on 1 February 1987, with its installation by the President 
of the Federal Supreme Court Jose Carlos Moreira Alves. The following day the CNA elected 
Guimaraes as its president. Guimaraes was also the president of the Chamber of Deputies and 
the national president of the PMDB. As president of the Chamber he also served as acting 
President in the absence of the President of the Republic. Guimaraes, a moderate politician, 
had a strong and wide leadership which he used to arbitrate on the various conflicting forces 
not only in his divided and contradictory party but also in the CNA and in the relationship 
between Congress and the Executive. The results reached in the final draft of the Constitution, 
where many sensitive issues were avoided, can be credited to Guimaraes's conciliatory 
leadership.
However, before the CNA took its seats, the Samey government was in full swing,' 
in his second year 19. Samey built up his fragile political and parliamentary support over the 
parties, trying to decrease PMDB's and Guimaraes's powers. According to Senator 
Passarinho,
Samey was Guimaraes's prisoner. The PMDB delayed as much as possible the decision 
regarding Samey's term in office to keep him under control. Guimaraes appointed, fired and 
vetoed ministers [21 May 1993].
Samey was doomed by his lack of legitimacy and by the impossibility of accomplishing 
the country's high expectations, stimulated by previous events such as the Dir etas-Ja, Neves's 
victory in the indirect election, the propositions of the Democratic Alliance and the first
,8Published on 28 November 1985, p. 17422, in the DiarioOficial (the official journal of the government).
19 See Campello de Souza (1989) and Fleischer (1986).
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excellent results of the Cruzado Plan in early 1986. Uncertain policies, populists' concessions 
to still powerful segments, suspicions of corruption, the failure of the Cruzado Plan and, most 
of the time, the paralysis in the decision-making processes, were the main legacies of the 
Samey administration. His presidency was also notable for the beginning of the struggle 
between Congress and the federal Executive. This tension is one of a permanent type in every 
democratic country, especially under the presidential system, but in Brazil the 1964 
authoritarian regime kept Congress open and elections were used to give the military some 
legitimacy. As mentioned above, Congress had the requisites to regain its powers even before 
the promulgation of the Constitution. Among the reverses the Samey administration suffered 
in Congress was the federal government proposal to pass a tax reform to increase local 
governments' finances. The government proposal was replaced by a more comprehensive bill 
presented by federal deputy Airton Sandoval, giving the initial signs that financial 
decentralisation was to be achieved 20.
The second battle within the CNA concerned its functioning, a subject of hot debate 
between two competing groups, which would later split into several subgroups. On the one 
side, were members from the PFL, PDS, PTB and many from the PMDB, who formed the 
conservative group. On the other, were some of PMDB's delegates and those from the 
progressive parties who were pushing for radical changes and a for a total break with the past. 
The battle behind the definition of how the CNA should work was mainly around how far the 
CNA should go in the task of removing authoritarian legal instruments, known as entulho 
autoritario (authoritarian refuse). President Samey was against the right of the CNA to 
remove the laws promulgated during the military regime, especially because he was becoming 
extremely unpopular. Already, in the streets there were calls to shorten his term 21. Other 
sensitive topics were already being discussed before the inauguration of the CNA, such as the 
form of government, either presidential or parliamentary, land reform and, led by mayors and 
state governors, financial decentralisation.
Senator Fernando Henrique Cardoso (then PMDB-SP) was the rapporteur for the
20 Through this proposal, which became Constitutional Amendment No. 27 issued on 28 November 1985, the 
municipalities gained from the federal government an increase of 1% in their PPM'S share.
21 According to the previous Constitution, the President had a six-year term.
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Internal Rules of the CNA. On 24 March 1987 the Internal Rules were finally promulgated 
22 with a speech by the President of the Chamber, Guimaraes, and he highlighted (i) the 
novelty of the Internal Rules because the Constitution was going to be drawn from below, i.e. 
there was not going to be only one committee to design a draft of the Constitution, but 
twenty-four subcommittees that later would be merged into eight committees and finally into 
a systematisation committee of ninety-seven members, and plenary sessions with two rounds 
of voting; (h) the arrangements with radio and television to broadcast daily the works of the 
CNA; (iii) the performance of the rapporteur, Senator Cardoso, for his 'talent, flexible and 
creative behaviour1 and (iv) the performance of the twelve party leaders 23 who had 
contributed to 'clearing up misunderstandings, enriching the Internal Rules with suggestions 
and changes, promoting consensus'.
One innovation of the Internal Rules was to allow the proposal of amendments to 
come from outside Congress in two ways. One, from the state and local legislative chambers 
plus the Tribunals, which was not much used during the process; and the other coming 
directly from the population, when up to 30,000 voters could sign a proposal under the 
responsibility of three associations accountable for the signatures. This mechanism was widely 
used by social movements and organisations to lobby in favour of issues blocked by the 
conservatives. These amendments were included in the Internal Rules as part of the 
negotiations with the progressive parties following the ideal of strengthening collective 
citizenry as opposed to isolated political behaviour. Thousands of demonstrators arrived in 
Brasilia from all over the country during the debates on the Internal Rules to pressure in 
favour of what was called 'popular participation' in the CNA In another direction, but also 
stimulating the participation of the population in the writing of the Constitution, a branch of 
the Senate, the PRODASEN, accountable for Congress's sophisticated informational 
technology, established a system through the network of post-offices in which any citizen
22 The Internal Rules were approved through Resolugao No.2, published by the Assembleia NacionaJ 
Constituinte (1987).
23 The parties leaders at that time were: Luiz Henrique (PMDB-SC), later replaced by Mario Covas (PMDB- 
SP), Jose Louren9 0  (PFL-BA), Amaral Netto (PDS-RJ), Brandao Monteiro (PDT-RJ), Gastone Righi (PTB-SP), 
Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva (PT-SP), Adolfo Oliveira (PL-RJ), Mauro Borges (PDC-GO), Haroldo Lima (PC do 
B-BA), Roberto Freire (PC-PE), Jamil Haddad (PSB-RJ) and Antonio Farias (PMB-PE). When party affiliation 
and die state from which the parliamentarian has been elected are used in the text, they are identified by the name 
of the parliamentarian, with the acronyms of the party and state in parenthesis.
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could write his or her suggestion for the Constitution. Under the PRODASEN1 s scheme 
72,719 suggestions arrived in Congress, making this participation, plus the one related to the 
amendments sponsored by the social movements, unique in the world, as Monclaire (1991) 
suggested. The Internal Rules also allowed public hearings at subcommittees level, to 
encourage the participation of invited specialists and even those who came spontaneously.
There were 69,166,963 electors enrolled to vote in the 1986 elections; 122 popular 
amendments were signed by over 12,000,000 voters and eighty-three fulfilled the requirements 
set up in the Internal Rules, achieving the right to defend them at the Systematisation 
Committee 24. These schemes of popular participation were unique as compared to other 
countries which had their constitutions rewritten in the 1970s and 1980s25.
The enthusiasm that the CNA was able to trigger can be seen by the results of a survey 
by IDESP in the city of Sao Paulo from 1974 to 1988. It shows that while in 1974, 1978 and 
1982 only 11% of the respondents were said to have a great interest in politics, in 1986 and 
1987, Le. the years when the Constitution was being debated, 21% and 20%, respectively, 
were said to have great interest. By 1988 the high interest in politics was down again; only 
13% of the respondents still expressed their high interest in politics (Muszynski and Mendes, 
1990: 63). A comparison between the results of that survey with another by Jornal da Tarde 
on 26 October 1987, which shows that only 25% of the respondents approved the 
performance of the members of the CNA, gives grounds to an affirmation that there was a 
movement towards direct participation as a result of the popular participation that happened 
during the initial years of the transition to democracy. These figures, plus more than twelve 
million signatures for the popular amendments and over 72,000 persons who signed proposals 
under PRODASEN’s scheme, show the high confidence that people had in the CNA and,
24 This figure is approximate because each voter was entitled to sign three popular amendments. The lobby in 
favour of the preservation of tax allowances for quangos administered by employers' confederations to sponsor 
training schemes for workers was the one with the highest number of signatures (1,111,916), followed by 
amendments in favour of the preservation of private schools to receive grants from the government, which was 
led by the catholic universities, with 750,077 signatures. On the progressive side, an amendment sponsored by 
the workers' union CUT calling for the expansion of workers' rights, higher protection for workers by the social 
security system and the right of retirement for rural workers, was able to collect 743,718 signatures and an 
amendment in favour of the agrarian reform had 638,469 signatures. The first three amendments were 
incorporated in the Constitution and die one on agrarian reform lost in the Plenary. For more details on the popular 
amendments see Comissao de Sistematizagao da Assembleia Nacional Constitutinte (1987).
23 In Spain, for instance, the subcommittees worked under strict secrecy and the joint committee, with eleven 
members, was characterised by its secret talks (Bonime-Blanc, 1987).
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therefore, the high degree of political efficacy the CNA was able to trigger26.
The presence of all kinds of lobbies, unions and corporatist groups was the CNA daily 
routine and for twenty months Congress and Brasilia were the centre of Brazilian life, the core 
of power, a visible exercise in democracy and political participation. This participation became 
an important instrument for the legitimisation of redemocratisation.
3.2.3 Internal Functioning of the Constituent National Assembly
The internal functioning of the CNA was as shown in Table 3.2. According to the 
Internal Rules, each subcommittee and committee was headed by a president, two vice- 
presidents and one rapporteur. The committees had around sixty-three members and the 
subcommittees around twenty-one. The president and the vice-presidents were elected by the 
members of the subcommittee or committee and the president nominated the rapporteur. 
Members of the subcommittees and committees were chosen according to their party 
representation, which meant that the biggest parties, the PMDB and the PFL, monopolised 
the main positions. However, the progressives managed to control several important positions.
Within a subcommittee and a committee, the mam position was that of the rapporteur 
because he or she was in charge of drafting the first version of the topic. Unless endorsed by 
the majority of the members, the rapporteur was not obliged to accept proposals coming from 
other members or from other forms of participation.
The roots of the CNA were marked by confrontations on some issues, coalitions in 
most of the cases and postponements when consensus could not be reached. Coalitions were 
made and remade. For almost every issue or roll-call a new bloc was created and later 
dismissed. The whole process of constitution-making had its own logic distinct from that of 
a political party platform or ideological coherence but coalescence could be found within each 
group and subgroup, a point to be developed more in the next chapter.
26 Political efficacy means, in this sense, the extent to which citizens feel confident of their ability to participate 
in the political process and to influence government policies.
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Table 3.2 Committees and Subcommittees of the CNA
Subcommi 11ee Committee
.Nationality, Sovereignty and Sovereignty, and
International Relations the Rights of Men
.Political Rights, Collective 
Rights, and Guarantees 
.Individual Rights and 
Guarantees
and Women
.Union, Federal District Organisation
and Territories* of the
.States*
.Municipalities and Regions*
State*
.Legislative Power Organisation
.Executive Power of the Three
.Judicial Power Powers and System
and Public Prosecutors of Government
.Electoral System and Electoral
and Political Parties System,
.Defense of the State, Society Parties and
and their Security Institutional
.Safeguard of the Constitution, 
Its Reforms and Amendments
Guarantees
.Taxation, and Sharing and Tax System,
Distribution of Revenues* Budget and
.Budget and Fiscal Oversight 
.Financial Systems
Finance*
.General Principles, Intervention Economic
of the State, Ownership of 
Underground Resources and Economic 
Activities
.Urbanisation and Transport 
.Agricultural Policy, Rural Policy 
and Agrarian Reform
Order
.Rights of Workers and Public Servants Social
.Health, Social Welfare and Environment 
.Blacks, Indigenous Populations, 
Disabled, and Minorities
Order
.Education, Culture and Sports Family, Education,
.Science and Technology and Culture and Sports
Communication Science and Technology
.Family, Minors and Elderly and Communication
Systematisation Committee*
Plenary Sessions★
(Two rounds of roll-call voting)
Note: * Subcommittees and Committees to be analysed in Chapters 3 and 4.
3.3 Coalition-Building within the Subcommittees
The subcommittees were the first stage of constitution-making. At that level 
negotiations were strong only for issues promoting important changes when compared to the 
previous scheme, as detailed below.
3.3.1 Subcommittee on the Union, Federal District and Territories
This subcommittee had as president Jofran Frejat (PFL-DF), first vice-president
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Meira Filho (PMDB-DF), second vice-president Rubem Figueiro (PMDB-MS) and as 
rapporteur Sigmaringa Seixas (PMDB-DF). The composition of the main positions in the 
subcommittee, with three of its four main members elected by the Federal District, shows the 
priority of the subcommittee: to achieve the political independence of Brasilia 21. The 
subcommittee, also in charge of the jurisdictions and powers of the Union, concentrated all 
its efforts on expanding the political representation of Brasilia and assuring financial resources 
for the Federal Capital
The report delivered by Seixas stressed that the main alteration made in the 
subcommittee was related to the federation. The argument had been a common cliche among 
politicians: in previous years, especially after the promulgation of the 1967 Constitution, the 
federation was centralised under the Union. Seixas asked in his report: who does not know 
that states and municipalities are always begging for federal revenues and are supported by 
federal transfers?. The autonomy of states and municipalities, according to the report, even 
if formally assured, could not be put into practice because of the concentration of revenues 
in the Union. According to Seixas, this imbalance stimulated regional disparities which 
affected not only national development but also political interrelationships within the 
federation. Seixas mentioned that the long practice of centralised federalism could not be 
abolished overnight, which is why he proposed the expansion of the common responsibilities 
between the three tiers of government.
The subcommittee received 289 proposals and held five public hearings with a strong 
presence of personalities from the Federal District and the territories that were lobbying for 
their transformation into states. Public hearings at all phases of the CNA are a good source 
for the identification of the interest groups which had access to the decision-making process.
Among the measures adopted by the subcommittee were: (i) the maintenance of the 
traditional statement on members of the federal pact, which includes the Union, the states and 
the Federal District. Only later did the municipalities become members of the federal pact; (ii) 
the expansion of the Union's assets and powers as compared to the previous Constitution28;
21 One of die commitments of the Democratic Alliance was to enact the political representation of Brasilia,
meaning that the Federal District could elect its own legislative and executive branches. So far elections were for
only the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The governor of Brasilia was appointed by the President of the
Republic.
28 For a comparison between the 1946,1967,1969 and 1988 Constitutions, see Senado Federal (1991).
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(iii) the expansion of common responsibilities between the three tiers of government. When
this subcommittee was incorporated by the committee of the Organisation of the State, all the
common responsibilities were eliminated, hut they were later approved; (iv) the right of the
municipalities to promulgate their Organic Law, which functions like a municipal constitution;
(v) restriction on the right of the municipalities' legislative chamber in determining the salary
of their councillors, which, according to the proposal of the subcommittee, should be decided
by the state. At the Systematisation Committee the councillors were given the right to define
their salary within limits established by the constitution of each state. Lordello de Mello, a
supporter of the autonomy of local institutions, said that the Constitution exaggerated this
issue [13 April 1993]; and (vi) the military police of the Federal District should be organised
and maintained by the Federal District itself At the Systematisation Committee this
jurisdiction returned to the federal government. According to Seixas, this issue was crucial
for the Federal District, which wanted, but did not achieve, control over the military police
and the Judiciary [13 May 1993].
Seixas acknowledged that he was not under pressure during his term, from state
governors, mayors or officials from the federal government or from corporatist groups. In his
own words: I used to say that I had no prestige because nobody would pressure me [13 May
1993]. He believed that the lack of pressure was because decentralisation would occur only
if resources were also decentralised.
However, the political status of the Federal District required intense negotiations.
Seixas's commitment in strengthening the Federal District's resources was fundamental in
assuring Brasilia the collection of both state and municipal taxes. In the words of Seixas:
Negotiations were hard and sometimes I  thought that autonomy was not going to he achieved. 
There was also the problem of revenues, because the Federal District had always hadfederal 
transfers and autonomy could block the possibility of receiving more resources and this 
would bring serious problems for some services. However, 1 cannot say that there were 
pressures against political autonomy for the Federal District, but there were difficulties in 
convincing the federal government to support the degree of autonomy we wanted [13 May 
1993].
The events in this subcommittee show that concerns about the design of new 
intergovernmental relations, how to cope with new conflicts brought about by 
decentralisation, and discussions about the new role of the federal government in a 
decentralised political and financial system were not issues at that time. Therefore, 
decentralisation was adopted without a clear definition based on a social consensus of what
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was to be achieved.
3.3.2 Subcommittee on Municipalities and Regions
This subcommittee had as president Luiz Alberto Rodrigues (PMDB-MG) and as 
rapporteur Aloysio Chaves (PFL-PA). The North-East and the Centre-West, which are 
traditionally accused of practising clientelism through local and state governments, were over­
represented, which shows the importance these regions gave to the issues under discussion 
at the subcommittee. Surprisingly, given the number of former mayors and local councillors 
who were members of the CNA, only one member of the subcommittee had been a city 
councillor before, one had been mayor three times and two had been mayors and city 
councillors before their election to Congress.
The subcommittee held eight public hearings with the participation of several mayors, 
city councillors and some practitioners. It was influenced by the proposals of IBAM, the 
private institution committed to the defence of local governments' demands IB AM’s proposals 
were lobbied by Lordello de Mello.
In his report Chaves summarised the main proposals of the subcommittee. First, the 
inclusion of the municipality as part of the federal pact, despite some theoretical 
considerations against this proposal The reason, argued the rapporteur, is that this inclusion 
is the political aspiration of every Brazilian. Second, a detailed definition of what should be 
considered as a municipal responsibility was introduced. This detail should be included 
because the citizen will claim the provision of the service from the municipality, even at the 
risk of being too much of a detail for a Constitution, said the report. The detailed definition 
of fourteen services was not approved either within the subcommittee or later at committee 
level. According to Lordello de Mello, pressures coming from the technical staff of the 
rapporteur of the committee of the Organisation of the State were responsible for the 
exclusion of the list of services [13 April 1993]. Hence the conflict between facilitating the 
citizens' claim for the provision of the services and the requirements for flexible functional 
allocations in a federal system was resolved in favour of the latter. Third, the subcommittee 
made proposals to increase local revenues and transfers from the state and federal 
governments, although this issue was not within its jurisdiction. In justifying the proposal to 
expand the powers and the revenues of the municipalities, the rapporteur argued that there 
was no time or space to mention the outcries of mayors, city councillors, practitioners, 
community leaders and of the people in favour of strengthening the municipality. He said
I l l
nobody contradicts the idea that the municipality is the tier of government more capable than 
the others of fulfilling the permanent aspirations of the people. This assumption was in line 
with the normative features of development theories reviewed in Chapter 1, thus ignoring 
broader political and economic contexts.
The second vice-president of this subcommittee, Jose Dutra (PMDB-AM) asserted 
that decentralisation was a consensus among the CNA's members. Dutra said that no pressure 
group influenced the subcommittee, except one, sponsored by himself  ^'to defend the tax-free 
zone of Manaus against the threat of a President of the Republic or a Minister of Finance to 
abolish the tax privileges of the area by decree' [3 May 1993]29. Dutra asserted that the state 
governors and mayors were only interested in the tax system
The lobby in favour of the municipalities had long been strong in Congress. In 1979, 
at the very beginning of the political opening, Congress held a CPI - Comissao Parlamentar 
de Inquerito (Parliamentary Inquiry Committee) on the 'causes of the increasing 
impoverishment of states and municipalities'. The words of the final report were strong, 
accusing the federal government of fiscal tyranny and stating that sub-national governments 
were on the verge of a total breakdown, with serious consequences for the social order. The 
report concluded that centralisation affects the autonomy of the states but, above all, of the 
municipalities30.
Although most of the CNA was committed to the strengthening of local governments' 
powers and revenues, the achievement of the idea was not easy because of differences among 
municipalities and regions. The over-representation of the North-East and the Centre-West 
was a sign of the interest both regions had in the topic. It also shows the dependence of the 
politicians of both regions on 'parochial' links. Lordello de Mello suggested that the greatest 
lobby within this subcommittee was made by IB AM Other municipal associations were weak, 
including the Municipalist Front led by Quercia31 [13 April 1993], IBAM published a booklet 
with eighteen proposals to the CNA on local issues. Out of these, seven were totally
29 Clause 40 of the Transitional Dispositions of the 1988 Constitution guarantees for twenty-five years tax 
privileges to the tax-free zone of Manaus.
'in The final report of this CPI was published on 5 December 1979 in the Diario do Congresso Nacional.
*11 Quercia is Sao Paulo's former governor and senator and was known during the military regime as a 
defender of local government He created a nationwide association of mayors, the Municipalist Front, capable of 
putting strong pressure on Congress each time a bill was voted about local finances.
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incorporated in the Constitution, three were partially incorporated and eight were rejected, 
which accounted for IB AM’s success [13 April 1993]32.
Again in this subcommittee the goal to decentralise was not followed by a clear 
definition of what was to be achieved. Also the rapporteur was prodigious in expressions that 
showed a populist, vague and sometimes normative approach to decentralisation. Here, again, 
the federal government was absent from the discussions.
3.3.3 Subcommittee on the States
The subcommittee had as president Chagas Rodrigues (PMDB-PI) and as rapporteur 
Siqueira Campos (PDC-GO). Campos was the main lobbyist in favour of the creation of new 
states because he was committed to the creation of the state of Tocantins to be carved out of 
the northern of Goias, in the Centre-West. The creation of Tocantins had been approved 
before by both houses of Congress but it was vetoed by Samey by the allegation that the 
federal government could not fund the creation of new states because of its financial 
constraints. The regional composition of the members of the subcommittee shows that the 
North was over-represented, having 22% of its members, while its representation in the CNA 
was 11% of members. The subcommittee did not have any outstanding leader in Congress and 
the progressive parties did not show any interest in it. The subcommittee was devoted to only 
one issue: the creation of new states, as recognised by Campos himself in his report.
The small importance of the subcommittee is also shown by the low number of 
proposals received: 148. Eight proposals were about the creation of new states, especially 
in the North. The rapporteur accepted the creation of the states of Tocantins; Santa Cruz, 
carved out of the southern part of Bahia; and Triangulo, carved out of the western part of 
Minas Gerais. He also approved the transformation of the federal territories of Roraima and 
Amapa into states.
The subcommittee held eight public hearings with a strong presence of lobbies in 
favour of the creation of the new states. In his report Campos acknowledged that two issues 
polarised his attention: (i), the organisation of the member states; and (ii) the territorial 
division of the country. He wrote extensively about the latter. Campos regretted that he could 
not make a broader territorial redivision because of the Tack of financial resources, the
32 Among the proposals rejected was one that limited the practice of negotiated grants from state and federal 
governments to the municipalities. Negotiated grants have always been a source of survival for most politicians 
and an important instrument for the federal government in building up governing coalitions.
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existence of conflicting political interests, of regional prejudices and of the weakness of local 
structures'. The newly created states, he argued, could count on the federal governments 
financial support, which was not difficult because it had been very prodigal in helping the state 
banks to solve their severe financial problems.
Intense territorial cleavages were the mark of this subcommittee. Those cleavages 
occurred mainly in areas of late development, Le. in the Centre-West and the North. Old 
disputes about the boundaries of the states were brought up, such as the one between 
Pernambuco and Bahia. Sub-regions within states that felt they had little attention from the 
state government mounted for independence, such as in Bahia, Minas Gerais and Parana. One 
state created by the military regime, Rio de Janeiro, reacted against the anti-democratic way 
decision was made. The territorial arrangements within the federation were threatened by those 
cleavages as a reaction against the way the military had treated territorial disputes. Territorial 
cleavages are an expression of intra- and inter-elite dissatisfaction and show that existing 
boundaries were not able to accommodate the struggles between different political interests.
The over-representation of the North, plus the lack of an outstanding Congress 
member in the subcommittee, shows the relationship between territorial cleavages and 
'parochial' links. These links were expressed by the lack of discussion on the consequences of 
a new territorial design. Territorial dissatisfaction polarised the subcommittee as another 
reaction against the previous territorial centralisation that had blocked political re­
arrangements in new and old areas outside those which the military had used to support their 
policies in Congress33.
The creation of the state of Tocantins, rejected later at committee level but 
reintroduced in following stages, shows the struggle for power between Congress and the 
federal Executive. Congress's will to confront the Presidency and to exercise its power was 
successful in this episode.
As in other subcommittees, the financial predicaments of the federal government 
shown in Chapter 2 were ignored. The rapporteur's cynical comment that the federal 
government had no reason to argue financial constraints against the creation of new states
33 Between 1964 and 1986 die military promoted the creation of four states in the North, one in the Centre-West 
and merged the states of Rio de Janeiro and Guanabara, in the South-East. Poor states are more dependent upon 
federal revenues, therefore more likely to support the government. These new states increased the military support 
in Congress to counterbalance the growing number of opposition votes in the big state capitals.
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because it was supporting the state commercial banks shows that the idea of an all-powerfiil 
federal government was still in the minds of the CNA's members.
The events that took place in the two subcommittees in charge of the restructuring of 
the State display several points. First, no figures or evidence were used to support the cliche 
that sub-national governments had been in a weak position during the last twenty years. Data 
and academic research which was available then, show that the discourse on the dependence 
of sub- national governments, especially the municipalities, was not based on empirical 
evidence (Serra and Afonso, 1991). Second, there was a lack of acknowledgement that 
decentralisation could also contribute to an increase in regional inequalities. One of the 
political reasons behind a federal system is the solidarity between regions that can be better 
implemented through the transfer of resources from better-off regions to worse-off ones by 
the federal government. Third, the subcommittees were not particularly under pressure on 
issues related to intergovernmental relations and its conflicts, which signals that the real battle 
was to be developed in the territory of financial resources. This lack of pressure proves that 
the decentralisation of responsibilities and the new role of the federal government in a 
decentralised system were not issues at the level of the subcommittees. However, each 
subcommittee was bound to a specific issue and their rapporteurs were in those positions 
because they represented the lobby for the mam goal of each subcommittee. However, 
negotiations did occur for anything considered to be a priority. Fourth, the defence of 
decentralisation was based on the argument dear to development theories of increasing 
efficiency, as if unitary states could not have efficient local managements. Fifth, the choice of 
the intense use of common responsibilities has been blamed today for many federal problems. 
In the attempts to change the Constitution34, the lack of clarification about decentralisation 
of responsibilities is pointed out as one of the main issues to be addressed. Last, a paradox 
emerged because the anti-centralist position of the subcommittees was not reflected in the 
powers of the Union and in the new responsibilities delegated to it.
To sum up, the reform of Brazil's intergovernmental relations and of the centralisation- 
decentralisation continuum under the federation was left to the territory of'parochial' politics
34 According to clause 3 of the Transitional Dispositions, Congress should review the Constitution after 3 
October 1993. Because some of die progressives were against the revision, and because die starting date was too 
close to the 1994 elections, Congress did not review the entire constitutional text, although changes have been 
made on specific issues, such as in the tax system, as shown in the previous chapter.
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and to die interests of less developed regions. This means that the ideal of decentralisation was 
not followed by a clear definition of its impact on the federation, on intergovernmental 
relations and on policy results.
3.3.4 Subcommittee on Taxation, and Sharing and Distribution of Revenues
The North-East had the main positions in this subcommittee. Benito Gama (PFL-BA) 
was the president and Fernando Bezerra Coelho (PMDB-PE) the rapporteur35. Regions more 
dependant upon federal revenues and transfers, Le. the North, the North-East and the Centre- 
West, had 54.2% of the subcommittee's members. The subcommittee had among its members 
some party leaders, outstanding members of Congress and parliamentarians with previous 
experience in this topic. The subcommittee received 818 suggestions from CNA members and 
forty from society, which placed it in the third position on the number of suggestions received 
by subcommittees36. Among the suggestions, five came from the popular amendment scheme, 
with 114,103 signatures (Michiles et aL, 1989: 104).
The public hearings held by the subcommittee showed a great presence of specialists 
in fiscal matters. Local and state lobbies were also strong. The federal government attended 
one public hearing through the secretary of the Federal Revenue Bureau and one civil servant 
from IPEA According to the rapporteur, the main issue addressed by the subcommittee was 
the fret that there was a concentration within the federal government of the most productive 
taxes. He blamed this concentration for the financial predicaments of states and municipalities. 
According to Coelho, this concentration was responsible for the weakness of the federal 
system, for bureaucratic delays, for delays in the decision-making processes, for the increase 
in corruption and waste. Coelho stressed in his report that the main goals of the subcommittee 
were to (i) strengthen state and municipal finances; (ii) decentralise responsibilities; (iii) 
redistribute revenues, with privileged treatment for less developed states; and (iv) to make the 
tax system more progressive.
A comparison between the tax structure proposed by the subcommittee and the one
Conflicts were strong on the appointment of this rapporteur. One interviewee declared, asking for 
anonymity, that another federal deputy was chosen for the position but 'he had no understanding of the topic and 
the draft was becoming irrational and out of control*. The interviewee acted to withdraw the original rapporteur 
and Coelho was then chosen because he was better prepared for the task.
36 In the first place was the subcommittee on the Rights of Workers and Public Servants, with 1,418 
suggestions, and in second the subcommittee on Individual Rights and Guarantees (Michiles et al., 1989: 62).
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approved by the Constitution shows the following points. First, not many changes were made 
from the first to the last stages of the constitutional process in the taxation framework 
regarding the allocation of revenues to the federal government, which suggests a consensus 
for its losses. The inclusion of one additional tax not proposed by the subcommittee, the Tax 
on Large Fortunes, occurred afterwards as a result of a late awareness of the losses imposed 
on the federal government. Second, the disputes over revenues between states and 
municipalities did not achieve consensus and important changes were made during the 
constitutional process. Third, the subcommittee proposed a higher increase on state 
governments' revenue than that which was finally approved, which means that the states held 
more power to influence the draft at that stage than the municipalities.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the most important decision taken in the fiscal system was 
that to increase federal transfers to sub-national governments. However, the amount to be 
transferred was not yet clear at the subcommittee level, as Table 3.3 shows. The large 
increases in sub-national revenues during the constitutional process, especially of transfers to 
the states of a percentage of Income Tax (IR) and of the Tax on Industrial Products (IPI), 
shows the struggle between less developed regions and the more industrialised ones. The 
changes in the amount to be distributed to the regions also show a clear pact between the 
North, the North-East and the Centre-West. In the previous Constitution only the North and 
the North-East were entitled to receive 2% of the revenues from IR and the IPI. The Centre- 
West was included in the scheme as a reward for voting in favour of the requests sponsored 
by the two others.
The subcommittee proposed that the sub-national governments should retain IR paid 
by state and municipal civil servants. It proposed also that the three tiers of government could 
institute 'compulsory borrowing' under certain circumstances, but this power was restricted 
only to the federal and the state governments at committee leveL The subcommittee's proposal 
that 60% of new taxes introduced by any level of government after the promulgation of the 
Constitution should be shared with the other levels was not later approved. The idea behind 
this proposal was to discourage changes in the tax system After being subjected to different 
versions, this clause was approved with a smaller percentage, 20%, and applies only from the 
federal to the state government level
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Table 3.3 Revenue Transfers to Sub-National Governments Proposed by the 
Subcommittee and Approved by the Constitution
Transfers Subcommittee Constitution
From the .18% of IR and the IPI .21.5% of IR and the IPI
Union to .2% of IR and the IPI .3% of IR and the IPI
the states to the states situated to the states situated in
in the North and North- the North, North-East
North-East and Centre- 
West
and Centre-West
.5% of the IPI to .10% of the IPI to states
states according to according to their total
their total industrial industrial production
production exports exports
From the .22.5% of IR and the . Same
Union to the IPI
municipal­ .50% of the Rural Property
ities Tax
From the .50% of the .50% of the Motor
states to Inheritance, Gifts, Vehicle Registration
the Property Transfers, Tax
municipal­ Motor Vehicles
ities Registration and 
Rural Property Taxes
.25% of the Value-Added .25% of the Value-Added,
Services and Communication and
Hydroelectricity Tax Transportation Tax
.25% of the share of 
the IPI that is 
transferred to the states 
according to the amount 
of their industrial
. Same
production exported
Sources: Senado Federal(1988 and 1987a)
The most important regional dispute was concentrated on one aspect of the 1988 fiscal 
reform which highlights an important issue: the concept of 'autonomy1 for sub-national 
governments. The concept is shown by the changes made in the levy of the most important 
tax nationwide, the ICMS, the Value-Added, Transportation and Communication Tax 
collected by the states. As noted in Chapter 2, the Constitution broadened this tax by adding 
activities and services previously not included in its composition. However, the struggle was 
about the criteria to be applied when goods or services are produced in one state and bought 
in another37. The proposal endorsed by the most complete study on the issue at that time by
37 This issue is an old one and was one of the bases of the creation of the USA as a federal countiy. The 
problem raised at that time was how goods should circulate on a competitive basis from coast to coast In Brazil, 
when the decision to industrialise was taken, one of the main measures adopted was to empower the federal
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IPEA, a federal government agency, was to change the characteristics of this tax by defining 
that it should be levied only by the state that bought the goods or services. No taxation should 
occur in operations between states. The proposal intended the allowing of more freedom to 
the states to define their own rates for the levy of the ICMS, therefore, giving them more 
autonomy in determining their fiscal policy and management. According to one of its authors, 
the idea was received with no enthusiasm. The more developed regions were not interested 
because they would lose too much and the less developed ones because they would rather rely 
on federal transfers than assume the responsibility for administering their revenues with more 
autonomy (Rezende, 1990: 145). Another reason that should be added is the fear of state 
governments being pressured by regional elites in favour of reducing the ICMS's rates or even 
its exemption, as had occurred in the past. The ICMS maintained its previous characteristic 
of being levied partially at the place of origin and partially at the destination38.
Another of IPEA's proposal was that federal transfers to sub-national governments 
should comprise of percentages of the entire revenue collected by the federal government and 
not only of percentages of IR and the IPI. The reason was to stimulate progressive increases 
in tax collection and to decrease the degree of conflict between the three levels of 
government. Despite IPEA's efforts to influence this subcommittee, the head of these works 
Fernando Rezende recognised that IPEA was not backed by the government, which absented 
itself from the discussions (Rezende, 1990: 144).
If IPEA's proposals were not voiced because of regional conflicts and the lack of 
support from the government, this subcommittee was the only one to show worries about the 
outcomes of decentralisation. It presented the only scheme for attaining the goal of the 
decentralisation of responsibilities. It was the proposal for the creation of a decentralisation 
fund, with resources from a federal fund, the FINSOCIAL, now CONFINS, which, for the
government to regulate external and inter-state exchange rules. The reason was the need to unify the territory 
commercially and to deny the states, ie. regional oligarchies, the right to prescribe their external and internal trade 
rules. This change was made by the 1937 Constitution, immediately after Vargas's coup, as mentioned in Chapter 
2.
38 One of the consequences of maintaining the principle of taxing goods at their origin and at their destination 
is related to food consumption. A study by Rezende shows that after the promulgation of the Constitution, the 
states increased taxation on staple food by more than 50%. This fact puts Brazil in an uneasy position among the 
so-called modem economies because it is the country with the highest tax on staple food (UNAFISCO, 1992: 
176). Less developed states are the biggest producers of grains consumed by the poor and they depend upon the 
taxation of these products for a better budget
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following five years, would implement decentralisation. At the end of five years the 
FIN SOCIAL was to be abolished. According to the report, it was assumed that with the 
revenue from the FINSOCIAL, plus the increases in municipal and state finances, the sub­
national governments could easily absorb the responsibilities transferred to them and that the 
federal government would not have been penalised because its responsibilities would have 
been transferred. This scheme was rejected at every stage of the constitutional process and 
reintroduced again by its creator, Jose Serra, Serra explained that at the end he did not lobby 
for his proposition because the federal government's losses were high and it could not afford 
to lose another source of revenue [2 Feb. 1994].
The subcommittee recognised that the fiscal reform carried out in 1966 by the military 
was one of the reasons for the high indebtedness of the sub-national governments. To address 
solutions to that problem, it was proposed that Congress should set up a committee to 
evaluate the effects of the 1966 fiscal reform. The committee should find ways for the federal 
government to help sub-national governments clear up their domestic and foreign debts. This 
clause was later withdrawn.
This subcommittee showed a clear regional axis. Disputes among states and between 
states and municipalities were high. The consensus on reducing federal revenues was clear. 
However, the degree of losses that were about to penalise the federal government were not 
yet clear. It was not clear either how the gains of sub-national governments should be 
regionally distributed. However, one thing became transparent about regional cleavages: the 
high degree of negotiations which took place every time a region was penalised by a proposal 
that benefitted another, which promoted a positive-sum game through increasing every 
region's revenue by 0.9% (Rezende, 1990: 163)39.
To sum up, this subcommittee chose to decentralise tax revenue but with less impact 
on federal revenue than was later to be approved. A scheme was also proposed to support 
decentralisation and to call for the stronger action of sub-national governments in delivering 
services and in assuming more responsibilities as a result of their financial strength. Here 
again, the same intriguing lack of pressure from the federal government was registered.
39 Taking into account only tax transfers per capita revenue by region remained with the same distortions as 
the previous scheme, with the North-East receiving the lowest share, followed by die North (Rezende, 1990:163).
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3.4 Conclusions
Brazilian constitutional engineering was noticeable for efforts to legitimise the return 
to democratic order through the promulgation of a constitution rooted in mechanisms of 
popular and societal participation rather than in worries about policy results or in building a 
social consensus of what was to be achieved with the measures it adopted, especially under 
the topic of decentralisation. Furthermore, the decentralised and democratic way the 
constitutional procedures were designed did not guarantee that any level of decision was to 
be taken as final, which meant that bargaining and compromises had to be made several times, 
broadening the number of players. Finally, redemocratisation was not only a process without 
rupture but one which incorporated old and new players aiming at its legitimation and at 
defending the new order against threats from the old regime. These features could only 
amplify the number of players in the decision-making process, therefore increasing power 
fragmentation but not disintegrating old political coalitions.
Whereas for substance, three points should be highlighted to summarise the events that 
took place at the subcommittees in charge of designing a new organisation of the State and 
a new tax system. First, there were no doubts about the decision to decentralise but few CNA 
members were aware of the consequences of decentralisation for the federal government and 
for the political system. Second, there was a consensus on rejecting whatever existed before 
the CNA sat and an attitude of confronting the federal Executive, which was partially 
responsible for the enthusiasm for decentralisation. Congress's rebellion was eased because 
Samey was a weak President. Furthermore, the federal Executive did not react to measures 
that are now held responsible for its difficulties in governing. Third, strong regional cleavages,
weak party discipline, deficiencies in party guidelines, a lack of ideological polarisation and
/
*the absence of a national project on a new role for the State made each CNA member an 
individual player and a solitary negotiator. This process also created a game where everyone 
had the power to become an individual veto player. In this kind of game proposals had to be 
submitted to intense negotiations with each particular veto player.
One aspect of the constitutional process deserves special attention: the intriguing 
absence of the federal government not only at the subcommittees but at other stages of the 
constitutional process, as shown in the following chapter. The strong reaction against 
centralisation among politicians, and the involvement of the Samey government in short-term
121
issues, like his term in office and the system of government40, plus the weakening of the 
federal bureaucracy, are probably the reasons. What is puzzling is why segments that today 
blame decentralisation for many of the country's diseases did not manifest themselves against 
such a clear policy of weakening the federal government. What is also puzzling is that most 
Congress members depend upon either the state governor or the political leaders of the 
interior (or both) for their political survival, given their 'parochial' links. This kind of 
relationship requires Congress members to allocate revenue for their constituencies in the 
federal budget. The allocation of federal revenue requires a federal government with enough 
resources to support the demands of over 500 Congress members, each of them with interests 
in several constituencies, given the electoral system of open-list proportional representation 
41. It requires, also, a federal government incapable of enjoying support from a political party 
commanding a congressional majority. As Ames (1995) pointed out, presidential survival in 
Brazil depends on the distribution of construction projects and political jobs to crucial 
governors, mayors and deputies. Since these coalitions have to be remade for practically every 
vote, the fiscal pressure on the Executive becomes intense. More than that, the bargaining 
power of Congress is increased remarkably. The decision to decentralise taken in the initial 
days of the constitutional process is at the basis of the 'peripheralisation' of the country's 
federal and political systems.
The events analysed show that the developments of the Democratic Alliance and the 
outcomes of the first stages of the constitutional process piloted Brazilian redemocratisation 
to a unique process of decentralisation of power, where several unequal but competing power 
niches had the strength to play a part in the decision-making process. Hence the features of 
a consociational democracy as discussed in Chapter 1 were deepened at that moment. This 
kind of game or model led the political system towards a 'paralysed competitive arena', where 
decisions and players cancel each other out. The incursion into the first stages of the decision­
making process highlighted the importance of bringing to the policy-making analysis the
40 The decision about the system of government is not a short-term issue. However, the change from 
presidentialism to parliamentarism was discussed as a way to shorten Saraey's term because of his low popularity 
and lack of legitimacy.
41 Brazil has a system of open-list proportional representation. According to this system, those who run for 
election are voted for in many constituencies within a state. Therefore, candidates are linked to large, multimember 
districts.
intersection of conflicting interests as a critical arena in explaining policy-making and policy 
changes. This chapter showed how tensions between governmental spheres have been 
suffocated by the previous regime. It also showed the influence of'parochial' demands in 
shaping the decision to decentralise. These forays signal the complexity surrounding a decision 
and show how incomplete is the literature reviewed in Chapter 1 in explaining how reforms 
become part of the political agenda. The incompleteness of the literature is especially 
noticeable in cases in which legislators take decisions about issues usually treated as 
belonging to the territory of practitioners and officials.
In the next chapter the study details the stages of the constitutional process which 
followed, as well as the aftermath of decentralisation, where the building of coalitions and the 
management of conflicts and alliances were broadened. Chapter 4 also provides greater detail 
of how political and institutional reforms evolve and why the decision to decentralise was 
taken. By showing the ways used by sub-national politicians, both collectively and 
individually, to influence and to veto national policies and to show how tensions between 
levels of government are dealt with, the chapter further explores the constitution-making 
process from which sprang the final decision to decentralise.
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Chapter 4 The Constituent National Assembly and Its Aftermath: The 
Management of Conflicts and Alliances
Introduction
In theory, one of the main tasks of a constituent assembly is to strike the proper 
balance of power between the legislative and the executive branches of government (Elster, 
1993: 182). Furthermore, a major dilemma in democratic regimes concerns a divergence 
between what representative assemblies do best and what executives must do if democracy 
is to function well (Shugart and Carey, 1992: 3). However, not only does the tension between 
branches of government have to be addressed by a constituent assembly, the relationship 
between levels of government is as important, especially in federal countries. How to build 
up a federal system based on power sharing without causing partition of one of its 
components is intrinsically contradictory.
In Brazil redemocratisation and decentralisation have given Congress and sub-national 
governments an increasingly-assertive role, bringing imbalance to the political process and to 
intergovernmental relations. Congress has replaced the federal government in mediating 
regional and 'parochial' conflicts and in defining the allocation of revenues. Congress's strength 
in a milieu of weak parties, Presidents without the support of parties or society, together with 
strong regional cleavages brought about a decision-making process designed to drive the 
federal Executive to compromise with too many veto players. On the other hand, and as 
Elster (1994b: 18) reasoned, power, to be effective, must be divided. The CNA was 
successful in legitimising the new democratic order and in fostering democracy through 
strengthening Congress and sub-national governments. Nevertheless, by the time the 
Constitution was being drafted, Brazil faced (and still does) many unresolved issues that 
needed to be tackled nationwide. Why did those drafting it choose to decentralise financial 
and political power? The answer to this puzzle is the aim of this chapter.
The chapter deals with the intermediate and the final stages of the constitution-making, 
where conflicts and alliances were stronger than in the previous phase. The localist and 
regionalist features of the CNA went much further than the policy of transferring revenues 
from the federal to the sub-national governments. The decision to decentralise has been 
interpreted as a less polemic topic when compared to the discussions around land reform, 
workers' rights, nationalist measures and the length of the President's term (Sadek, 1991).
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Nevertheless, the developments in the CNA show that despite a consensus to weaken the 
federal government, cleavages between municipalities and the states, and among states, were 
strong but played in the shadows.
The already mentioned feature of the Brazilian constitution-making, in which 
individual players became more important than collective ones, leads to the recognition that 
analyses based exclusively on the party composition of the CNA cannot explain the outcomes 
of the Constitution. The decision to decentralise can be better understood through the analysis 
of three dimensions: (i) the relationship between political parties and the State; (ii) intra- and 
inter-party competition; and (iii) regional cleavages \  These variables are developed in this 
chapter to shed some light on the basic conflicts and cleavages in the constitutional debate 
which led to political and financial decentralisation.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 deals with the decisions taken at the 
committees related to the research's topic. Section 2 analyses the final stages of the 
constitution-making. Section 3 investigates why the decision to decentralise was taken. 
Section 4 examines the main results of decentralisation, both for the fiscal system and for the 
balance of power. Section 5 presents some conclusions.
4.1 Coalition-Building at the Committees' Level
4.1.1 Committee on the Organisation of the State
The president of the committee was Jose Thomaz Nond (PFL-AL), from the North- 
East, and the rapporteur was Jose Richa (then PMDB-PR), from the South2. A short report 
was written by Richa, in which he reasoned that the main aims of the committee were the 
question of autonomy and the problem of decentralisation, because democracy requires 
decentralisation of power1. Commenting on the drafts received from the three subcommittees 
analysed in the previous chapter, Richa found grounds to support the Federal District's plea 
for political, financial, administrative and legislative autonomy, but not to support the creation 
of any new state.
A comparison between the draft issued by this committee and the final version of the 
Constitution shows that many changes were made during the constitutional process. One of
1 The importance of analysing the outcomes of the CNA beyond the political parties was raised by Campello 
de Souza (1989: 357).
The committee's members were the same as those who had participated in the previous subcommittees.
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them .was the way to put decentralisation to sub-national governments into action. The 
Constitution introduced many concurrent powers between the three tiers of government that 
had been rejected by this committee and which reappeared at the Systematisation Committee. 
When asked the reasons for this decision, Richa said he did not remember [5 May 1993]. 
Another difference relates to the expansion of federal government powers and assets when 
compared to the previous Constitution. This expansion was smaller at the committee than that 
finally approved.
According to Richa, the state governors and mayors did not put pressure on the 
committee, which he regretted.
The state governors were absent and die mayors do not have technical skills . The corporatist 
groups put no pressure on the decentralisation o f responsibilities either. All the 
constitutional improvements, mainly financial decentralisation, should be credited to 
Congress [Richa, 5 May 1993].
In an ex-post mea culpa, Richa reckoned that
we went only half way regarding decentralisation, because we did not propose an 
administrative correspondence to financial decentralisation. Financial decentralisation 
should correspond to the decentralisation of responsibilities, so the population can claim the 
delivery o f the service [5 May 1993].
Richa, former mayor of Curitiba and former governor of Parana, classified himself as
a defender of decentralisation, but he gave a strong argument against it.
The mayors treat tax collection as a political rather than a financial issue and they are more 
open to accepting pressures against tax collection than the governors or the Presidents o f 
the Republic [Richa, 5 May 1993].
The committee received 536 suggestions from Congress members and 109 were 
selected to analyse the three variables mentioned above for a better understanding of the 
decision to decentralise. Table 4.1 shows an aggregation of the topics presented. Several 
contradictions can be found in the analysis of the table. First, there was a concentration of 
proposals about territorial cleavages, meaning the creation of new states, and few suggestions 
on what was actually the main reason for the committee, Le. the definition of a new format 
for the State and ways of achieving decentralisation by sub-national governments. Second, the 
suggestions reflected a feature that cut across the entire constitutional process: the intention 
to change whatever had been done by the military governments or buffered by them The 
military created new states in the North and Centre-West, but had always rejected proposals
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for territorial rearrangement outside these two regions. The military had also rejected the 
introduction of more decentralised formats for the administration of large territorial areas, 
areas experiencing fast urbanisation, and the introduction of schemes to distinguish powers 
and responsibilities between municipalities that are so different from each other (Medeiros and 
Souza, 1993; Souza, 1990). Although several proposals had been presented for a more 
decentralised and democratic way of governing intra-state and municipal areas3, they were 
not accepted by the committee or the Constitution. Third, some issues decided at the level of 
the three subcommittees were threatened at the committee level, e.g. the creation of the state 
of Tocantins, and the decision to introduce the model of concurrent powers to address the 
issue of intergovernmental relations, both rejected by the rapporteur. These rejections meant
more bargaining and negotiations at the following stages in the constitutional process.
Table 4.1 . Selected Amendments Proposed by the CNA Members to the Committee
on the Organisation of the State
Topic Number of 
Proposals
.Territorial cleavages
.Local autonomy, municipal powers and different
30
political status according to local characteristics 
.Organisation of metropolitan regions and other
15
forms of intra-state organisations 
.Special tax benefits to some municipalities,
15
regions and sectors 10
.Federal government powers and assets 10
.Issues concerning the Federal District 9
.Concurrent powers 2
.State and local borrowing and debts 2
.Others 16
Source: Aggregation based on PRODASEN's data
The intensity of regional cleavages is shown by the number of proposals presented 
about territorial re-arrangement4. Here alliances were made cutting across party affiliations 
and geographic representation. Every region was involved in struggles for a different 
territorial division. The North sought the creation of two new states (Jurua and Tapajos) and 
the transformation of the federal territories of Amapa and Roraima into states. The North-East 
urged the creation of two new states (Maranhao do Sul and Santa Cruz), and there was a 
resurgence of old disputes involving the boundaries between the states of Bahia and
9
Each municipality is divided into several districts which do not have elected bodies.
4 Although based on different reasons, territorial cleavages were the stickiest and the most emotional of the 
constitutional issues in Spain (Llorente, 1988) and India (Hermet, 1988).
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Pernambuco and Bahia and Sergipe. The Centre-West lobbied for the creation of the state of 
Tocantins. The South-East argued for the creation of two states (Sao Francisco and 
Triangulo), and for the re-creation of the state of Guanabara; and the South for the creation 
of the state of Igua9u. However, and following the military tradition, the states created by the 
Constitution were only those located in the North and in the Centre-West.
For inter-and intra-party competition, again proposals for the creation of new states 
clarify the understanding of coalitions and dissensions. The PFL presented three proposals 
against the creation of states by the Constitution, but other PFL members were the main 
lobbyists for the creation of five states. The PDT presented several proposals for the re­
creation of the state of Guanabara, against the will of its main national leader Brizola. A 
member of the PMDB called for the creation of the state of Santa Cruz, carved out from the 
state of Bahia, against the will of Bahia's governor, Pires, who was also a member of the 
PMDB. The progressive parties other than the PDT were not involved in those cleavages.
Here again the parties which supported the creation of new states are considered as 
having strong ’parochial' links, suggesting their close ties to the State apparatus. The 
relationship between political parties and the State can also be found in the number of 
proposals calling for a broader role for the federal government, either in its jurisdiction or in 
its assets. The PMDB presented the highest number, but the PDT, PFL, PDS and PT also 
wanted a federal government with expanded powers. The reasons could be different. 
Proposals coming from the progressives were more likely to be argued on ideological 
grounds, but most of the PMDB, PDS and PFL's discourses favoured reducing the role of the 
State.
This committee was marked by a rejection of what was achieved at the subcommittees. 
A permanent tension was identified between the proposals of the subcommittees and those 
of the committee, stressing the importance of the following phases of the constitutional 
process. The presence of Richa, a well-known politician with great visibility during the 
transition, allowed him to block what he considered the 'excesses of the subcommittee* [5 May 
1993]. These 'excesses', however, were to be re-introduced later and were the mark of the 
way decentralisation was built up. The outcomes of the issues related to the restructuring of 
the State show that decentralisation was more a matter of financial resources than a banner 
for the restructuring of the State.
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4.1.2 Committee on the Tax System, Budget and Finance
This committee was one of the most important within the CNA given the nature of its 
remit5. Some of the most prominent figures were among its sixty members. The president was 
a former Minister of Finance, Francisco DomeUes (PFL-RJ). The rapporteur, Dr Jose Serra 
(then PMDB-SP), is a well-known economist with great experience in fiscal matters. The 
South-East held the main positions, but less developed regions held 53.3% of the committee's 
members. The committee received 1,164 suggestions. In his report Serra mentioned the main 
problems he had had to face in accomplishing his task: (i) disagreements among the members 
o f the committee because of their different ideas and their distinctive knowledge on the 
subject; and (ii) the tendency to detail every aspect of the subject.
Serra underlined the most important results reached by the draft. First, a broadened 
basis for the main state tax, the ICMS, and more freedom for the states to define its rates. 
Second, the creation of a tax on retail sales for the municipalities. Third, the increase in 
constitutional transfers to sub-national governments. Fourth, the blocking of the earmarking 
of revenues. Fifth, the prohibition of the federal government from allowing tax exemptions 
on revenues to be transferred to sub-national governments. Sixth, the creation of a fund with 
resources from FINSOCIAL to promote a phased decentralisation. On the latter Serra 
mentioned that 'decentralisation of responsibilities is essential for the financial equilibrium of 
the three spheres'.
Serra called the attention of his colleagues to two points. First, the increase in taxation 
that the measures adopted in the draft would bring. He argued that at that time there was no 
answer to this concern because some things were not yet defined, for instance the rates of 
several taxes, the creation of new responsibilities for the levels of government that the 
Constitution was about to launch and the future behaviour of the governments at the three 
levels. Second, the losses of the Union's revenues. Serra called for an effective transference 
of responsibilities to sub-national governments and for the importance of the complementary 
legislation to tackle the issue of federal fiscal equilibrium In his second report, Serra showed 
deeper concern at the losses of revenue that the federal government was about to face:
It is well known that between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s the federal government enjoyed
5 The importance Brazilian drafters gave to fiscal issues was in opposition to their counterparts in France in 
1958. The French founders decided that fiscal issues belonged to the domain of the law, therefore no discussion 
took place on this point during the drafting of their constitution (Foyer, 1988: 45).
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an excessive concentration o f  revenues and o f  tax collection, a t the expenses o f  states and  
municipalities, thus bringing a strong imbalance to the federation. The new  Constitution w ill 
co rrec t this mistake, but it would be another mistake to maintain such an imbalance with 
changed signals.
Two major changes were introduced in the draft issued by the subcommittee. First, 
the exclusion of hydro-electricity from the municipal Value-Added on Goods and Services 
Tax. This tax, phis the increase in the percentage that the states would transfer to the 
municipalities out of its ICMS, from 20% to 25%, should compensate the municipalities for 
the exclusion of the Services Tax, the ISS, which would become part of the ICMS. 
Surprisingly, the mayors of the state capitals, where the ISS is generally the main tax, were 
not against its abolition, because of the compensation given by the state transfers of ICMS 
[Serra, 2 Feb. 1994]. Congress members, however, strongly opposed the abolition of the ISS 
and managed to re-introduce it at a later stage. Parliamentarians from different political 
spectra, such as PC do B and PTB leaders, lobbied for the re-creation of the ISS. Later, the 
increase in the percentage of the ICMS to be transferred to the municipalities to compensate 
them for the incorporation of the ISS could not be withdrawn because the lobby for keeping 
it was too strong [Serra, 2 Feb. 1994].
Second, the sub-national governments' share in their participation in Income Tax and 
in the Tax on Industrial Products, which constitute the FPE and FPM, were increased from 
18% to 18.5% for the states and from 21.5% to 22.5% for the municipalities. Serra argued 
that his behaviour over the transfer of revenues was that of resistance because not much could 
have been done:
I f  I  had n o t resisted, the fed era l government's losses w ould  have been greater, maybe 60 or  
70% o f  Incom e Tax and the Tax on Industrial Products [2 Feb. 1994].
New federal taxes approved by the Constitution were not proposed at the committee level 
Serra declared that he was not subjected to pressure by any kind of interest group, 
because 'everyone knows I am not a person to be pressurised' [2 Feb. 1994]. His words do 
not mean, however, that conflicts were few. Surprisingly again, the main pressures would not 
come from entrepreneurs or the federal government, but from Congress members 
themselves6. In the words of a member of the committee, Osmundo Rebousas:
6 During the CNA, according to one of Serra's technical assistants, there was a broad lobby by entrepreneurs 
to pay less taxes and a specific one by the building industry to maintain the tax on fuels earmarked for road 
construction. They did not succeed. Another lobby was from some federal civil servants, especially from the
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The whole environment regarding the fiscal system was emotional and irrational. I  saw 
depressing displays. A heated dehate occurred among the delegates o f several regions on 
how to define the percentages of the FPE and FPM. Members from the North, North-East and 
Centre-West wanted this percentage to be as high as possible, whereas the ones from the 
South and the South-East wanted them to be the lowest possible because they do not depend 
upon these transfers. In exchange, an agreement was settled to increase by ten the number 
of federal deputies to be elected by the state o f Sao Paulo (UNAFISCO, 1992:172-3) \
Party leaders and opinion formers interviewed tended to be evasive when questioned 
about the issue of regional cleavages. Leaders of parties with more internal coherence, 
whether conservative or progressive, such as PTs Genoino [12 May 1993], PC do B's Lima 
[30 April 1993] and the PDC were said to have counterbalanced these cleavages with the 
guidelines of their programmes for the nation. Despite that, the PDC's leader Eymael said that 
an agreement had to be made by representatives of every region stating that their delegates 
should think: of the country as a whole and not about particular regions [28 April 1993]. 
Within the PMDB negotiations were intense. According to its leader, his main aim was to 
keep the coherence of the party [Covas, 19 May 1993]. The PFL was evaluated by its leader 
as not being affected by many conflicts, because there was a sense of national unity, but the 
press exaggerated the occurrence of regional conflicts' [Louren90, 10 May 1993]. For the 
PTB's leader, one of the most 'physiological' parties8, negotiations were high and took too 
long, which was interpreted by the press and the public opinion as neglect [Righi, 29 April 
1993].
Serra's concern at the way decentralisation was conducted made him write a personal 
letter to President Samey stating his worries and sending it through Ulysses Guimaraes. 
Samey replied verbally that Serra should go even further in decentralising resources to sub­
national governments. Serra acknowledged that
Samey was a President unable to see Brazil as a whole. Also the Ministers o f Finance at that
federal universities and from social services who did not want their jobs transferred to sub-national governments 
[Afonso, 16 April 1993].
7 The 'victory* of the paulistas was counterbalanced by the creation of Tocantins and the elevation of two 
territories to statehood, adding sixteen new deputies and nine senators, thus skewing the agreement Paradoxically, 
die final roll-call voting in favour of the creation of these new states was approved with only one vote against it  
All the delegates from Sao Paulo voted in favour.
8 'Physiological' parties means, in this sense, those parties which have no limits in negotiating with the 
government in exchange for political goods. Saint Francis's sentence lie who gives shall receive', endorsed by 
a FIB member from Sao Paulo, Roberto Cardoso Alves, became an accurate definition of the behaviour of these 
parties and groups.
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time were too busy tackling inflation and making stabilisation plans, and  they could not think  
about the Constitution  [2 Feb. 1994].
Serra then became the most visible figure (and a solitary one) in defending the role of 
the federal government against further losses. Serra's ex-post evaluation is that the Union's 
losses to sub-national governments were not that important, but he found serious conundrums 
in other issues. First, the tax privileges given to the tax-free zone of Manaus, which decreases 
revenues to be distributed to states and municipalities and the entire country has a heavy 
burden to sustain few industries and jobs. Second, Congress is not technically prepared to 
fulfil its role in fiscal matters given by the Constitution, especially over expenditure and 
budget9. Third, Congress does not show any political will for becoming co-responsible for 
public sector performance, as the model proposed by the Constitution requires. Finally, the 
federal Executive does not have the political will to carry out measures that will imply losing 
more power10.
However, Serra reckoned his main defeats were in two areas, which happened after
th e  co m m ittee  w a s  d ism issed:
First, in the impossibility o f  implementing larger autonomy fo r  the states to define their own 
f is c a l po licy  through more freedom  to decide the rates o f  the ICMS. The route taken in the 
Constitution and  in the regulations o f  the IC M S was that o f  a  grea t uniform ity among the 
sta tes. Second, the lack o f  backing among my colleagues in setting  up institutional 
mechanisms to materialise decentralisation o f  services. D isparities am ong municipalities and  
s ta tes are very big, and this requires p lanning and coordination through the fed era l 
governm ent [2 Feb. 1994].
In the second phase of the committee, 692 suggestions were made and 279 were 
culled to analyse the three selected variables to understand the outcomes of the Constitution, 
shown in Table 4.2. The highest number of proposals were on tax privileges to regions, states, 
municipalities and the Federal District. There was no agreement on the amount of federal 
revenue that should be transferred, with variations from 35% to 52% of Income Tax and of 
the Tax on Industrial Products. The rates to be transferred among states and between states 
and municipalities also varied. The strength of sub-national finances was led by the North-East 
and by the PMDB's and PFL's delegates, whereas the South and the South-East led the
9 Both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies have a large and well-paid staff of senior officials to provide 
parliamentarians with technical support. However, these advisors have no expertise in fiscal matters because 
during the military regime Congress did not have much say in budgetary matters.
10 Serra pointed out those problems during his interview for this research and in an article (Serra, 1989:102).
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proposals aimed at tax exemption and at the granting of incentives. Serra rejected every 
proposition related to the latter n . Considering that the South and the South-East are less 
dependent on federal taxes, it is understandable why they presented more proposals towards 
exemption of federal taxes than the other regions.
For regional cleavages those proposals which favoured the North and the North-East 
on the one hand, and the South and the South-East on the other, were listed. Here again the 
proposals to increase revenues for the North and the North-East were sponsored only by 
members of the PFL and the PMDB.
Contradiction can be found in proposals against the decision taken by the rapporteur 
to transfer the collection of the Rural Property Tax (ITR) from the federal to the state 
government. The argument against Serra's suggestion was that in the past the ITR was under 
the states' jurisdiction and it was not properly collected, 'given the political structure of the 
states', according to one of its supporters, Vivaldo Barbosa. Later Serra withdrew his 
suggestion 'because it was the only plea made to the committee by the Minister of Finance at 
that time, Dr Bresser Pereira, even though I don't know why he asked for that' [2 Feb. 1994].
Table 4.2 Selected Amendments Proposed by the CNA Members to the Committee 
on the Tax System, Budget and Finance (*)
Topic Number of 
Proposals
.Tax privileges for regions, states, municipalities 
and the Federal District which implied in the 
reduction of federal revenues 84
.Tax exemption and incentives to specific segments,
like pensioners, companies and institutions 56
.Regional cleavages 43
.Increasing Congressional powers in fiscal and 
budgetary matters 38
.Calculi, procedures and regulations of tax collection 29
.Earmark of public and private resources 11
.Creation of more federal taxes 8
.Keeping under federal jurisdiction tax collection 
transferred to other tier of government 7
.Against the creation of the Decentralisation Fund 3
.Limits on public expenditure and taxation 2
.Limits on the power of Congress to amend the budget 2
Source: Aggregation based on PRODASEN's data 
Note:(*)Does not include proposals about the financial and banking systems.
11 Tax exemption on books, newspapers, journals and papers for their printing, political parties, education and 
welfare institutions, churches of any religion, workers' unions and for pensioners over 65 years of age whose 
income are only from their pensions was approved by the committee and by the Constitution against Serra's will..
11
The reaction against the creation of the decentralisation fond came only from the 
North-East, with the exception of Bahia. The argument of one of the authors against the fund, 
Ismael Wanderley, was that the resources to make up the fund, from UNSOCIAL, should 
continue to be allocated only to welfare programmes. Serra counteracted using their 
colleagues1 traditional line of reasoning: revenues to social programmes and services should 
be applied at the tiers of government closer to the community. The proposal was approved 
by the committee but was rejected at every further constitutional stage. It was re-introduced 
by Serra several times and always defeated. The rejection of the decentralisation fund was not 
surprising, given that resources from FINSOCIAL are one of the methods used by Congress 
members and by the federal Executive for negotiations between them 12.
The high degree of regional cleavages and of conflicts between states and 
municipalities can be verified by the way party leaders avoided a direct answer to the question 
posed to them about this topic, by the changes in the rates of the federal taxes to be 
transferred to sub-national governments, and for the later gains by the municipalities in 
keeping 25% of the ICMS and in regaining the ISS. Despite the intensity of these cleavages, - 
every individual state and municipality was a winner, not only because their revenues had 
risen, but also because issues apparently outside the sphere of the committee were included 
in the negotiations, e.g. the increase in the political representation of Sao Paulo, a state which 
benefited less from the policy of expanding federal transfers to sub-national governments.
Inter- and intra-party competition played the same role as in the committee previously 
analysed. Parties' delegates behaved more according to their individual commitments or to 
their regional representation than to their parties' programme. An example is that one would 
expect a party like the PL, which some analysts such as Campello de Souza (1992) reckoned 
as the one which best expresses the New Right ideology in Brazil, would be very active in the 
committee, but only one proposal was presented by a member of the PL. The amendment in 
favour of tax exemption for the press brought together parliamentarians from the PMDB,
12 Resources from FINSOCIAL end up becoming the main source of corruption in scandals over Congress 
brought up in 1993 that resulted in a CPI (Parliamentaiy Inquiry Committee). The CPI was set up to investigate 
members of the Budget Committee and the process by which it had been reallocating expenditure within budget 
lines, in response to amendments put forward by individual members of the Chamber of Deputies who had 
pocketed funds mainly from FINSOCIAL. Eighteen members of Congress were incriminated by the CPI which 
revealed a chain of corruption in die process of budget appropriations and the involvement of legislative, executive 
agencies and building industries. It was no coincidence that eight federal deputies out of the eighteen investigated 
were members of this committee and seven were from the North-East.
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PDT, PDS and PFL. Against the proposal to transfer to the states the collection of the ITR 
were members from the PFL, PMDB, PCB and PDT. These frets show, as in the previous 
committee, that at least for the two topics analysed, inter- and intra-party competition was 
developed more on an individual than on a collective basis and could vary according to the 
issue.
The relationship between political parties and the State had two different roots. The 
strengthening of sub-national governments' finances, mainly of the municipalities, has different 
lines of reasoning. For progressive parties, there is an ideological correlation between 
decentralisation and democracy. But there are also practical reasons: since the 1985 elections 
the progressives started a steady increase in mayoral elections. Therefore, the strength of local 
government finances is an important asset for the building up of governing coalitions. 
However, the progressives were not involved very much in this committee, as it was opposed 
to their involvement in agrarian reform, nationalist measures and workers' rights. Financial 
decentralisation should be credited mainly to the PMDB and PFL. On the other hand, there 
are parliamentarians with 'parochial' links who operate under a clientelist style. For them, the 
strengthening of local finances meant a recognition of the importance of local leaders for their 
political careers, expressed by more revenues to their allies and more jobs for their proteges. 
Given that in most of the municipalities of the interior the political battle has been polarised 
between the PMDB and the PFL, more revenues are needed to form governing coalitions. 
Even from their different roots, both the progressives and the 'parochial's had good reasons 
to support financial decentralisation because it increased their room for manoeuvre through 
the control of more revenues at the local level As for governorships, the PMDB and the PFL 
together have been the main parties since the re-introduction of popular election.
Who was responsible for the decision to decentralise? Party leaders and opinion 
formers interviewed show that there is no consensus about this, even if a slight majority 
credited the decision more to the parliamentarians than to state governors or mayors. 
However, a former state governor made an assessment that the governors 'acted enbloc 
during the CNA to introduce provisions to favour the states' finances' [Pires, 23 April 1993]. 
hi the second place the leaders identified the result as a consequence of pressures from both 
state governors and mayors, as much as pressures coming more from state governors than 
from mayors. The leaders were almost unanimous in identifying President Samey as a weak 
President, indirectly elected, and the governors as strong leaders, who had come out of the
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1986 elections with great political support. This partially explains the defeats suffered by the 
federal government, the victories of the states at subcommittee and committee levels, but it 
does nor explain why the municipalities were the winners in the end concerning tax resources.
The cleavages between the municipalities and the states resulted in higher tax revenues 
for the former at the end of the constitutional process13. There are four reasons for this. First, 
a reaction against the military practice of discrediting the mayors, who used, more than the 
governors, to be labelled by the military as irresponsible managers, more than the governors. 
Second, the struggle towards more local revenues was the oldest one in Congress, symbolised 
by the CPI mentioned in Chapter 3. Third, there is the ambition of most federal deputies to 
hold executive positions, which are more likely to materialise at the local level14. Finally, the 
commitment of parties with strong 'parochial' links in favour of decentralisation. Therefore, 
the decision to decentralise was taken more on the grounds of'parochial' needs and stimuli, 
which favour the municipalities more than the states, rather than on democratic requirements 
or better policy results.
Other points are paramount in summing up the events that took place at this 
committee. The adoption of a tax framework for the sub-national level based more on 
constitutional transfers rather than on the collection of their own revenues may have three 
meanings. First, the assumption that in most of the states and municipalities, especially in the 
less developed regions, economic activities are scarce and their financial survival relies on 
federal transfers. Second, federal transfers are necessary for promoting horizontal balance, 
given the great economic differences within the country. Third, the fear of the 
parliamentarians that sub-national governments were not strong enough to cope with the 
interests of local and regional economic groups. Another aspect relating to the tax framework 
is the concept of autonomy. It is not only decentralisation that has different meanings to 
different people and groups, the same happens with the concept of autonomy. The final 
features of decentralisation show that the idea the drafters had in mind was shaped more by 
expanding federal transfers than by political and financial freedom
The recognition of Serra's skills in the subject was enough to attract his colleagues
13 The same happened with the Venezuelan Constitution of 1966 (Manrique, 1988).
14 In the 1992 local elections around 100 Congress members ran for mayoral positions (Gazeta Mercantil, 
1992)
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only to his proposals at this leveL As at the previous committee, what was decided here could 
not be taken as final. The open conspiracy against the federal government was facilitated by 
the existence of a weak President, strong state governors, mayors and individual interests of 
members of the CNA to jump to executive positions or to increase their 'parochial' links 15. 
In a conjuncture like this there was little room for technicalities or for worries about policy 
results.
Pressures from less developed regions and severe regional cleavages were not 
counterbalanced by parties' guidelines or by different ideologies because of the lack of 
cohesion between the members of the parties that dominated the CNA. This imbalance 
brought about a decision-making process where individual views prevailed over collective 
ones. As a result, the process of constitution-making had to expand the number of players in 
the decision-making process, each of them playing the double role of proposers and vetoers.
These sub-sections answered some of the puzzles raised previously on how to 
understand the absence of the federal government in discussions on its role in a decentralised 
fiscal system. However, another puzzle raised is still to be answered: what made the 
legislators, so dependent upon the mediation of the federal government to sustain their 
‘parochial' links and to accommodate their regional and local cleavages, take the decision to 
weaken their mediator's power?
4.2 Decentralisation in the Broad Sense
4.2.1 The Systematisation Committee
This committee, with its ninety-three members, was conceived to filter and to give 
coherence to the drafts coming from the eight thematic committees. According to Internal 
Rules No. 2, the Systematisation Committee should be composed of fifty-three members, plus 
the presidents and the rapporteurs of the thematic committees. Every party should be 
represented, assuring the minorities' rights to representation and following the democratic 
spirit of the constitutional process. Party representation at the committee was similar to that 
of the CNA. However, the same did not happen for regional representation. Table 4.3 shows 
the struggle between the North-East and the South-East and that the North and the Centre- 
West delegated their requests to the North-East. Two other great battles for political
15 Brazilian framers did not fear a weak central government, like their Indian counterparts (Morris-Jones, 1988: 
131) nor a weak executive, like the German framers of 1949 (Sontheimer, 1988: 230).
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leadership happened in the CNA. One for the position of leader of the PMDB, decided at the 
beginning of the CNA, and another for the rapporteur of the Systematisation Committee. The 
latter was characterised as a dispute among orators, both from the PMDB. Pimenta da Veiga 
was the favourite of PMDB's leader, Covas. Bernardo Cabral is a well-known orator, which 
is why he was elected to one of the most powerful positions in the CNA [Passarinho, 21 May 
1993]. The president of the committee was Afonso Arinos (PFL-RJ), the head of the 
Commission of Notables. Later, two more vice-presidential positions were created because 
of pressures to speed up the work of the committee. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and 
Passarinho then became vice-presidents.
Table 4.3 Percentage Composition of the Systematisation Committee and of 
the CNA by Region
Region Systematisation
Committee
CNA
North 5 11
North-East 38 32
Federal District 1 2
Centre-West 5 8
South-East 37 32
South 14 15
The Systematisation Committee issued seven drafts, between June 1987 and July 
1988. It held 125 meetings and received 35,111 amendments from Congress members and 122 
from outside groups. These figures, plus fixture developments within the committee and the 
CNA, show that here again the process of drafting the Constitution started from a zero-point.
An account of both of the topics analysed shows the evolution of negotiations and 
compromises, as opposed to confrontations over a few issues not related to decentralisation. 
A chronological view of the drafts discloses the return of pressures for the creation of seven 
new states, although only the creation of Tocantins and the elevation of Roraima and Amapa 
to statehood status remained. In June 1987 sub-national governments were benefitted by the 
introduction of a clause stating that they should be compensated for the exploitation of 
natural resources in their territories. In August 1987 concurrent powers were re-introduced 
and approved in the following drafts. In October 1987 the victory of the drafters who 
advocated the re-introduction of the Services Tax was assured. Another municipal gain was 
the creation of a local tax on the Retail Sales of Fuels Except Diesel (IW C). Also in this draft 
the alliance between the North and the North-East with the Centre-West was achieved,
through the inclusion of the latter in the scheme of federal revenues to be applied in less 
developed regions. The decentralisation fund was eliminated after the first draft and never re­
introduced. In the drafts issued in August and in October 1987 there was a clause establishing 
federal and state plans to transfer responsibilities to the municipalities for programmes such 
as combatting illiteracy, primary schooling, health and welfare services. The plans should 
contemplate the transfer of civil servants, revenues and assets. These schemes disappeared in 
the draft of February 1988. In the draft issued in February 1988 a Tax on Large Fortunes was 
introduced at the federal leveL In the draft of July 1988 a curious mediation emerged between 
centralism and decentralisation. In this draft the changes in the tax framework that weakened 
the federal government had been made, but several new obligations were incorporated among 
the Union's jurisdictions. These new obligations remained in the Constitution. Also in this 
draft a new measure strengthening sub-national finances was inserted: gold, when taken as a 
financial asset or as an exchange instrument, should be considered as being under the rules of 
the Tax on Financial Operations and Insurance (IOF), to be collected by the federal 
government but entirely transferred to sub-national levels.
Cabral wrote extensive reports in rhetorical and vague language. Two points in 
Cabral's reports are worth mentioning. The first was about what he called the high degree of 
consensus-reaching, showing that the Constitution was building up a new and durable social 
pact1. Confrontation was viewed as undesirable. However, he recognised that consensus had 
not been possible on some issues. The second point was on the strengthening of the 
federation', though Cabral's examples mentioned only the strengthening of sub-national 
governments.
Consensus was reached mainly through a scheme implemented by the PMDB's leader 
Covas. According to Passarinho, Covas created a kind of UN Security Council model within 
the CNA The scheme, called the College of Leaders, put together the leaders of every party 
in the CNA, each with veto power. Passarinho added that
Covas's leftist origin, together with the messianic efforts o f  the radical left, p lu s the neglect 
o f  the right, were responsible fo r  the right's defeats. The right could  only minimise certain 
measures but could  never win a  battle [21 M ay 1993].
Because of the routes that the draft was taking, especially the threats to Samey’s term 
in office, phis the adoption of several measures with which the business community disagreed, 
a group was then created to fight against what they called the leftist features of the drafts. The
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group was named the Centrao (Big Centre) 15. It included 152 parliamentarians from the 
PFL, PMDB, PDS, PIB, PDC and PL. The group also reflected the PFL's reaction against 
the conservative's latest defeats 16. President Samey played all his cards by supporting the 
Centrao. He distributed political benefits, such as radio and television licences, public work 
contracts and appointments to public offices 17. Samey relied also on the military's position 
against the parliamentary system and against the shortening of his term He used their position 
to threaten the CNA [Passarinho, 21 May 1993]18. Although the Centrao's intention was to 
support the requests of both the business community and Samey, the latter was much more 
successful in his demands to the CNA According to the president of the FIBSP, Sao Paulo's 
powerful industrial federation, in 1988 he went eighty-five times to Brasilia to lobby for the 
industrialists' interests. Out of the twenty-four points for which he lobbied, he was defeated 
on twenty-one (Folha de Sao Paulo, 1993) 19.
The issues that brought this coalition together were not related to decentralisation20.
15 At the beginning of this conservative reaction, Passarinho was invited to become its leader by a group of 
the PFL and die PMDB. The invitation came because the group wanted a respected leader. However, Passarinho's 
invitation was blocked by other of Centrao's members, especially Roberto Cardoso Alves (PFL-SP), Amaral 
Netto, (PDS-RJ), and Gastone Righi (PTB-SP) [Passarinho, 21 May 1993]. Those parliamentarians were famous 
for their lack of ethics when negotiating political benefits. Louren9 0 , the PFL's leader, became the Centrao's 
spokesman.
16 Since its creation the PFL had dominated Congress because it used to rely on the PMDB's fear of its own 
internal divisions. The PMDB had been avoiding confrontation because it did not trust the coherence of its 
members in a roll-call voting . PMDB's leader Covas himself said that giving coherence to the party was not 
always possible [19 May 1993].
17 The methods used by Samey and by die business community to influence the CNA are described by Baaklini 
(1992), Campello de Souza (1989 and 1992) and Fleischer (1990).
18 The military were not only die feared members of the transitional pact but they were used by Samey as an 
extra-constitutional force to counterbalance the alliance between lefitist parties and social movements.
19 Since the political opening whenever Congress has to choose between the interests of the business 
community and those of the federal government, the latter prevails. The most significant episode happened in 1993 
when 500 institutions from the business community and the workers' unions were unanimously against the 
creation of the IPMF tax (Folha de Sao Paulo, 1993), which was approved by Congress. This attitude does not 
mean that the business community is powerless, but that whenever Congress is confronted with conflicting 
interests between the federal government and society, most of their members are more likely to do business with 
the federal government An interesting attempt to identify the motivations of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies 
was made by Ames (1995).
Centrao's agenda varied according to different analysts. However, some issues arrived at the Plenary 
sessions without consensus and most of diem belonged to Centrao's concern: Samey's term in office; the system 
of government; measures concerning domestic and foreign companies; workers' rights and unionisation; land 
reform; measures to strengthen democratic participation; abortion; and whether Brazil should keep diplomatic
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The tax framework and the organisation of the State had already been decided by the time the 
Centrao was created, despite a lack of consensus on some details. However, the creation of 
the Centrao had four important points which relate to this research. First, in December 1987 
the group succeeded in amending the process by which the draft document was to be 
considered at the Plenary. As a result, Internal Rules No. 3 was adopted, which practically 
allowed a new draft to come out. Second, the Centrao broke the fragile coalition built by the 
Democratic Alliance, broadening the number of players in the decision-making process. 
Third, the Centrao's victories in supporting Samey's demands showed that the federal 
government was not an actor to be ignored and that it could exercise its power, if it wanted. 
Finally, the late awakening of the conservatives in the CNA shows that the groups and 
institutions they represented did not know how to cope with democratic and pluralistic ways 
of decision-making. The Centrao represented mainly those who were active in the old political 
and economic alliance. It took those actors some time to react to the democratic and pluralist 
procedures through which the Constitution was to be designed. The old alliance not only 
managed to organise their demands within a specific group, but were also responsible for 
some victories relating to their demands.
The constitution of groups cutting across party lines was not the Centrao's monopoly. 
Some of these groups were ideologically homogeneous and waged a concerted campaign over 
issues facing the CNA; others were temporary alliances of diverse individuals with little in 
common except certain issues in the Constitution. The existence of so many groups was an 
expression that political engineering was still in full swing, shown also by the fact that around 
15% of Congress members changed parties during the CNA21. The constitution of so many 
groups, the changing of the parties' affiliations and the subdivision of parties into new ones 
show two main things. First, the tendency to subdivision instead of mergers was an indication 
that groups were still searching for their positions in the new political arrangements. Second,
relations with countries where apartheid was tolerated. For an account of the roll-calls that went to the Plenary 
without consensus, see Coelho and Oliveira (1989) and Kinzo (1990). Apart from these issues, other topics 
polarised Congress during the CNA According to Passarinho, the state monopoly on petrol, the nationalisation 
of mining activities and the right to strike were also subjected to polarisation [21 May 1993].
21 A major split occurred in June 1988 when more than fifty delegates, mainly from the PMDB, left their 
parties to create die PSDB. Among those were several interviewees: Seixas, Richa, Serra and Covas. The PDC 
was the party which registered die highest number of new affiliations during the CNA, seven. The second was 
the PSB, with four. The PDT increased its members by two. The most harmed party was the PMDB, which lost 
sixty-seven members.
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the lack of a relatively homogeneous group to lead the constitution-making could only 
strengthen individual practices, meaning that each clause or amendment was negotiated and 
renegotiated innumerable times. If the progressives were mostly hegemonic until the level of 
the thematic committees, based on their messianic behaviour 22 and on their ability to use the 
so-called popular forces, at the level of the Systematisation Committee they had to draw back 
and negotiate every single issue with the conservatives. At that stage consensus-reaching was 
the way to cope with differences. These events made room for more political negotiations 
over issues not directly related to decentralisation but negotiated under its name.
4.2.2 The Plenary Sessions
There were 1,021 roll-calls covering both rounds of voting. More than 95% of the 
final text of the Constitution was already decided by the time the CNA got together for the 
two rounds of roll-call voting. Out of more than 1,000 roll-calls, 115 were selected as relating 
to the organisation of the State and the fiscal system shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4 Selected Roll-Calls in the Plenary Sessions Related to the 
Organisation of the State and the Fiscal System
Topic Number of
Proposals
. Fiscal system and public expenditure 61
. Inter and intra-governmental conflicts 31
. Regional cleavages 13
. Role of the State 10
Source: Aggregation based on PRODASEN's data base
An average varying between 350 and 400 of the CNA members attended the roll-calls 
selected by this research. This number was also the average presence in most roll-calls23. Out 
of these 115 roll-calls, 82 were rejected and 33 were approved, meaning that more than 70% 
of the proposals were presented without negotiation, and were, therefore, defeated. However, 
83% of the proposals presented achieved a high consensus, either for their approval or for
22 The view of the messianic behaviour of the progressives was shared both by Passarinho [21 May 1993] and 
by the PB do B's leader Lima [30 April 1993].
23 Only the roll-call voting for the form of government managed to bring together at the Plenary the 559 
parliamentarians. Another roll-call that came close was the one on Samey's term in office, attended by 554 
delegates. Roll-calls on die interests of the business community never managed to bring to the Plenary more than 
490 parliamentarians. These figures confirm the argument on the strength of the federal Executive. It also shows 
that parliamentarians in Brazil are more likely to support the Executive's demands than those coming from society 
or interest groups.
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their rejection34. Only eleven roll-calls were subjected to tough disputes25. Seven were related 
to the tax system, three to inter and intra-govemmental conflicts and one to the role of the 
State 26. Most of the proposals sought to change parts of specific taxes. Only one proposal 
was presented to change the entire chapter governing the tax system. It was roll-call No. 417, 
sponsored by a member of the PL. Following the New Right tradition, this proposal aimed at 
limiting taxes and at a more decentralised federal system. The proposal received 125 votes 
in favour out of 345.
Cleavages among regions were less intense at the Plenary, given the strategy of 
consensus-building. However, some confrontations still occurred, as Table 4.5 shows.
Table 4.5 Selected Roll-Calls Voting Among Regions Showing Their Internal 
Divisions or Coherence
Region
811
Yes No
R o 1
904
Yes
1 - C 
No
a l l
913
Yes No
708
Yes No
North 25 15 30 11 28 10 14 31
North-East 49 44 64 55 75 6 60 77
South-East 43 80 53 77 15 120 69 64
Centre-West 23 9 3 23 26 4 13 21
South 25 33 36 38 3 68 38 31
Fed.Dist. 4 5 1 9 4 5 6 3
Total 169 186 187 213 151 213 200 227
Source: Aggregation based on PRODASEN's data base.
At that stage the South-East was more successful and more united than the North- 
East. If  the North-East was the winner in the previous stages and proved its efficiency in 
individual negotiations, the South-East proved its power at the Plenary as a less divided
24 By a high consensus those proposals in which two-thirds or over of Congress members voted equally are 
meant
25 By tough disputes those proposals which were approved or rejected by a 5% difference are meant
26 Roll-call subjected to tough disputes were: 202 (the states should have the power to provide public transport 
between municipalities); 246 (prohibition of states and municipalities from hiring private companies to mediate 
in matters concerned with their interests); 438 (changes to the Union's power to levy taxes); 460 (changes to die 
distribution of revenue from the Union to the states and municipalities); 677 (returning to the states the lands that 
had been transferred to die Union by the 1946 Constitution); 708 (the Union should pay interest of no more than 
3% a year on the balance of the foreign debt); 811 ( reduction of the powers of the three tiers of government 
concerning the organisation of agricultural production and food supply); 901 (exclusion of the power of the states 
from levying up to an additional 5% of Income Tax); 902 (exclusion of individual taxpayers from the payment 
of the state tax of an additional 5% of Income Tax); 904 (to levy taxes on petrol, fuels and electric energy when 
they are moved from one state to another); and 909 (reduction of the rates of the ICMS).
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group. Roll-calls numbers 811, 904 and 913 27 are examples of how the South-East won 
confrontations as a united force, whereas the North-East was defeated because of its 
divisions. It also showed in roll-call No. 708 that whenever the regions voted differently, the 
North, the North-East and the Centre-West could impose their will. Surprisingly, the South, 
Brazil's most homogeneous region, tended to vote differently in the selected roll-calls, except 
in No. 913.
In the opposite direction, Le. in showing the high degree of negotiations among 
regions, four roll-calls can be cited as examples (Table 4.6)28. All these roll-calls represented 
the particular interest of a certain area or region, but the others were united in voting 
according to what had been negotiated. Sometimes an agreement on a measure to benefit an 
area could later become a liability. This happened in roll-call No. 718, which created three 
new states, therefore decreasing Sao Paulo's intention to strengthen its influence over
Congress.
Table 4.6 Selected Roll-Calls Voting Among Regions Showing Their High 
Degree of Compromise
Region
453
Yes No
R o 1 
463 
Yes
1 - C 
No
a l l
464
Yes No
718
Yes No
North 23 12 32 5 3 34 35 1
North-East 21 87 91 20 2 115 111 0
South-East 9 107 103 10 48 80 116 0
Centre-West 1 24 32 1 4 31 34 0
South 6 59 59 4 8 58 62 0
Fed.Dist. 2 7 6 0 3 3 9 0
Total 62 296 323 40 68 321 367 1
Source: Aggregation based on PRODASEN's data base.
Some inter-regional cleavages occurred at the Plenary. Roll-call No. 679 is an example 
that individually the states were weak and could be defeated if alliances were not made at least 
within the region. The proposal was to earmark for twenty years the allocation of federal 
revenues to sectoral programmes. It was endorsed by thirty parliamentarians, twenty-seven 
from Rio de Janeiro. The North-East and the South voted in favour, but the South-East, 
where Rio de Janeiro lies, voted against. The result was for approval but the number of votes
27 Roll-call 913 proposed changes to the distribution of federal revenue between states.
28 Roll-calls in such situation were: No. 453 to exclude wood and semi-manufactured wood from states' taxes; 
No. 463 proposing that half of h e  Union's revenue that was to be transferred to the North-East should be invested 
in h e  drought-affected areas; No. 464 to include h e  north of Rio de Janeiro among h e  regions h a t should receive 
a privileged tax treatment; and No. 718 for h e  creation of h e  state of Tocantins and h e  transformation of two 
territories into states.
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did not reach the necessary quorum 29. Two more roll-calls were related to inter-regional 
cleavages. Roll-call No. 676 was intended to determine that for the next twenty-five years the 
state of Piaui, in the North-East, should have a 50% reduction in the federal taxes levied on 
that state, therefore decreasing the amount of federal revenues to be shared. Most regions 
voted against it. Roll-call No. 912 sponsored by a parliamentarian from Maranhao, in the 
North-East, tried to change the proposal that stated that half of the federal revenue to be 
invested in the North-East should be allocated to the drought-affected area. Every region 
voted against it, showing that previous negotiations were to be respected. This result also 
shows the importance of politicians from the interior, which is the area most affected by 
droughts. Roll-call No. 812 is an example of how the regions were articulated in favour of the 
creation of new politically appointed positions. The proposal was presented by two members 
of the PFL and one of the PDS. They wanted to abolish the clause which obliged the states 
to create a state-owned company to exploit gas pipeline services. Every region and every 
party voted to keep the obligation, except the PFL.
Two proposals were again presented to materialise decentralisation. Roll-call No. 726, 
sponsored by Serra and by several other parties from every region except the North, was 
intended *to reinstate the proposal about transfer of responsibilities and jurisdictions from the 
federal to sub-national governments and from the states to the municipalities and to define the 
procedures and limits of decentralisation'. The proposal was defeated in every region. Roll-call 
No. 727 was introduced by a member of the PDT from Parana to list public services and 
welfare activities that should be transferred to the municipalities. Here again the proposal was 
rejected by every region.
The high consensus achieved by issues concerning decentralisation was built up by 
putting together members from different parties. Figure 4.1 shows that the best way to 
guarantee the approval of a proposal was to obtain the support of four or more different 
parties. Even so, not all proposals with such an orientation passed, e.g. roll-call No. 726. The 
second best way was to put together two or three members from 'opposite' parties or groups. 
Here all kinds of combinations occurred, but the most common was between the PMDB and 
the Centrao. The third most successful way was registered by proposals presented individually
29 Party leaders extensively used the tactic of not approving a proposal by recommending that their colleagues 
should not show up at the Plenary for voting.
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by parliamentarians with some sort of leadership support, by a party leader, a rapporteur or 
a representative of a pressure group or the business community. Here the three party leaders 
who presented proposals, from the PFL, the PDC and the PTB, failed to have them approved 
because they reduced federal taxes or assets. A leader of the building industry, Luiz Roberto 
Ponte (PMDB-RS) also saw his proposal to reduce federal taxes rejected.
Figure 4.1 CoaMon-Building at the Plenary Sessions 
Rate of Approval According to the Way the Proposal Was Presented
One leader 25.4%
'Opposite' parties 26.6%
One Individual 7.1%
Same party/group 4.7%
4 or more parties 36 1%
The worst way to 
achieve a proposal was 
to collect the signatures 
of parliamentarians from 
the same party or group.
Only 8% of their 
p rop osa l s  were 
a p p r o v e d . T h i  s 
performance was even 
worse than proposals 
presented by a single 
parliamentarian without 
clear leadership support, 
which scored 12% of approvals.
Although roll-call voting on decentralisation obtained a high consensus, a significant 
degree of dispersion was found within each party, except the maoist PC do B. Not 
surprisingly there was not one roll-call vote among the 115 analysed in which members of the 
PMDB and the PFL had not disagreed. Figure 4.2 shows that parties with more ideological 
identity among their members, such as the PC do B, PT and PSB, presented no, or a low 
degree, of dispersion.
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Another group was 
constituted by the PL 
and the PDT, both with 
fifty-seven proposals 
without agreement 
among their members, 
which means that they 
agreed in half of the 
votes. Another group 
was integrated from the 
PDC and the PSDB.
Figure 4.2 Diepereion in Roll-Call Voting
78
67 67
P C doB  PT PSB  PL PDT PD C  PSD B  PTB P D S  PFL  PMDB 
Perty
Notoe: (1) Includes those who abstained.
(2) Excludes parties with less than 4 members 
and parliamentarians without party afflHatlon.
These two parties could
be labelled as the most representative of the centre-right, the PDC, and the centre-left, the 
PSDB. Their members disagreed in a ratio above what would be expected, especially in the 
PSDB, a newly created party. However, this high disagreement can be explained by the fact 
that both parties were constituted of politicians coming from the less ideological parties. 
Finally, there was a group integrated from the 'physiological' parties PTB and PDS.
Every party had more victories than defeats on their propositions. Considering the roll- 
calls where most of their members voted for the winning proposal, the PMDB was the overall 
winner. There could be no other possibility, given that most of the votes were previously 
negotiated and that the PMDB's enormous representation made the party the most important 
collective player. In the second place was the PSDB, with only nine defeats, including the one 
on the scheme to bring decentralisation of responsibilities into being. Here the influence of 
Richa and Serra as ex-rapporteurs, Cardoso's vice-presidency in the Systematisation 
Committee and Covas's leadership could be felt. The PFL was third, with fourteen defeats 
against 101 victories. In the fourth place came parties with a more ideological identity: the PT 
registered nineteen defeats, the PDT twenty, the PC do B and the PDC twenty-two each. 
Another group was that integrated from the 'physiological' parties: the PTB and the PDS. The 
party with the highest score in defeats was the PL, with thirty-five, showing that the New 
Right's demands were the least successful in the two topics analysed. Nonetheless, the number 
of defeats suffered by every party in the CNA over the two constitutional chapters analysed
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was very low. What these figures show is that everyone was a winner and every party or 
group is to be held accountable for the decision to decentralise30.
4.3 Reasons for the Decision to Decentralise
Why was the decision to decentralise taken? Three groups of reasons can be noted 
aggregating at nine different motivations, shown in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7 Reasons to Decentralise
Group Motivation
External Agenda of the Transition
External + Internal Cleavages between the Legislature and 
the Executive
Internal CNA's peculiarities
The first group was constituted for reasons based on external motivations over the 
agenda of the transition. Five reasons can be classified in this category. First, the decision was 
a reaction against the authoritarian regime. Centralisation and dictatorship have historically 
been associated in Brazil, as previous chapters have shown. Second, issues of 
decentralisation, such as fiscal and federal equilibrium and public deficit control were not on 
the agenda of the transition. Politically, the main issues addressed by the CNA were to end 
the transition and to legitimise redemocratisation. It was in this broad framework that the 
issue of decentralisation was addressed. Third, the lack of a national project, or consensus 
over a new format for the State and a new economic model, made the decision-making 
process fragmented and, therefore, regionalist. Decentralisation was the result. As the basis 
for the decision was fragmented, decentralisation was adopted without a definition of what 
was to be achieved. Fourth, there was a great euphoria in the country when the Constitution 
was being drafted, stimulated by previous political and economic achievements. Few 
politicians would mention problems such as the financial constraints of the federal 
government. Finally, there was an environment favouring normative assumptions on the
30 This positive-sum game happened also with other constitutional measures. The best example was roll-call 
No. 623. Based on a collective amendment sponsored by the PMDB, PTB, PFL, PDT and PDC, it called for the 
revision of the Constitution five years after its promulgation. The proposal was approved by 327 votes in favour, 
165 against and 18 abstentions, showing that the parties were confident that their Victories' could be expanded. 
Every party and every region, except the PFL, voted in favour of die amendment, including the progressive parties 
that later boycotted the revision. Contradictorily, the PFL is the party which now puts more pressure on the goal 
of constitutional revision.
148
efficiency and the accountability of sub-national units.
The second group was constituted for reasons based on both external and internal 
motivations over cleavages between the Executive and the Legislature. After a model where 
the institutions were subordinated to the federal Executive, and following the 'anti-model' 
approach partially adopted by the CNA, Congress was fighting for power with the Presidency 
and decentralisation was a weapon with which to threaten the federal government31. Two 
reasons can be included in this category. First, the idea of a powerful federal government still 
prevailed among parliamentarians. There was a false notion that the federal government was 
financially fit. Second, Samey was a weak President, as opposed to the governors and 
Congress members who were surrounded by the image that they were rebuilding the country 
and wiping out the old order. Congress's power was also aggrandised because parliamentarism 
was to be adopted until close to the end of the constitutional process. Later, despite its defeat, 
many measures typical of a parliamentarian system were kept, such as the President's right to 
issue the Medidas Provisorias (Provisional Measures)32.
The third group was constituted for reasons based on the CNA's and Congress's 
peculiarities. Three reasons can be listed in this category. First, few parliamentarians were 
known nationwide and thus could act and think nationally on issues. 'National' members of 
Congress are generally elected by states that do not depend, for their daily performance, upon 
federal fiscal revenues. The majority of Congress members are what Serra [2 Feb. 1994] calls, 
'federal councillors'. They do not have access to the media and the only way to show their 
loyalty to their constituencies is to favour their demands. Second, issues regarding the fiscal 
system are difficult to understand; the average parliamentarian does not understand them 
Figures were generally ignored. Third, 54% of the CNA's members who had had previous 
political experience had been city councillors, mayors, state deputies and governors. Also, 
members of Congress are always potential candidates for the executive branches of the state 
and local levels.
The Constitution was designed to set up the basis of the new democratic order and to 
legitimise redemocratisation. Decentralisation was seen as an inport ant aspect of
31 The expression 'anti-model' was used by Lamounier to define die Brazilian Constitution, meaning a rejection 
of the previous authoritarian model (Lamounier et al., 1991: 9).
32 Provisional measures allow the President to enforce ordinary legislation without previous approval by 
Congress, although conditional to Congress's further decision.
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redemocratisation and as a way of restructuring the State. In the sense that it accomplished 
its main goals, the Constitution was successful. However, the decision to deepen 
decentralisation was marked by conflicting interests among regions and between the states and 
the municipalities. Those conflicts tended to be intensified by the momentum through which 
the decision took place, namely in the turbulence of changing the regime from 
authoritarianism to democracy. Furthermore, the decision was characterised by normative 
assumptions rather than evaluations about consequences for intergovernmental relations and 
for the balance of territorial power within the federation. On the other hand, the decision 
expressed the Value concept1 behind Brazilian federalism, namely the accommodation of 
conflicting regional demands and the country's deep regional inequalities.
4.4 The Aftermath of Decentralisation
The first reaction against decentralisation occurred before the Constitution's 
promulgation. On July 1988 President Samey delivered a speech against the draft, concluding 
that the Constitution was going to make Brazil ungovernable. Sameys disagreement was, 
among other issues, with 'the federal government's losses of revenue to sub-national levels, 
estimated at $12,6 billion'. An immediate reaction came from Guimaraes. He argued that the 
measures adopted were the 'only way to provide govemability for the country because it 
transferred resources to the municipalities, pensioners, educational programmes and to those 
receiving social benefits'. Two days before the Constitution's promulgation Samey gave up 
his confrontation with Congress and accepted the Constitution, because its promulgation 
meant the 'peaceful end of the transition'33.
Nevertheless, many constitutional mandates needed regulation to be put into force but 
the political actors, instead of concentrating in its enactment, opted for changing them. This 
trend was in opposition to what happened in Germany, where constitutional amendments were 
adjustments to new situations rather than attempts to alter the Constitution (Sontheimer, 
1988: 231) but similar to Australia, where proposals for changing the Constitution have been 
prompted by the need to cope with immediate political problems on the part of the central 
government and not from any broadly based consensus on the need for constitutional adaption 
(Sharman, 1988: 110).
33 Complete versions of these speeches are in Andrade (1990: 911-20).
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4.4.1 The Regulation of the Constitutional ’Grey Areas' Versus Attempts to Change 
the Constitutional Mandates
The 1988 Constitution was full of what became known as 'grey areas', meaning that 
whatever was impossible to reach consensus on was left to be decided by complementary or 
ordinary legislations. However, seven years after its promulgation few of its provisions have 
been issued34. The proposals presented in Congress since the Constitution's promulgation 
over the regulation of the 'grey areas' show a lack of interest by both the federal government 
and Congress in the bringing forward of several constitutional mandates. On the organisation 
of the State, 120 proposals were made and only four were about intergovernmental relations. 
None of these few proposals has been approved.
As for the fiscal system, the number of proposals to regulate the constitutional clauses 
were surpassed by the number of proposals to change them. Until April 1993, out of the 306 
suggestions by parliamentarians since the Constitution's promulgation, only forty-three were 
to regulate constitutional measures. The highest concentration, 107, was destined for tax 
incentives, tax exemptions, subsidies and tax benefits. This figure shows that increases in tax 
privileges are putting pressure on the tax system. The political system's lack of commitment 
to the enactment of the Constitution means also that those who benefit from the lack of 
regulation are preventing the political system from making decisions35.
Here again the presence of the progressive parties in fiscal matters is scarce. However, 
the PSDB was very active, with forty-eight proposals, the majority to regulate the 
Constitution and to expand tax incentives36. The agenda of the federal Executive was also 
more concentrated in changing the fiscal framework than in consolidating it.
The private sector rejected the fiscal system and the policy of creating new taxes to 
sort out the federal government's cash flow problems, especially the increases in the Social
34 An ex-Minister of Justice reckoned that the Constitution requires the enactment of some 285 ordinary 
statutes and forty-one complementary laws in order to put its provisions into action (Rosenn, 1990: 778).
35 The idea that political power has more than one dimension and that power may also be exercised by 
preventing an issue from being brought up for decision was developed by Bachrach and Baratz (1962 and 1963).
36 Fernando Henrique Cardoso presented die highest number of proposals on the fiscal system. This fact means 
that the PSDB was die party with the greatest commitment to die implementation of die fiscal system, but it may 
also mean that Cardoso and his party were preparing die way to hold executive positions, which happened in 
1993, when he became Minister of Finance, and in 1994, when he was elected President
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Contribution based on the payroll, which, they argue, decrease their competitiveness 37. 
International investors also call for constitutional changes (.Forbes, 1993; The Economist, 
1991).
The following government also reacted against the Constitution, and especially against 
the tax system. Under the argument that he was the first elected President, Collor put pressure 
on Congress and on society against several constitutional mandates. His uneasiness with the 
1988 Charter became visible from two episodes. First, in October 1991 he sent six bills to 
Congress proposing deep constitutional changes, known as the Emendao, mentioned in 
Chapter 2. One bill was destined to alter the entire chapter on the tax system. Second, in 
trying to fight the Constitution Collor chose as Ministers the most outstanding leaders in the 
CNA and those who most enthusiastically advocated the Constitution, even if some disagreed 
with many of its measures Conor's impeachment, the financial scandals involving members 
of Congress's Budget Committee and the coming of the 1994 elections temporarily changed 
the political agenda and the threats to the Constitution, despite several changes in the tax 
system, as mentioned in Chapter 2.
Conor’s intention of backing down from financial decentralisation has been replaced 
by Cardoso's strategy to create the conditions so that the sub-national governments can 
shoulder more responsibilities for delivering services in a more planned and coordinated way. 
This is to happen through the most important programme launched by Cardoso: the 
Comunidade Soliddria, the Solidarity Community. The policy is to decentralise social 
programmes such as nutrition, rural development and urban services to sub-national 
governments. To counteract the traditional clientelism and corruption in such projects, the 
programme intends to transfer federal resources to sub-national governments but to ensure 
that the implementation of the programmes will be carried out mainly through NGOs and 
community groups. Yet it has to be seen if the federal government will effectively transfer 
responsibilities to the sub-national levels, given that the management of such programmes has 
meant more room for political manoeuvre, either through the appointment to political
37 For the entrepreneurs’ view on the Constitution, see Mercadante (1990).
38 Passarinho, for instance, who became Collor’s Minister, spoke on die day of the Constitution's promulgation 
that 'nobody has the right to be against this Constitution because it represents the demands of the majority of 
Brazilians' (Jom al da Constituinte, 1988). Five other members of the powerful Systematisation Committee, 
including its rapporteur, also became Collor’s Ministers.
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positions or through the allocation of federal revenues, which have been crucial for building 
governing coalitions.
Despite the existence of a broad consensus on the need to reform the 1988 Charter, 
the reform agenda is overloaded: tax system; privatisation; divestiture of state monopolies; 
strengthening the Executive's position in fiscal policy; reforms in the civil service and of the 
pension scheme. They all affect the role of the State in the economic and social spheres. This 
congested agenda means more compromises within the framework of a fragmented political 
system where consensus-reaching prevails over confrontation.
4.4.2 Balance of Power After Decentralisation and Redemocratisation
Apart from the strength of sub-national politicians and Congress, two other aspects 
of the political system should be mentioned for a better understanding of Brazil's current 
balance of power. These aspects influence the position of the federal government in the 
federation The first aspect regards the Chamber of Deputies' regional representation. As 
mentioned above, since the promulgation of the 1932 Electoral Code smaller and 
economically weaker states hold proportionally more seats in the Chamber than bigger 
constituencies, whereas in the Senate the criterion is parity: each state has three senators. The 
largest difference in the Chamber is found between the South-East and the North regions. The 
former has 46% of the electorate but occupies 33.6% of the seats, whereas in the North 4.8% 
of the voters elect 11.3% of the Chamber (Folha de Sao Paulo, 1992). This over- 
representation was maintained by the 1988 Constitution and was reflected in the hegemony 
of the three less developed regions within the CNA's committees and subcommittees. 
Arguments against this over-representation emphasise two points. First, it acts against the 
principle of electoral systems based on proportional representation such as Brazil's, i.e. the 
goal of'one man, one vote1 is not totally met. It is also criticised because parliamentarians 
from smaller states tend to act according to 'parochial' demands. Despite recognising the 
problems raise*! by those in favour of increasing the South-East's representation in the 
Chamber, there are important historical and political facts favouring this over-representation. 
First, the scheme was set up in the 1930s as a way to decrease the control of Sao Paulo and 
Minas Gerais over the whole country, as mentioned in Chapter 2. The concentration of 
economic and human resources in the South-East, especially in Sao Paulo, has since 
decreased, but the gap among regions is still wide. Second, the over-representation of smaller 
units of the federation is one element reinforcing the relationship between federalism and
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consociational democracy according to Lijphart’s (1984) formulation. Third, in line with this 
study’s argument, the over-representation of weaker economic units of the federation forces 
the political system, the federal government and Congress to incorporate the problems of 
Brazil's regional inequalities into the political agenda.
The second aspect regarding the country's balance of power is related to the locus 
where intergovernmental conflicts are mediated. The 1988 Charter brought Congress and 
sub-national governments to the fore in the decision-making process, especially in approving 
the federal budget. Kugelmas, Sallum and Graeff (1989) traced the events that took place in 
the 1989 budget showing the new role of governors and of Congress in feeing 
intergovernmental conflicts. With that budget, the first after the Constitution's promulgation, 
the government intended to solve its reduction of revenues by decreasing its share in 
programmes of regional development, transport, housing and urban development and to 
oblige sub-national governments to pay part of their domestic and foreign debts. This attempt 
was known as Operagao Desmonte. When the channels of negotiation between the governors 
and the Executive became blocked, the issue was transferred to Congress' s Budget 
Commission. Their members found a way to decrease the amount sub-national governments 
were initially to pay for their debts, which was finally accepted by the federal government, 
although the scheme was not later honoured by the states. They also reacted strongly against 
the transfer of programmes with the allegation that without the transfer of assets and 
personnel, sub-national governments would have to spend more money, therefore increasing 
the public deficit.
From then on Congress and sub-national governments have enjoyed much freedom 
in increasing the annual budget proposal, not only through negotiations with the Executive 
and through direct amendments in the budget proposal, but also during the extra-budgetary 
rounds mentioned in Chapter 2. The power to increase budget proposals works as follows. 
The 1988 Constitution enabled Congress to change the budget proposal sent by the Executive, 
which was denied during the military regime, but not to increase it 39. However, 
parliamentarians have been using the following manoeuvre: with the false allegation that the 
Executive has underestimated its revenue, Congress has considerably expanded overall
39 The militaxy regime would set aside around $ 100 million out of the budget proposal to be distributed among 
their supporters in Congress for allocation in their constituencies (Veja, 1993).
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spending40 On the other hand, Congress amendments to the budget are not compulsory and 
the President has the power of veto, including that over unrealistic estimated revenues. The 
President, however, does not use his power of veto and ends up yielding to politicians' 
pressures to spend the amount allocated, which he uses, again, to negotiate with Congress and 
sub-national governments.
The power gained by extra-Executive and extra-parliamentary forces to decide on
federal expenditure shows the vulnerability of the federal government in the intergovernmental
relations game. The tendency of sub-national units to increase expenditure is natural in any
democracy. But as Franco (1993: 34) put it, the case of Brazil is that, with the end of
authoritarian rule there are no institutional guidelines or procedures to establish fiscal
_to,
discipline and there is no market to which bring demands for expenditure to levels consistent 
with budgetary balance and price stability. Moreover, because parliamentarians are more loyal 
to their constituencies than to their parties, the federal government and the President of the 
Republic are left to 'float over a vacuum, over an unruly and atomised parliament', as Sartori 
(1994: 95) described the position of the Brazilian Presidents. The power of extra-executive 
forces over spending also stresses the puzzle raised in the previous chapter: how can one 
explain the drafters' decision to financially weaken the federal government when they need its 
mediation and resources to face disputes in their several constituencies?
4.5 Conclusions
Issues on the organisation of the State and the tax system during the constitutional 
process were less politicised and more regionalised and individualised, but these features are 
not only a Brazilian bias. Shugart and Carey (1992: 3) assessed that assemblies are ordinarily 
expected to be 'parochial' in nature and Elster (1994a) made the evaluation that the interests 
of constituencies are the most important ones. Despite some distrust of mayors and 
governors shown in the reports and interviews relating to the subcommittees and committees 
analysed, the drafters took the risk of increasing 'parochialism' and the power of their 
constituencies. Other factors have contributed to furthering the localist and individualised 
feature of the Brazilian CNA. The lack of a national project, and of ideological polarisations 
and confrontations, which could impose losses on certain groups, brought fragmentation and 
postponements to the political system Some conclusions can be drawn from the events that
40 In the 1989 budget parliamentarians 'created' an extra revenue of 3% of GDP (Afonso, 1994: 75)
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took place in the CNA and, afterwards, from the ones directly concerned with 
decentralisation.
First, if an 'anti-model' was embraced for certain issues, the same did not happen for 
other measures, which lingered as reminders of the military heritage. Second, in the name of 
decentralisation, many clauses were negotiated. Therefore, regional fragmentation and 
pressures on the federal revenues went much further than revenue transfers to sub-national 
governments. Third, the concept of autonomy as an element of decentralisation has proved 
to mean different things to different groups, regions and even individuals. Fourth, few 
Congress members admitted their responsibilities for the outcomes of decentralisation. The 
reason can be found in the traditional high turnover rate in Brazil's Congress. High turnover 
is likely to induce political behaviour based more on short-term issues rather than on 
commitments to policy results. Fifth, the option for a consensual strategy rather than 
confrontation meant two different things: (i) it promoted a positive-sum game in the 
constitutional chapters analysed; and (ii) the consensus approach blocked the possibilities of 
addressing solutions to Brazil's most difficult comm drums The institutionalisation of a veto 
power scheme could only result in more fragmentation and in postponements, symbolised by 
the high number of'grey areas' that remain unresolved.
Another set of conclusions can be drawn about coalition-building as a result of 
decentralisation. First, the failure to bring to being the decentralisation of responsibilities has 
been held to be responsible for the federal government's predicaments. Some parliamentarians 
blame the federal government, either accusing it of inertia or making an assessment that it 
does not want to lose power. However, the preservation of its large bureaucracy, plus the use 
of additional federal revenues are the ways found by the federal government to build up 
governing coalitions and to cope with a fragmented political system. In this sense its power 
continues to be immense, given that it has managed to push through every bill that it 
considered important. On the other hand, the weakness of the federal bureaucracy mentioned 
in Chapter 3 contributes to the federal government's difficulties in proposing and implementing 
policies.
Second, financial decentralisation to sub-national governments has only partial 
responsibility for the Executive's problems in building up coalitions to govern. Other 
constraints come from Congress itselfj especially from its increasingly assertive role. At the 
end of the day Congress replaced the federal government in the mediation to sustain
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'parochial' links and to accommodate the country’s regional cleavages. Congress now plays 
a double role. First, it decides where the federal resources are to be allocated. This role was 
made possible through Congress's enormous power to amend the budget, which, in practical 
terms so far has no limits. Congress's new roles have fostered power fragmentation, 
encouraging the making of decisions by a case-by-case approach from each individual player. 
Congress is the most important player in the decision-making process, less as a proposer and 
more as a vetoer, given its expanded powers and the lack of support to the civilian 
Presidents. Congress exercises this power by blackmailing the Executive and broadening the 
scope of the issues under negotiation. This tactic is aggravated by Congress's traditional 
consensus-building approach. The fragmentation of Congress was heightened by the death of 
Guimaraes in 1992 and no one has taken his place either as a negotiator with the Executive 
or as an arbitrator between the fragmented and contradictory demands of parliamentarians.
The Constitution's main goal of legitimising the new democratic order brought 
Congress and regional and local politicians to the centre of the decision-making process. Too 
many players, all with veto power, are congesting the political agenda with their contradictory 
demands. State clientelism cements this uncertain coalition.
Through the exploration of Brazilian constitution-making, this study has generated 
evidence for an understanding of the emergence, discussion, and the consequences of a reform 
decision. In particular, it has focused on the conflicts and the interests of groups and 
individuals involved in Brazil's constitutional engineering and its aftermath. Analysing the role 
of legislators allowed the study to map out the factors that influenced the choices they made. 
The evidence show that legislators were actively engaged in changing intergovernmental 
relations, the centralisation-decentralisation continuum and to the promotion of a more 
decentralised federation. Their perceptions, activities, motivations and the impact of their 
decisions deserve more systematically analytic attention than has generally been given in the 
literature reviewed in Chapter 1.
Building on particular instances of the decision to decentralise, this study gives 
grounds for an explanation of the subsequent course of the decision, namely its 
implementation. The outcomes of political and financial decentralisation are clear at the 
federal level, which is experiencing the financial constraints mentioned in Chapter 2 and facing 
difficulties in building coalitions to govern. However, at the sub-national level, the results are 
still unclear, especially with regard to what sub-national governments are doing with their
increased financial resources and increased political power. This issue is addressed in the 
following chapter, which paves the way for the research's downstream approach. It answers 
the question of whether decentralisation under democratic rule has changed the allocation of 
public expenditure in the twenty-six states and their capitals, especially to education. The 
following chapter also discusses the extra-constitutional and extra-parliamentary mechanisms 
used by sub-national politicians to influence and to veto national policies.
Chapter 5 Decentralisation at Sub-National Level
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Introduction
The literature on intergovernmental relations, decentralisation and federalism has 
stressed the permanent tension between levels of government, both in unitary and in federal 
states. This tension has lately tended to favour sub-national units of governance, given that 
many countries with different cultural, social, political and economic features are witnessing 
movements towards more decentralised governments and institutions. This chapter analyses 
the political and financial performances of sub-national governments in a federal country that 
has been decentralised and redemocratised. It stresses the importance of incorporating the 
states and regions into the framework of the analysis of decentralisation because at their level 
one can grasp a set of details about processes which remain too general at the national level 
or too specific at the local leveL Bringing out empirical evidence of the political and financial 
developments of the Brazilian states and municipalities may contribute towards developing 
sharper questions about decentralisation and redemocratisation. The inclusion of the 
performance of both states and municipalities fills a gap in the literature of intergovernmental 
relations, decentralisation and federalism which pays little attention to a whole range of 
problems which remain under the political domain of other spheres, such as the states and 
regions, and which tends to focus on only one of the sub-national spheres.
The main issue addressed in this chapter is whether decentralisation and 
redemocratisation have changed the way local and regional goods (political or material) and 
services are distributed between different groups and whether they have changed political 
practices. Furthermore, the chapter addresses the question of whether decentralisation under 
democratic rule has changed the agenda of public expenditure at sub-national level, especially 
expenditure on education. As mentioned in Chapter 1, two aspects of decentralisation are 
pursued. First, intergovernmental, or a decentralisation of governance and power from the 
federal to sub-national leveL Second, the allocation of resources to sub-national levels. This 
approach may shed light on the country’s power structure and on the quota of power enjoyed 
by each group and each level of government. Both aspects of decentralisation can provide a 
sharper definition of political decentralisation which implies that sub-national units of 
government become part of the decision-making process both at the national and sub-national
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levels, either by deciding on policies affecting their jurisdiction or by influencing/vetoing 
nation al policies. T his definition suggests that centralisation-decentralisation is a continuum 
rather than a dichotomy.
This study argues at several points that sub-national governments are now at the 
centre of both the political and financial scenes as a result of redemocratisation and 
decentralisation. The strengthening of sub-national governments has introduced a 
fragmentation of power in Brazil's political structure. In the absence of party-oriented politics, 
sub-national politicians, especially the state governors of the most important states and the 
mayors of the state capitals, provide the federal government with governing coalitions. This 
chapter introduces the research's downstream approach and acts as a bridge between the 
decision to decentralise and the results achieved by the sub-national governments in a decade. 
The chapter also provides a link between a more general analysis of the political and financial 
performance of sub-national governments and the three case studied. This link deepens the 
argument about the role of sub-national governments in a 'paralysed competitive arena' and 
in a 'peripheralised' federation. It provides evidence to further the theoretical formulations 
discussed in Chapter 1 regarding the way sub-national politicians play the intergovernmental 
game. By investigating the results of decision making, the chapter attempts to answer some 
questions which remain unanswered in the literature spanning political science and public 
administration, especially the links between a policy decision and its implementation.
The chapter proceeds in four sections. Sections 1 and 2 analyse political and financial 
decentralisation at the state and at the local levels. Furthermore, Section 1 shows how the 
states' indebtedness became a national issue and the great freedom for political and financial 
manoeuvre enjoyed by the states through their commercial banks. Section 3 presents an 
overview of the state of education in Brazil and investigates the expenditure on education by 
both sub-national levels. Section 4 draws some conclusions.
5.1 Decentralisation at the Level of the States 1
The states in Brazil have always had great political power. Financially, however, their 
participation in the national revenue has been unstable and not always proportionate to their 
political strength. Inequalities among states and regions are a common feature. Attempts to
1 An earlier version of this section was presented at die Institute of Latin American Studies's Seminar on 
Contemporary Brazil. See Souza (1995).
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overcome them have been made, but the gap between the regions is still wide. Brazil has 
twenty-six states, phis the Federal District. The country is divided into five regions. The state 
of Sao Paulo, in the South-East, is the centre of the Brazilian economy. In 1985 the South- 
East accounted for 70% of the country's industrial production and for 58% of the country’s 
GDP, 34% of which was from Sao Paulo. In 1970 Sao Paulo's share of the country's GDP 
was higher: 39%. Since 1975, national wealth has been more widely dispersed, mainly through 
the state of Bahia, in the North-East, and the Centre-West and the North regions. Even given 
this relative dispersion, the gap between Sao Paulo and the other states is enormous2.
The North-East is the country's poorest region. It holds 29% of the total population 
and Brazil's worst social indicators. Life expectancy in the North-East is 58.8 years against 
the country's average of 64.9. Per capita GDP is $918, much lower than the country's average 
of $2,241. Income concentration is the country's second worse: the region's Gini Coefficient 
was 0,638 in 1988, while the country's coefficient was 0,625 (Albuquerque, 1993: 41). As 
discussed in the previous chapter, less developed regions compensate for such an imbalance 
by retaining the rule introduced in the 1930s which makes the South and the South-East 
under-represented in the Chamber of Deputies.
5.1.1 Political Resources
The formation of the Brazilian State had its roots in two contradictory bases, namely, 
strong central and local powers. However, the states have in post imperial times been 
important political actors (Ames, 1987; Camargo, 1993; Medeiros, 1986; Skidmore, 1967). 
Two attempts have been made in Brazilian history to break down the power of the states, both 
of which were associated with authoritarian regimes. The first was made between 1937 and 
1945 by Vargas, during his dictatorship. Seeking greater political and administrative unity, 
Vargas strengthened the federal government by centralising resources and by appointing 
'intervenors' to replace popularly elected state governors. The second attempt to reduce 
regional powers was made by the 1964 military coup. But, despite promoting the
2 In 1990 the participation of the other strongest economies in the country's GDP was as follows: Rio de 
Janeiro, 11%; Minas Gerais, 9.5%; Rio Grande do Sul, 7.8%; Parana, 7.7% and Bahia 5%. Sao Paulo and Rio 
de Janeiro's percentage in die GDP decreased in a decade, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul presented a stable 
participation, and Parana and Bahia increased their participation by 1% each (CEI, 1991a: 8). However, among 
the states GDP per capita shows a different hierarchy. The highest one is found in the Federal District ($ 4,498); 
Sao Paulo comes second, with $3,993; followed by Rio de Janeiro, with $3,352; Rio Grande do Sul, with $2,738; 
Santa Catarina, with $2,344; and Parana, with $2,037. Minas Gerais comes seventh, with $1,850 and Bahia, tenth, 
with $1,226 (Albuquerque, 1993: 41).
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centralisation of the national revenue and prohibiting popular elections in the states and in 
their capitals, sub-national politicians remained important political actors for the legitimation 
of the military regime, as argued by Medeiros, 1986.
In 1982 the states were the first level at which the military allowed direct elections for 
the Executive Branch. These elections were the first under the electoral reform of 1979 which 
eased the re-introduction of the multiparty system Six new parties were created and three 
managed to elect state governors. Table 5.1 presents the results of governorship elections 
since 1982. In 1982 the PDS, a party which replaced the one which supported the military 
regime, won twelve governorships. The PMDB, a party then identified with resistance to the 
military and which later became Brazil's biggest party, won nine governorships. The PDT, a 
party created by former refugee Brizola, won one governorship. The following state election, 
in 1986, made the PMDB the overall winner in twenty-two out of twenty-three states. The 
main reason for the massive victory of only one party was the temporary success of the 
Cruzado Plan at that time, which was credited to the PMDB. The results of the following 
election, in 1990, presented a broader participation by political parties, which contributed to 
the fragmentation of national politics given the dependence of parliamentarians upon state 
governors. In 1994 the number of parties governing the states decreased from ten to eight. 
Those elections also saw the rise of centre and leftist parties to governorships.
Table 5.1 Results of the 1982,1986,1990 and 1994 Elections for Governorships
Party
1982 1986
Number
1990 1994
PMDB 9 22 7 9
PFL - 1 5 2
PDS 12 (*) - . 5 -
PPR - - - 3
PDT 1 - 4 2
PSC - 1 -
PSDB - 1 6
PRS - 1 -
PTB - 1 1
PTR - 1 -
PSC - 1 -
PT - - 2
PSB - - 2
Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral
Note: (*) There were 23 states at that time. The PDS had one more
governorship in Rondonia, then a federal territory. Its governor was 
nominated in 1981 by the President of the Republic.
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By region, the Noith-East and the North are mostly governed by conservative parties 
and leaders; the Centre-West shows a preference for the centrist PMDB; and in the South and 
South-East, there is a pulverisation of parties. With only a few exceptions, the state elections 
have maintained the tendency of the electorate to reject the candidates of incumbent 
governors for the state Executive 3. Nevertheless, the governors increased their influence 
over Congress by supporting their proteges' candidacies and by being elected themselves4.
The role of the state governors has to be analysed more in the light of their personal 
strength and the economic strength of the states they govern than in the features of the 
political parties to which they are affiliated. The reason for this choice is twofold. First, as 
mentioned above, Brazil has a weak party system Second, Brazil's electoral system of open- 
list proportional representation tends to exclude the parties from forming the government's 
support. Many members of the Legislature are elected with the leftover votes of those who 
have accrued 'excess' votes. They are free to search for electoral support where they want and 
how they can. These politicians are not accountable to their parties because they do not owe 
their election to them They are also not accountable to the government because they have an 
independent mandate, they court the electorate directly and the government's success or 
failure does not necessarily determine their future career. Additional constraint comes from 
the party's legal impossibility in preventing their members from changing parties at any 
time s. With such a feature, in which parliamentarians are more loyal to their constituencies 
than to their parties, it is only natural that politicians are likely to negotiate specific issues in 
exchange for governmental favours.
The governors elected in 1986, although all but one were affiliated to the PMDB, 
tended to be either politicians who were in exile, such as Pires in Bahia and Arraes in 
Pernambuco, or those who had been on the political scene for a reasonable time, like Quercia 
in Sao Paulo, Moreira Franco in Rio and Newton Cardoso in Minas. In 1990 the same thing 
happened. Magalhaes and Brizola were re-elected in Bahia and in Rio; Sao Paulo came to
3 Presidents, governors and mayors cannot stand for re-election, but may be elected again after at least a four 
year interval. They can also resign six months before elections to run for legislative positions.
4 In the 1994 elections a record number of twenty-two former governors made their way to Congress (Folha 
de Sao Paulo, 1994).
5 Ames (1995) found hat almost 40% of h e  members of h e  1986-90 Chamber did change parties during their 
four-year mandate.
be governed by Luiz Antonio Heury, an unknown civil servant, thanks to Quercia's personal 
endorsement; and Minas Gerais saw the election of Helio Garcia, a politician with ties to 
the military regime. The 1994 elections started to change this tendency, with the ascension to 
governorships of ex-state capital mayors, such as Covas in Sao Paulo, Alencar in Rio, Lemer 
in Parana, Azeredo in Minas and Buaiz in Espfrito Santo. Pernambuco and Bahia kept the old 
pattern, with Arraes's return and the election of a Magalhaes protege. The state of Ceara has 
been an exception to this pattern because, since 1986, their political bosses have failed to 
agree on a candidate for governor. The result was that a young business leader, Tasso 
Jereissati, took over the government. Since then the Jereissati group has been leading the 
state's politics. This picture shows that, at least until the 1994 elections, the politicians who 
have been governing the most important states had their roots either in the populist regime 
previous to 1964 or were part of the military regime, either as members of the military pact 
or as reliable opponents.
The political strength of the state governors vis-a-vis the federal government became 
visible after the 1982 elections. According to the PFL's federal deputy Aleluia, the governors 
took office saying they did not owe anything to Brasilia [20 May 1993]. Since then the 
political and financial powers of state governors have become intertwined, and each of these 
powers strengthened the other. Although enjoying great political power, which varies from 
state to state, the governors do not enjoy great popularity. Close to the end of their term, in 
1994, opinion polls showed that only three governors had the approval of a majority of their 
electorate, in Ceara, Bahia and Parana, the first two in the North-East and the third in the 
South {Folha de Sao Paulo, 1994). The press, however, had been assessing the good 
administrations of three of the poorest states in Brazil: Piaui, Paraiba and Ceara, all in the 
North-East. As stressed by The Economist (1991) referring to Ceara, 'being poor is no 
obstacle to being well governed'. These states had a balanced budget, paid their debts 
according to the schedule, proportionally made more investments than the others, and had 
reduced the expenditure on payrolls (Veja, 1993). Here a comparison can be made with Italy. 
Before the corruption scandals which swept through Italy in the early 1990s, it was said that 
regional reform was more successful in the rich North than in the poor South (Putman, 1993). 
The economic and political features of Italy’s Mezzogiomo are always compared to Brazil's 
North-East. In Brazil, however, examples of better use of public revenue after the 1988 fiscal 
reform come from the poor North-East.
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The most visible way in which governors exercise their power over national issues is 
through Congress members. Fleischer (1990: 254) mentioned the governors' power over 
Congress in budgetary issues; Ames (1995) showed the control of Bahia's governor, Antonio 
Carlos Magalhaes, from the PFL, over the state's PFL's delegation in the CNA. The press 
constantly assessed the role of Sao Paulo's ex-governor and PMDB's ex-president Quercia in 
blocking fiscal reforms (Folha de Sao Paulo, 1991). This vision is shared by PFL's Senator 
Marinho, who stressed that the governors' authority is rejected in Congress' [23 April 1993]. 
The results of the CNA also prove the governors' power over Congress. Either by 
commanding a large share of their party, as Quercia did within the PMDB and Brizola within 
the PDT, or the majority of the members of the Chamber elected by the state, as Antonio 
Carlos Magalhaes from Bahia still does, they have blocked solutions to the federal 
government's fiscal constraints, as such solutions might afreet their own political influence.
The governors, however, complain that they have no voice in the federal decision­
making process. In a survey by Folha de Sao Paulo (1994) they argued that the federal 
government never consult them when it comes to macro-economic decisions, as if such 
decisions could be shared with conflicting regional interests. They recognised, however, some 
governors' influence over the state's delegation in Congress. They also recognised the 
governors extraordinary veto power, although analysing it as conjunctural, citing that in 1987 
the governors of Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro successfully articulated the fall 
of the Finance Minister Funaro. They acknowledged also the game played by the federal 
government in trying to counterbalance their power: Ciro Gomes, then Ceara's PSDB 
governor and an ally of the President, had to swallow the nomination of a foe for the 
presidency of a federal bank in his state. Therefore, and as mentioned in previous chapters, 
the governors' strength does not mean that the federal government is an absent player. The 
use of federal political appointments, the success in passing bills to temporarily overcome its 
cash-flow problems and the approval of several stabilisation plans prove this. The governors' 
strength has created patterns of additional intergovernmental relations, in which extra- 
constitutional and extra-parliamentary structures and processes are as important as ordinary 
ones. The existence of those structures and processes thus support Anton (1989) and 
Chapman's (1993) suggestion that intergovernmental conflicts are entanglements across 
national and sub-national systems.
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5.1.2 Financial Resources
There is a myth in Brazil which overshadows the debate on the role of the public 
sector in the economy. This myth, reproduced by opinion formers, the media and Congress, 
is that states and municipalities have nothing to do with the need for fiscal austerity (Serra, 
1991). However, for several reasons, sub-national governments are important partners in any 
fiscal policy. First, in 1992,44% of the national public revenue was retained by them. Half of 
the remaining 56%, which belonged to the federal government, was earmarked for 
expenditure such as pensions, health care and regional development programmes. Sub-national 
governments are more free to spend their revenue, given that the only earmarked resource is 
the 25% that they have to spend on education. Second, sub-national governments' expenditure 
on payrolls is almost twice as much as that spent by the federal government. Third, sub­
national governments invest around five and a half times more than the federal sphere and in 
1991 they were responsible for 75% of the resources invested in GFCF. Fourth, in the 1980s, 
sub-national governments' current expenditure increased by 114%, whereas that of the federal 
government increased by 77% 6. Despite these figures, the analysis of sub-national 
government expenditure has received scant scholarly attention. Moreover, policy results at 
sub-national level have, with a few exceptions, so far been ignored by the political and 
academic spheres7.
Hie orchestrated way in which the governors operate politically towards the federal 
government does not mean, however, that the states are an harmonious entity. Disputes 
among them are hidden by the complexity of the way their main tax is administered. Conflicts 
are common, especially concerning the granting of tax benefits to businesses through the 
ICMS. The system works through a scheme for avoiding what the specialists term fiscal war. 
Any measure to grant tax benefits in one or more states must have the unanimous approval 
of the others. This scheme operates through the federal institution CONFAZ - Conselho de 
Politico Fazendaria, presided over by the Minister of Finance. The North, North-East and 
Centre-West are united against the South-East and the South. As the former are constituted 
by nineteen states and the latter by seven, the less developed regions have successfully
6 Data from Serra (1991).
7 As mentioned above, one exception is the research carried out at the University of Campinas, but it is 
restricted to the state of Sao Paulo. See Castro (1992).
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approved measures to benefit businesses located in their states. This confrontation among 
regions is hidden by the rule of unanimous decisions required by CONFAZ. For the last 
twenty years less developed regions have increased their participation in the distribution of 
the ICMS because of their political strength and because recession has affected the ICMS's 
collection in more developed regions. However, the gap among regions is still wide, as Table
5.2 shows.
Table 5.2 Regional Relative Participation in the Collection of the ICMS, 
1974-1992 (Percentages)
Region/Year 1974 1980 1985 1988 1992
North 1.0 1.7 2.3 2.5 3 .4
North-East 9.5 11.6 13 .4 11.6 12 .5
Centre-West 3.9 4.8 6.4 5.5 6.7
South-East 67 .9 63 .7 58 .9 63 .3 60.6
South 17.7 18 .3 19 . 0 17 . 0 16 .8
Source: Ministerio da Fazenda apud Gazeta Mercantil (1993) .
Although sub-national governments' financial vigour and the existence of the 
participation funds FPE and FPM to address the goal of fiscal justice, or horizontal balance 
among unequal governmental units, there are some states and hundreds of municipalities 
which cannot survive without additional financial help from the federal government given 
Brazil's high regional inequalities. A survey showed that seven Brazilian states collect less than 
0.5% of the ICMS levied in the country (IPEA and IBAM, 1994: 16). Bremaeker (1994: 16) 
showed that more than 200 municipalities in the North-East have no chance of levying then- 
own revenue. They have to rely on federal transfers and resources, given the lack of any 
outstanding economic activity and the poverty of their population. Therefore, Brazil's regional 
inequalities act against the goal of decentralisation given that decentralisation has weakened 
the possibilities for the federal government to play one of its roles in a federal system, Le. to 
transfer resources from better-off regions to worse-off ones. Even in countries where there 
are schemes aiming at horizontal balance, like those of Brazil's FPE and FPM, these schemes 
are insufficient in situations of high inter- and intra-regional inequalities. This picture shows 
the limits of financial decentralisation in countries cut across by regional inequalities.
5.1.2.1 Constitutional and Negotiated Grants to Sub-National Governments
With redemocratisation and the 1988 Constitution the financial strength attained by 
sub-national governments assumed different forms. First, as mentioned above, sub-national 
governments had an increase of 1% of GDP in their constitutional transfers. This increase has
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not meant as much to the states as it has to the municipalities. The states' share in the national 
tax revenue was increased by 3.5% and the municipalities' by 4.6%. However, when 
negotiated transfers are added to the constitutional ones and when the analysis incorporates 
the size of the states' debt to the federal government and the role of the states' commercial 
banks, the states were the mam beneficiaries of fiscal decentralisation 8. In 1985, the states' 
net revenue accounted for 7.2% of GDP, whereas the federal government's share was 5.8% 
and the state capitals' share was 0.9%. In 1989 the states' percentage rose to 8.9%, the state 
capitals to 1.2%, while the federal government's decreased to 4.3% (IPEA, 1992a: 15). 
Inflation and high interest rates also played a short-term positive role in the sub-nationals' 
revenue because they were able to invest their revenue and were freer to adopt a policy of 
wage compression than the federal government, because their civil services were not as strong 
as those at the federal leveL
The second way to show the strength of sub-national governments is through the 
m echanism  of negotiated grants. One way by which the federal government builds coalitions 
is by transferring resources to sub-national governments through negotiated grants to attain 
their support. This scheme was used by the military to compensate sub-national governments 
for the losses imposed by the 1966 fiscal reform9. With fiscal decentralisation this scheme was 
maintained, but with different results. Given the financial and political vulnerability of the 
federal level, sub-national governments use their strength not to recover their revenues, as in 
the past, but to increase them The states get the biggest share of the negotiated grants: in 
1987, for instance, nearly 90% of those transfers, excluding those to enterprises, went to the 
states (Shah, 1991: 44).
The use of negotiated grants to pursue different objectives is a common practice in any 
country 10. Some are destined for less developed areas or for those affected by natural
8 As mentioned in previous chapters, the states also benefitted by accruing the biggest tax in the country, the 
ICMS. Twenty-five per cent of the ICMS is transferred to the municipalities.
9 The 1966 fiscal reform concentrated control over tax bases and rates at the federal level and expanded the 
importance of negotiated and earmarked federal transfers in the sub-national's revenues. It also (i) determined 
criteria for the allocation of constitutional transfers according to federal priorities; (ii) set up strict and patronising 
rules about accounting and budget; and (iii) centralised programmes in housing, sanitation and urban transport
10 There is a vast literature on intergovernmental transfers and grants to sub-national governments. See 
Musgrave and Musgrave (1973) for typologies; Bahl (1986) for a methodology of analysis; and Afonso (1992b) 
for a comparison of the Brazilian experience with other federal countries.
disasters; others are to encourage the sub-national levels to pursue policies or to implement 
services which are considered a national priority or which should be provided nationwide; and 
others to build political coalitions. In Brazil, negotiated grants are used for all of these 
purposes, including the implementation of the decentralised health programme adopted shortly 
before the 1988 Constitution. However, the debate on the use of negotiated grants reveals 
that the system has been subjected to distortions. First, negotiated grants were used to 
privilege the President's home state and those states which form the government's support, 
sometimes contributing to fiscal injustice. In 1988 President Samey sent to his home state 
Maranhao 25% of the resources destined for the North-East, but 60% of the total transfers 
went to the South-East, 90% of them to the state of Sao Paulo. In 1991, President Collor sent 
to his home state Alagoas 26% of the total transfers to the North-East. As Conor's main allies 
were also from the North-East, the region gained 52% of the transfers n . Those years were 
market by Presidential despair. Samey because the CNA was deciding about the length of his 
term in office and Collor because of procedures for his impeachment. A second distortion 
found in the practice of negotiated grants was that they were at the centre of the corruption 
scandals involving Congress and the building industry in 1993.
In 1990, negotiated grants represented 3.7% of total transfers from the federal to the 
sub-national governments. In 1991, this percentage jumped to 9.2%. The worse performance 
was in 1988: 22% of total federal transfers were made under the negotiated grants scheme 
{Relatdrio Reservado, 1992). After 1992 negotiated grants started to decrease because of the 
federal policy of tight fiscal control and because the Presidents were not seriously threatened 
by Congress. However, in 1993 negotiated grants still represented 1% of GDP, being 
accountable for one-fifth of the total transfers from one level of government to another 
(Afonso, 1994: 35) 12.
A third way to evaluate the financial and political importance of the states is through 
their indebtedness.
"  Figures from Relatdrio Reservado (1992).
12 A constitutional ban on negotiated grants was proposed by 1BAM in the CNA Despite having the support 
of a few politicians, such as former Finance Minister Krause (Relatdrio Reservado, 1992) and the CPI's 
rapporteur in charge of the investigation of the 1993 corruption inquiry (Gazeta Mercantile 1993), it has not so 
far been formally proposed.
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5.1.2.2 The Indebtedness of the States
The states have two additional financial advantages not shared by the municipalities. 
The first is the size of their debt to the federal government. The second is the role of the state 
commercial banks (SCB) controlled by each state.
The states' debt to the federal government has, so far, been an unresolved issue. First, 
the total size of the debt is subjected to heated debate. Second, attempts to find solutions for 
payment are threatened by the feet that the debt is treated as a political rather than a financial 
issue. Third, because of the influence the governors exert over their backbenchers in 
Congress, the federal government has to compromise with them in order to build governing 
coalitions. The federal government has systematically postponed the payment of the states' 
debt to win the approval of the bills it sends to Congress, especially those to minimise the 
Treasury's cash-flow problems. Table 5.3 presents the position of each state's debt, both 
domestic and foreign 13. The table shows that the size of the debt corresponds to the size of 
the state's economy u. As in the USA, the governmental jurisdictions of the states are not 
equal in their ability to borrow or in the cost of their borrowing (Hildreth, 1993). Five states, 
Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul and Bahia, are responsible for 
65% of the debt. An important aspect in analysing the size of the debt is the relationship 
between the debt and the state's net revenue. This relationship tends to be bigger in smaller 
states, which makes the solution to the problem harder to achieve. Another relationship has 
to be made between the debt and the GDP. In 1993, Sao Paulo's debt accounted for 9% of 
the state's GDP, which was relatively low when compared, for instance, with Argentina's. The 
latter has been praised because it decreased its debt from 112% to 26.6% of GDP in 1993 
{Gazeta Mercantile 1993).
Since the late 1980s, the federal government has been struggling with the states to find 
solutions for their debt problem After 1989, the states slowly started payment of part of their
13 A great part of the states' foreign debt is now considered a debt to the federal government because in the past 
die federal government used to guarantee their loans. According to the Central Bank, the federal government has 
paid 25% of the states' foreign debt
14 Figures presented in Table 5.3 do not include the states' debt to the Social Security System. Together with 
the municipalities, the states' debt to die Social Security System is estimated at between $ 18 and 20 billion (Gazeta 
Mercantile 1993). Negotiations for payment have not yet started. Several attempts were made during the CNA to 
write off those debts. Neither do they include the $1.2 billion debt of the eighteen state hydro-electricity 
companies to ELETROBRA.S, the federal holding company (Folha de Sao Paulo, 1995).
interest, but a broader and more institutionalised solution has yet to be found. The states' 
indebtedness has its roots in the 1966 fiscal reform and in the federal policy of using new loans 
to finance previous ones in order to maintain a high rate of investment. The states not only 
had their own resources reduced but were stimulated by the federal government to borrow. 
With the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, this disarray in the states' finances was sorted
out, but a web of unpaid debts remained, leading to a chronic disorder in federal finances.
Table 5.3 States' Debt to the Federal Government, 1993
Region/State Debt
Domestic
in $ Million 
Foreign Total
North
Acre 222 10 232
Amazonas 660 266 926
ArnapH 6 0 6
Para 189 240 429
Rondonia 116 30 146
Roraima 15 19 34
North-East
Alagoas 483 53 536
Bahia 2,419 745 3, 164
Cearci 1, 004 82 1, 086
Maranhao 1, 013 390 1,403
Paralba 910 184 1, 094
Pernambuco 1, 028 82 1,110
Piaui 496 172 668
R.G. do Norte 392 35 427
Sergipe 259 24 283
Centre-West
Federal District 341 0 341
Goilis 1,322 645 1, 967
Mato Grosso do Sul 1,174 408 1, 582
Mato Grosso 636 269 905
Tocantins 75 0 75
South-East
Espirito Santo 415 127 542
Minas Gerais 4, 325 1,243 5, 568
Rio de Janeiro 5, 620 119 5,739
Sao Paulo 9, 570 4, 024 13,594
South
Parana 1,437 715 2,152
Santa Catarina 1,120 227 1,347
R.G. do Sul 3, 083 643 3, 726
Total 38,330 10,752 49,082
Source: Calculation based on unpublished figures by the Secretaria do
Tesouro Nacional, Coordena<?ao de Responsabilidades e Haveres 
Financeiros da Uniao, Divisao de Estados e Municipios.
Note: Does not include loans from the private banks and non-federal
banks.
The second Tiidden' political and financial strength of the state governors is the state
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commercial banks (SCB). In theory, a country's currency can be issued only by its Central 
Bank Under Brazilian practice, every state has created its own SCB (some have created more 
than one), and whenever a governor asks its SCB for more currency than it has, the Central 
Bank is obliged to cover the deficit and to throw more currency into the market, thereby 
pushing up inflation. As a result of the 1966 fiscal reform and of the federal fiscal policy at 
that time, the SCBs were granted permission to make loans to their main shareholders, and 
therefore controllers, the states 15. The 1982 state elections played a role in this disorder. At 
the first election after the political opening, the state governors played all their cards with the 
blessings of the federal authorities in order to elect their successors. From then on, with more 
or less emphasis, the SCBs have been used to finance the governors' allies (Folha de Sao 
Paulo, 1993) 16. In 1992, the SCBs' debt to the Central Bank was 64% bigger than their 
assets. Here again, the biggest debtors are also the biggest SCBs: Sao Paulo held 60% of the 
debt of the ten biggest SCBs (Folha de Sao Paulo, 1993). A Central Bank's ex-govemor 
declared that until 1993 the Central Bank had spent $4 billion to try to recover the SCBs 
(Folha de Sao Paulo, 1993).
The federal government and the Central Bank are taclding the problem by passing new 
laws, threatening to enforce others which already exist, closing-down some SCBs in smaller 
states and intervening in others. Law 4595 issued in 1989 prohibited the SCBs from making 
loans to their controllers, but it was seldom enforced. Constitutional Amendment No. 3, 
promulgated in 1993, prohibited the issue ofnew bonus to the states. Between 1990 and 1991 
six SCBs were closed by the Central Bank because of their high debts to the federal 
government. In early 1995 the Central Bank decided to intervene in eleven SCBs, the most 
important ones being those of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, the former for the second time 
in the decade, because they owed $7.6 billion (Folha de Sao Paulo, 1995).
The SCBs are one of the mam levers of the state governors. Because of the governors' 
strength, the SCBs have always managed to evade federal control However, the SCBs are
13 The same situation is found in Argentina, where the provinces also borrowed from the Central Bank via
provincial banks to cover their deficits. The provinces have also tried to obtain federal grants by running up high
fiscal deficits and asking the federal government to step in. In 1986, provincial deficits, before transfers from the 
federal government, were 6.2% of GDP, about $4 billion (Wallich, 1992: 53).
16 It was reported that on the eve of the 1990 elections, BANESPA lent $600 million to the Quercia 
administration which it did not have. With interest and monetary updating, this bill, which remained unpaid, rose 
to $1 billion in 1993 (Veja, 1993).
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more transparent than private banks because negotiations of their debts are on the political 
agenda. On the other hand, the states' use of institutions and financial schemes other than their 
own reveals fragmentation in fiscal policy and politics. The political significance of fragmented 
government and policies is that regional politicians are assured a great deal of autonomy as 
political actors.
5.1.2.3 States' Expenditure
The analysis of the aggregate data on the states' expenditure shows not only the 
structure of their expenditure but also identifies the political priorities which are reflected in 
the share gained by each item of expenditure in public spending. Table 5.4 shows that the 
states maintained their pattern of spending more on consumption than on capital expenditure. 
Despite this, in 1990 the states were responsible for 61% of the country's investments, 
whereas federal and local governments were responsible for 15% and 24% respectively, 
excluding investment by the state-owned companies (IPEA, 1992a: 16). Therefore, the states' 
importance as investors and consumers increased not only because of the amount they spend 
but also because of the decrease in federal spending.
Table 5.4 shows also a strong relationship between elections and increases in 
expenditure. The period saw six elections. The pattern of expenditure increases varies 
according to the election's geographic dimension and the nature of the political regime. In the 
1982 state elections, the incumbent governors did not put pressure on fiscal resources for 
investment (or were not allowed to by the military) but instead used the resources of the 
SCBs. With redemocratisation, the pattern changed. In the 1986 and 1990 state elections, 
expenditure rose on payroll, as a way of winning the votes of the vast contingent of civil 
servants 17. A different pattern is observed at local elections, in which governors become 
involved in maintaining their grassroots leadership and in supporting their local proteges. In 
the 1985 and 1988 local elections, increases occurred in capital spending, both through direct 
investment in the municipalities and through the increase in states' transfers to them The 
increase in investment and in current transfers registered in the 1989 fiscal year is probably 
because the governors were starting projects for the 1990 state elections rather than because
17 In 1992 Brazil had around eight million public servants working in the three levels of government, state- 
owned companies, the Legislature and the Judiciary. Public servants account for 12.4% of the Economically 
Active Population and for 36% of die formal jobs. In many less developed states payroll expenditure is higher than 
tax revenue (Gazeta Mercantil, 1992).
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they were supporting candidacies for the Presidency. The 1989 presidential election did not 
affect the states' expenditure, probably because of the pulverisation of candidacies. In that 
election, twenty-two governors were affiliated to the PMDB, and the party's candidate, 
Ulysses G u im ara.es, was never well placed in the opinion polls.
Table 5.4 Selected Items of Expenditure by the States as a Percentage of 
Total Expenditure According to Economic Categories, 1981-1991
Year Current Payroll Current Capital Investment Capital
Spending Transfers Spending Transfers
1981 72 .7 31.7 34 .4 27 .3 8.3 16 .6
1982* 74 .3 31.6 36 .6 25.7 7.6 15 . 0
1983 77.1 32.3 38 . 9 22 .9 5.8 14 .6
1984 74 .2 28 .9 39 . 0 25.8 6.7 15.6
1985** 71.5 27.9 37.7 28 .5 7.5 18 .3
1986* 72.9 30.7 36 .2 27.1 7.6 16 .8
1987 74 .4 30.4 37.6 25 .6 6 . 9 15 .7
1988** 70.7 27.7 34 .7 29.3 7.0 17.8
1989*** 73 . 0 28 .1 36 .3 27.0 7.9 15.6 ..
1990* 75.1 29.7 36 .8 24 . 9 6.3 14 . 0
1991 77.8 28 .3 40.6 22 .2 6 . 0 13 .7
Sources: Ministirio da Economia, Fazenda e Planejamento (1992:12 and
1993:19)
Notes: Only main items of expenditure are presented in the table.
Payroll and Current Transfers are part of Current Spending. 
Investment and Capital Transfers are part of Capital Spending. 
Capital and Current Spending together represent the totality of 
the states' expenditure.
(*)State elections
(**)Local elections
(***)Presidential election
Average expenditure by function is shown in Table 5.5. The most significant increases 
were registered in the Legislature and in the Judiciary, showing their strength not only at the 
federal level, where these expenditures were also boosted. The states gave priority to 
investments in infrastructure (communications and transport). Health and sanitation increased 
only after 1988 as a result of the decentralised health programme adopted shortly before the 
1988 Constitution. Administration and Planning, where the payment of interest and part of 
the payroll are allocated, increased only a little when compared to the above mentioned items. 
Two reasons explain this relatively low increase. First, the state governments in general were 
not paying their debts regularly. Second, the state governments have a policy of wage 
compression in periods outside elections. Annual disaggregation of the expenditure by 
function between 1981 and 1991 derived from the states' balance sheets (Ministerio da 
Economia, Fazenda e Planejamento, 1992 and 1993) riiows two points. First, expenditure
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rose but its functional allocation was kept constant, meaning that the states did not change 
their functional expenditure much during the period, except in few areas not related to social 
services. This tendency means that decentralisation has not changed expenditure patterns on 
the provision of social services, as promised by the drafters of the 1988 Constitution. Second, 
even if some functions have registered an increase above average, no outstanding priority is 
revealed. This lack of priorities shows there is as yet no clarification of the role of the member
states in the economic and social spheres as a result of decentralisation and redemocratisation.
Table 5.5 Average Increase Rate in the States' Expenditure by Function, 
1981-1991 (Percentages)
Function Average Increase Rate
Legislature 11
Judiciary 11
Communications 11
Health & Sanitation 9
Welfare & Pension 9
Transport 7
Housing & Urbanisation 6
Administration & Planning 5
Police 5 .
Regional Development 5
Education & Culture 5
Agriculture 1
Industry, Commerce & Services 0
Employment -5
Electricity & Mineral Resources -13
Source: Ministerio da Economia, Fazenda e Planejamento (1992:18 and 1993: 20) .
On the other hand, the lack of clarification of the role of the states in a decentralised 
financial system does not mean that the states ardt replacing the federal government in the 
provision of services and as investors. This replacement has occurred because the states are 
investing more and because the federal government is investing less. A calculation by Afonso 
(1994: 62), which considers the expenditure of all federal agencies, including decentralised 
agencies, shows that, slowly and inconstantly, the states are replacing the federal government 
in some spheres while others remain without governmental support caused by the backing 
down of the federal government. First, in governmental services and regional development, 
the federal government decreased its expenditure from 17.1% of GDP in 1989 to 8% in 1991, 
whereas the states moved their expenditure from 3% in 1989 to 3.6% in 1990 and to 3.2% 
in 1991. Second, in housing and urbanisation, the backing down of the federal government 
was dramatic: from 58.5% of GDP in 1989 to 9.1% in 1991, whereas the states have doubled
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their expenditure using their own revenue, in a sector that was previously under the federal 
government's financing scheme18. However, the amount spent by the states is still low: 0.2% 
of GDP in 1991. Third, in economic activities such as transport, communications, electricity, 
agriculture, industry and commerce, the federal government invested 3.2% of GDP in 1989 
and 2.8% in 1991, whereas the states were inconstant in their expenditure: 1.4% in 1989, 
1.7% in 1990 and 1.2% in 1991. Fourth, in education, the federal government decreased its 
expenditure from 1.9% of GDP in 1989 to 1% in 1991 and the states increased theirs from 
1.8% to 1.9% 19.
Figures presented so far show that there has been an unplanned, uncoordinated and 
slow transfer of responsibilities to the states, which contradicts the view mentioned in Chapter 
2 that the financial constraints faced by the federal government lay solely in the lack of 
responsibility transfer to the sub-national levels. This slow, unplanned and uncoordinated 
transfer of responsibilities, however, has not changed policy results at the state level much and 
is subjected to distortions. These distortions are more likely to be explained on the grounds 
that the decision to decentralise was taken without a social consensus on what was to be 
achieved. The problems freed by the federal government lay more in the power gained by sub­
national leaders and Congress, which tend to have a regional and local view of national 
issues, and in the lack of a social consensus on what has to be achieved with decentralisation. 
These reasons are more likely to explain the federal government's constraints rather than the 
amount transferred to the sub-national governments or the lack of replacement of a role 
previously under the discretion of the federal government.
5.2 Decentralisation at the Local Level20
A brief look back at the development of municipalities in Brazil is needed to 
understand the trends and their current position. Many studies have been undertaken on the 
historical role of local government and local politics, but few have considered its position in
18For an account of the operation of the housing financial system during the military regime, see Batley (1983).
19 As is going to be shown later in this chapter, the municipalities have increased their expenditure, in 
proportional terms, much quicker than the states. Therefore, if the analysis considers both levels of sub-national 
government, the argument that there is a tendency to replace the role of the federal government in die provision 
of services and as an investor becomes stronger.
20 An earlier version of this section was presented at the Ninth Urban Change and Conflict Conference. See 
Souza (1993)
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recent years and none has deeply analysed local governments' performance after 
decentralisation and redemocratisation. A review of this literature was presented in Chapter 
1, which showed that some works emphasise the hegemony of local politics and of private 
groups in the power structure of the country as opposed to others which assert that central 
government has always played the major role in Brazilian politics. An intermediate position 
was that taken by Ames (1987), Bursztyn (1985), Medeiros (1986) and Schwartzman (1988). 
They concluded that the polarisation of the debate is only apparently a paradox. They 
identified interdependence between central and local levels as generating a mutual legitimacy. 
This study argues, however, that this interdependence, properly identified by those scholars 
during the military regime, has now vanished. The relationship between the federal and the 
sub-national spheres has changed with the new balance of power brought about by 
redemocratisation. Brazilian politics, the federation and its intergovernmental relations present 
a diffused character, a fragmentation of power, where local and state politicians have their 
own political spaces and are partially responsible for the federal government's capacity to 
govern.
In Brazil local government is an important political institution, as are the mayors, 
similarly to those in the USA, besides being the oldest surviving political institution21. Local 
government is associated with city government and urban management because Brazil is a 
very urbanised country. Geographical size, demographic characteristics, and the degree of 
development vary from one municipality to another. The official definition of urban places in 
Brazil is administrative, including all municipal and district seats, regardless of size. By these 
criteria Brazil's degree of urbanisation increased from 31% in 1940 to 45% in 1960, 68% in 
1980 and 74% in 1990. These rates were extremely high in the regions of the agricultural 
frontier, the Centre-West and the North, during the 1970s, because of the combination of high 
fertility as well as in-migration, and they were lowest in the North-East because of a low 
migration rate towards the urban areas in this region. As a result of this process of internal 
migration and urbanisation, the South-East has the highest degree of urbanisation (89%) and 
the North-East has the lowest (57%).
As in the states, the cities exhibit deep differences in their occupational, social and
21 The first municipality, Sao Vicente, was instituted in 1532. For the history and description of Brazil's 
municipalities see Humes (1991: 155-67) and Lordello de Mello and Reston (1991).
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physical structures because of heterogeneity and uneven social and economic developments. 
A major consequence of this rapid process of population redistribution is that the rural 
population has not only lost relative importance but has also stopped growing during the last 
two decades. Despite this demographic, social and economic variety a process of cultural 
unification is under way. Investment since the 1960s in transport and telecommunications, 
especially television, has contributed to a widespread diffusion of urban values in lifestyle and 
consumption patterns, as well as political standards 22.
hi 1993 Brazil had 4,974 municipalities. The creation of new municipalities increased 
extraordinarily during the last two decades, partially as a result of redemocratisation. Over
1,000 municipalities were created between 1975 and 1993. One of the reasons for the creation 
of so many new municipalities was the spatial re-arrangement that followed increasing rates 
of urbanisation. However, regional politicians have sponsored the creation of many 
municipalities to generate more offices for local political leaders. This trend contributes to the 
diffusion of power that has characterised Brazil under redemocratisation and undermines the 
positive effects of federal revenue transfers. From these almost 5,000 municipalities, twenty 
six state capitals 23, plus the Federal Capital (Brasilia), have great political and economic 
importance and have 34,994,197 inhabitants, ie. 24% of the country’s population. In 1991 
they were responsible for 16% of all governmental expenditure on consumption, 23% of 
public expenditure on payroll, 36% of governmental investments, raised over $2,7 billion of 
their own revenue and $7,9 billion of total revenue and owed over $2 billion 24. The nine 
metropolitan regions (Belem, Fortaleza, Recife, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, 
Sao Paulo, Curitiba and Porto Alegre) have 25,793,391 inhabitants, Le. over 73% of the 
population of the state capitals and 17.7% of the country's population.
22 Brazil has an average of 237 television sets per 1,000, above the world average of 186 and the Latin 
American average of 184. About 75% of urban households have television as contrasted with 28% in rural areas. 
Radio reaches 70% of rural homes and it is also found in 90% of low-income urban houses (UNFPA, 1992:35).
23 The state capitals are: Aracaju (Sergipe), Belem (Para), Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais), Boa Vista (Roraima), 
Campo Grande (Mato Grosso do Sul), Cuiaba (Mato Grosso), Curitiba (Parana), Florianopolis (Santa Catarina), 
Fortaleza (Ceara), Goiania (Goias), Joao Pessoa (Paraiba), Macapa (Amapa) Maceio (Alagoas), Manaus 
(Amazonas), Natal (Rio Grande do Norte), Palmas (Tocantins), Porto Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul), Porto Velho 
(Rondonia), Recife (Pernambuco), Rio Branco (Acre), Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro), Salvador (Bahia), Sao Luis 
(Maranhao), S5o Paulo (Sao Paulo), Teresina (Piaui) and Vitoria (Espirito Santo).
24 Data from ABRASF (1992).
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5.2.1 Political Resources
During the military regime the mayors of the main cities were not elected by popular 
vote 25. The state capitals had their first popular election in 1985, followed by others in 1988 
and 1992. In 1985, the PMDB, still a party identified with opposition to the military regime, 
won nineteen of the twenty-three state capitals. Since 1988, the progressives have experienced 
a steady increase in mayoral elections, with the victory of candidates from the PT, PDT and 
PSB. In the following local elections, the progressives commanded one-fourth of the 
population at municipal level and in 1992 the PSDB, PT, PDT and PSB together elected 61% 
of the mayors of state capitals. Despite their poor performance in the country as a whole, 
where the PSDB, PT and PDT held 15% of mayoral seats, the left and centre-left are now 
governing the main cities, as shown in Table 5.6, and are an emergent political group in the 
interior. In spite of this leftist rise, the conservative PDS elected the mayor of the most
important city, Sao Paulo.
Table 5.6 1988 and 1992 Local Elections in State Capitals
Party 1988(1) 1992
PSDB 1 5
PT 3 4
PDT 5 4
PMDB 4 4
PSB 2 3
PDC - 2
PDS 5 2
PPS - 1
PFL 4 1
PTB 1 -
Source: Veja. (19 92)
Notes:(l)The municipality of Palmas did not exist in 1988.
The results of the last two local elections show: (i) a reinforcement of the trend 
towards political fragmentation shown by the number of parties that govern the capitals; (ii) 
a tendency to decrease the participation of the conservative parties, with a reduction in the 
number of mayors affiliated to the PEL, PDS and PTB. The conservatives' defeats in the 
state capitals, however, were compensated for by a great number of municipalities won in the 
interior, especially in the North-East; (iii) the rise of the progressives and the decrease in the
25 There were 201 municipalities forbidden from having popular elections, plus the state capitals, representing 
more than one-third of die urban population. Their mayors were indirectly elected by the state legislature because 
state deputies were considered more reliable supporters of the military regime than city councillors, especially 
those from the state capitals.
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number of conservatives indicate an electoral shift, but this movement should not be 
overestimated because local campaigns registered a low degree of ideological polarisation;
(iv) the victory of tbe PDS's candidate, Paulo Maluf; in Sao Paulo, after five consecutive 
defeats in former elections re-introduced an old political leader into politics and into a mayoral 
seat at a time when some former leaders seemed to be suffering reverses in the major cities;
(v) no capital elected a mayor who belonged to the same party as the governor, showing that 
the electorate, in a certain way, voted against the state executive leader. Except in Fortaleza, 
the same phenomenon occurred in 1988.
Most of the mayors who left office in 1992 were highly regarded by the electorate, 
according to opinion polls. Only five state capital mayors out of twenty-six, from Rio Branco, 
Recife, Aracaju, Cuiaba and Salvador, had their administration evaluated as 'bad/veiy bad' 
(Folha de Sao Paulo, 1993). This positive evaluation is probably a consequence of the 
financial decentralisation that provided new revenues to the cities, which are noticeably much 
better kept. Only two former mayors were able to achieve the election of their proposed 
incoming candidates (Curitiba and Porto Alegre)26. 'Collorgate'27, however, was responsible 
for some defeats in the 1992 elections. According to an opinion poll 63% of the electorate in 
twelve state capitals would not vote for a candidate who had Collor's endorsement (Folha de 
Sao Paulo, 1992).
Although the results of the 1992 capital elections favoured the progressive parties, the 
country as a whole showed a preference for conservatives like the PEL, PDS and PTB who 
together won control of 1,697 municipalities, as shown in Table 5.7. A comparison between 
the results of the elections in the state capitals and in the country indicates that the 
progressives won 54% of the vote in the capitals and 15% in the country. The conservatives 
PDS and PFL obtained 8% in the capitals but, together with PL and PTB, received 41% of 
the votes nationally. The centre party PMDB won 33% in the country but only 16% in the 
capitals. As can be seen, voters' preferences in the capitals were very different from those in 
the rest of the country. These figures confirm a trend that also occurred in the 1988 local 
election, i.e. the two biggest political parties, PMDB and PFL, were losing the urban
26 An opinion poll showed that the majority of die electorate would not take into consideration the mayor's 
candidate, even if they approved his/her performance (Folha de Sao Paulo, 1992).
27 'Collorgate' was the term used in referring to the financial scandals in which President Collor was involved 
leading to his resignation and impeachment The impeachment procedures occurred during the local campaigns.
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electorate's vote in the most important cities but still maintained a leading position nationwide.
Table 5.7 1992 Local Elections
Party Number of Municipalities
PT 53
PSDB 293
PTB 295
PL 310
PDT 410
PDS 439
PFL 963
PMDB 1, 633
Others 529
Source: Isto£ (1992)
The growth of the progressives in local elections in the capitals should be credited to:
(i) the economic crisis of the period that tended to promote an anti-establishment vote; and
(ii) well-thought of administrations by the progressive parties in important state capitals, 
which were reflected positively in the national media and had an influence (like a 
'demonstration effect') over the electorate in other cities due to widespread access to TV and 
radio stations. However, these electoral victories do not necessarily mean a consolidation of 
the vast number of parties nor do they mean the existence of a pluralist political party system 
As argued by Sadek (1989) they show that a party keeps or increases its electoral support 
when it is able to maintain a distinguished performance compared to the other parties. This 
happened with the PMDB during the military regime and with the PT during 
redemocratisation.
A sample of the profiles of the country's mayors brought about by popular elections 
showathat from two aspects they were quite different from those elected during the military 
regime. First, the education of the mayors had improved: in 1973 17% of the mayors had 
higher education, whereas in 1989 there were 52%. Second, in 1977 63% of the mayors had 
had previous political experience, whereas in 1989 52% of the mayors were in an elected 
position for the first time (IBAM, 1990). These two facts show that redemocratisation 
incorporated new, and better educated, actors to the political scene at the local leveL
Ihe mayors of state capitals are also playing on other fronts than their local territories. 
They have been successftd in lobbying for their interests, both in the media and in Congress. 
They have been acting through a professional organisation called ABRASF - Associagao 
Brasileira dos Secretdrios e Dirigentes das Finanqas das Capitais that brings together the
181
Financial Secretariats of the capitals and a political association, the Forum dos Prefeitos das 
Capitais constituted of the mayors of state capitals. These two nationwide organisations were 
created also to decrease the influence of Sao Paulo's former governor, Quercia, who for a 
long time exercised strong leadership among mayors. The lobby of local authorities proved 
its efficiency during the Collor administration when he tried to win congressional approval for 
a decrease in state transfers to local governments through the ICMS, from 25% to 20%. The 
reduction was intended to form a fond to be attached to the payment of states' debt with the 
federal government. The proposal was never put to the vote. Mayors are aware of their power 
and also of the tension between state and local interests. According to Manoel Castro, former 
mayor of Salvador and now a Congressman, parliamentarians express more loyalty to their 
local bases than to the state governors [27 Nov. 1992]. Humberto Ellery, several times a 
mayor, reasoned that parliamentarians are perfectly aware that they have to preserve their 
local political bases [3 Dec. 1992]. These opinions, together with others mentioned above 
regarding the governors' power over Congress, show that local politicians also have ways of 
having their demands voiced in Congress. The ways used by Brazilian mayors to influence and 
to veto national policies affecting their local interests reinforce Page's (1991) concept of 
political localism as discussed in Chapter 1. They also show the similarities between Brazilian 
local politicians and their Italian, Spanish and French counterparts.
Local elections and local politics became laboratories for the re-arrangement of 
political power stimulated by redemocratisation. In addition, local politics have been more 
open than the states to incorporating actors without links to the previous regime. Therefore, 
the results of local elections should be seen from a broader perspective than that of the simple 
election of mayors and council members.
5.2.2 Financial Resources
Despite Levin's assertion (1991: 5) that although various versions and combinations 
of centralisation/decentralisation ratios have been used, persistent reservations have been 
raised about their meaning and significance, Brazilian municipality has a significant discretion 
in allocating its own revenue, and for financing and administering its resources, especially 
since 198828. The only restriction on constitutional transfers and local revenues imposed on 
local spending is the 25% of their total revenue that has to be spent on education. Brazilian
28 For an account of Brazilian local finances before 1988 see Batley (1984).
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municipalities are also highly capitalised as compared to their counterparts in less developed 
countries. In 1992 it was estimated that no municipality had received less than $400,000 a 
year just from the FPM, Le. transfers from the federal government (Bremaeker, 1994: 18), as 
opposed to $1,000 in Peru 29. In Latin America a great number of municipalities have an 
annual budget of between $5,000 and $20,000 (Lordello de Mello, 1991: 215). In Brazil 
revenue transfers by the federal government alone amounted to $5,5 billion in 1993 
(Bremaeker, 1994: 37), a significant figure when compared to the total amount of $2,2 million 
in Uganda, one of the African countries noticeable for decentralisation efforts (Villadsen, 
1994: 7).
Current spending increased from 8% of GDP in 1980 to 16% in 1991 but in most 
capitals it has been proportionally lower than the increase in revenue, Le. while the capitals' 
own revenue increased 31.6% in 1991 when compared to 1985, current spending was 16% 
of total governmental expenditure in 1991 and 10% in 1985 (ABRASF, 1992: 9). The 
municipalities more than doubled their expenditure on payroll in two decades, from 10% of 
the public-sector’s payroll in 1970 to 23% in 1991, a major increase when compared to the 
federal government's, responsible for 42% of the public sector's payroll in 1970 and 
accountable for 28% in 1991, while the states kept their participation at 49% (ABRASF, 
1992: 11).
The growth of local government spending is because of expenditure on education and 
health services, which registered 13% and 7% growth rates between 1988 and 1991. Table 
5.8 shows the aggregate data of the state capitals. The figures show that some capitals have 
prioritised capital investment rather than current expenditure, which explains the positive 
variations in the expenditure on housing and urbanisation programmes. State capitals' 
expenditure in programmes like education, health, housing and urbanisation shows that they 
are playing a significant role in responding to the social pressures that emerged during the 
recession. This aspect of local government expenditure also indicates that there has been a 
decentralisation of responsibilities towards the local level, even if this decentralisation has 
occurred in an unplanned and uncoordinated way, as at the state leveL
For state capitals as a whole, borrowing decreased and even became irrelevant, 
because of fiscal adjustment and of the lack of credit lines from the federal government. The
29 Figure provided by Lordello de Mello in a personal communication to the author.
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payment of interest has been accomplished and the net debt decreased, showing a trend 
towards surplus. The capitals have been able, since 1988, to reconcile their increase in size 
and relative importance within the public sector and in the economy with a fiscal adjustment 
pursuing a decrease in their debts and deficits. The state capitals are also changing the image 
stimulated by the military that mayors were irresponsible managers who were only interested 
in building superfluous assets such as shining fountains. As recounted by Selcher (1989), the 
view that localism and regionalism acted against the country's modernisation is an old one. 
Mayoral administration in the state capitals has been approved by the electorate, as mentioned 
above, by the media and by some enthusiastic academics, e.g. Camargo (1992). They are also 
aiming at one of Jones's (1985: 316) ideals about the role of local government, namely that 
of devising a financial system where the bulk of local finances comes primarily from local 
taxpayers and voters.
Table 5.8 Financial Data of the State Capitals, 1988-1991
Item 1991 
$ million
Per Capita Values 
$/inhabitants(1991) 
1988 1989 1990 1991
Annual Variation 
90/91 88/91 
Percentages
Revenue 7,906 .8 154 180 201 237 18 15
Borrowing 581.7 36 13 9 17 99 -21
Net Revenue 7,272 .2 119 167 192 218 13 22
Expenditure 8,210.9 197 190 221 247 12 8
Current 5,791.3 131 144 161 173 8 10
Payroll 2,798.1 51 64 69 84 22 18
Debt
servicing .299.2 14 5 7 9 24 15
Capital 2,450.5 66 46 60 73 22 3
Investment 1,398.0 45 26 33 42 29 -2
Debt
amortisation 341.9 8 13 9 10 9 9
Non-financial 
expenditure 7,599.8 175 171 204 228 11 9
Budget balance (335.0) (43) (11) (20) (10) -50 -38
Legislature 289.2 6 7 8 9 6 13
Education 1,407.5 29 33 40 42 6 13
Housing & 
Urbanisation 1,748.9 39 38 40 52 29 10
Health 1,073 .3 26 24 29 32 12 7
Transport 848.2 32 22 30 25 -16 -7
Funded debt 2,157 .3 74 72 68 65 -5 -5
Net debt 2,424 .1 94 81 82 73 -11 -8
Source: ABRASF (1992:33).
On the other hand, the participation of the state capitals' revenues in the amount of 
revenues available to the municipalities as a whole decreased from 38.9% in 1982 to 31.7% 
in 1991. In this sense decentralisation went down further to the level of less important
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municipalities. As shown by Paz (1993: 4), the municipalities which most benefitted from this 
shift were the middle-sized ones with an agro-industrial basis in the South-East, South and 
Centre-West.
However, in a country cut across by inequalities, the performance of the state capitals 
might not be the rule, although they can act as a 'demonstration' effect. The mayors who took 
office in January 1993 have had to free many negative legacies, especially those in the interior. 
In Bahia the following facts have been revealed: municipalities where no files were found, 
others with heavy debts and 'phantom' civil servants, delays in civil servants' salary payments, 
over-staffing and even the robbery of official equipment (A Tarde, 1993). This pattern was 
repeated nationwide {Gazeta Mercantil, 1993). On the other hand, the Municipal Tribunal 
of Accounts in Bahia has punished mayors and city councillors in an unprecedented way, 
according to one of its members. The reasons for this are that 'the Tribunal is engaged in a 
policy of tighter checking of local spending and because democracy makes people more 
aware of the duties of those they elect' [Pereira, 20 Nov. 1992]. The result was that 113 
municipalities, all in the interior, out of 415 in Bahia had their 1990 accounts rejected by the 
Tribunal (A Tarde, 1991). The municipalities, however, tended to show a bigger commitment 
to education than the states, to be discussed below.
5.3 Overview of the State of Education in Brazil
Specialists agree that the main problems of basic education in Brazil are not of 
quantity but of quality and of social and regional inequalities, combined with a pattern which 
penalises the poor. As Schwartzman (1995) reports, no standardised tests are applied to 
students to assess what they learn in school, but the small evidence available shows very poor 
levels in the acquisition of basic reading, writing and arithmetic skills, even among students 
of private, middle-class schools. The problems of equity appear not only in the regional and 
urban-rural differences in school access and literacy, but also in the association between social 
class and education failure. There are also high rates of grade repetition, forcing students to 
leave the system (Ribeiro, 1991).
Although illiteracy has diminished over the years, the total number of illiterates is still 
significant: in 1989 16.8% of the population of fifteen years old and over were illiterate. The 
North-East held 38% of the country’s illiterates, whereas the South and the South-East held 
10% each. Compared to other Latin American countries, Brazil's illiteracy rate is high. In 
1980, the illiteracy rate of the population, 15 years old and over, in Argentina and Chile was
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6.7% and 7.5%, respectively (Wilkie, 1992: 215).
The Brazilian educational system is divided into three levels: first-grade or elementary 
education; second-grade or secondary education; and higher education. Pre-school provides 
for children under 7 years of age. The 1988 Constitution states that education is mandatory 
and free for all, including those who did not have access to school at the appropriate age. 
Elementary education is compulsory for all 7- to 14-year-old children and free at all state 
institutions. The duration of compulsory education is eight years, although it takes the 
students an average of 11.8 years to finish it (Wilkie, 1992: 120). Secondary education is also 
free in state schools, although not compulsory. Both the government and the private sector 
provide education, but state schools enrol about 88% of the students in elementary education 
(Ministry of Education, 1990: 20). States and municipalities are the main agents of elementary 
education; the states, of secondary education; and the federal government and the private 
sector, of higher education. However, the three tiers of government are free to act at any level 
of education, because the 1988 Constitution considered education a concurrent power.
In 1988 Brazil had a lower gross enrolment ratio in primary education than Argentina, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia. However, the perverse aspect of Brazil's 
education is related to access to secondary education. In 1988, Brazil's gross enrolment ratio 
in secondary education was 38%, while Chile's was 75%, Argentina's 74%, Colombia's 56%, 
Venezuela's 54% and Mexico's 53% (United Nations, 1992: 40). The state system heavily 
penalises and excludes the poor. Table 5.9 shows the incidence of public expenditure on 
education by income leveL A comparison with other Latin American countries shows that, in 
Brazil, public expenditure on education reaches very few of the poor.
Table 5.9 Incidence of Public Expenditure for Education by Educational and
Income Level (Percentages)
Country Primary Education Higher Education
40% 40% 20% 40% 40% 20%
Poorest Middle Richest Poorest Middle Richest
Argentina 57 32 11 17 45 38
Brazil 15 80 5 . . . . . . 48
Chile 59 32 9 17 31 52
C. Rica 57 35 8 15 42 43
Venezuela 45 39 16 23 43 34
Source: United Nations (1992: 51)
The financing of the system is complex. The federal government must allocate to 
education no less than 18% a year of the total tax revenue, and sub-national governments no
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less than 25% of their total revenue, including constitutional transfers30. Part of the federal 
share of UNSOCIAL (Social Investment Fund) goes to education, especially to student aid 
programmes 31. There is also a large discretionary fund created by the salario-educaqao 
(educational salary), a 2.5% tax on all salaries paid by industries and services and 0.8% of the 
commercial value of rural products. These resources are integrated into a national educational 
fund, the FNDE, administered by the federal government. The federal government retains one- 
third of the FNDE and transfers two-thirds to the states. However, the federal quota of the 
FNDE is also transferred to sub-national governments, mostly for investment.
In 1985 the country spent 3.7% of its GDP on education, which is close to the 
continent's average of 4%, but fir from the average of industrialised countries at 5.4% (United 
Nations, 1992: 194). In 1990, the government spent $19.9 billion on education, 45% by the 
states, 29% by the municipalities and 26% by the federal government (Schwartzman, 1995). 
Of the amount spent by the federal government, the majority goes to higher education. In 
1987, 1988 and 1989, 54, 62 and 64% of resources from the Ministry of Education were 
spent on higher education32 (Mmisterio da Educagao, 1992a: 37-9). Despite this amount, the 
federal system enrols 21% of the students ofhigh education, the states 13%, the municipalities 
5% and private institutions enrol 61% (Ministry of Education, 1990: 27) 33. The federal 
government is also under constant pressure by a strong lobby of university lecturers and staff 
to maintain the network of federal universities free of fees. As competition to enter a federal
30 Figures presented below will not reach the percentage required by the Constitution. Mayors and state 
governors who do not meet the target should have their accounts rejected by the Tribunal of Accounts. However, 
most sub-national governments argue that investments in infrastructure near schools, such as urbanisation works 
and sanitation, even allocated in different items of expenditure, are investment in education. The Tribunals 
generally accept this explanation.
31 FINSOCIAL had its name changed to Contribuigao Social para o Financiamento da Seguridade Social, 
with the acronym of CONFINS, through Complementary Law No. 70, issued on 12 December 1991. CONFINS 
is one of the Social Contributions and is constituted of payments of 0.5% of the gross revenue of corporations, 
financial institutions and insurance companies and of 0.5% of income tax from the tertiary sector. In 1993 the 
corporations owed CONFINS around $10 billion (Folha de Sao Paulo, 1993).
32 This percentage is unconstitutional, given that clause 60 of the Transitional Measures states that the three 
levels of government should spend 50% of their revenues to eliminate illiteracy and to provide universal access 
to elementary education. According to Senator Joao Calmon, every year someone takes the federal government 
to court because it is not accomplishing the constitutional mandate. By the time a judge of the Supreme Court 
analyses the case, the fiscal year is over and the case does not go to judgment because the case is against 
expenditure in a fiscal year that no longer exists [11 May 1993].
33 The amount spent by the federal government is not only on payroll, given that they support teaching 
hospitals, museums and libraries.
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university is high, those who make it generally come from private schools. Less prepared 
students go to state schools, but have to pay fees in private colleges where there is less 
competition.
The three levels of government face different problems in education. Despite the 
constitutional responsibility of local and state governments for elementary and secondary 
education, more developed municipalities and states have reached an unwritten agreement 
with the middle-class to set up colleges free of fees: in 1990, the states had nineteen 
universities and sixty-three isolated institutions of higher education, whereas the municipalities 
had three universities, three federations and seventy-eight isolated schools of higher education 
(Schwartzman, 1995: 118). This unwritten agreement accommodates the demands of the poor 
and of the middle- and high-income groups for education. The poor receive free elementary 
education and the high-income families receive free higher education. This unwritten pact is 
dramatically noticeable in the North-East, as discussed above.
Education is a sector where current spending dominates the pattern of expenditure. 
Between 1985 and 1990, the three levels of government spent 92% of expenditure on 
education on current spending, i.e. teachers' payroll and maintenance of schools (IPEA, 
1992a: 76). Investment in the sector is not high, therefore expenditure on education is 
basically expenditure on payroll.
5.3.1 States' Expenditure on Education
When compared to GDP, the states' expenditure on education has registered a 
significant increase in recent years. During 1985 and 1990, the states spent an average of 
0.8% of GDP on education, whereas the federal government spent 0.4% in the same period. 
The increase made by the states was 84% more than that made by the federal government 
(IPEA, 1992a: 44)34. IPEA's study concluded that these figures show funding for education 
is being transferred from the federal to sub-national governments. Despite registering a. 
tendency for state-substitution for the federal role in education, as discussed in the previous 
section, the reason for this tendency is found in the impact of state elections on the states' 
expenditure on education.
Expenditure on education by the twenty-six states as a percentage of the states' total
34 These figures are different from those presented previously because they do not take into account investment 
by federal decentralised agencies.
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expenditure is shown in Table 5.10. The increase in the percentage spent on education 
occurred in the years of state elections, which are held with elections for the national and the 
state legislatures. One reason why expenditure on education was kept constant could be its 
relationship to the payments of interest, Le. expenditure on education decreases when 
payments of interest increase. However, the figures do not prove this assumption. Expenditure 
on education dropped in 1985, 1988, 1989 and 1990 but the assumption is correct only for 
1985.
Table 5.10 States' Expenditure on 
Expenditure, 1981-1991
Education as a Percentage of Total
Year Percentage of Total Expenditure
1981 18.9
1982* 20.0
1983 19.8
1984 18 .3
1985 17 .2
1986* 19.5
1987 18.9
1988 17 .2
1989 17 .3
1990* 17.5
1991 17.0
Source: Minist^rio da Economia, Fazenda e Planejamento (1992:18 and 1993: 19) . 
Note: (*) State elections
Given that regional issues are an important clue to an understanding of Brazilian 
politics, expenditure on education is analysed by region in Table 5.11. In the 1990 elections, 
only the Centre-West increased expenditure on education. The other regions had showed a 
tendency to prioritise infrastructure investment, shown in the previous section, rather than 
education. The data also show that every region except the Centre-West spent much more on 
education during the militaiy regime than after redemocratisation. The position of the North- 
East was dramatic. The region accounts for the worst levels of education and poverty, but 
their average increase was mediocre when compared to the region's indicators. The figures 
also show the economic hierarchy of the regions, with two exceptions. First, the South-East, 
the most developed region, spends less of its total expenditure on education than the South 
and the Centre-West. Second, the Centre-West, with its emphasis on educational expenditure 
because the region had the highest rate of population growth in the decade. The increase in 
the states' revenues promoted by the 1988 Constitution did not have an immediate impact on 
education expenditure in the North, North-East and South-East regions, given that their 
expenditure on education as compared to their total expenditure decreased after 1988.
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Table 5.11 States' Expenditure on 
Expenditure, 1981-1991
Education by Region as a Percentage of 1Total
Region
81 82* 83 84 85
Y e a
86*
r
87 88 89 90* 91
North 21 18 19 17 16 19 17 17 15 15 16
North-East 17 19 20 17 17 19 19 16 16 16 16
Centre-West 18 15 17 16 15 18 17 18 19 22 21
South-East 19 21 20 19 19 20 19 18 17 17 16
South 22 21 20 19 16 19 19 17 19 20 19
Source: Ministerio da Economia, Fazenda e PIanej amento (1992: 36, 126, 252,
312, 378 and 1993: 37, 139, 265, 325, 391).
Note: * State elections
There is a relationship between clientelism and education, especially in the North-East. 
A survey by the Ministry of Education found that 12% of the country's state school 
headteachers started their careers through appointment by politicians. In the North-East, 
however, this percentage was 32%. Access to the position of headteacher is also influenced 
by politicians. In the South, 9% of the headteachers owe their positions to politicians; in the 
South-East and in the Centre-West, 17%; and in the North, 23%. Again the North-East 
presented the highest percentage: 41%. The survey also showed that in rural areas the 
influence of politicians was higher than in the urban areas. Headteachers' salaries vary 
according to the region. In the North and in the South, they earned respectively $416 and 
$440 per month. The Centre-West and the South-East paid their headteachers $633 and $608, 
respectively. Here again the North-East presented the lowest indicator: the average salary of 
a headteacher in the region was $24835.
The problems of education in Brazil, especially of secondary schooling, which is 
basically the states' responsibility, have been assessed in this section. The states spend a high 
amount of their resources on education, which is usually the second most major item of their 
expenditure. However, there is evidence to show that education was subjected by regional 
politicians to clientelism. Given that the highest percentage of the resources allocated to 
education is for teachers' salaries, teachers' votes were an important target for regional politics 
in every region until the 1990 elections. The manipulation of education for electoral purposes 
is the most likely explanation for the maintenance of the country's poor educational indicators. 
In the North and North-East, the use of education in a patron-client relationship affects the 
poorer population more deeply, given that the regions hold the country's worst social and 
economic indicators. The use of patronage by governments is not new in Brazil The country
33 Data from an unpublished survey by Ministerio da Educa9ao (1992b)
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has provided rich literature on the subject, as mentioned in Chapter 1. There is enough 
evidence to show the existence of patronage in Latin America and in other poor regions of 
the world, and to show that clientelism plays a role in reproducing social inequality. As 
Waterbury (1977: 340) put it, 'patronage helps to perpetuate the power advantage of the 
dominant groups by the conscious cultivation of vulnerability and dependency1. The issue is, 
therefore, not its reality but its implications in a given political environment, namely, a 
democratic and fragmented regime, and for a given policy, such as education.
5.3.2 Local Governments' Expenditure on Education
Brazilian mayors acknowledged education as their main priority (IBAM, 1990: 27). 
However, as in the states, the municipalities' expenditure on education as a percentage of their 
total expenditure was kept constant. In 1980, 1985 and 1990 the municipalities spent 17.6%, 
17.8% and 17.9% of their total revenue on education 36. Administration and Planning, 
Housing and Urbanisation, and Transport have been the leading items of expenditure since 
1980. This tendency shows that in Brazil local governments perform a minor role in welfare 
programmes, as opposed to their counterparts in Europe, which became the mam agent of the 
social-democratic or Keynesian welfare state constructed after the War (Batley and Stoker, 
1991; Cochrane, 1989). However, when the expenditure is taken as a percentage of GDP, 
local governments' expenditure on education increased at a higher pace than that of the states. 
They moved from 0.8% of GDP in 1988 to 1.2% in 1991, whereas the states increased theirs 
only a little and the federal government decreased its expenditure (Afonso, 1994: 63), as 
mentioned above.
On the other hand, the state capitals have shown a steady tendency to increase their 
expenditure in the last decade as compared to other items of expenditure, except in the South- 
East, as shown in Table 5.12. In contrast to the states and to the municipalities as a whole, 
expenditure on education by the state capitals increased after the political opening. The 
increase in local revenues brought about by the 1988 Constitution did not have any particular 
effect on state capitals' expenditure on education because their tendency to increase the 
resources allocated to education started before 1988. This result shows that expenditure on 
education was more positively affected by the constitutional amendments issued in the early
36 Unpublished data from the CEEG/FGV. These figures do not reach all of the municipalities because those 
with less than 50,000 inhabitants are not obliged to present their itemised accounts.
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1980s by the military as a result of the political opening than by the 1988 Constitution. Local 
elections did not affect the expenditure pattern, as opposed to what happened in the states. 
In some regions, expenditure rose during the first year of the new administration, showing that 
the mayors tried to fulfil the commitments they had made during their electoral campaigns. 
However, their initial intentions were not maintained.
Table 5.12 State Capitals' Expenditure on Education as a Percentage of Total
Expenditure by Region, 1981-1991
Year/Region North North-East Centre-West South-East South
1981 10.8 12.8 15 .0 20 .5 11.6
1982 9.3 16.2 18.1 20 .1 13 .1
1983 11.2 15.3 18.3 22.7 14 .5
1984 10 .5 15 .2 11.7 22 .2 13 .4
1985* 11.1 15.5 18 .3 23 .4 14.3
1986 16.3 23 .2 20.2 26 .4 15 .3
1987 14.8 15 .7 16.9 23 .1 17.1
1988* 13 .3 17.5 14.5 19.3 21.1
1989 18.6 16.8 19 .3 18.8 19 . 9
1990 15.8 15.9 20.0 21.1 21. 0
1991 20.9 16.5 19.3 18.2 18.5
Source: Ministerio da Economia, Fazenda e Planejamento (1992: 79, 187, 283, 343, 403
and 1993: 85, 200, 296, 356 , 416).
Note: (*) Local elections.
Similarly to the states, no relationship was found between the decrease in expenditure 
and the payment of interest. There is, however, a strong relationship with expenditure on 
housing and urbanisation. Every time expenditure on education decreases, expenditure on 
housing and urbanisation increases. This relationship shows that at the level of the state 
capitals priorities are clearer, although under tension, than at the level of the states. Health and 
sanitation were also important items of expenditure in the state capitals, registering an average 
increase in the decade of 8.3% due to the implementation of the decentralised health care 
programme. The increase in educational expenditure shown in Table 5.12 might have two 
meanings. First, the state capitals are not following the country's trend towards the 
transference Of responsibilities for first-grade education from states to municipalities 37. 
Second, the capitals are paying better salaries to their first-grade teachers.
Transfer of responsibility for first-grade education from states to municipalities, called 
the 'mimicipalisation' of education, is the banner of most practitioners and teachers. Some, 
however, do not believe this transference is likely to occur. Lordello de Mello stated that
37 The country as a whole saw a significant transference in that direction. Between 1988 and 1989 the states 
decreased die number of first-grade schools by 3,726, whereas 3,255 new municipal schools and 160 private 
schools were created (IBGE, 1992). In Brazil the 'municipalisation' of education is only a trend and not a central 
policy as in Chile (Angell and Pollack, 1990: 10).
V192
'municipalisation' does not occur because the state secretaries for education are always 
potential candidates for elected positions [13 April 1993]. A survey in three state capitals has 
shown that there were attempts to municipalise first-grade education but problems were found 
in discontinuity and delays in transferring state resources [Neves, 15 April 1993]. In 1987 the 
rate of first-grade 'municipalisation' in the country was 29%. The North-East and the North 
had the highest rates, 45% and 39% respectively. The South had 30% of first-grade schools 
under local discretion, the Centre West 22% and the South-East 18%38. If teachers votes are 
an important target for regional politics in most regions, as shown in previous section and 
confirmed by Lordello de Mello, the low degree for the 'municipalisation' of first-grade 
education in the country as a whole and the imbalance figures among regions may give 
grounds for different assumptions. First, less developed regions might be transferring the 
patron-chent relationship on education from regional to local politics. On the other hand, the 
two more developed regions, the South and the South-East, do not follow the same pattern. 
The South, a more homogenous region, which has a less clientelist approach to education as 
shown in the previous section, might trust their local politicians in dealing with education. In 
the South-East, where the lowest degree of'municipalisation' was found, either there is a 
distrust of their local politicians or a policy of keeping the clientelist use of education within 
the territory of regional politics.
This section and the preceding ones have shown that if there is a political and financial 
pattern followed by the state capitals, including by the way the political system at the state 
capitals' level treats education, the same does not apply to the country as a whole. This lack 
of a pattern calls for caution in making generalisations in a country cut across by inequalities. 
It also calls for the need to investigate the performance of particular states and municipalities 
for a better understanding of the effects of decentralisation39.
5.4 Conclusions
This chapter has highlighted some of the results of redemocratisation and 
decentralisation at the sub-national leveL Both processes have so far improved the power and
38 Figures from an unpublished report by Bahia's Secretary of Education. See SEC (1992).
39 The financial and administrative performances of individual municipalities were earlier analysed by Batley 
(1991), who studied Recife and Porto Alegre; Castro (1988) investigated two municipalities in the interior of Sao 
Paulo; and Davey (1989), studied die case of Curitiba. A list of M.Sc and Ph.D theses relating to urban Brazil 
can be found in Valladares et al. (1991).
the revenues of sub-national governments, especially the states and their capitals. Although 
these processes are leading the country towards a 'peripheralised' federalism as mentioned 
above, this 'peripheralisation' does not mean that sub-national units are equal in their ability 
to influence and to veto national policies and to benefit from financial decentralisation. 
Conversely, both processes have as yet not substantially affected the pattern of expenditure 
on education. Some conclusions can be drawn, despite the cautions suggested above. First, 
the lack of priorities found in state governments show there is yet no clear definition of their 
role on social issues, as opposed to that of the state capitals. Second, politicians still treat 
education according to their electoral interests. Therefore, education is used by the politicians 
as a tool for cementing clientelism Third, there is a slow movement in some regions which 
replaces the clientelist use of education from the regional into the local sphere. Clientelism 
alone cannot explain fully how the political system operates although its presence delays, but 
does not cancel, more advanced forms of horizontal networks and collective actions. The 
implications of clientelism for policy results is that the state apparatus for dealing with 
education is deeply affected by its existence, which means that the problem might have to be 
tackled outside the traditional bureaucracy.
Surprisingly, the data showed that the North-East is not the only region that has a 
patron-client-oriented approach to political and financial resources. This finding challenges 
a Brazilian bias against the region. The media and society tend to see the North-East as a 
region managed by irresponsible and corrupt politicians who daily assault public resources. 
In Brazil's most developed region, political practices more associated with less developed 
regions also occur. This finding, plus the analysis presented in Chapter 2, raises a question 
for future scholarly works, Le. have redemocratisation and decentralisation affected what was 
thought to be the 'modem' Brazilian region, in the sense that the South-East is more 
economically developed and therefore should be less influenced by patronage? Is the South- 
East being 'northeastemised' after redemocratisation and decentralisation, or has the region 
always had practices closer to those of the political practices of the North-East? Examples of 
good management of public resources now come from the poor North-East. On the other 
hand, although every political system is susceptible to forms of patronage, patronage becomes 
more perverse in a poor, backward' region. If examples of good management may now be 
found in the North-East, their politicians are not yet committed to finding solutions for the 
improvement of the conditions of the poor through an increase in expenditure on education.
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Good management of public resources in the region is probably benefiting other social groups 
rather than the poor.
Decentralisation invested old political actors, especially state governors, with new and 
powerful roles, yet these new roles have been subordinated to old political practices. As 
mentioned in previous chapters, a common aspect among those who have studied Brazilian 
transition and consolidation is the high level of continuity between both regimes. Sub-national 
governments are no exception, especially the states. This fact characterises the way 
decentralisation is being implemented. It also highlights the importance of political forces in 
the implementation of decentralisation. In a country with vast territorial dimensions and 
marked by social and regional differences, commitment to the implementation of 
decentralisation may differ deeply. The country’s diversity brings big gaps among states and 
municipalities. These gaps operate against the goal of decentralisation because they decrease 
the possibilities of federal help to try to event out the inequalities.
Political and financial decentralisation in Brazil has so far had conflicting effects. First, 
as the federal government has not relinquished its importance as a political institution, 
competition for power is stronger than ever. Diffused power is 'good news' for democratic 
stability. Second, it should not be taken for granted that the financial and political 
achievements of governors and mayors are guaranteed, especially because of the pressures to 
change several constitutional provisions, including the tax system. Furthermore, as Batley 
(1991: 137) pointed out referring to local governments in Brazil, discontinuity is a major 
feature of municipal political and administrative life not only because of internal factors but 
also because of the changing context. On the other hand, and as a reaction against those 
pressures, the governors and mayors might pursue better policy results in areas such as 
education. Third, it cannot be expected that the serious fiscal crisis of the country can be 
addressed only at the sub-national level On the other hand, the sub-national governments are 
replacing the federal level as investors and consumers, thus playing a role against recession. 
Fourth, it cannot be said that the conditions for a democratic regime have been achieved. 
Reforms are needed to improve the conditions of govemability, as shown in previous chapters, 
and to overcome the country's social and regional inequalities. Fifth, as governors and mayors 
are not financially and politically subordinate to the federal Executive, they probably have to 
address their basic loyalties to a wider base of alliances at the sub-national level As a 
consequence, forms of public accountability can appear.
195
The Brazilian experience with the implementation of decentralisation shows that there 
is a pattern in intergovernmental relations whereby governmental spheres pit themselves 
against each other in order to upgrade their position. This game is a continuum which has 
always been part of the Brazilian federation and of its intergovernmental relations throughout 
different political regimes. What might be a feature of Brazil’s current experience is the 
resurgence of a type of political game mentioned above as being a 'paralysed competitive 
arena'. However, conflicts between levels of government are not isolated from other conflicts 
in society. This chapter showed that conflicts among regions, and how and to whom education 
should be provided, are a reflection of the social and regional cleavages in Brazilian society. 
This chapter has also suggested some explanations as to why decentralisation tends to promise 
more than it delivers. The reason for this is that policy results are a matter of political 
processes rather than merely matters of effective administration, as they have tended to be 
treated by the literature.
By analysing the political and financial performances of both the states and the 
municipalities this chapter provided grounds for an argument for the need to distinguish in 
theoretical terms intergovernmental relations when related to different sub-national spheres. 
It also provided evidence showing that evaluations of the effects of redemocratisation and 
decentralisation on deeper patterns of policy results need to be made by assessing each 
particular case. These conclusions bring about the need to investigate in depth whether 
decentralisation and redemocratisation have meant a better situation for the regional and local 
communities, the state and local elites, or the national elites who have moved around this new 
political and financial map punctuated by old actors. The following chapters further this 
study’s downstream approach by analysing the case of one state and two municipalities in 
Brazil's North-East. They provide an empirically-based analysis of the financial and political 
performances of three sub-national governments during the political opening and democratic 
consolidation. They give a deeper answer to the question as to whether decentralisation and 
redemocratisation have changed public expenditure at sub-national levels. Furthermore, the 
chapter about the state of Bahia suggests that the 'paralysed competitive arena' is not the only 
likely feature of Brazil's entire political system
Chapter 6 The Case of Bahia State
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Introduction
Bahia is where the Portuguese first landed in Brazil in 1500. Bahia's capital, Salvador, 
was the capital of colonial Brazil until 1763 when the Portuguese named Rio de Janeiro as 
capital The state as it is now was constituted by the addition of five 'hereditary captaincies', 
a Portuguese way of delegating territories to their proteges and of protecting the colony from 
foreign invasion. In colonial times Bahia's economy did not differ much from that of Brazil. 
They were based on the export of agricultural products, dependent upon the oscillations of 
the international market. Bahia was one of the main areas for large sugar plantations and an 
important port for the Atlantic slave traffic. From a position of importance during early 
colonial times, Bahia started to lose political and economic significance. The moving of the 
Portuguese administrative centre to Rio, the abolition of slavery and the entry of other 
countries into the trade and export of sugar contributed to the state's political isolation and 
economic decline I Bahia's reaction to its economic decline was slow. Only in the mid-1950s 
did politicians, practitioners and some entrepreneurs became aware of the need to pursue a 
change in Bahia's economic base.
The study of Bahia is important for several reasons. First, in spite of its location in the 
most backward region of Brazil, with the establishment of modem industries Bahia became 
the sixth largest economy of the country. The impact of economic development upon the 
social, political and administrative structures was far-reaching. Second, Brazil is a big country 
with profound differences among states and regions. However, Bahia's economic development 
places the state in an intermediate stage between the best and worst-off regions. Furthermore, 
understanding why economic development was made possible in such a backward 
environment may have significance, especially if the analysis is linked to its political 
development. Third, studies focusing on the state have been the territory of historians and 
anthropologists. They have analysed either the influence of the landowners on the maintenance
1 See Bethell (1970) and Furtado (1963) for an analysis of the decline of the sugar economy and its 
relation to political and economic movements in Europe.
197
of patron-client relations or Bahia's popular religions and culture 2. Fourth, studying Bahia 
challenges the metropolitan bias of many of the political science studies of Brazil, which focus 
either on national figures or on the North-East old coronel3.
Despite its economic prosperity and having an outstanding figure in national politics, 
the three-times governor Antonio Carlos Magalhaes, no study has focused on the politics of 
Bahia in recent years nor on the role of its politicians in the democratic transition and 
consolidation. The political science and the sociology literature focusing on the North-East 
still treats the entire region as a case of economic failure, political backwardness and of 
politics manipulated by local patrons. Bursztyn (1985) argued that federal programmes and 
investments in the North-East contribute to the maintenance of the old political structure 
based on the strength of local leaders, the coroneis, mediated by the state, and to preserving 
a social structure based on inequality. Pereira (1993) pictured the dilemmas of democratic 
consolidation in the North-East because of its weak civil society. The problem with such 
approaches is that they treat the North-East as a homogeneous region, both politically and 
economically, ignoring areas with more advanced economic activities where political practices 
have changed over the years. On the other hand, little attention outside the media has been 
given to Bahia's main leader, Antonio Carlos Magalhaes, better known by his initials, ACM 
4. ACM has achieved such power that the Financial Times pictured him twice during the 1994 
presidential election as one of its mam players (1994) and as Brazil's 'sovereign ruler1 (1994). 
Therefore, Bahia's politics and ACMs trajectory are of importance for a better understanding 
of the features, problems and trade-offs of democratic consolidation. It can also contribute 
to furthering the understanding of the features of Brazil's consociational democracy by 
analysing the upgrading of a regional politician to the national scene.
This chapter provides a *pre-experimental' treatment of the phenomena analysed in the
2 For the history of Bahia, see Lins et al. (1988); Pang (1979); Schwartz (1973; 1992) and Tavares (1987). 
For studies about Bahia's popular religions and culture, see Bastide (1978); Fernandes (1982); Gross (1971); 
Henfrey (1981); Hoomaert (1974); Leacock and Leacock (1975); Pang (1973-1974) and Silverstein (1979).
3 An exception to the trend in scholarly works of focusing on national politics in studies about contemporary 
Brazil is Hagopian's (1992) study about the role of Minas Gerais's politicians in the Brazilian transition to 
democracy. The scarcity of knowledge regarding the states' politics is also true in the USA (Osborne, 1988).
4 Some North-American scholars are already aware of ACMs importance for a better understanding of 
democratic transition and consolidation. Schneider (1991) briefly assessed ACMs role in both periods and Ames 
(1995) mentioned ACMs strong leadership and his capacity for polarising politicians.
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research. It illustrates the assertions made in previous chapters as well as the theoretical 
formulations on which this study relies. The assumption of this chapter is that political 
fragmentation produced by democratic transition and consolidation does not necessarily imply 
that a 'paralysed competitive arena' is a likely feature of the entire political system, as at the 
national leveL There has been room at the state level to overcome governmental paralysis, as 
well as for the emergence of forms of organisation able to challenge the strength of the 'old 
alliances' referred to in previous chapters. On the other hand, political fragmentation at the 
national level has upgraded the leaders of some states to a position of influence and/or veto 
over national issues. Those leaders, however, have their roots in the political alliances which 
prevailed before the 1980s.
The chapter also assumes, as the one which follows, that the state of Bahia, its capital 
and its most industrialised municipality, are examples of how economic growth, 
decentralisation and redemocratisation did not bring changes in the allocation of resources to 
the provision of social service, taking education as example. This study argues, however, that 
the demands of the poor are being partially addressed by other means, such as the provision 
ofjobs.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 offers a brief description of the 
demographic and spatial aspects of the state. Section 2 presents the state's mam social and 
economic characteristics. Section 3 discusses the political resources which made the state's 
economic and political upgrading in the national scene possible. It concentrates on AGVTs 
trajectory because the state's political development in the decade was a result of his leadership. 
Section 4 details the state's expenditure between 1981 and 1991. Section 5 analyses 
expenditure on education. Section 6 offers some conclusions.
6.1 Demographic and Spatial Aspects 5
Bahia has an area of 561,026 square kilometres, a little bigger than France and twice 
the size of the United Kingdom In 1992 the estimated population was 11,738,000 inhabitants, 
56.6% of which were in urban areas, distributed among 415 municipalities. The state's 
demographic density was 16.88 inhabitants per square kilometre in 1980 and 20.92 in 1990. 
Bahia's urbanisation was slow. It was a result of the need to unify the domestic market 
through the establishment of complementary activities of consumption and production to
5 Unless mentioned, data presented in this section are derived from CEI (1991b) and IBGE (1992).
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expand the .dynamism of the South-East. National roads have been built since the 1960s to 
achieve the goal of economic unification. Several regions in Bahia were the beneficiaries of 
such a policy. The road network in the state jumped from 11,739 km in 1937 to 133,953 km 
in 1986 (Silva and Silva, 1991: 53). A national urban system was created with the integration 
of regional sub-systems such as that of Bahia. The cities in Bahia with the highest rate of 
demographic growth were exactly those around the national roads, such as Feira de Santana, 
Vitoria da Conquista, Itabuna, Eunapolis, Itamaraju and Barreiras. The growth of the state 
capital and the cities around it would come a decade later, with the establishment in Cama9ari, 
a municipality of Salvador's Metropolitan Region, of petrochemical industries.
Although the state is now more urban than rural, its typical municipality is not, which 
repeats the pattern of the country as a whole. The highest number of municipalities have under
5.000 inhabitants. In 1990 there were 145 municipalities of that type; ninety-six between
5.000 and 10,000; forty-one between 10,000 and 20,000; thirty-five between 20,000 and 
50,000; ten between 50,000 and 100,000. Only eight cities had between 100,000 and 500,000 
inhabitants and one, Salvador, had over 2 million. The state is the fourth electoral college of 
the country, with 6,701,738 voters registered for the 1994 elections: 7.4% of the Brazilian 
electorate. Most of the electorate, 83.3%, live in the interior.
Bahia became the last state enrolled in the import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) 
policy. The need to export goods manufactured in the South-East and the policy of integrating 
productive sectors, especially through intermediate inputs, were the main economic reasons 
which gave Bahia the grounds to claim a position in the ISI. These two decisions were taken 
by the federal government. However, if the policy of economic integration through the 
construction of roads reached Bahia because of its location, the same cannot be said about the 
establishment of the petrochemical industries, which could have been located in several other 
states. What conditions existed in Bahia to encourage such a decision? This study argues that 
its type of political leadership was responsible for the decision.
6.2 Economic and Social Aspects
In the 1950s the state's economy was typically underdeveloped, although its GDP had 
increased between 1950 and 1955 at an annual rate of 5.5% and between 1955 and 1960 at 
6.5% (Simoes, 1978). The state had an unbalanced economy, dependent upon agricultural 
production and cattle raising, weather conditions, especially droughts, and the prices of the 
international market. Low productivity and scarce technology, combined with an obsolete
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agrarian structure, aggravated the picture.
The state started to push for economic changes in the mid-1950s. The aim was to 
surpass what became known as the Bahian 'enigma', meaning that the state had all the 
conditions to join the national process of economic development based on the ISI, but this 
integration was not achieved. Several analysts searched for the reasons behind the 'enigma'. 
Oliveira's (1987) explanation was that the economy was dominated by non-productive 
investments and that society was classless, because the dominated did not feel their 
exploitation. Almeida (1986) blamed the 'enigma' on psychological factors which affected both 
the elites and the people, for instance, discouragement and passivity. He also stressed the 
government's clientelist pattern, because it employed people not to work. A leader of the 
business community listed several reasons: Bahia was a state which lived on its glorious 
colonial past; its population was weakened by its well-being; the state had a conservative elite, 
who would not embrace change and whose skill was only rhetoric; savings did not find 
sources of application; its politicians were not interested in economic issues; the workers were 
unskilled; the state lacked infrastructure, especially electricity (Mariani, 1977). All these 
explanations were tautological reasons for the state not finding products to sell outside its 
boundaries and for its domestic market not being big enough to consume its production.
In 1955, under the government of Antonio B albino, the task of addressing alternatives 
to the 'enigma' was given to an economist, Romulo Almeida. Taking advantages of the 
euphoria brought about by Rubitschek's Plano de Metas and by the launching of several 
economic plans, such as that for the North-East elaborated by Furtado, Bahia started a 
movement to put pressure on the federal government for economic development6. The fight 
was on two fronts: (i) with the federal government for the establishment of fiscal policies to 
facilitate the allocation of industries and (ii) with the state's apparatus to assume a leading role 
in building up infrastructure and in financing industrialisation. The movement began with the 
creation of a planning system7. The first sign that the quest for economic development had 
become a political issue was a letter sent by Balbino to President Kubitschek in August 1956 
in which he stressed two points. First, fiscal policy was being used to take revenues from
6 In the early 1950s the state had benefitted from the construction by the federal government of the Paulo 
Afonso hydro-electric power station built to overcome its lack of electricity.
7 For an analysis of the economic aspects of Bahia, especially the role of the planning system in changing the 
state's economic performance, see Souza (1991b).
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Bahia to finance the industries of the South-East. This policy was known as 'exchange rate
confiscation'. The state's argument was that the federal government had established artificial
exchange rates to be applied on the one hand to imported goods to equip and broaden Sao
Paulo's industrial plants and, on the other, to pay for goods exported abroad. Given that Bahia
had a surplus balance of trade and that the exchange rate for goods exported abroad was
artificially low, the state would export at a low exchange rate and would import goods from
Sao Paulo at a higher rate. Goods exported were worth $1 less and goods imported were
bought for $1 more than their real value (Vianna Filho, 1984: 14). In his letter to President
Kubitschek B albino argued that
The fiscal policy withdraws Bahia from its main, if  not only, possibility for autonomous 
economic progress, preventing the state fromfinding development, despite the fact that in the 
last decades we have provided for the country's highest net surplus on the foreign trade 
balance.
The second argument was that Bahia would soon become a burden to the federal 
government, given its economic stagnation. The letter called for the restoration of the federal 
system through federal investment, loans and credit lines.
The state launched an ambitious economic programme supported by two financial 
schemes, a fund called FUNDAGRO and a state bank called BANFEB 8. From then on, a 
broad consensus was built for the need to change Bahia's economic pattern. In the 1960s the 
first industrial estate was set up, taking advantage of federal and state subsidies. Later, the 
goal was to set up petrochemical industries to provide intermediate inputs for the industries 
located in Sao Paulo. This proposal was based on the argument that the petrochemical 
industries would take advantage of the oil refinery which had already been operating in the 
state since the 1950s. The federal decision on the location of the petrochemical industries in 
Bahia was taken only in 1970, under the military regime9.
Despite the choice for industrialisation, Bahia's rural elites were not defeated. The 
political and economic history of Bahia is marked by a close association between industrial 
and agrarian interests. Urban and agrarian elites cohabit without threatening each other and 
without major tensions. Economically the state adopted simultaneous policies for industrial
8 Those institutions still exist FUNDAGRO was transformed into DESENBANCO and BANFEB into 
BANEB, Bahia's SCB.
9 For analyses of the location and the ownership of the petrochemical industries in Bahia see Evans (1979) and 
Vianna Filho (1984).
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and agricultural development Politically the pattern since the 1950s, and until 1994, has been 
that each governor committed to agrarian interests is replaced in the following election by 
someone committed to urban interests. This intriguing cohabitation is built on the basis of the 
state's pragmatic political attitudes. It has also been crucial to the balancing of economic 
interests. Given Bahia's territorial dimensions and the characteristics of the Brazilian economy, 
the state has to rely on agrarian as much as on industrial activities to push its economic 
development.
The economic structure of the state changed greatly with industrialisation, as shown 
in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Bahia: Structure of the Gross Domestic Product, 1960-1990
(Percentages)
Group 1960 1970 1980 1990*
Agriculture & 
Livestock
39.8 21.0 16 .4 15.2
Industry 12 .1 13 . 0 35.2 32 .7
Services 48 .1 66 . 0 48 .4 52.1
Source: CEI (1992a: 9)
Note: (*) Estimate
hi the early 1990s the economy saw three new sectoral changes. First, two cellulose 
industries were located on the coast. Second, irrigated agriculture was introduced, 
contributing to the modernisation and expansion of Bahia's agriculture. Third, the state's 
savannah in Bahia's West started intense production of grain, as an expansion of the 
production already developed in the country's Centre-West region. These projects were not 
introduced by government's initiative, as were those during the 1960s and 1970s. However, 
investments in infrastructure were made later by the state government.
Table 6.2 presents the annual rate of change in real GDP for Brazil and Bahia. The 
figures show the interdependence of both economies, but a higher increase in that of Bahia 
after 1980, when the effects of the petrochemical industries became more visible. Although 
affected by the country's economic instability, Bahia made significant improvements in the 
1980s and could consolidate the changes in its productive basis. These changes were 
responsible for the increase from 4.9% to 5.3% of Bahia's participation in the country's GDP. 
Bahia's GDP grew 27.9% in the decade, the second best result among the six biggest
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economies10. The decrease of the more developed states' contribution to the country's GDP 
should be credited to an economic model strongly dependent upon the domestic market, 
which was the basis of the ISI.
Table 6.2 Annual Rate of Change in Real GDP, Brazil and Bahia, 1980-1991 
(Percentages)
Year Brazil Bahia
1980 9.2 11.1
1981 -4.5 1.0
1982 0.5 5.5
1983 -3.5 1.4
1984 5.3 1.8
1985 7.9 9.3
1986 7.6 6.3
1987 3.6 -4.5
1988 -0.1 3.1
1989 3.3 3.3
1990 -4 .4 -2.2
1991 0.9 -2.4
Sources: IBGE (1992:1026) and CEI (1992a: 51).
The good results of the Bahian economy, especially after the recession which mainly 
reached the South-East, should be credited to the move made by the petrochemical industries 
to change their exports from the domestic to the international market. Lately, however, there 
has been a tendency towards decreasing the export of manufactured and increasing the export 
of semi-manufactured products, derived from the agro-industry, cellulose and metallurgy 
(Gottschall, 1991: 82). The reason is that the petrochemical industries were, in the past, 
heavily subsidised by the federal government. The restructuring of the petrochemical 
industries made 30% of their workforce redundant, 5% more than the national average for the 
chemical industries (Teixeira, 1993: 107), affecting state and local economies as well as their 
finances.
If the Bahia economy has had a good performance in the last two decades, the same 
could not be said of its population, as most of the social indicators show. The type of industry 
set up, capital-intensive, is partially responsible for this, because it does not create enough 
jobs. Similarly to the rest of the country Bahia has registered an increase in the concentration 
of income in the last decade. Income per capita decreased by 0.7% in 1992 (CEI, 1992b: 15). 
Inflation, recession and the political impossibility of tackling the country’s unequal income
10 Despite this increase, the gap among states is large, as mentioned above. The value of Bahia's industrial 
production in 1980 was equivalent to the third industrial municipality in Sao Paulo (Paz, 1984).
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distribution are a Brazilian characteristic, which especially affects the poor. In Bahia the 20% 
richest control 69.5% of the income, while the 20% poorest attain only 2.8%. While GDP 
grew by about 28% in the decade, in 1990 the real per capita income of the 20% richest was 
$12,170 and that of the 20% poorest was $490, increasing income concentration by 24.8% 
(CEI, 1992b: 16). Despite registering a surplus in the state's GDP in nine out of twelve years, 
as shown in Table 6.2, GDP per capita was negative in ten out of the thirteen years between 
1980 and 1993 (SUDENE, 1994).
An HDI - Human Development Index for 1970-88 showed that Bahia's HDI was 
estimated at 0.658, whereas the country’s was 0.794. Bahia's population had a per capita GDP 
of purchasing power of $2,358, while Brazil's was $4,307. Bahia's per capita GDP was $1,226 
and the country’s was $2,241 (Albuquerque, 1993: 41). Bahia is the state with the highest 
number of needy people. A survey by IPEA showed that out of 32 million Brazilians whose 
income was only enough for a daily diet according to the guideline established by the FAO - 
Food and Agricultural Organisation, 12.4% of them live in Bahia, followed by Minas Gerais 
with 11%, and Ceara with 9.6% (Filgueiras, 1994: 12). Bahia also has Brazil's highest rate of 
illiteracy, despite some improvement during the last decade. In 1981 42.6% of Bahia's 
population of 15 years and over were illiterate. In 1989 the rate had decreased to 32.3% (CEI, 
1991b: 43).
There was a significant reduction in mortality in Brazil after the 1940s. Average life 
expectancy is now around sixty-eight years, but there are differences as great as twenty years 
between the life expectancy of high-income groups in the South and low-income groups in 
the North-East. In Bahia life expectancy was around fifty-eight years in 1980 and sixty-three 
years in 1990 (CEI, 1991b: 50). A decline in infant mortality is behind this significant rise in 
life expectancy. Although this decline has been taking place over all regions, it has been 
relatively slower in the North-East and in Bahia. Infant mortality was still as high as 95.97 per
1,000 in 1980 in Bahia (CEI, 1991b: 50). Diseases related to the lack of sewerage such as 
hepatitis, typhoid and leptospirosis have been occurring at high levels during the last decade 
(CEI, 1992b). In 1989 only 38.7% of the state's households had sewerage, as opposed to 
Brazil's average of 47.3% and the South-East's 91% (IBGE, 1992: 455) n .
11 Sewerage was provided under a financial scheme of the federal government Only the South-East was 
contemplated, with the other regions lagging behind. In 1989 the South had 39.1% of its households with 
sewerage and the percentage in the North was striking: 8.4% (IBGE, 1992: 455).
To sum up, in Bahia good economic indicators did not necessarily correspond to an 
improvement in the population's quality of life. The way the economy is structured, the pattern 
of distribution of wealth and income, the type of technology and industry, among other 
factors, make a straightforward correlation between economic growth and the distribution of 
its gains to segments of the population who were the worst-off groups before economic 
growth impossible. Apart from these reasons there are limitations at the state level on 
adopting policies of income distribution and of reducing unemployment and poverty, if there 
are no national policies in that direction. This feature is not peculiarly Brazilian. There is 
evidence showing that economic growth under capitalism experienced in poor countries had 
disappointingly little effect on the standards of living of the poor (IDB, 1993: 14). The Bahian 
case not only proves this assumption but adds a striking aspect. Bahia's economic growth was 
achieved in a period of redemocratisation and financial decentralisation. It should not be 
forgotten that redemocratisation and financial decentralisation had been commended by 
politicians to the people as the only way to promote a better distribution of economic gains, 
as seen in Chapters 3 and 4. On the other hand, good economic performance and financial 
decentralisation influence the state's public finances. Therefore, there are several policies that 
can be regionally addressed to improve the living conditions of the poor. Education and 
health, and in Bahia, sanitation, are examples of the above mentioned policies. The political 
system, however, found a different way to address social inequality and to accommodate the 
demands of the poor.
6.2.1 The Government's Response to Social Pressures
How is the political system facing the pressures coming from its poor constituents? 
The strategy is shown in Table 6.3. The figures on governmental activities are a clear sign that 
the government has adopted a policy of increasing the number of public employees as a way 
to distribute the gains of economic growth. As the state government holds the biggest 
bureaucracy in the state, the strategy of accommodating the demands of the poor through the 
provision of jobs is basically pushed by the governors. From the view point of employment 
opportunities, the creation of new jobs in the government has buffered the job losses which 
have occurred in other sectors of the economy. Given that few public positions were subjected 
to competitive examinations before the 1988 Constitution and that governments may create 
interim positions that can later be transformed into regular jobs, there is no doubt that 
patronage is the basis of the increase in the number of jobs in the government.
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Table 6.3 Bahia: Distribution of Formal Jobs, 1980-1989 (Percentages)
Activity 80 81 82* 83 84 85 86* 87 88 89
Mineral
Extraction 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6
Manufacture
Industry 15.2 13 .7 13 .5 13 .1 12.5 12.2 12.8 12.4 12 .2 12.5
Construction 11.6 11.6 10.9 7.0 7.1 6.6 6.1 5.5 5.9 5.9
Commerce 18 .0 16.8 16.0 16.0 15.1 15.1 15 .2 14.9 14 .1 14.3
Services 31.9 31.5 32.0 31.6 31.4 31.1 31.0 31.4 31.2 31.3
Government 18.4 20.9 21.4 23.8 24.1 25.8 26.2 26.7 28.0 27.4
Others 3.2 3.8 4.6 6.9 8.1 7.4 7.1 7.4 6.9 7.0
Source: CEI (1992b: 37).
Note: (*) State elections.
Salary in the public service is very low, averaging $300 a month in 1994 12, which 
means that public employment is mostly directed to low-income groups. Contrary to the trend 
in less developed states, Bahia's public servants are not a burden on the state's finances, as 
seen below. However, it does influence the Bahian political system The creation of almost
80,000 jobs in the government between 1980 and 1986 (CEI, 1992b: 38) has two causes. 
First, it was the government's response to alleviating the living conditions of the poor. Second, 
the creation of new jobs under conditions of low payment and without competitive exams 
increased patron-client relationship and State clientelism in Bahia. This strategy was used by 
governors from different political groups, meaning that in Bahia State clientelism was not just 
a behaviour followed by certain groups but had a systematic dimension which shapes the 
state's politics.
6.3 Political Resources
The economic prosperity of the last decade has upgraded Bahia to a position of 
political importance in the national scene. However, the achievement of economic prosperity 
by a state located in Brazil's poorest region was the result of action by its political leaders. 
Given that Brazil is a federal State and that the military had relative control over the states' 
politics after 1964, national politics are important variables in understanding Bahia's political 
development (Souza, 1991a). Despite this interdependence, Bahia's politics have their own 
features. Administrative frameworks, political styles and alliances varied according to different 
political groups13. The decade saw four governors: ACM, from 1979 to 1982 14; Joao Durval
12 Figure provided by a government official, Ronaldo Sampaio.
13 For an analysis of administrative changes in the 1980s see Souza and Dutra (1991).
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Cameiro, from 1983 to 1986; Waldir Pires, from 1987 to April 1989; and Nilo Coelho, from 
1989 to 1990.
For the last two decades politics in Bahia has moved around ACM. Loved by many, 
hated by others, rewarded and betrayed by the electorate, ACM is at the centre of the state's 
political events. Even when his influence moved to the national scene, thanks to 
redemocratisation, and his alliances became more national and less provincial, he still polarises 
Bahian politics.
6.3.1 The Building of One Man's Dominance
Coming from an urban middle-class family without a political tradition or oligarchic 
ties, although his father had a short experience as a delegate to the 1937 Constituent 
Assembly, ACM started his political career in the UDN under the protection of the main 
leaders of that time. ACMs beginning was not usual for Bahian patterns, given that in the 
state even today family ties influence the access of political careers 13. Juracy Magalhaes 
supported ACMs rise to the state Legislature in the 1950s 16. Later, ACM joined the group 
of Luiz Vianna Filho, then in ARENA, to whom he owed his first appointments to executive 
positions. First, as Salvador's mayor during Vianna's term as governor and later as Bahia's 
governor succeeding Vianna himself
As mayor he took advantage of two things: his close ties with governor Vianna, from 
whom he gained not only political but also financial support, and by being the first mayor to 
introduce modem administrative and planning techniques into the obsolete structure of the 
town hah For these reasons ACM is praised as the best mayor Salvador ever had. His mayoral 
administration changed the physical features of the old city, mainly by the opening of avenues 
in the valleys and the demolishing of shanty towns and of traditional but decayed sites. This 
approach to the city's heritage was condemned by some and praised by many, who saw it as 
'modernisation' of the old town following Bahia's economic 'modernisation'.
In his first term as governor, from 1971 to 1974, ACM took advantage of the decision
14 ACM was three times governor. In the first two terms he was nominated by the military and indirectly elected 
by the state Legislature.
13 Ames (1994) found that in 1990 40% of the federal deputies from Bahia had a relative holding political 
office, as opposed to 5% in Sao Paulo. Oliveira (1988) found that among Bahia's delegation at the CNA 17% were 
political heirs. Most of those heirs had been in Congress for more than three legislatures.
16 Although ACM and Juracy Magalhaes have the same surname, they are not related.
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taken by the federal government to set up petrochemical industries in Camasari. Most of the 
infrastructure was put in place by the state government under ACMs administration, which 
promoted a positive association between the petrochemical industries and ACM, given that 
these industries are the pride of Bahians. ACM carried on his task of'modernising' Salvador 
by moving the government's vast state bureaucracy from the inner city to an area of urban 
expansion, the Centro Admimstrativo da Bahia. This project expanded the limits of the old 
city and created opportunities for developers and for the building industry, as well as 
strengthening the ties between ACM and this powerful sector of Bahia's business community.
ACMs successful trajectory during the military regime may be credited to the 
following factors. First, the ability to build up a pact with the oligarchies and with 
conservative political and economic groups. Second, while preserving these alliances ACM 
was slowly broadening his personal leadership and creating his own political group. Third, by 
controlling different groups, ACM became the main interlocutor of the military in the state.
The creation of his own group was a master-stroke. The strategy was to capture 
young and talented professionals, giving them major positions in the city and state 
administrations, thus creating a group of technocrats-tumed-politicians. Those positions had 
always been occupied by members of Bahia's old traditional families. In doing so ACM not 
only brought enthusiasm and new ideas to the government but was also preparing his political 
group with talented professionals who knew that the opportunities for them to improve their 
positions in their careers were given to them by ACM. Loyalty was then the natural result of 
such a strategy. This movement was so broad that even young professionals who were 
affiliated to clandestine communist parties or had a left-wing ideology entered the public 
service to become what became known as the esquerda carlista, meaning the left arm of 
ACM ACM himself is proud of this strategy, as recounted by his son, the federal deputy Luiz 
Eduardo Magalhaes [12 May 1993]17. With a large group of technocrats-tumed-politicians, 
ACM slowly took ground from his old allies, namely the group around Juracy Magalhaes, 
another group around Luiz Vianna Filho, and other individual leaders such as Nilo Coelho, 
Prisco Viana and Ruy Bacelar. With such a strategy ACM became typical of the case where
17 Out of the eighteen federal deputies from Bahia who were in Congress in 1993 and belonged to ACMPs 
group, five could be listed as technocrats-tumed-politicians. Several others were in key positions either in the state 
or in the federal government by ACM's appointment These appointments were made under the military regime 
but mainly during the Saraey and Collor administrations.
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a creature becomes bigger than his creators. This characteristic of Bahian politics was 
different from that of the North-East in general, where alliances were (and still are) made with 
the old oligarchies, except in Ceara.
Part of the state bureaucracy was ready to welcome and support the technocrats 
introduced by ACM. The reason is that during the early 1960s Bahia's state apparatus 
experienced a wave of modernisation, developing a wide programme of training and 
professionalisation of the civil service, especially for planning, budget and the formation of 
officials to implement Bahia's industrial programme. The professionalisation of the civil 
service was conducted outside the state apparatus, by the Federal University of Bahia. Later 
the Bahian model was copied by many of the north-eastern states. The goals were similar to 
attempts made earlier by the federal government to professionalise its civil service, but the 
methods were no t18. Unlike the federal experience, the Bahia experience was not intended to 
cover the entire state apparatus. It insulated from patronage a segment of the bureaucracy in 
planning activities, but left those in charge of social services as a reservoir for patronage and 
personal favours. The professionalisation programme was not designed to be implemented by 
the traditional bureaucracy. Instead, several public enterprises were granted relative autonomy 
to perform the same tasks performed by traditional offices. These enterprises became known 
as 'islands of efficiency1. Their staff were hired on a merit basis and were much better paid than 
their counterparts in the traditional bureaucracy. Also unlike the experience of the federal 
government, there was no major struggle among agencies for political influence, given that 
each model was free to enjoy the advantages of patronage or meritocracy in managing their 
missions.
The third reason for ACMs successful trajectory was his ability to manage the support 
of the hegemonic groups of the military regime, who guaranteed his two appointments as 
governor as well as abundant federal revenues which he used to carry on the projects of 
'modernising' and to industrialise Bahia. According to senator Jutahy Magalhaes, now one of 
his foes 19, ACM would do anything to please the military and the powerful, which was not 
difficult given that power was concentrated in the hands of two or three persons [7 May
18 The federal experience has been widely analysed. See Daland (1963) and Geddes (1990).
19 Jutahy Magalhaes is Juracy's son. During the military regime, Jutahy Magalhaes fought against ACMs 
hegemony, although both belonged to the same party, the ARENA He is now affiliated to the PSDB and his son 
Jutahy Magalhaes Junior stood for Bahia's governorship in the 1994 election as the PSDB candidate.
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1993].
ACMs support from and for the military never prevented him from taking risks. ACM 
himself recounted the times when he confronted the military over attending Rubitscheck's 
fimeral, allowing an annual meeting of the banned students' leftist organisation, UNE - Uniao 
National dos Estudantes, and signing a contract with a company owned by a well-known 
leftist, Rubens Paiva, who was later killed in prison (quoted from Carta Capital, 1994).
Ideologically, ACM defines himself as previously belonging to the centre of the 
political spectrum. 'Now', he said, 'these labels do not make any sense. I am a politician 
synchronised to people's will and interests' (quoted from Carta Capital, 1994). Whatever his 
ideology, ACM is a pragmatic politician and one not afraid to take risks, either before or after 
the military regime came to an end. He became an important articulator of the transition. He 
was one of the few politicians to support Samey throughout his term as President. He became 
Conor's lonely supporter after Conor's corruption scandals became public. Nevertheless, ACM 
was well rewarded during these events.
However, ACMs manipulation of the old political leaders was about to suffer a first 
reaction. He was defeated in the appointment of his successor for Bahia's governorship for 
the term starting in 1975. Part of his party, the ARENA, manoeuvred for the nomination of 
Roberto Santos as a response to ACMs power. Santos was an academic and former dean of 
the Federal University of Bahia. ACM never forgave Santos. The result was that since his 
term as governor Santos has continued to pursue a political career but had never succeeded 
in winning another election until 1994, when he finally made his way into Congress.
During Santos's term ACMs group was expelled from power. The President of the 
Republic was Ernesto Geisel The military group in power left ACM without any formal 
position for eight months. Finally they appointed him president of ELETROBRAS, the state- 
owned hydro-electricity company. However, the ELETROBRAS headquarters was not in 
Brasilia but in Rio; therefore, ACM was left away from the core of power. In talking about 
that period, Senator Jutahy Magalhaes recalled that when he was putting pressure on the 
military against ACM, who was campaigning to become a minister, he heard from General 
Golbery do Couto e Silva that the military did not want ACM in Brasilia. Golbery said the 
military would give ACM only *the candy of the state' [7 May 1993], meaning that ACMs 
power was to be kept within the state's boundaries. Keeping ACM limited to regional politics 
was the way used by the military to constrain a politician they felt they could not trust. This
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lack of trust was not on ideological grounds but on ACMs ability to dismantle political groups 
to expand his own power. This ability could have been a threat to the restricted nucleus of 
military command and to the regime's balance of power.
ACM returned to the state government in 1979. His second term was marked by the 
provision of electricity to the West, then a region without any important economic activity. 
The biggest test of ACMs leadership was in the following state elections, the first to be based 
on the popular vote. For the first time ACMs leadership was judged by the electorate and not 
just by a restricted group of military. He appointed as his successor one of the technocrats- 
tumed-politicians, the then president of Bahia's state commercial bank, Cleriston Andrade. 
Andrade was unknown to the electorate and had never run for an election. Andrade, however, 
died in a helicopter accident forty-five days before the election was due. Like any autocrat20, 
ACM did not have (and still does not have) a natural successor or anyone known by the 
electorate who could be identified as such. He then appointed Joao Durval Cameiro, former 
mayor of Feira de Santana, federal deputy and ACMs Secretary for Sanitation and Hydro 
Resources. Cameiro was known only in his municipality and had no popular or charismatic 
appeal Cameiro won with 38.7% of the votes. His competitor Roberto Santos attained 24.6% 
of the electorate. Cameiro's victory had to be credited to ACM. When questioned by a 
journalist how he managed to have an unknown candidate elected in such a short period of 
time ACM replied with one of his oft-quoted phrases: 'I win elections with a bag of money 
in one hand and a whip in another1.
The Cameiro administration was a fiasco, both politically and for the state's finances. 
He spent his term trying to remove ACMs influence and to build up his own group; he failed. 
ACM had appointed most of the heads of key positions and Cameiro was left with less 
important posts in the administration. The struggle between these two groups was developed 
in the shadows, but it kept the government paralysed for its entire term. In trying to build up 
his own group Cameiro used the state apparatus for clientelistic purposes in ways not used 
in recent years. Political appointments were made to the 'islands of efficiency* on the basis of 
clientelism. Cameiro's clients competed with the technocrats for the control of programmes,
20 By autocrat a leader who holds all power for himself and imposes his will on his followers is meant Such 
a leader centralises decisions which are not channelled through institutions such as political parties. Despite 
presenting similar features to those found in the Weberian concept of patrimonialism, ACMs dominance was not 
legitimised by tradition.
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contributing further to paralysing the administration. Cameiro ended his term surrounded by 
accusations of corruption, which have never been investigated. Cameiro's disastrous 
administration was the first example to generations of Bahians of a popular elected 
government. ACM recognised that he had made a mistake in choosing Cameiro. He told a 
magazine that he elected a lamppost, referring both to Cameiro's paralysis as well as to his 
height (quoted from Playboy, 1993 21). Later Cameiro became ACMs opponent.
From his followers ACM requires complete loyalty but knows how to reward them, 
while being implacable against opponents. Despite saying that he does not hate those who 
have 'betrayed' him (quoted from Playboy, 1993) they are either left in a secondary political 
position, as, for instance, Roberto Santos and Cameiro, or are forced to leave politics, e.g. 
Mario Kertesz, one of ACMs favourite technocrats-tumed-politician appointed by ACM as 
Salvador’s mayor. President Samey admitted he never wanted ACM as a foe (quoted from 
Playboy, 1993). The federal deputy Joao Almeida said that ACM uses Tiis power without any 
ethics or morals and that he knows the weaknesses and the values of those who count' [10 
May 1993]. Another opponent, the federal deputy Vieira Lima, accused ACM of 'anti­
democratic methods, such as lies, slanders, plots and betrayal even of those who are loyal to 
him' [7 May 1993]. Senator Magalhaes stated:
ACM does politics only with those who say 'amen'. The others are treated as personal enemies 
not adversaries. ACM's style is violent: he attacks his foes in their private lives. To confront 
him you have to have nothing to hide or to fear, because even i f  you don't have anything 
against you, he creates it [7 May 1993].
The need for complete loyalty is recognised even by ACMs followers. The federal 
deputy Aleluia stated that Bahian politics are poor and patronising because you cannot debate 
issues about the state with politicians who are not ACMs allies [20 May 1993]. ACM himself 
assumes that the only loyalty he recognises is towards himself. In his report to the state 
Legislature in March 1994 about his four-year term, he thanked the state deputies for their 
support but mentioned he would forgive those who, Svith a bitter heart and driven by the gall 
of life, lied and detracted only for the sake of being faithful to themselves' (Govemo da Bahia, 
1994: 26).
6.3.2 Bahia in the Transition from Military Rule
Bahia's role in the transition was twofold. One was through the participation of the
The Brazilian version of Playboy magazine has a tradition of interviewing public figures.
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state's delegation at the CNA The other was in the straggle for power within the Democratic 
Alliance. Bahia's delegation at the CNA was described as progressive (Coelho and Oliveira, 
1989). Some of its members gave outstanding participation, either because of their unexpected 
vote in favour of leftist demands, such as Senator Magalhaes, or because they became party 
leaders. The latter was the case of Jose Lourenso, the PFL's polemical leader because of his 
attacks on the State and his role in defending Sameys demands. In an opposite direction was 
Haroldo Lima, national leader of the PC do B, the most radical and coherent party at the 
CNA- The delegation was cut across by ideological polarisation between a left and a right- 
wing orientation, both standing out as coherent blocs, as Ames's (1995) statistical model 
suggested.
The straggle within the Democratic Alliance was fought on two fronts. One front was 
led by ACM, then in the PDS, and another by the PMDB and other opposition parties, except 
the PT. The main figure of the group led by the PMDB was Waldir Pires. Pires was Bahia's 
main leader in exile and he had been the Attorney General of the Republic during Goulart's 
government. In 1962 he was defeated for Bahia's governorship. He was Bahia's most famous 
refugee. The others were academics, terrorists and some politicians, all without popular 
visibility. Pires's return from Paris on the wave of the amnesty transformed him into a political 
hero, the only one able to challenge ACMs domination in the state.
ACM, however, now free from the militarys control, began to eye the national 
political scene. He actively participated in the transition, first in the shadows and later with 
greater viability. With the electoral reform of 1979, which reintroduced the multiparty system 
and abolished the two 'official' political parries, ACM maintained his affiliation to the party still 
faithful to the militaiy, the PDS. ACM endorsed Andreazza's candidacy against that of Paulo 
Maluf ACM, however, had foreseen Neves's victory in the Electoral College, as he himself 
recognises (Carta Capital, 1994). He then started to look at an alliance with Neves. Here 
again he planned a master-stroke by putting on a show broadcast by TV Globo accusing 
Maluf of corruption. Globo's support meant that ACMs behaviour had the blessing of the 
powerful Roberto Marinho, Globo's owner and one of Brazil's most important political actors. 
The episode was motivated by accusations raised by the then Minister of the Air Force, Delio 
Jardim de Mattos, against ACM on the grounds that, in supporting Neves, ACM had betrayed 
the principles of the '1964 Revolution'. ACM replied that traitors were those who were 
supporting the candidacy of the corrupt Maluf According to Senator Jutahy Magalhaes [7
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May 1993] ACM was ensuring his participation in the new regime even before Andreazza's 
defeat. ACM was Neves's main interlocutor to ensure the presidential election would be 
indirect and not popular, as ACM himself recounted (Carta Capital, 1994) 22. ACMs attitude 
had a significance beyond his personal intentions. It symbolised that those who were part of 
the military pact were ready to leave politics based on the military headquarters and to play 
the game of a more open and competitive politics, but not by playing a minor role.
In Bahia opposition to the military regime was weak and lacked a clear ideological 
alignment. Some groups supported the military, for instance the entrepreneurs, who, given 
Bahia's late economic development, were dependent upon federal subsidies and policies. The 
politicians in the opposition were mainly those the military did not want in their alliances. 
Although minor leaders, they were important because they stayed in opposition to fulfil the 
military's strategy of preserving reliable opponents. In the mid-1970s, however, a reaction 
started against the lack of leftist ideology and against the compromising politics played by 
Bahia's MDB, a party to which those minor leaders were affiliated23. This reaction came from 
a group of youngsters affiliated to different branches of the then illegal Communist Party who 
had been active in secondaiy-school and in college politics. They started to join the MDB 24 
because it was the only party available, and slowly isolated the old leaders and paved the way 
for the arrival of Pires. These youngsters were elected as councillors and later as state 
deputies. They only reached Congress during the CNA, which explains the conjunctural 
ideological polarisation in the CNA's Bahian delegation. The work of these young politicians 
was focused on Pires, because of his past, his popularity and his moral authority. High 
expectations were placed on Pires antecipating that he would make the left a real alternative 
power and would challenge ACMs hegemony in the state.
At first Pires's arrival did not bring the results expected by the opposition. He ran for 
the Senate in 1982 but was defeated by ACMs group. Later, with the Diretas-Ja and with his 
involvement in the Democratic Alliance, Pires expanded his leadership. An alliance between 
the PMDB and the PDS dissidents unhappy with ACMs control over the political scene was
22 As has now become public, Neves acted behind the scenes for an indirect presidential election, although 
publicly supporting the Diretas-Ja movement
23 With the 1979 electoral reform, the MDB changed its name to PMDB.
24 See Kinzo (1988) for the MDB's trajectory at the national level.
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then made possible. Jutahy Magalhaes, Luiz Vianna Filho, Roberto Santos, Ruy Bacelar, 
Prisco Viana and Nilo Coelho, all PDS dissidents, gathered around Pires to build a front to 
challenge ACM within the state. Pires's leadership promoted two things. First, a polarisation 
of politicians to him or to ACM It was the first time since ACMs ascension that he had been 
challenged by another politician of the same stature. Second, Pires did not want to share 
power with his young supporters. Like ACM, he acts as an autocrat and a centraliser, though 
his discourse is apparently against this.
Although Pires's appeal for centralised power is recognised only by Mousinho [29 June 
1993] among the interviewees, the similarity between the methods of these two figures shows 
another aspect of Bahia's politics: a strong conflict of generations. Most politicians 
interviewed who are around 40 years old mentioned the conflict. Aleluia, ACMs follower, 
stated that good political prospects rely on a new generation of politicians, who represent 
either liberal or labour interests, without being either 'physiological' or corporatist [20 May 
1993]. Wagner, a federal deputy from the PT, has said he likes to joke by saying that Bahian 
politics is going to change only when people between 40 and 50 years old start to take over 
the government. Only then may the polarisation to either Pires or ACM be broken [13 May
1993]. Vieira Lima, from the PMDB, reckoned that there is a new generation of politicians, 
some of whom are the sons of old politicians, like himself but this new generation 
understands that there is ho more room for oligarchies and their practices, for the old 
discourse, the old coronelista way of sustaining electoral bailiwicks and the old vision that 
buying votes is the way to win elections' [7 May 1993]. Claudia Mousinho talked about a Svar 
of generations which killed the political mobility of those youngsters who remained in the 
country fighting against the dictatorship during their college years. They were suffocated by 
Pires' [29 June 1993].
Bahia's participation in the transition was therefore marked by polarisation of those 
for ACM and those who were against him. ACM, however, was mainly responsible for the 
73% of votes Bahia gave to Neves in the Electoral College, given that he controlled most of 
the state's votes. Neves rewarded that support by giving Bahia third place in the appointment 
of ministries, one more than Pernambuco, where Neves's victory had been bigger in 
proportional terms. Because Neves appointed ACM as his Minister of Communications and 
Pires as his Minister of Social Security, an intermediate branch of the PMDB led by Roberto 
Santos managed to name Carlos Sant'Anna as the Minister of Health. Why did the Bahian
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PMDB let ACM have such a powerful ministry? Almeida's [10 May 1993] view is that the 
PMDB never dreamed that ACM would hold a large share of power because Neves would 
have the ability to control him. Pires [18 May 1993] relied on Neves's 'democratic tradition 
and experience in dealing with conflicts'. With Neves's death, Samey was the manager of this 
delicate regional arrangement. He favoured ACM in that balance of power, and ACM was a 
faithful partner, supporting Samey throughout his mandate, despite later endorsing Collor's 
candidacy behind the scenes25.
6.3.3 The Role of Societal Groups in Bahia's Politics
Politics in Bahia is played basically between its politicians and less by other societal 
groups. Social movements are still weak, with a few localised exceptions 26. Urban trade 
unions are few, especially when compared to other states with similar populations, such as Rio 
de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul, in part because of Bahia's capital-intensive industry. In 
1987 Bahia had 189 urban trade unions, comprised of employers, employees and autonomous 
professionals, whereas Rio Grande do Sul had 572 (IBGE, 1987: 29). 'Politically, labour 
leaders still think that one should be grateful to have a job', according to Wagner [13 May
1993]. However, Bahia has the third highest number of rural trade unions, both for employers 
and employees (IBGE, 1987: 29). On the other hand, employer federations are so subservient 
to ACM that the heads of the four mam federations sent a letter to Folha de Sao Paulo 
defending ACM from an editorial published by the newspaper (Folha de Sao Paulo, 1992). 
The newspaper replied that to cringe before elected officials should not be the occupation of 
institutions of the civil society (Folha de Sao Paulo, 1992).
Two reasons might explain the weakness of civil society in Bahia and consequently 
the dominance of a leader such as ACM. One is the existence of clientelism27. Patronage
25 Samey was Collor's favourite target during the presidential campaign.
26 Movements based more closely on collective action are still scant in Bahia but some can be listed, especially 
in the interior. These social movements have even found unusual allies. This is the case recounted by Lehmann 
(1990: 209) about a World Bank loan in 1985 to finance the dam at Itaparica, in Bahia's interior. Protests from 
the fanners whose land was to be flooded and from international humanitarian organisations reached the bank and 
a $300 million resettlement scheme was approved.
Maybe die most important event which started to break the influence of clientelism in the country was die 
introduction in 1945 of the secret ballot and of die stimulus for die creation of opposition parties by the Electoral 
Code of 1932. These points are constantly ignored by those who study clientelism in Brazil, with the exception 
of Pang (1979:233); by those who analyse the Brazilian political system, with the exception of Lamounier (1993: 
126); and by politicians, with the exception of Josaphat Marinho [23 April 1993]. Another important blow against 
patronage was the 1988 Constitution mandate which granted life tenure to civil servants of die three levels of
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tends to weaken civil society and to decrease power competition. In Bahia different political
groups took advantage of this weakness. Despite the existence of clientelism, the interviewees
did not consider clientelism to be the main weakness of the political system in Bahia, as
opposed to ACMs control over the media, a point to be discussed in the following
section 28. Almeida [10 May 1993], from the PMDB, stressed that
since the 1986 elections no one has control of votes as in the past, when a cabo eleitoral fa 
mobiliser o f votes], could ensure five, ten or twelve thousand votes for a candidate in a 
constituency. ACM used to give the name of a candidate to the mayor or to the cabo eleitoral 
one month before the election was due and sometimes they did not even know the candidate. 
This does not happen any more, which shows that the electorate is more independent.
Alehiia [20 May 1993], from the PFL, said the demands of the middle class of the interior are 
no longer for jobs but for collective action such as infrastructure. Vieira Lima [7 May 1993], 
from the PMDB, declared:
in the last campaigns we have seen that people realised that they are exploited in their 
ignorance, misery and hungry and they want a political practice which is not based on 
clientelism.
The most striking comment came from ACM's son, Luiz Eduardo Magalhaes:
The ACM group is convinced that society want good administrators and the fulfilment of 
macro-demands. People want to feel that what the government is doing for them is goodfor 
many people. They want an end to politics based on personal demands and clientelism [12 
May 1993].
Luiz Eduardo's words show that in the view of ACM's group clientelism is being 
replaced by 'efficiency. The 'efficiency image is based on ACM's reputation as a good 
administrator. The expression 'efficient administrator' was used to label ACM’s government 
by (i) most of the interviewees who are ACM's faithful followers or opponents and (ii) by 
other politicians who belong to ACM’s party or alliance but follow a more independent line, 
such as Josaphat Marinho [23 April 1993] and Jose Lourenfo [10 May 1993] 29. Patronage,
government after five working-years and the requirement for public competition to enter the civil service. 
Although these constitutional mandates are being accused of being responsible for the governments' administrative 
problems, they did represent a further blow against clientelism.
28 Most empirical studies on clientelism see the phenomenon from below, either from the client's point of view 
or from the local patron's. This study tried to see it from the viewpoint of a group of politicians who are in 
Congress. Those politicians (i) benefit from clientelism; (ii) are penalised by it or (iii) have part of their 
constituencies under the influence of patronage.
29 The only interviewee who said that the control of the cabos eleitorais in the interior is still the same as in the 
past was Wagner, from the PT. Given the PTs grass roots, its politicians are more likely to suffer from the still 
existing forms of clientelism than those from more 'flexible' parties such as the PMDB and the PFL. Despite this,
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however, still plays a role in Bahia's politics, especially in local elections and in the state
Legislature, but the state's delegation in Congress seems to be less affected by it.
The other reason for the weakness of Bahia's civil society is the peculiar type of
entrepreneurship which exists in Bahia. Bahia's entrepreneurs can be grouped into four types.
First, there are those who came from traditional and wealthy families and who, since the last
century, have developed a niche in private commercial banking, as with two families, Calmon
de Sa and Mariani30. The second group is made up of newcomers whose main business is the
construction industry such as Odebrecht and OAS, the latter owned by ACM’s son-in-law.
They have also diversified their interests beyond the construction business. They, especially
Odebrecht, have been involved in almost every corruption scandal in the last two years. Like
the previous group, these conglomerates became national and international; therefore, their
decisions and ties do not depend upon regional politicians. The third type of entrepreneur is
from the petrochemical industries. The federal government, and foreign and domestic capital,
the latter mainly from Sao Paulo, have equal shares in the ownership of those companies. The
companies' decisions are also taken outside the state. The fourth type is from the interior:
raisers of cattle or owners of cocoa, cotton and coffee plantations. These people tend to be
involved in local rather than in regional politics, their field of influence and interest being
restricted to their municipality. Few run for state executive positions, like Nilo Coelho, the
state's major cattle rancher. These entrepreneurs do not operate in the entire state; their pleas
are localised and more dependent upon federal credit.
However, these four types of entrepreneurs have not relinquished ACM's protection.
An explanation is given by Vieira Lima:
Intelligent people as Calmon de Sd are dominated by ACM and fear him. So are all the 
business leaders. Why? Because of ACM's control over everything, especially the media and 
the Judiciary. Therefore, the entrepreneurs, who are sensitive to any change which might 
affect their profits, do not want to fight such a man [7 May 1993].
These four types of entrepreneurs support the assumption that unlike Sao Paulo Bahia
Wagner recognised that improvements have been made, with die PTs ascension to mayoral positions in Bahia's 
interior.
30 The Mariani family sold their bank in the 1970s to a financial group in Sao Paulo and moved their activities 
to the petrochemical industry.
219
has a faceless business community 31. Their federations are generally headed by what are left 
of the middle-sized entrepreneurs whose companies do not have ties outside the state. 
Therefore, state politics is left to the politicians alone without the entrepreneurs1 mediation. 
This feature leaves plenty of room for the development of a leader like ACM.
The other way ACM uses to control the state's political and economic life is through 
the Judiciary. As mentioned above, the states in Brazil have their own Judiciary and the 
members of each state's highest court, the State Justice Tribunal, are appointed by the 
governor and are granted life tenure. Because ACM had governed the state three times, he 
has had many opportunities to appoint judges loyal to him.
Another feature of Bahia's societal development is the weakness of the state's branch 
of the Workers' Party, the PT. The PT has been seen as a party which successfully challenges 
the state-centric and elite-driven politics of Brazil (Keck, 1992). However, the PT has found 
it hard to take-off in the North-East and in Bahia. According to one of its federal deputies, 
Wagner, the party in Bahia is different from that in Sao Paulo because 70% of the party’s 
delegates come from the interior [13 May 1993]. This means that in Bahia what drives the 
party is not a strong urban working-class, as in Sao Paulo, but a movement based on landless 
peasants. Wagner has assessed that the PT ftnds it difficult to grow in Bahia because of the 
state's roots in coronelismo, messianism and in politics oriented around ACM [13 May 1993]. 
Despite Wagner's pessimistic view Bahia is the north-eastern state where the PT is strongest. 
In 1993 it had four state and two federal deputies and governed two municipalities. The 
growth of the PT in a state like Bahia is a signal that the hegemony of the elite-driven and 
autocrat politics has fissures. The growing presence of the PT does not mean a breakdown 
in the entrenched patterns of dominance of the state's political system is about to occur, but 
that room for more competitive politics exists in Bahia.
While the state's politics and society have gone in the direction analysed above, its 
main leader was moving to the national scene and expanding his alliances beyond the state's 
borders.
31 The political role of Brazilian industrialists in the transition has been discussed by Cardoso (1986). A case 
study of the involvement of Sao Paulo's industrialists in politics was made by Payne (1994). However, studies 
about the financial and agricultural sectors are still lacking, as is knowledge of the role of entrepreneurs outside 
Sao Paulo.
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6.3.4 The 'Deprovincialisation' of a Politician
After Sameys mid-term ACM became his main political articulator. Once in the 
federal government, ACM launched another master-stroke which qualitatively changed his 
domination. Despite preserving the technocrats-tumed-politicians strategy, ACM expanded 
his dominion to the mass communication. He set himself up to control the media in his home 
state and expanded his power beyond Bahia's borders through the concession of television and 
radio licences according to his and Sameys interests 32. The alliance which made ACMs 
'deprovinrialisation' and his access to mass communication possible was made with Roberto 
Marinho, with whom ACM had previous ties. However, as Minister of Communications ACM 
had the chance to do Marinho several favours. One was known as the NEC scandal, after 
ACM's decision to cancel contracts between TELEBRAS, the state-owned 
telecommunications company, and NEC. NEC partner, Mario Gamero, was forced to sell his 
shares to Marinho. Congress launched an inquiry which cleared ACM. During ACMs hearing 
he performed one of his usual shows, full of language offensive towards those who questioned 
him (Folha de Sao Paulo, 1992)33. Marinho returned ACMs favour by supporting ACMs 
quest to broadcast Globo's programmes, which had been early granted to TV Aratu, a 
competitor of ACMs TV Bahia M. As 80% of the Brazilian audience belongs to Globo, ACM 
was eager to be its regional representative. With Marinho's support, TV Bahia won in court 
the right to broadcast Globo's programmes in a trial considered suspicious by his opponents. 
In 1994, ACMs family and friends had control of six television channels in the state, all 
Globo's broadcasters.
In building up his own telecommunications empire35, ACM was able to change his 
type of domination. Instead of exerting control in a clientelist way, ACM now has a direct 
relationship with the electorate through the media and not just through the local leaders of the 
interior. Patron-client relations in Brazil have been seen as mediated by the state (Bursztyn,
32 It was said Samey distributed through ACM more than 1,000 licences (Veja, 1994:24). These licences were 
worth close to $100 million (Fleisher, 1990: 251).
33 ACM is known for his hot-temper. His emotional explosions are followed by offensive language and by 
making his opponents' private lives public.
34 Legally, the TV Bahia belongs to ACMs children.
35 According to his foes, ACM controls a network of ninety radio and TV channels. These channels belong either 
to his family or to his proteges {Folha de Sao Paulo, 1994) ACM argued that in 70% of the cases only one 
company applied for the license (quoted from Folha de Sao Paulo, 1994)
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1985), by popular religions (Henfrey, 1981) or by ethnological processes (Huntchinson,
1966). The Bahian case shows that mass communication has become another source of
mediation between politicians and the voters. ACM's control over the media is considered by
many as a means to limit the growth of the opposition, as stressed by Wagner [13 May 1993],
Almeida [10 May 1993], and Vieira Lima [7 May 1993]. In the words of Senator Magalhaes,
the Bahicm media criticise everything and everyone who is against ACM but when they talk 
about the ACM administration the state becomes an island of fantasy, where everything is 
perfect, even inflation does not affect Bahia because of the Cesta do Povo 36. Therefore, the 
population gets the news mediated by political and economic interests [7 May 1993].
Political control of the press is also strong in Bahia. In only one daily, A Tarde, are 
there disputes between different political groups. The other three are owned by ACMs 
children, by the ex-federal deputy Joaci Goes, and by Salvador's ex-mayor Kertesz, both 
ACMs opponents. The same happens with the television channels. Apart from TV Bahia, 
there is TV Aratu, controlled by ex-govemor Coelho, and TV Itapoa, owned by the federal 
deputy Pedro Irujo, sometimes ACMs foe and sometimes his ally. This situation confuses 
outside observers, given that the local news either presents different interpretations of the 
same facts or simply ignores a fact.
How can one understand ACM beyond his ability to polarise politicians? Apart from 
this characteristic is it possible to shed more light on a politician who has survived under 
different political regimes? As a journalist has said, ACM is, among the living, the clearest 
picture of the Brazilian power scene, resistant to all crises and to any regime (Carta Capital,
1994). The labels given to ACM by the interviewees might bring more confusion than 
clarification. Mousinho views ACM as the moderniser of the right [29 June 1993]; Wagner 
as a new coronel [13 May 1993]; Almeida, as the last coronel [10 May 1993]; Pinto, as a 
political oligarch [19 May 1993]; Vieira Lima, as a new oligarch [7 May 1993], but ACMs 
son, Luiz Eduardo, thinks he is the destroyer of the oligarchies [12 May 1993]. Are these 
labels sufficient to explain ACM? Did industrialisation, bureaucratisation and mass 
communication make no difference?
Whatever the label given to ACM, he is a politician of insight. He transformed to an 
advantage the fret that he did not belong to Bahia's traditional families. He uses with freedom
36 The Cesta do Povo is a supermarket chain launched by ACM in poor residential areas to sell popular 
products at subsidised prices.
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(or without limits or morals, according to his opponents) whatever and whoever is around 
him From the oligarchies he learned to deal with 'parochial' politics. From economic 
modernisation he learned the power of communication in a mass society. Individually, he has 
great power. None of the surviving old oligarchies had ever enjoyed such power. He managed 
to build solid foundations and therefore attracted whatever was scattered. ACM knows the 
old ways as well as the new ones; he uses either depending on what he wants to accomplish. 
This is why most of the interviewees mentioned they did not think that the common words 
used in Bahia to label ACM's partisans, the carlistas, or opponents, the anti-carlistas, were 
correct because one could not extract any ideology from ACMs behaviour. This view is 
untrue. Like any politician ACM values power. He managed not only to survive but to 
increase his power with the change of regime. He benefitted from Brazil's slow transition, 
from the fragmentation of power caused by redemocratisation and by Brazil's version of 
Lijphart's (1984) consociational democracy. His ideas may sound contradictory and it may be 
difficult to extract a systematic doctrine from his attitudes, but he has built a programme of 
political action. The basis of this programme is efficiency. As Aleluia put it, the difference 
between ACM and the others is that ACM plays well while the others play badly [20 May
1993]. Playing in a society cut across by inequalities, ACM found the right vague words to 
address to the people through his communication network. The message is based on 
efficiency. Playing in the political environment, he does the job that others are afraid to do. 
He takes risks and is prepared to reward, to betray and to change, whenever the plot requires.
6.3.5 Bahia's Brief Experience of an 'Opposite' Government
While ACM was enjoying the freedom given by redemocratisation and the power 
given by Samey, at home his candidate for the governorship, Josaphat Marinho, suffered the 
worst defeat in the country. Marinho, a former socialist, was supported both by ACM and 
Cameiro who were already on bad terms. Marinho ran against Pires, who articulated the 
support of every Bahian leader who rejected ACMs control Pires won 55.5% of the votes,
1.5 million votes ahead of Marinho. The PMDB won both Senate seats and most of the 
congressional and the state legislature delegates, thus interrupting, but not cancelling, ACMs 
domination. In Congress the Pires ticket elected twenty-five parliamentarians to the CNA, 
against fourteen belonging to ACMs group. In the state legislature ACM had control of 40% 
of its members, while Pires's coalition counted for 58%.
What were the reasons behind such a dramatic change in the preferences of the
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electorate? A combination of both domestic and national motivations can be found. First, the 
electorate saw Pires as a romantic figure who had suffered in exile and returned to his 
motherland under the banners of helping the poor and restoring morality to public affairs, so 
affected during Cameiro's term and so stressed during the transition. Second, Pires was the 
choice of those politicians who felt manipulated or betrayed by their creature. Pires was 
supported by such a range of politicians who included landowners such as Coelho and the 
maoist PC do B. This alliance brought the votes of a solid core of faithful supporters based 
on bailiwicks, such as the votes controlled by the Magalhaes and the Vianna families. The 
Pires ticket was also endorsed by wealthy politicians, such as Coelho, Pedro Irujo and Joaci 
Goes. Third, Pires profited from Turing the best advertising agency in Bahia and his campaign 
touched people's emotions' [Vieira Iima3 7 May 1993]. For national motivation, Pires enjoyed 
the popularity of the Cruzado Plan and the population's honeymoon with democracy.
The broad alliance around Pires was justified on the grounds that the state was 
reproducing Neves's strategy to take over the government from the military. The alliance was 
commended as legitimate because it would eliminate the last representative of the dictatorship 
in Bahia, namely ACM. No one, except the PT, questioned this point. In choosing his 
partisans Pires proved to be more of a pragmatic than an ideological politician. Pires's running 
mate, the Senate candidates, plus his main allies were all faithful supporters of the military 
regime. They had moved from the PDS to the PFL but were forced to join the PMDB because 
ACM managed to hold control of the PFL. Coelho, Pires's running mate, is a landowner who 
owned at that time 70,000 head of cattle, 130,000 hectares of land and 100,000 votes in fifty 
municipalities in the Sertao area \IstoE, 1986]. For the Senate, the Pires alliance was with 
Jutahy Magalhaes, whose family had had control over Bahian politics since the 1930s.
In an ex-post evaluation, Pires said:
1 regretted the choice of such a broad alliance after I  saw the dimension of my victory. 
However; nobody couldforesee such a victory. We had only thirty-four municipalities against 
343 controlled by the conservatives. It was disproportional and almost impossible to win an 
election [18 May 1993] 37.
Like Cameiro's, the Pires administration remains in the minds of Bahians as a failure. 
He also frustrated the high expectations around his government not only administratively, but
37 Despite his alliances and the later development of his political career, which does not show any leftist 
commitment, Pires still talks about himself as a leftist politician as opposed to ACM's conservatism.
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because he resigned after two years to become Guimaraes's running mate in the 1989
presidential electionM. The Pires administration carried on the slow destruction of the 'islands
of efficiency1. His reasons seemed different from Cameiro's. The idea was to cut down the
relative autonomy and the privileges enjoyed by them, with the aim of making the public
sector uniform. The result was equalisation from below, where one could not distinguish the
clients from the technocrats nor could one distinguish priority programmes. This destruction
was bemoaned by ACMs group, as mentioned by his son [12 May 1993], Clientelism and
corporatism occurred during the Pires administration, as he recognised, 'even among the left-
wing, which did not have a clear notion of the accumulation of popular forces needed to build
a democratic government and then fell under corporatist and clientelist pressures, such as
those in education' [18 May 1993]. Pires, however, although rejecting clientelism, could not
impede it. He explained his strategy of facing what he called the 'anti-democratic' methods of
governing. The strategy was, in Pires own words,
not to allow the politically appointed positions in the state and in the municipalities to remain 
as the governor's personal nomination. It was necessary to avoid the idea of the governor as 
a chief When you choose a person on these grounds, you strengthen a clientelistic 
relationship traditionally supported by the governor. I  understood that my task was to change 
this relationship [18 May 1993].
Two methods were used by Pires to play the clientelist game, although he did not 
mention them during his interview. For the most important positions, Pires shared the 
administration with his main allies during the campaign. For the posts in the interior, mainly 
headteachers and police officials, all the political leaders of the municipality who had joined 
the Pires coalition got together under the coordination of a lecturer appointed by Pires to 
decide who was going to be nominated. Given Pires's large majority, which meant that ACMs 
supporters in the interior had switched to Pires, this was not an easy task and took more than 
a year to complete. A vacuum of power in the interior was the natural result of such a method. 
Dissatisfaction also occurred with the appointments, given the plurality of leaders who had 
always been on opposite sides. This is among the most important facts to explain (i) ACMs 
quick reassumption of local constituencies and (ii) Pires's quick loss of support from the state 
Legislature, whose influence and ties come mainly from the interior.
Pires's unsuccessful government is explained by the interviewees. Wagner, who, as a
38 Pires was not Lula da Silva's running mate, as mentioned by R. Schneider (1991: 356).
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PT member did not join Pires's alliance, assessed that Pires lacked the political will to govern 
the state. The same reason was pointed out by ACM in explaining Pires's failure: 'they did not 
know how to use power, either to command or to administer. The result was that I returned 
to the governorship as a saviour* (quoted from Carta Capital, 1994). Among Pires's partisans, 
the reasons given for his failure varied. Almeida [10 May 1993] blamed the opposition's 
incapacity to manage such a great victory; Boaventura [13 May 1993] pointed to the 
impossibility of changing the state apparatus; Correia [18 May 1993] blamed the 
disintegr ation of the alliance, whose members struggled among themselves; Vieira Lima [7 
May 1993] put the blame on Pires, who 'did not have the courage to manage the alliance; he 
was indecisive and dubious'; Mousinho [29 June 1993] said the Pires administration showed 
the left was not prepared to govern; one interviewee who asked not to be named said Pires 
was incompetent and lazy.
No one mentioned, however, the most likely explanation, which is the difficulties of 
governing and implementing policies when political forces in power are so fragmented and 
when high expectations come to the fore. These difficulties are the main distinction between 
a government run by one group, democratic or not, and a coalition of groups with different 
logic and goals, such as the Cameiro and Pires administrations. Therefore, Bahia's experience 
of two types of government, one under single command and two others with power-sharing 
between antagonistic logics shows that the fragmentation of power in the transition and during 
democratic consolidation affected the efficiency of both government and govemability. This 
assumption can be applied to the national sphere and to other states.
A government able to build a coalition around specific goals does not necessarily have 
to be anti-democratic. There are examples in contemporary Brazil of state governments 
considered democratic, which have shown good policy results, at least in the eyes of their 
electorates, as in the last two terms in Ceara and in the last term in Parana. In mid-1994 
opinion polls showed that Ciro Gomes, Ceara's PSDB governor, ACM, Bahia's governor from 
the PFL, and Roberto Requiao, Parana's PMDB governor, were very positively evaluated by 
the electorate. The worst were Brizola, from the PDT, who is known for his control over his 
party, and Joaquim Francisco, Pernambuco's governor from the PFL (Folha de Sao Paulo,
1994). These evaluations show that to be efficient is not the privilege of right-wing, 
conservative, centralist or anti-democratic governors. In these three states their governors 
managed to build a coherent coalition, using either democratic or anti-democratic methods,
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to end their terms with policy results approved by the electorate.
Pires's resignation to become Guimaraes's running mate left the way open for Nilo 
Coelho. Coelho was surrounded by corruption scandals, especially of privileging his properties 
with public investments. Here a point about Bahia's politics should be stressed. Two 
governors left office after attacks on the way they used public resources for their own and 
their friends' benefit: Coelho and Cameiro. Both come from Bahia's Sertao, the state's most 
backward region, not only economically but also politically, where bailiwicks and 'pork barrel' 
still dominate the political system39. Whenever the Sertao gets into power it is not by its own 
strength, given that Cameiro was elected with ACMs votes and Coelho became governor 
because of Pires's resignation. However, when political circumstances upgrade the Sertao's 
leaders they break into the state apparatus and public finances with a voraciousness which 
symbolises the thirst of the sertanejos, the dwellers of the Sertao, a region historically affected 
by constant droughts. Also whenever the sertanejos govern, the group which opposes them 
is elected easily in the following election.
6.3.6 Bahia in the Democratic Consolidation
ACM returned to Bahia's government in 1991. His contender was Roberto Santos. 
The anti-carlistas were divided and ACM was victorious in the first-round of the election, 
with 30% of the votes 40. The polarisation between ACM and Pires was transposed to the 
Legislature. Pires was the highest voted federal deputy, with 147,689 votes, but ACMs son, 
Luiz Eduardo, was in second place, with 86,680 votes.
The fact that ACM attained 30% of the votes, the same total reached by Josaphat 
Marinho in 1986 and similar to that reached by Cameiro in 1982, shows that ACMs control 
over the electorate is limited to that figure. Two reasons make ACMs importance greater than 
the votes he can attract. First, ACM has a faithful core of supporters, especially in small 
towns, whereas in larger towns the political system tends to be more competitive. This 
assumption is sustained by ACMs historical setbacks in Salvador, combined with his
<>Q
The existence in the Sertao of these forms of political domination is sustained by the Coelho and Cameiro 
stories cited in the press.
40 The 1990 election was die first election after the 1988 Constitution which introduced the rule that executive 
positions at the three levels of government should have two-round elections if no candidate met the absolute 
majority of die votes, including the blank and die null votes. In the case of the municipalities, the rule applies only 
to those with more than 200,000 voters. ACMs victory with 30% of the votes meant that the number of blank and 
null votes were high.
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candidates' defeats in Bahia's most important cities in the 1992 local elections 41. These defeats 
can be partially explained by ACMs stand against Collofs impeachment, which happened 
during the local election campaign, but they also mean that there is room for other political 
forces. However, ACM's faithful supporters in the interior can switch to other candidates if 
they foresee an ACM defeat, as they did with Pires. This oscillation shows that pragmatism 
is the basis of the behaviour of political leaders in the interior. Political pragmatism in the 
interior means not only the local leaders' need for jobs and bailiwicks but also a disposition 
for change. The second reason that makes ACMs importance greater than his support by 30% 
of Bahian voters is because his leadership is not challenged by internal disputes among his 
group or the parties he controls42.
In his third term as Bahia's governor ACM opened the way for upgrading Bahia's 
tourism beyond the borders of the country. He invested heavily in Salvador, mainly in 
restoring what he had left of the city's historical sites and in expanding its cultural equipment. 
In doing so ACM was motivated by two reasons. First, to create a new economic front for 
the state. Second, to gain the support of Salvador's electorate, which has traditionally voted 
against him. He ended his term with 75% of Bahians considering his administration was 'good 
and very good' (IstoE, 1994).
While governing Bahia, ACM did not despise the national scene. He kept a low profile 
during the 1989 presidential election, but in the shadows he supported Conor's candidature 
and ignored his party's candidate, Aureliano Chaves. Collor won in Bahia with the backing of 
ACM and Coelho. After one year of the Collor administration ACM was again on the national 
scene as a major star. He appointed several proteges to CoUor*s team, including three 
Ministers and the heads of several federal agencies. ACMs influence over Collor was 
nationally recognised and rewarded not only politically but also financially. It was reported 
that in February 1992 Bahia received grants from the federal government amounting to $10 
million, $248 million were to be transferred in May and $300 million were to be invested by
41 Mayors' candidates supported by ACM were defeated in Salvador, Cama9ari, Lauro de Freitas and SSo 
Francisco do Conde, in the Salvador Metropolitan Area, and in many of the most important municipalities 
of the interior, such as Feira de Santana, Guanambi, Bom Jesus da Lapa, Itabuna and Barreiras.
42 In Bahia ACM controls evety party considered as conservative, namely the PFL, PTB, PDC, PL, PDS 
andPST.
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the federal government in the state's infrastructure (Gazeta Mercantile 1992)43. ACM's role 
was so crucial that Collor once mentioned that ACM had a Ph.D in politics.
ACM left Bahia's government in 1994 to run for the Senate, when two seats were 
available. He appointed for the second seat Waldeck Ornelas, a former technocrat-tumed- 
politidam The candidate from the opposition was Pires, who had tried for the nomination of 
his party, now the PSDB, for governorship. The PSDB decided for Magalhaes Junior since 
Pires's rejection by the electorate was three times bigger than Magalhaes Junior's [IstoE,
1994). ACM easily won one seat, with 32.7% of the votes, therefore keeping his traditional 
ratio. He managed, however, to have Ornelas elected to the second seat. Pires was defeated 
in a competition surrounded by allegations of fraud, although ACMs group had been cleared 
by the Judiciary. ACM was also the first placed in Salvador but this victory did not mean that 
the anti-carlista city was down on its knees because only 23% of Salvador's electorate voted 
for him. ACMs victory in Salvador must be credited as being a reward for his heavy 
investments, for the weakness of the competitors and because of Pires's rejection. For 
governor ACM again appointed a technocrat-tumed-politician, Paulo Souto. Like the others, 
Souto was unknown to the electorate. He won the position in the second-round. His 
competitor in the second-round was Cameiro and not, as expected, the PSDB's candidate 
Magalhaes Junior. Again ACM showed his strength by transferring his share of 30% of the 
Bahians votes to an unknown technocrat-tumed-politician.
At the national level ACM was the articulator of the PFL's support for Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso's presidential candidacy in the 1994 election. In doing so ACM killed two 
birds with one stone. With Cardoso's victory, ACM and the PFL were brought to power, 
although not to the Presidency. This position is familiar to ACM. At home ACMs support 
to Cardoso forced the PSDB's branch in the state to join the PTs candidature. As mentioned 
above, the PT is not strong in the state, which meant that by supporting the PTs presidential 
candidate Lula da Silva, Pires and Magalhaes Junior did not gain much in electoral terms. On 
the other hand, with Cardoso's victory, the PSDB in Bahia might be kept at bay, given that 
they denied support to the party's candidate.
43 When fieldwork research in Bahia was carried out there was no centralised record on negotiated grants, 
which made it impossible to check whether these figures were really transferred. However, ACM's support for 
Collor until the very end probably means that federal grants combined with appointments to political positions 
produced their alliance.
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ACM’s major victory, however, was in the election of the Congress members who 
belong to his group. In 1995 ACM took to Congress the North-East's second biggest 
delegation. Twenty-two out of thirty-eight federal deputies elected from Bahia, plus two 
senators, are members of ACM's group (O Globo, 1994). This delegation, who 'belongs' more 
to ACM than to the state, is bigger than those from nineteen states and than the delegation 
of ten political parties represented in Congress. This figure means that ACM's power over 
Congress and the federal Executive is individually vaster than any other politician or governor 
and bigger than that of many parties. In addition, Luiz Eduardo, ACMs son, was elected 
President of the Chamber of Deputies for the 1995-1997 term and Samey became the Senate's 
President.
The events reported in this section show the upgrading of a regional politician to the 
national sphere after the political opening. They show that in Bahia political pragmatism is an 
important variable. Instead of a left-right axis the ideology in Bahia stands more for an 
inefficiency-efficiency axis, the former associated with fragmented and democratic politics and 
the latter with centralised and anti-democratic methods. The events in this section also show 
that ACMs electoral strength is smaller than their opponents believe.
6.4 Financial Resources
During the military regime the continuing backwardness of the North-East was 
credited to the emphasis put by the federal government on efficiency criteria in the design of 
public expenditure, which promoted a concentration of resources on economic activities at 
the expense of social services. Another reason was the rigid ear-marking provisions applied 
to federal tax transfer programmes (Goodman, 1976: 7). These reasons no longer exist after 
financial decentralisation but no significant change was found in the provision of education 
to the people, especially the poor.
As seen in previous chapters, in Brazil the three levels of government have always had 
a key role in the formation and expansion of economic activities and had spent a considerable 
amount of revenue on social programmes and pensions 44. Therefore, the performance of
44 Public-servant workers from the three levels of government remain on the salary rolls at full pay after they 
retire if they were hired under the 'statutory1 system, which is based on the French model. The three levels of 
government should then provide full pay after they retire and each level is responsible for the pension payment 
Another scheme for public-servant retirement is provided by the federal government alone. This scheme is 
financed by part of the Social Contributions and it provides pensions to those employed by the private sector, the 
self-employed, those with no income and to public-servants of the three levels under the rules of the CLT -
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economic and social indicators is extremely dependent upon the performance of public 
finances.
The value in US dollars of Bahia's total revenue is presented in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4 Bahia: Total Revenue in $ Million, 1980-1989
Year Total Revenue
1980 929, 0
1981 1,271,0
1982 1,284,7
1983 899, 6
1984 1,051,0
1985 1,249,2
1986 1,443,7
1987 1,452,0
1988 1,661,0
1989 2,299,2
Source: Paz (1990 : 299) .
Bahia has the highest FPE share among the states, 9.4%, followed by Ceara, with 
7.3%, and Maranhao, with 7.2%. The Federal District, with 0.7%, and Sao Paulo, with 1%, 
attain the lowest shares (Gazeta Mercantile 1992). As the FPE is designed to promote 
horizontal balance among the states, Bahia's share shows the size of its population, given that 
the state is the most populous in the North-East, but it is also an indicator of the size of its 
poor population. In 1991 Bahia had a per capita net revenue of $191, smaller than states with 
similar or bigger populations, such as Rio de Janeiro, with $322, Rio Grande do Sul, with 
$311 and Minas Gerais, with $274 (Afonso, 1994: 55).
Bahia was engaged under ACM's last governorship in increasing the collection of its 
own revenue. In 1993 its own revenues represented 47.8% of total revenue, federal transfers 
accounted for 25% and other revenues for 27.2% 45. The ACM administration was also 
praised for, together with Parana, having financed 80% of its expenditure with its own 
revenue, the best performances among the states (Afonso, 1994: 41). However, net revenue 
per capita remains low: $160 in 1993.
During the 1980s the state's accounts presented deficits in five years and surpluses in 
the other five, as shown in Table 6.5. The figures show that during the military years Bahia
Consolidagao das Leis do Trabalho, the law on labour legislation. In general, public-seivants who work for the 
government's 'direct administration', that is the secretaries and departments, belong to the former scheme. Those 
who work for the 'indirect administration', the parastatal organisations, which is where Bahia's 'islands of 
efficiency1 are placed, belong to the latter scheme. See Batley (1991: 22-25) for details of how both systems work.
45 Figures provided by Mr. Jose Pinheiro, senior official of Bahia's Secretariat of Finance.
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had less room to operate with a budgetary deficit. In every electoral year since the political 
opening pressure has been put on the state's finances; and it is not a coincidence that this has 
led to deficits.
Table 6.5 Bahia: Deficit and Surplus in $ Million, 1980-198 9
Year Deficit Surplus
1980 19,3 -
1981 - 64, 6
1982* - 45,7
1983 56, 8 -
1984 - 7,3
1985** 132,2 -
1986* 234, 7 -
1987 - 31,4
1988** 14 9,7 -
1989 - 87,5
Source: Paz (1990:305)
Notes : (*) State elections.
(**) Local elections.
Two types of spending should be analysed separately: payroll, because of the high 
number of public servants, and expenditure by function. Expenditure on payroll is shown in 
Table 6.6. Contrary to many states, Bahia obeys the constitutional mandate which determines 
that no more than 65% of current revenues should be spent on payroll Although expenditure 
on payroll is not such a burden on public finances, the rate spent has increased during the 
decade, following a trend in the states as a whole. Given that the country has had a decade 
ofhigh inflation and high interest rates, the governors adopt a policy of wage compression in 
their mid-term in office, investing the state's resources to finance their construction projects 
during electoral periods. At each election, the state's expenditure on payroll increases, either 
because public-servants are granted a rise in their pay or because new ones are hired. This 
increase is at the expense of society as a whole who, at least theoretically, get fewer resources 
for the provision of social services and for investments.
Table 6.6 Bahia: Expenditure on Payroll as a Percentage of Current Revenue and
Fiscal Revenue, 1981-1991
Revenue 1981 1982* 1983 1984 1985 1986* 1987 1988 1989 1990* 1991
Current
Fiscal
30.9
45.4
33.1 34.6 
53.3 47.0
28.8
37.7
33 .1 
43 .6
37.1
47.8
41.0
57.1
40.1
69.2
36.9
64.9
47 .8 
88 .4
41.8
76.5
Source: Calculation based on Balance Sheets 
Note : (*) State elections.
Functional expenditure is shown in Table 6.7, which introduces some puzzling figures.
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The state's priorities were placed on five functions. E>g)enditure on the Legislature, Judiciary 
and Welfare & Pensions registered higher increases as compared to the states as a whole. The 
payment of the state pensioners is a heavy burden on the state's finances: 92,000 public 
servants contribute to the system while there are 250,000 pensioners (CPE, 1991:18). The 
state's contribution to economic activities was concentrated on two functions: Regional 
Development and Transport. Low increases were registered in Administration & Planning, 
Agriculture and Education & Culture. The state's contribution to the improvement of health, 
sanitation, housing and urbanisation was negative.
Table 6.7 Bahia: Average Increase of Expenditure by Function, 1981-1991
Function Average Increase
Regional Development 15 .6
Judiciary 15 .4
Legislature 12 .7
Welfare & Pensions 12 .1
Transport 8.2
Administration & Planning 1.8
Education & Culture 1.5
Agriculture 0.8
Police -0.5
Electricity & Mineral Resources -0.7
Health & Sanitation -0.7
Communications -2.5
Industry, Commerce & Services -4.8
Housing & Urbanisation -13 . 0
Employment -19.1
Source: Ministerio da Economia, Fazenda e Planejamento (1992: 180 and
1993 : 187) .
A puzzle occurs when the figures presented in Table 6.7 are compared to the 
performance of the states discussed in Chapter 5. Bahia presented negative figures in seven 
functions, while the states as a whole decreased their expenditure on only two functions. 
Health & Sanitation, which registered an average increase in the states of 9%, decreased in 
Bahia, probably because the health care programme, which is financed by federal resources, 
was set up in Bahia later than in most of the other states.
Another type of analysis should be made relating to the participation of each function 
in the total expenditure. Table 6.8 presents the governors' priorities reflected in the 
participation of each item of expenditure in the state's total spending. It shows several things. 
First, the increase in the Legislature and in the Judiciary are related to redemocratisation. Also 
the increase in Welfare & Pensions is a trend in every state, not only in Bahia, which raises
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questions about the financing of the state's pensioners under the full-pay scheme. Second, 
expenditure on Administration & Planning shows that, except in 1990, the payment of interest 
had more impact on the state's finances during the military years than after redemocratisation. 
This reduction means that Bahia enjoyed more room to negotiate its debt payments after 
redemocratisation. The unusual figure registered in 1990, when the state allocated 30.8% of 
its total revenue to Administration & Planning, may be explained for political and technical 
reasons. The then governor Coelho was ACM's foe. As ACM enjoyed great power in the 
federal government and as he was running for Bahia's governorship, he probably put pressure 
on the federal government not to negotiate with Coelho on the payment of interest. On the 
other hand, ACM would benefit from taking office with the state's finances less affected by 
previous debts. The technical reason was the end of a financial artifice adopted by the state 
in the early 1980s. The trick was that the state borrowed heavily between 1983 and 1986 to 
finance the construction of the Pedra do Cavalo water main. As DESENBANCO, the 
investment bank controlled by the state, was the warrantor of the loan, the state transferred 
that debt to DESENBANCO. The payment of Pedra do Cavalo's debt, estimated at $200 
million, did not appear in the state's accounts until 199246. Another reason behind Bahia's low 
expenditure on Administration & Planning was the adoption of a less expansionist fiscal 
policy, in part because of the lack of federal credit. Less expansionist fiscal policy meant that 
the state pulled out of several social services because the expenditure on economic activities 
was high. Third, expenditure on Education & Culture, Health & Sanitation, Police, Transport 
and Regional Development was erratic, as opposed to a trend to spend less on Electricity & 
Mineral Resources, Housing & Urbanisation, Industry, Commerce & Service and 
Employment. This picture is not the same in the states as a whole.
Another line of analysis derived from Table 6.8 is the relationship between expenditure 
and elections. Three functions were particularly sensitive to state elections: Police and 
Education, in 1982 and 1986; and Transport, in 1990, whereas for local elections, the 
involvement of the state government does not occur through an increase in functional 
expenditure, but through transfers to the municipalities. The governors' priorities during the 
decade were as follows. Cameiro promoted an increase in the expenditure on Housing &
46 Only in 1992 was Pedra do Cavalo'& remaining debt to DESENBANCO transferred to the state 
government, according to DESENB ANCO's President, Raimundo Moreira in a personal communication to the 
author.
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Urbanisation, Health & Sanitation and Regional Development. Cameiro was a representative 
of rural interests; therefore, the significant increase in programmes of Regional Development 
is not surprising, but this trend is kept onwards, except in 1991. The Cameiro administration 
registered the highest deficits, promoting an increase of more than 1,000% on the resources 
spent on Regional Development, most directed to his region, and contaminated the state's 
finance with the construction of Pedra do Cavalo, a questionable public work located in his 
home region.
Pires prioritised expenditure on Police and a significant increase in Health & Sanitation 
in 1988. The reason for the latter was political. Pires was the Minister of Social Security. He 
resigned in 1986 to run for Bahia's governorship. His relationship with Samey had never been 
easy because of ACM's influence over Samey and because Pires was one of the leaders who 
opposed Samey's five-year term which was being decided by the CNA. It was said that not 
a single grant nor any financial help from the federal government reached Bahia at that time 
47. However, this affirmation is not totally true, given that Pires's successor at the Ministry of 
Social Security, Renato Archer, was Pires's ally, which explains why in 1988 the state spent 
an unusual 19.5% of its total revenue on Health, probably most of it having been derived from 
federal grants. Pires was replaced by Coelho, who governed from 1989 to 1990. Coelho had 
only one priority, Transport, meaning the construction of roads48.
Figures derived from Bahia's balance sheets show that the state is replacing the federal 
government in its role as investor in electoral periods, which, in Brazil, means an average of 
seven regional and local elections in every decade. The importance of Bahia as an investor is 
more likely to be credited both to competitive politics, mainly elections, and to federal fiscal 
predicaments. Increases in capital expenditure meant an automatic decrease in current 
expenditure. Therefore, instead of registering a conflict between fimctions, as in the state 
capitals, the conflict over public finances in Bahia is between investment and consumption. 
In other words, the tension registered in the state's finances is between economic types of
47 This argument was widely used by Pires (quoted from Playboy, 1993) and by his allies, such as Senator 
Jutahy Magalhaes, who stated that Bahia did not receive a single penny from the federal government during the 
Pires administration' [7 May 1993].
48 Coelho is being sued by ACM for misuse of public resources. One of the accusations is that Coelho's road 
programme was directed to benefit his various farms in the interior. ACM alleged that Coelho invented 'the one 
kilometre of 700 metres; the remaining 300 metres were for bribes' (quoted from Playboy, 1993).
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expenditure both during and outside electoral years.
Figures presented so far show that Bahia reduced its participation in social services 
during the 1980s. The state's steady expenditure on Regional Development, Judiciary, 
Legislature, Welfare & Pensions and Transport shows three major trends. First, the 
Legislature and the Judiciary were clear beneficiaries of redemocratisation, different from 
what happened to social services, especially education. Second, if the policy of 
accommodating the demands of the poor through the provision of jobs in the public service 
did not affect payroll expenditures very much, the same cannot be said of the pressures this 
policy brings on the payment of pensions. Therefore, society as a whole is prevented from 
receiving social services because the state is financing the retirement of those who entered the 
public service through clientelism Third, high expenditure on Regional Development and 
Transport shows two trends. One, different from the 1960s and 1970s, is that the state's role 
in inducing economic activities is more restricted to the provision of infrastructure for 
activities taking place outside the metropolitan area. The other is that given that more than 
80% of the electorate live in the interior, the return of more competitive politics induces 
governors to pay more attention to the needs of the population who live in the interior.
The state's low priority for the provision of social services shows that decentralisation 
and redemocratisation have not meant a higher commitment to tackling the living conditions 
of the majority of the state's population. This finding calls for fixture scholarly attention in 
order to investigate each state individually and the role of regional and local politicians in 
defining the expenditure agenda.
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Table 6.8 Bahia: Expenditure by Function as a Percentage of Total Expenditure, 1981-1991
Function 1981 1982* 1983 1984 1985** 1986* 1987 1988** 1989 1990* 1991
Legislative•« 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.2 1.7 2.3 2.7 2.2 1.7
Judiciary 1.9 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.5 3.2 4.6 4.2 5.2 6.1 6.1
Ad. & Planning 34 .1 30.6 30.6 19.5 21.7 20.8 23 .1 21.7 23 .4 30.8 19.5
Agriculture 2.0 2.6 2.8 1.9 2.1 2.9 4.7 2.6 2.5 1.6 2.7
Communications 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0 . 0 0.0 0.0
Police 7.0 8.7 7.4 6.2 5.7 7.1 9.8 7.9 7.3 5.1 5.6
Regional Development 0 .7 0.5 1.2 14 .0 11.1 11.5 11.4 10.4 12 . 0 2 .1 16 .3
Education & Culture 15.4 19 .2 18 .7 15.5 14 .2 16 .4 18 . 9 14 . 0 17.8 13 .6 13 .9
Elect.& Mineral Res. 5.9 6.5 6.5 3.6 2.6 3.1 2.8 3.6 2.5 4.2 4.5
Housing & Urbanisation 2.6 3.6 4.0 4.5 3.0 3 . 0 1.0 1.1 1.2 0.5 1.0
Ind.,Comm.& Services 2.5 2.4 1.7 2.3 2.6 4.1 1.9 1.5 2.1 1.1 1.4
Health & Sanitation 12 . 7 8.6 12 .7 15.2 21.2 14 .2 8.0 19.5 9.7 9 . 0 11.8
Employment 1. 9 2.1 1.6 1.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4
Welfare & Pension 4.2 5.2 4.2 3.6 4.1 5.0 5.9 6.5 8.1 10.0 10.6
Transport 7.9 6.5 5.6 9.2 7.1 6.7 5.6 4.6 5.3 13 .5 4.5
Source: Calculation based on Balance Sheets. 
Notes : (*) State elections.
(**) Local elections.
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6.5 Expenditure on Education
Most of Bahia's educational indicators place the state in an uncomfortable position 
compared with other states, including those of the North-East. Data from 1987 show that in 
Bahia 30% of the children aged between 7 and 14 years old were not in the classrooms. In the 
same year over 1,000,000 children between 15 and 19 years old did not go to school (CPE, 
1991: 22). The gap between those who enter the first-grade and finish it, and those who make 
it to the second-grade is a Brazilian characteristic, but Bahia's figures are below the national 
average. In 1989 there were 2,023,601 students registered for the first year of the first-grade; 
886,961 did not finish it and out of those who finished, only 191,976 were registered for the 
first year of the second-grade (IBGE, 1992: 385-6).
The number of teachers in elementary and in secondary education in Bahia has 
declined, despite an increase in population. In 1989 elementary schools had 10,618 fewer 
teachers than in 1988, a decrease of 12%. The decrease from 91,010 teachers to 80,392 
happened in schools provided by the federal, state and local governments as well as in those 
provided by the private sector. The same phenomenon was found in secondary schools. In 
1988 there were 12,553 teachers, in 1989 the number was reduced to 11,953, a decrease of 
600 posts. Only the municipal schools increased the number of second grade teachers by 
thirty-two, a small number when compared to the amount of positions which became vacant 
49. The qualifications of teachers are another constraint: 40% of them are lay, the highest rate 
in the country. Teachers' salaries varied from 1.3 to 2.1 of the minimum wage (CPE, 1991: 
23).
The quality of education can be assessed by a survey of a sample of over 2,000 
students on their skills. The highest average achieved in Portuguese was 57 points out of 100 
and the lowest was 43. In Mathematics the global average was 25 out of 100 and in Sciences 
37 (SEC, 1992: 85-93). According to the same survey most of the headteachers considered 
that these low results should be credited mainly to the poverty of the students (SEC, 1992: 
52). The reasons for the low quality of education were explained by specialists. Irede 
Normando called attention to the fact that being a teacher is no longer a choice for middle- 
class women on their way to social mobility [30 Nov. 1992]. Sylvia Assmar stated that the
49 Calculation based on IBGE (1992: 383,389).
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great majority of the teachers are poor and therefore their culture and access to information 
is limited [2 June 1993]. deise Neves said that the low salaries paid to teachers attracts only 
segments of the poor population [15 April 1993].
The state government adopts a policy of omission and has been delegating the problem 
to local government. As seen in Chapter 5, the North-East in general, and Bahia in particular, 
has the country's highest rate of'municipalisation' of elementary education. The country's 
average of elementary schools under the jurisdiction of the municipalities was 29.5%, whereas 
in Bahia it was 47.1% (CPE, 1990). The delegation of basic education to its over 400 
municipalities, each with different financial capacities and most of them still influenced by 
patron-client relations, is probably part of the problem faced by the poor in getting access to 
basic education. The ’municipalisation' of elementary education is also a way out found by the 
state to continue its policy of concentrating its resources on economic development rather 
than on social services.
Clientelism deeply shapes the provision of education in Bahia. The presence of 
clientelism can be seen in two aspects. First, in the way teachers start their careers, shown in 
Table 6.9. A comparison with the same type of survey carried out for the whole country, 
shown in the previous chapter, displays the high influence of politicians in Bahia over the 
appointment of teachers, especially in the interior, in rural areas and in municipal schools.
Table 6.9 Bahia: Forms of Access to the Career of Teacher
Form of Access Capital Interior Urban Rural State
School
Municipal
School
Competitive Exams 57.0 24.0 38.1 5.6 39.0 15.5
Appointment by 
Politicians 19 .3 45.5 34.8 58 .5 40 .1 41.1
Appointment by 
Educational Staff 23 .7 30.1 27.5 34.5 20.9 42.5
Internal Exams 0.4 1.4 0.9
Source: SEC (1992: 16).
Political appointment to the position of headteacher is even higher, especially to
schools ran by the state government, as shown in Table 6.10.
Table 6.10 Bahia: Forms of Access to the Position of Headteacher
Form of Access Capital Interior Urban Rural State
School
Municipal
School
Competitive Exams 5.7 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.6 0.0
Appointment by 
Politicians 22 .9 77.2 64.6 72.2 73 .0 38.9
Appointment by 
Educational Staff 48.6 21.3 27.1 27 .8 20.6 50.0
Election 22.9 1.6 6.9 0.0 4.8 11.1
Source: SEC (1992: 59)
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A second way to prove the influence of clientelism and of the electorally-oriented 
treatment of education can be seen in the revenues spent by the state government on 
education, in Table 6.11. Although the state has kept almost constant the ranking of education 
vis-a-vis other items of expenditure, expenditure on education rose during electoral years and 
in the first year of the governors' administrations, except in 1990 and 1991. No correlations 
were found between decreases in expenditure on education and payment of interest, except 
in four years, which does not prove the correlation. Hie lowest rate spent on education was 
registered during the two coalition governments, in 1988 and 1990. A conflict between 
expenditure on education and other functions has not been established. State governors' 
popular election and the increase of the state's finances promoted by the 1988 Constitution 
had no influence over expenditure on education, meaning that in Bahia redemocratisation and 
decentralisation did not increase the resources devoted to education.
Table 6.11 Bahia: Revenues 
Expenditure and
Spent on Education 
Current Revenue, 1981
as a Percentage of Total 
-1991
Year Total Current Ranking of
Expenditure Revenue Education
1981 15.4 21.4 2
1982* 19.2 23 .3 2
1983 18 .7 26 .1 2
1984 15 .5 21.7 2
1985 14 .3 23 .6 3
1986* 16.4 25.7 2
1987 18.9 25.5 2
1988 14 . 0 19.8 3
1989 17.8 22 .2 2
1990* 13 .6 16 .6 2
1991 13 .8 12.4 3
Source: Calculation based on 
Note : (*) State elections
Balance Sheets.
However, expenditure on education represents a high volume of resources, being, for 
the majority of the time, Bahia's second major item of expenditure, as seen in Table 6.11. The 
manipulation of these resources for political goals is the only explanation for the maintenance 
in Bahia of the country's worse indicators for education. Education has been used, at least 
over the last decade, to accommodate regional and local elites' conflicts. This accommodation 
is achieved in many ways. One of them is by moving teachers from classrooms to less 
demanding tasks. In 1987 the Secretariat of Education had 68,923 public-servants, 53% of 
them were in the classrooms; the remaining 47% were in administrative positions (CPE, 1990: 
271). Other forms used by the political system to foster the clientelist approach to education
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are: hiring teachers without competitive exams and eventually raising their salaries;
headteachers1 appointments on the basis of political affiliation; the promotion of teachers on
a political rather than a merit basis; appointment of teachers to interim and political positions
which are better paid; and the extensive use of grants in private schools to political proteges.
Other methods for the use of education for political and electoral reasons can be listed.
According to a former senior official of the Secretariat of Education, schools were built not
where there was a great demand for them but because of pressure on the governor from
mayors affiliated to the governor's political group. State deputies also put on pressure on the
governor, but as a complementary support to the mayor’s pressure [Costa, 21 June 1993].
Costa, who worked for the Secretariat of Education in two periods of the ACM
administration, reckoned that both secretaries started their terms implementing technical
programmes, but after their second year, when it was already decided that they should run for
the Legislature, clientelism was the basis for decisions, especially concerning the appointment
of teachers, headteachers and politically appointed positions [21 June 1993].
Every state secretary of education in the military years left the position to run for the
Legislature. This trend stopped in the early 1980s, but this did not mean that the portfolio of
the Secretariat of Education was no longer used for clientelist purposes, especially in
supporting the governor’s candidates for the Executive and the Legislature. According to
Teixeira, a former official during the Pires administration, clientelism was widely exercised
at that time [18 June 1993]. Ex-govemor Pires assessed:
I  found strong resistance to change the methods previously used to provide children with 
access to education. Children could register in a state school only if  they had a letter from 
a local politician, a state deputy or an influential politician. Attempts to change these 
practices found strong resistance from the traditional political groups [18 May 1993].
Education has been used to keep the loyalty of political leaders, namely state deputies 
and mayors, to assure elections for the governors' proteges and to guarantee the future of 
technocrats-tumed-pohticians, sometimes upgrading them to the state or to the national 
spheres, as with the secretaries of education during the military years. According to the 
interviewees, federal deputies have little involvement in education issues. Education is then 
the territory of local politics mediated by the state. However, as the qualitative and 
quantitative data showed, the other side of the picture is that if education is not being 
provided for the bulk of population, some segments of the poor who had access to patron-
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client relationships benefited from public expenditure by job provision, salary improvements 
in electoral years and by easier access to school places.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter began with two puzzles. First, the political system in Bahia could develop 
mechanisms to counterbalance the country's fragmented polity. In principle one would expect 
that in a fragmented, decentralised constitutional structure with weak political parties, such 
as those found in Brazil and Bahia, the political system would operate more through 
persuasion rather than through control. This is the case at the national level In Bahia, 
however, both situations can happen. When control prevails over persuasion it is cemented 
by two elements, namely efficiency, which depoliticises governance because it is addressed 
as if the entire constituency benefits from the government's actions, and anti-democratic 
methods ". Clientelism was identified as a common element in both control and persuasion 
features. The combination of efficiency and anti-democratic methods does not necessarily 
mean that there is a straightforward correlation between these elements found in the way that 
the state's political system has been operating in the last decades. A vast amount of empirical 
research needs to be conducted on other state governments to ascertain the incidence of this 
correlation. The case of Bahia reveals that at the state level the political system can manage 
to cope with fragmentation, as opposed to the national level, where, as shown in previous 
chapters, fragmentation of power has constituted a 'paralysed competitive arena1. The Bahia 
case shows also that when a fragmented political system is developed in a country marked by 
social and regional inequalities, the correlation between political fragmentation and the 
incapacity of delivering policies is not automatic or inherent. Coalitions can be built to address 
the drawbacks of political fragmentation for policy implementation. Bahia, however, is 
probably Brazil's most striking example of how redemocratisation and decentralisation did not 
cause the disintegration of the old political coalitions although they have changed their 
practices. There are survivals of the military regime, depicted by ACM, and of the pre-1964 
populist regime represented by Pires. The study of the state proves the vigour of politicians 
who belonged to the military's pact to govern.
Q Q  #
By efficiency the combination of conditions of govemability and positive policy results is meant. The latter 
is measured by the approval of the population of the administration. The former refers to the ability to build a 
coalition to govern by insulating the drawbacks of institutions which are particularly affected by fragmentation, 
such as political parties, the Legislature and the business community.
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The second puzzle was related to the mediocre effects that financial decentralisation 
and redemocratisation have had on education expenditure. The answer to this puzzle lies in 
two political choices. First, there has been a choice by politicians, officials and practitioners 
since the 1950s for changing the state's economic profile, which causes a tension between 
expenditure on social services and expenditure on economic activities, which was resolved to 
favour the latter. Second, social services, especially education, were left to the territory of 
clientelism.
However, as discussed in Chapter 5, can patronage alone explain Bahian politics and 
how its political system operates? Data and findings in this chapter show that two processes 
are occurring in Bahia. One is highly centralised and forms of elite dominance have been 
maintained, although presenting different features from the traditional personal patron-client 
relation. Mass communication has been introduced as another source of mediation to assert 
control over the politically and economically weak. The bag-of-money-whip formula is being 
replaced in the post-transition by television and radio sets. Empirical studies have yet to be 
made in Brazil to ascertain the influence of the media over election results and in shaping 
political values 10°. The second process which occurs in Bahia goes in an opposite direction: 
the emergence of new forms of political and social organisations challenging the status quo. 
Surprisingly these new forms of horizontal relations find more favourable grass roots in the 
interior.
Data also showed that if Bahian economic modernisation can survive without 
incorporating its poor population, the same principle does not apply to the political system 
Therefore, clientelism and economic modernisation can coexist. This assumption applies not 
only to Bahia but to other Brazilian states. As discussed in Chapter 5, every political system 
is susceptible to forms of patronage, but in situations of high inequality patronage helps to 
encourage vulnerability and dependency. Both vulnerability and dependency are being 
reinforced by the state politicians' control over the media and by the local politicians' control 
over education and job provision.
Bahia is a state in political transition. Elements of both elite-driven politics mediated 
by the media and new forms of social and political organisation have been identified. Despite
100 The debate was opened by the 1989 presidential election. Some analysts argued that television was 
responsible for Conor's victory (Singer, 1990). Others showed the candidates did better in municipalities where 
the mayor represented their parties (Ames, 1994). The issue is, therefore, a fertile topic for scholarship.
its economic achievements in the last decade, Bahia is a less developed state, given the size 
of its economy as compared to Sao Paulo's. But even this less developed state has managed 
to have great influence on the national political scene, thanks to redemocratisation and 
fragmentation, and this shows the 'peripherisation' of the federation. Bahia's upgrading to an 
important position on the political scene suggests that there are elements of Lijphart's (1984) 
consociational democracy in operation in Brazil It also suggests that the view of 
intergovernmental relations as a centre-periphery relation is insufficient in explaining the 
phenomenon in countries in which sub-national spheres have achieved political salience. The 
Bahia case also shows the high degree of extra-constitutional and extra-parliamentary 
resources used by state-level politicians not only in intergovernmental relations but as a source 
to force the political system to incorporate the demands of less developed states and regions 
in the decision-making process. By allowing the upgrading of a less developed state to a 
position of influence and of veto in the national scene, Brazil has become more 'federal'.
As is true for intergovernmental and political relations between the federal and the 
state governments, the relationship between the states and the municipalities is also shaped 
by what happens in other spheres, although each sphere has its own features. The 
understanding of these features is the aim of the following chapter, which furthers the thesis's 
downstream approach by investigating two Bahian municipalities. The following chapter 
suggests that despite political and financial decentralisation, local governments can be 
prevented from playing a more active role in the local political scene. The reason for this lies 
in the existence of problems which need to be addressed outside the local sphere but which 
compel local governments to find short-term and local solutions for national predicaments.
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Chapter 7 The Case of Two Bahian Municipalities: Salvador and 
Cama^ari
Introduction
Salvador and Camafari are two contrasting municipalities in the Salvador 
Metropolitan Region, SMR The SMR comprises ten municipalities: Salvador, C anaan,
f
Candeias, Dias D'Avila, Lauro de Freitas, Itaparica, Madre de Deus, Sao Francisco do Conde, 
SimoesFilho, and Vera Cruz. The SMR covers an area of 2,181 square kilometres. Cama9ari 
is the largest municipality, with 33% of the region's area and Salvador comes second, with 
14%. The region's population in 1991 was 3,109,034, the fourth largest in Brazil. Compared 
with other metropolitan regions the SMR has experienced stable population growth since the 
1940s (Lee, 1985: 4). In 1991 Salvador, Bahia's biggest city, had concentrated in it 66% of 
the SMR's inhabitants, 6,620 inhabitants per square kilometre, while Cama9ari held a small 
share of 3.4%, with 158 inhabitants per square kilometre. The region's population growth rate 
between 1980 and 1991 was 2.6%, close to the country’s average of 2.5%. Salvador's 
population growth was also close to the national and the regional averages, 2.9%, while 
Cama9ari's rate was 4.2% \  C anaan 's relatively high figure follows a trend found in the 
1991 Census, which showed that north-eastern migrants have tended to move to the region's 
metropolitan areas rather than to the South-East, as in the past.
The city of Salvador fulfils administrative and political functions, with an economic 
system based on tertiary activities. The SMR has a concentration of 43% of the industrial 
collection of the ICMS, 10% being in the CIA - Centro Industrial de Aratu (Aratu Industrial 
Estate), located in the municipalities of Sim5es Filho and Candeias, and 33% in Cama9ari, 
which holds the COPEC - Polo Petroquimico de Camaqari (Cama9ari Petrochemical Park) 
(CEI, 1991b: 38). An oil refinery is located in the SMR, in the municipality of Candeias.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the pattern of Bahia's industrialisation was 
characterised by the relatively low number of jobs created as compared with the capital 
required to generate them, given that the necessary capital to produce one job in COPEC was 
estimated at $100,000 (Pinho, 1986: 254). However, the number of jobs created in absolute
1 Figures from IBGE (1992:65).
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terms was high2 Hie jobs generated by the new industries required skilled labour; therefore, 
the majority of the population of the SMR did not have access to these jobs. Different criteria 
have given different estimated figures for the SMR's workforce in the informal labour market, 
which varies from 46.8% to 26.5%. The main concern, however, is not the exact number of 
those excluded from formal and well-paid jobs, but the assessment of the existence of a large 
tertiary sector, of a labour-intensive nature, in which domestic service and petty-commodity 
production still assume great importance3.
Most of the industries located in the CIA had few links with the existing economic 
baas. They produce capital and intermediate goods destined for markets outside the region. 
COPEC followed a different pattern as far as backward linkage, given that its basic input, oil, 
is available in the region, but forward linkages were not created because its production is 
exported to Sao Paulo and overseas. Industrialisation produced growth in the service sector, 
especially in the building industry and in the urban infrastructure for industries. Public service 
increased to cope with the new demands brought by industrialisation. Industrialisation and 
tertiarisation fostered a third change in the regional economy: the emergence of a market for 
final goods destined for a new middle class which emerged with the economic development.
The officially declared overall unemployment rate in the SMR in 1990 was 5.4%, the 
highest among Brazilian metropolitan regions after Recife. However, this general figure hides 
worrying details. In 1990 the unemployment rate among heads of households was 29%, the 
highest after Porto Alegre; in 1985 the rate had been 23%. Real medium income for registered 
employees is smaller in the SMR than in the metropolitan regions of Sao Paulo, Rio and Porto 
Alegre and higher than in Recife and Belo Horizonte. Real medium income for registered 
workers decreased between 1985 and 1990, a pattern also registered in Recife and Belo 
Horizonte. Non-registered employees and the self-employed earn less than their counterparts 
in other metropolitan areas, except in Recife (Cacciamali, 1991).
In contrast to the majority of Brazilian metropolitan regions, the SMR holds only a 
small part of the Bahian electorate, 16%, which means that the region's political importance
2 The oil refinery owned by PETROBRAS created 13,000 direct jobs. The 250 plants in the CIA and COPEC 
directly created 77,700 jobs. Before the establishment of both industrial estates the industrial sector of the SMR 
employed 15,000 workers (Pinho, 1986: 251-4).
3Faria(1980) studied the SMR's domestic service and Henfrey (1981) analysed petty-commodity production 
in Liberdade, a block in Salvador.
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cannot be measured by the size of its electorate but by how the rest of the state is influenced 
by what happens in its most economically developed area. During the military regime almost 
the entire region was prevented from electing its mayors by popular vote because its 
municipalities were considered as ’national security areas' or 'mineral sites'. Only the small 
municipality of Vera Cruz was able to elect its mayor by popular poll This characteristic was 
important in strengthening ACM's control over the region.
The political features of the SMR were assessed for the first time in a survey with 
regional leaders, using Hunter's (1953) 'reputational' method4. The survey showed that the 
SMR was marked by contradictions between a 'new1 rationality brought about by 
industrialisation anduibanisation as against features of the 'old' agrarian rationality. Elements 
of the former were found in the existence of claims made on the leaders by the population for 
collective action such as the provision of better urban services. Elements of the latter were 
found in claims for personal assistance, such as those for financial help and job provision. The 
coexistence of these contradictory *rationalities' indicates that a new balance of power is under 
way as a result of economic modernisation, redefining social and political relations. 
Industrialisation and urbanisation have changed vertical solidarities, from the local boss to the 
union leader, for instance, as well as horizontal solidarities, from the family to social 
movements and unions (Medeiros and Souza, 1993: 43).
This chapter furthers the thesis's downstream approach by investigating the results of 
decentralisation and redemocratisation at the local leveL It deepens the answer to the question 
as to whether decentralisation and redemocratisation have changed the allocation of public 
resources at the local leveL It relies on Page's (1992) formulations regarding political localism 
as discussed in Chapter 1 to investigate how free municipalities surrounded by social and 
economic problems to influence and to veto national policies are. This chapter argues that 
there are a number of unresolved problems which have to be tackled outside the local level 
which prevent local governments from playing a more active role in improving the living 
conditions of their populations. It also suggests that because the decision to decentralise was 
taken without a social consensus on what was to be achieved, the availability of more local 
financial and political strength has not had a great impact on the previous patterns of local 
expenditure.
4 See Medeiros and Souza (1993) for the results and analyses of the survey.
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The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 analyses the municipality of Salvador, 
showing its political importance in contrast to its financial weakness and the city's struggle 
against ACM’s hegemony. Section 2 deals with the municipality of Cama9ari, which, as 
opposed to Salvador, has extraordinary financial ’wealth’ because of its modem industries but 
struggles with the demands for survival of its poor population. As in previous chapters, the 
governments' performance in education is added to the analyses of their political and financial 
resources. Section 3 offers some conclusions.
7.1 The Case of Salvador
The city of Salvador was created by the Portuguese in 1549, half a century after their 
arrival Its creation recognised that an urban centre was necessaiy to coordinate the 
occupation of Brazil Salvador remained the capital of colonial Brazil until the middle of the 
18th century. Like many Brazilian cities Salvador’s physical appearance can confuse the 
visitor. It has large avenues occupied by commercial and middle-class residential areas with 
elegant, modem architecture and luxury buildings. The centre of the city shows the remains 
of the opulence of old colonial times, with its baroque mansions and churches. The city has 
always managed to hide its shanty towns because they are located outside the coastal and 
tourist areas. Even when poor and rich are spatially and socially together, the latter affords 
an intimacy with the former, identified by Henfrey (1981) as both material and ideological. 
Henffey acknowledged also that the Portuguese and Brazilian masters tended to manipulate 
ethnic distinctions among African slaves, as opposed to the colonial British. This apparent 
intimacy hides social inequalities and masks the economic gap between the descendants of 
masters and slaves.
The city is famous for its candombles (a religious cult introduced by the slaves), for 
its popular religious festivals during the summer, and for its carnival The latter is praised for 
its classless character because everyone is allowed to parade, not only those who belong to 
a club or who pay to parade, as in Rio's carnival Popular religions, such as candomble and 
the recent arrival of the evangelical churches, a long period of popular festivals in the streets 
which combine elements of Catholic and candomble cults, the intimacy between poor and rich, 
whites, blacks and mulattos, and a large array of petty-production and domestic jobs are 
responsible for preventing the poor from rising up, given that they are a majority.
Salvador is the third most populous city in Brazil, after Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, 
with 2,1 million inhabitants. The city has accumulated a number of unresolved problems. In
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1991 only 23% of the population had sewerage services; half had access to a refuse collection 
service; 39% were illiterate; 300,000 were unemployed; 19.2% were in the informal market; 
and 80,000 were street peddlers. Despite these figures, Salvador is becoming an important 
tourist area: each summer around 400,000 tourists visit the city5.
7.1.1 Political Resources
Like the other state capitals in the country, Salvador elected its mayor by popular poll 
in 1985. The decade saw five mayors: from 1979 to 1982 the city was governed first by Mario 
Kertesz and later by Renan Baleeiro; from 1983 to 1985 by Manoel Castro. These three 
mayors were appointed by ACM and indirectly elected by the state Legislature. In 1986 
Kertesz returned to the mayoral position by popular poll after having broken his ties with 
ACM In 1989 Fernando Jose, a former television and radio football broadcaster, was elected.
Kertesz was ACMs favourite technocrat-tumed-politician. Before being appointed 
mayor Kertesz was ACMs Secretary for Planning during ACMs first term as governor. 
Kertesz was responsible for the construction of the state government's large headquarters, the 
Centro Administrative da Bahia, which gave him the opportunity to get close to the federal 
bureaucracy and to establish strong ties with the building industry. ACM strongly supported 
the Kertesz mayoral administration, especially by using his prestige in the federal government 
to assure credit for Kertesz?s construction projects (Barbosa, 1992). Given the precariousness 
of the city’s finances, which will be detailed in the following sub-section, the support of the 
state government is crucial to Salvador's mayors. As mayor, Kertesz set up a parastatal 
agency, RENURB, as the main agent in charge of the municipality's public works. It was 
through RENURB that the building industry started to control decisions on the city's public 
works (Barbosa, 1992). During the Kertesz administration Salvador started to have two 
patrons: the governors, who have traditionally supported the city financially, and a new one, 
the building industry. The municipal legislative chamber was not an obstacle to Kertesz's 
businesses because most of its members belonged to the PDS, as did he and ACM.
It seemed that Kertesz would become ACMs political heir and be appointed for the 
1982 governorship. As ACM appointed Andrade, Kertesz broke relations with him and 
resigned from his mayoral position close to the end of his term, being replaced by Baleeiro. 
With Andrade's sudden death, Kertesz would have been ACMs easiest choice, but faithful to
5 Data from the 1991 Census and from the Municipality of Salvador quoted from Folha de Sao Paulo (1992).
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his creed of being implacable with those who do not say 'amen', ACM did not forgive Kertesz 
and appointed Cameiro.
When Kertesz broke his relationship with ACM, elections for the municipal legislative 
chamber were close but he could not run because he was still affiliated to ACMs party. He 
then supported the candidacy of his wife for Salvador's legislative chamber. Mrs Kertesz, who 
had never ran for election before, was elected with the highest number of votes the legislative 
chamber had ever seen: 90,000. Kertesz campaigned for his wife with a speech against ACM. 
His reaction started a trend in the behaviour of Salvador's electorate, namely to vote 
systematically against ACM and his candidates for executive positions.
The following mayor was Manoel Castro. He was also one of ACMs technocrat- 
tumed-politician and governed the city while Cameiro governed the state. Castro was then 
a member of the PDS, which had suffered a great defeat in the election for the legislative 
chamber, stimulated by Kertesz's defection. Castro's relationship with Cameiro was tense 
because of Cameiro's estrangement ffom ACM, mentioned in the previous chapter. Castro 
was the mayor of the transition, when federal measures granting more resources to sub­
national governments started to be put forward. He was also the mayor when urban popular 
movements such as the Diretas-Ja started to show that the military regime was near to 
reaching its end. Castro was affected by ACMs initiative of breaking his ties with the military 
government by endorsing Neves's candidacy. He was also the first mayor to govern the city 
with a legislative chamber occupied by opposition parties and by councillors with ties to the 
leftist and communist parties. Castro defined his term as marked by three types of constraints:
First, I  wanted to introduce measures to strengthen popular participation in the decision­
making process, but Ifound a strong reaction from the politicians and the civil servants, so 
I  had them against me. Second, the majority o f the legislative chamber belonged to the 
opposition parties, with several members belonging to branches o f the Communist Party 
although affiliated to the PMDB. The PMDB had twenty-six councillors and the PDS seven. 
Those councillors recognised me as a serious and incorrupt politician, but as a 
representative o f the right-wing; therefore, they opposed any proposal coming from me. 
Third, Salvador was characterised as the city which opposed ACM, but 1 could not overcome 
my ties with ACM; people saw me more as a manager than as a politician [27 Nov. 1992].
Because resources from the federal and the state governments became scarce, Castro 
strengthened the city's ties with the building industry as a way of putting pressure on the 
federal government for resources. The scheme with the building industry worked as follows: 
mayors would approve urban plans and projects developed by officials and the building
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industry would lobby in Brasilia for the financing of those projects as an additional source of 
pressure to that of the governors, mayors and Congress members voted in by the constituency. 
This scheme was common practice among municipalities and was surrounded by suspicions 
of corruption. Later, the relationship between Salvador's building industry and the city hall 
was furthered. The building industry started to determine which projects the municipality 
should ask for federal financing and later, during Kertesz's second term, they would not only 
decide but design the project. During the Castro administration this scheme was widely 
publicised by the legislative chamber, which strongly opposed it and successfully blocked 
many projects. This reaction by the legislative chamber was not pursued by councillors who 
followed. From the Kertesz administration until 1993 the city lost control for planning and 
decision-making to the building industry. As mentioned above, in Brazil the building industry 
is an important actor in influencing public policies, budgets and priorities. What is peculiar 
about Salvador is that because its debt with the building industry was so high, because no 
mayor in the decade had challenged its power and because of the Judiciary’s decision to block 
part of the city’s revenue, a point to be discussed later, the strength of the building industry 
over the city became clearer to society. Reviewing the relationship between the governments 
and the building industry became then part of the political agenda not only in Brazil but 
especially in Salvador, where the close ties between them were first revealed (Souza, 1991c).
Between 1986 and 1989 Kertesz returned to the mayoral post. He was elected with 
45.7% of the votes. The closest contender was Edvaldo Brito, previously mayor in the 1970s, 
who had the endorsement of ACM and 13.4% of the votes. The councillors had their terms 
extended by federal law; therefore Kertesz, now in the PMDB, had control of the councillors. 
During his term Kertesz strengthened his relationship with the building industry and the city’s 
decisions were taken by a restricted number of persons: the mayor and the owners of the main 
building companies, without the participation of the legislative chamber and civil servants. 
Part of Kertesz's term was during the Pires administration. Although at that time they both 
belonged to the same party, the PMDB, they were not close allies. Pires did not help the 
Kertesz administration financially, but he did not interfere in Kertesz's direct access to the 
federal government or in Kertesz's business with the building industry.
The term between 1989 and 1992 had the broadcaster Fernando Jose as mayor. He 
was a creation of Pedro Irujo, a wealthy businessman, owner of radio and television channels, 
who became interested in politics. Castro ran again with ACMs support; Pires supported
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Virgildasio Senna, who was not his party's candidate; and Kertesz endorsed the PMDB's 
candidate, Fernando Jose, who had no previous political or administrative experience.
Jose's administration was a fiasco. When he left office, he had the worse evaluation 
of any of the mayors of the state capitals: 74% of the electorate evaluated his term as 
'bad/very bad' (Folha de Sdo Paulo, 1992). Jose credited such an evaluation to two factors. 
First, the high amount of debt he inherited from Kertesz, especially his agreement with the 
building industry entitling them to hold part of the city's resources. This agreement was 
ratified by the Judiciary when the city hall questioned it in court. Second, the city's finances 
were so bad that it was impossible to provide regular refuse collection, which is the city's most 
costly service [22 June 1993]. Because he had no political experience Jose found difficulty in 
negotiating with other politicians and with the unions. He managed, however, to become vice- 
president of the Forum Nacional dos Prefeitos, the national organisation which lobbies for 
the state capitals' demands. In spite of his performance within this national organisation, his 
term at home was marked by strikes in refuse collection, public transport and the civil service, 
which paralysed the city several times.
To overcome some of the city's problems, Jose had to accept ACNTs financial help, 
although they had no previous ties and belonged to different parties. Several times the state 
government anticipated the city's quota from the ICMS to allow the municipality to pay its 
payroll, according to Alival Silva, a senior official at the municipal Secretariat of Finance [7 
June 1993]. Jose also transferred to the state government responsibility for providing the city's 
refuse collection. He said he was grateful to ACM for this [22 June 1993]. Jose also carried 
out the policy of leaving the levying of resources for the city's construction works in the hands 
of the building industry. He stated that his priority was to solve one of the city's main 
problems: the constant landslides of houses built by poor people on the city's many hillsides 
because
These people were temporarily transferred to municipal schools, preventing the children from 
attending classes and every year during the rainy season the problem returned. 
Infrastructuring the hillsides was my priority but it is invisible work because these places are 
on the outskirts o f the city [Jose, 22 June 1993].
In the 1992 election Castro and Kertesz ran again for mayor, the former with ACMs 
support. The electorate chose Lidice da Mata, a former member of the maoist PC do B and 
now in the PSDB. ACM was the state governor, but the electorate continued with the
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tendency of voting against ACMs candidates.
During Jose's term the financial crisis of the municipality became more visible. For the
last fifteen years Salvador had had a deficit budget. The scarcity of federal resources put such
a burden on local finance that it became impossible to administer the city without the help of
the state government and the building industry. This burden sealed the destiny of Salvador’s
politicians: losing control of the city's decisions and becoming prisoners of their sponsors' wilL
This evaluation is confirmed by the problems Mata is feeing. She is the first mayor to confront
the state government and the building industry. She cannot count on the federal government
because of its financial predicaments. Mata has no room to manoeuvre or to govern. The
media, controlled by ACM, have also been implacably against her. She has the second worse
evaluation of any of the mayors of the state capitals: in January 1995 29% considered her
administration as 'regular1 and 52% as 'bad/very bad' (Folha de Sao Paulo, 1995). Mata was
elected by a broad coalition of politicians opposed to ACM. As was the experience of
governors supported by broad coalitions mentioned in the previous chapter, Mata is paralysed
by internal disputes. The city's financial constraints and a systematic opposition from the
media aggravate Mata's space with which to govern and to communicate with the electorate
in a society where mass communication is very important.
If the electorate has shown a tendency to vote for mayors who are against ACM and
have a 'progressive' discourse, the same does not happen with the legislature, with only one
exceptional period during the Castro administration. Salvador's legislature consists of thirty-
five councillors 6. hi the 1992 election 1,212 candidates ran for the position 7 (A Tarde, 1992).
The electoral system and the role of the legislature are the same as in the federal and state
legislatures. According to ex-councillor Paulo Fabio, in Salvador the oscillation of the
electorate's vote is high, preventing the identification of political or party preferences [27 June
1993]. Fabio summarised the electorate's view about the role of mayors and councillors:
The mayors are seen as managers and die councillors as proxies o f the population's specific 
interests in die executive. Politics is a territory o f the state, particularly o f the governor [27 
June 1993].
Despite its political importance as the state's capital, Salvador's political leaders are
6 Municipal legislative chambers can have between nine and fifty-five councillors according to the 
municipality's population.
7 Disputes for Salvador's legislative chamber are much more competitive than those for the state Legislature.
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constrained by its financial weakness. The lack of financial resources prevents the mayors 
from governing, which makes the electorate disappointed and volatile: every mayor who has 
governed Salvador for the last twenty years is out of the political scene, despite several 
attempts to return to it. The only exception is ACM. Ex-mayors Virgildasio Senna, Jorge 
Hage, Edvaldo Brito, Mario Kertesz and Fernando Jose are so far out of politics 8. Despite 
the city's dependence upon the state and the building industry, its electorate still likes to think 
of itself as independent and the only one to confront ACMs whip-and-money formula.
7.1.2 Financial Resources
Financially Salvador is Brazil's worst-off state capital because of the lack of industry 
and the size of its poor population. Most of those who have jobs are employed in commerce, 
44%, 36% in services and 20% in industry. Salvador is the only state capital among the 
metropolitan regions where the main source of revenue, i.e. 64%, comes from commerce and 
not from industry. The city's contribution to the state's wealth and revenue is low, 36% and 
20% respectively (ABRASF, 1992), which means that its importance in the state's territory 
is political rather than economic or financial
Revenue structure reflects the city's dependency upon revenue transfers. Its balance 
sheets from 1981 to 1991 show that only 38% of the city's revenue comes from its own 
taxation. Salvador's main revenue comes from the state's transfers of the ICMS, its second 
from the ISS, the municipal tax over services, and its third from federal transfers of the FPM.
As shown in Chapter 5 the state capitals have increased their revenue since the 1988 
Constitution, not only in the amounts transferred from the federal and state governments, but 
through an effort to increase their own revenues and to adjust their finances. Most of the state 
capitals have overcome the financial constraints of the early 1980s and few still present 
deficits, but not Salvador. The city's chances of overcoming its financial problems were 
blocked by three pressures. The first was the size of its payroll In 1991, with the 
establishment of a career plan for the civil service, Salvador spent between 80% and 90% of 
the city's total revenue on payroll In previous years the average was about 50% (Gazeta 
Mercantile 1993). Between 1988 and 1991 expenditure on payroll increased by 31% but 
between 1990 and 1991 payroll expenditure increased by 139% (ABRASF, 1992). Despite
8 Apart from ACM, Manoel Castro is also an exception because he has been elected as federal deputy several 
times. However, his re-elections for Congress must be credited more to ACMs help than to the support of 
Salvador's electorate.
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this pressure expenditure per capita on the civil service was the lowest among the main state 
capitals: $24, less than other north-eastern cities such as Recife, $56, and Aracaju, $70 
(ABRASF, 1992). The low share of payroll in per capita expenditure shows that, as in the 
state, the salaries paid to the municipality's civil servants are low.
In 1994 the city had 21,660 civil servants. The average monthly salary was $440, when 
those who work both in the direct administration and in parastatal agencies are considered. 
This amount is higher than that the state government pays to its public-workers probably for 
two reasons. First, the current mayor has a leftist origin, which means that wages are more 
of a commitment to her than to ACMs group. Second, different from the state government, 
wage differences between those who work in the direct administration and in parastatal 
agencies are not high, around $80 in favour of parastatal workers. Average values, however, 
hide inequalities among public-workers: tax collectors had an average salary of $1,360 while 
teachers' average salary was around $360. Contrary to the state, pensioners are not a burden 
in terms of number. In 1994 there were 4,724 under the full-pay pension scheme administered 
by the municipality from over 21,000 workers. The problem of municipal pensioners in 
Salvador rests on the feet that the average pension is higher than the average salary: $720 per 
month9.
The second problem feced by the municipality in improving its finances was the judicial 
blockade imposed on the city's monthly revenue to pay its debt with the building industry. The 
city's debt with the building industry is due in 2014 and is estimated at $200 million. In 1991 
seven building companies managed to win the approval in court of an agreement signed during 
the Kertezs administration which allowed them the blockade of 20% of the monthly quota of 
the city’s FPM. Renegotiations of that debt started only in 1993 with the reduction of the 
blockade to 5% of the city's FPM revenue (Gazeta Mercantile 1993).
The third problem was the city's total debt. Salvador's debt accounted for 4% of the 
debt of the state capitals 10. The city's debt problem is not the size of the debt, but the 
relationship between the debt and net revenue. Salvador's debt meant 453% of the city's net
9 Figures presented in this paragraph were provided by Salvador's Secretariat of Administration.
10 Sao Paulo holds 53% of the debt, Rio 19%, Salvador and Belo Horizonte come third, with 4% each 
(Meneghetti Neto, 1991:191).
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revenue in 1989,220% in 1988,200% in 1987 and 37% in 1986 “ These figures show a huge 
increase in the city's debt after 1986, i.e. under the Kertesz administration. The annual rate 
of increase in Salvador's debt between 1980 and 1988 was 45%, which places the city in the 
uncomfortable position of being the fourth city among the state capitals with the highest rate 
of debt increase (Meneghetti Neto, 1991:190).
The city's attempts to increase its own revenue collection has also been blocked for 
political reasons. The mayors had always found it hard to raise the rates of the IPTU, the tax 
on urban property, because of resistance from the city's legislative chamber and from A Tarde, 
the state's biggest daily. Salvador was the city where the IPTLPs increase was the lowest in 
the state capitals of metropolitan areas. Between 1988 and 1991 the IPTU increased by 34% 
per year, while the average of the state capitals was 51% (ABRASF, 1992). The weakness 
of the mayors is such that every year, when the mayor sends the proposal to update the 
IPTU's rates to the legislative chamber, A Tarde invariably prints the same heading, 
denouncing the city hall's squeezing out of the middle class. During the term of Salvador's 
weakest mayor, Jose, A Tarde reported that because of their pressure, Jose went to their 
headquarters to discuss the rates with them (A Tarde, 1990). The daily, therefore, became a 
policy-maker regarding the city's levying of the urban property tax. Jose's submission revealed 
the city leaders' weakness and how the city's financial fragility constrains its mayors from 
governing and from deciding on policies.
Judicial and political constraints, together with the lack of industry and with the 
poverty of its population, mean that Salvador's revenue collection accounts for 2.5% of total 
revenue collected in state capitals, less than cities with a smaller population, such as Belo 
Horizonte and Recife (ABRASF, 1992). As revenue collection does not improve, the city has 
for the last eight years been using two perverse ways to pay its regular bills, such as payroll 
One is to borrow from private commercial banks at market interest rates, which are high in 
BraziL The second is to ask for the 'good will' of the state governor in anticipating the city's 
quota from the ICMS. The former is partially responsible for the increase on the debt. The 
latter means that mayors have to rely on the governor of the day for cash, which implies that 
they become dependent upon the governors not only for large projects but to accomplish the 
city’s ordinary duties.
" Figures from unpublished report by Salvador's Secretariat of Finance.
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This financial picture is responsible for the feet that in 1991 per capita expenditure was 
7% less than in 1988 and net revenue was 10% less (ABRASF, 1992). In 1991 Salvador 
collected $70,650,000 of own revenue, which meant a per capita own revenue collection of 
$34.55 (ABRASF, 1992). Salvador's performance in own revenue collection was the worst 
after Fortaleza, and well below cities with a similar population, such as Belo Horizonte, which 
had a per capita revenue of $68.55 and very fer from Rio ($139.29), Florianopolis ($121.95), 
Sao Paulo ($114.38), Vitoria ($114.05) and Curitiba ($76.72), cities with a considerable 
number of middle-class residents and which shelter industry (ABRASF, 1992). In 1991 total 
revenue was $256.2 million, which meant a per capita total revenue of $125, below the state 
capitals' average of $237 (ABRASF, 1992). In 1993 total revenue was $229.8 million and 
per capita revenue was even lower: $106 12.
7.1.2.1 Public Expenditure
Salvador's functional expenditure is shown in Table 7.1. The most striking aspect of 
the municipality's expenditure is that every function has an erratic performance, except items 
where expenditure is low, such as Health & Sanitation, Agriculture, Communications and 
Regional Development. This result contradicts the trend found in other state capitals. In 
Salvador there is a clear priority for housing and urbanisation programmes, which are areas 
of interest for the building industry. Expenditure on these programmes increased significantly 
in electoral years. Conversely, all other items of expenditure showed an unstable performance. 
This instability was also found during the military regime. Financial decentralisation and the 
re-introduction of popular election did not affect the pattern of expenditure 13.
Despite this instability some functions have registered a great increase in the period, 
as with expenditure on the Legislature, following a trend at every level of government and 
in every municipality. A similar increase was registered in Welfare & Pensions after the mid- 
1980s as a result of the pensioners' scheme mentioned above which became a financial burden
12 1993 figures were provided by Jose Pinheiro, senior official at Bahia's Secretariat of Finance.
13 In Batley's study of Recife and Porto Alegre he argued that the mayor is unlikely to be influenced by party 
policy, which makes the administration highly personalised. He also argued that this fact produces a high 
likelihood of discontinuity in policy between administrations even where political differences are unclear (Batley, 
1991:17). The case of Salvador, however, shows a discontinuity in the allocation of resources not only among 
different administrations but within die term of the same mayor. However, another of Batley's finding is confirmed 
in Salvador, namely, mayors favour projects with short-term political pay-offs, which explains the increases in 
urbanisation projects in electoral years.
at eveiy level of government. Expenditure on education followed an unstable pattern. 
Similarly to Bahia and to other state capitals, no relationship was found between expenditure 
on education and interest payments. Contrary to other state capitals, where there is a tension 
between expenditure on education and expenditure on housing and urbanisation, this tension 
was not present in Salvador because the amount spent on education was low.
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Table 7.1 Salvador: Expenditure by Function as a Percentage of Total Expenditure, 1981-1991
Function 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985* 1986 1987 1988* 1989 1990 1991
Legislature 2 .3 1.7 2 .2 2 .5 2 .4 2 .9 2 .4 2 .7 5 .2 6 .7 4 .8
Judiciary 0.5 0.8 0 .6 0.6 0 .6 1 .4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0 .7 0.6
Administration & Planning 22 .8 20 .7 25 .4 28 .5 24 .6 16 .7 53 .5 18 .3 15 . 9 23 .6 22 .3
Police 2 .7 2 .5 2 .2 0 .0 0,.0 0.0 0.0 0 . 0 0.0 0.0 0 . 0
Education & Culture 9.5 10 .7 9.6 11 .2 9 ,.6 12 .3 7 .7 8 .0 9 .6 9.1 9.1
Housing & Urbanisation 53 .2 43 .5 30 .7 33 . 8 39 .6 39 .4 14 .6 48 .7 29 .8 28 .2 46 .2
Industry, Commerce & Service 0 .1 9.5 9.8 12 .5 10,.2 12 .1 10 .7 0 .3 0.6 1 .2 1 .0
Health & Sanitation 2 .2 2 .8 2 .5 2 .6 2 ,.4 2 .6 2 .0 2 . 0 2 . 9 2 .7 1.8
Welfare & Pension 2 .4 2 .4 1.6 1 .7 1 .,8 4 .1 3 .7 4 .6 8 .7 12 .5 8 .3
Transport 4 .3 5.4 15 .4 6 .6 8 .8 8 .3 3 .8 14 .2 25 .6 13 . 0 3 .3
Agriculture 0,. 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 .,0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 0 .6 0 . 0
Communication 0,. 0 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 .,0 0. 6 0. 8 1 .,7 1 . 3
Regional Development 0,.0 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 0. 0 0.,0 1 . 3
Total 100 .0 100 .0 100. 0 100. 0 100 .0 100. 0 100 .0 100 .0 100. 0 100. 0 100 .0
Source: Balance Sheets. 
Note: (*) Local elections.
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A comparison between the expenditure structure in Salvador and in the other twenty- 
five state capitals displays the financial discrepancies of the former, as shown in Table 7.2. 
There are differences which make Salvador an exception to all the state capitals. First, 
expenditure on Administration & Planning was kept constant in the state capitals as opposed 
to the inconsistencies found in Salvador, with variations from 53.5% of total expenditure in 
1987 to 15.9% two years later, as shown in Table 7.1. Second, the high differences registered 
in the amount spent on social services such as Health & Sanitation and Education & Culture 
place Salvador as the capital which spends least on social services 14.
Table 7.2 Salvador and Brazil's State Capitals: Average Amount of
Expenditure as a Percentage of Fiscal Revenue in Selected Items, 
1981-1991
Item Salvador State Capitals
Legislature 3.2 3.2
Administration Sc Planning 25.7 25 .2
Education Sc Culture 10.1 20 . 0
Housing Sic Urbanisation 37.6 21.0
Health Sc Sanitation 2.6 12 .6
Welfare & Pension 4.5 11.1
Transport 11.1 14 .8
Source: Ministerio da Economia, Fazenda e Planejamento (1992: 25,241 and
1993: 28, 253) .
The high amount spent by Salvador on Housing & Urbanisation shows three things. 
First, there are strong ties between the mayors who had governed the city in the period and 
the building industry. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Bahia has a powerful building industry 
which influences expenditure priorities in the city and state. Second, as discretion about 
housing programmes has traditionally rested on the state with federal financing, most of the 
resources spent on this item were for urbanisation programmes. As the shanty towns are not 
at all well infrastructured, the city's main resources were invested in building infrastructure in 
areas occupied by the middle class and by businesses. Third, as the municipality concentrated 
its resources on Housing & Urbanisation, the state government had to finance the city’s 
functioning, either by anticipating revenue or by providing services and infrastructure.
7.1.3 Expenditure on Education
Compared with the rest of the state Salvador has the best indicators on education. In
14 Between 1981 and 1991 the state capitals in die North spent an average of 13.8% of their.fiscal revenue on 
education and 7.7% on health; in the North-East 16.4% and 7.3%; in the Centre-West, 17.3% and 5.2%; in the 
South-East, 21.8% and 14.8%; and in the South 15.8% and 10.2% (Ministerio da Economia, Fazenda e 
Planejamento, 1992).
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1987 only 2% of its teachers were lay; the schooling rate of the population between 7 and 14 
years old was 74%, as opposed to 68% in the state; 9% of the students had dropped out of 
school in the first year of elementary education, as opposed to 14.5% in the state. However, 
grade repetition in the first year of elementary school was higher than in the state, 25.5% in 
Salvador and 24% in the state, and the rate of students 14 years and over in the elementary 
school was 26% as opposed to 23% in the state (CPE, 1990: 291-2). Salvador has the lowest 
rate of'municipalisation' of elementary education in Bahia: only 13% of the state schools in 
the city are under the discretion of the municipality (CPE, 1990: 292). Therefore, the 
municipality plays a small role in the provision of education to its population, the state being 
the most important agent.
Table 7.3 pictures the disaggregation of expenditure on education. As everywhere else 
in Brazil, payroll is the major item of expenditure on education. The 1985 election did not 
affect teachers' salaries, as opposed to the 1988 election. The little variation in electoral years 
on the percentage of teachers' payroll as compared to allocations in consumption and 
investment shows that Salvador's mayors do not rely on teachers' votes as much as do the 
Brazilian governors.
Table 7.3 Salvador: Items of Expenditure as a Percentage of Total
Expenditure on Education, 1981-1991
Year Consumption Payroll Investment Total
1981 6.6 91.1 2.3 100.0
1982 5.4 93 . 9 0.7 100.0
1983 5.8 93 .4 0.8 100 . 0
1984 5.9 93 .3 0.8 100. 0
1985* 6.7 91.8 1.5 100 . 0
1986 9 . 9 89 . 0 1.1 100 . 0
1987 5.5 92 .8 1.7 100 . 0
1988* 2.5 97 .3 0.2 100 . 0
1989 3.6 96 .4 0.0 100.0
1990 2.1 95.5 2.4 100 . 0
1991 0.9 94 .3 4.8 100 . 0
Source: Balance Sheets.
Note : (*) Local elections.
The scant presence of the municipality in the provision of education can be seen by the 
feet that expenditure on education is generally the second major item of expenditure in most 
states and in most capitals. In Salvador, however, expenditure on education came in third 
place in 1981, 1982 and 1991; in fourth from 1984 to 1989; and in fifth in 1983 and 1990. 
Despite these figures, priority for education is the main promise of every mayoral
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candidate.
One-third of Salvador's civil servants are teachers 15. As in the state, clientelism is part 
of the Secretariat of Education's routine. According to Angela Barbosa, a senior official at 
the Secretariat of Education, between 1986 and 1988 local councillors were the main actors 
for appointing teachers and for moving them from one school to another. Barbosa said that 
the then secretary Eliana Kertesz tried to change this practice. According to Barbosa the 
technical team introduced elections for the position of headteacher, as a way to decrease the 
councillors' influence. The result was disappointing: Most of the headteachers were re-elected 
because of internal clientelism [23 June 1993]. In the period analysed, the term of Mrs Kertesz 
as head of the Secretariat of Education was considered the only one where attempts were 
made to introduce technical criteria in place of clientelism.
Barbosa stated that the Secretariat enjoyed plenty of resources at that time. Two 
reasons explain the temporary prestige of the Secretariat of Education. First, the secretary was 
the mayor's wife and a respected civil servant. Mrs Kertesz herself was a councillor and 
therefore die had links with the legislative chamber, which eased her negotiations with local 
councillors. Second, the mayor had a good personal relationship with Brasilia's bureaucracy, 
built when he belonged to ACMs group. This relationship is an important resource for 
education because of transfers from salario-educaqao. Barbosa recounted an example of the 
close relationship between mayor Kertesz and the federal bureaucracy. Barbosa was sent to 
Brasilia to correct mistakes in a project to be financed by the salario-educaqao. The civil 
servant who could help with the project was going to resign the following day. He managed 
to redo the project in only one day and to approve it before his resignation [23 June 1993],
As with the state government, in Salvador education was dealt with by clientelism. 
Given the small role of the municipality in the provision of education, disputes among regional 
and local politicians for shares in the Secretariat's decision-making process were not as strong 
as at the state level and were limited to the councillors.
To sum up, Salvador is a city undergoing severe political and financial problems. 
Financial constraints are responsible for the loss of control by local politicians of the city's 
destiny. They are also limiting the city's possibilities of having its own political face, despite 
the electorate's wish to break with dependency upon ACM. Contrary to other capitals,
15 Information provided by Claudia Mousinho.
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Salvador did not benefit from political and financial decentralisation. The lack of federal 
resources has meant a stronger dependency upon the state government and the private sector. 
T his finding is an exception to the rule that financial decentralisation had positive political and 
financial effects in most state capitals. Salvador can be numbered among those municipalities 
which cannot survive without resources beyond their own and in which financial 
decentralisation has proved to have little effect in improving the mayor's efficiency and 
capacity to govern, given Brazil's high inter and intra-regional disparities. Whereas for 
clientelism in general and for its role in education, the financial resources of the city are so 
scarce and the presence of the state government so high that clientelism does not play a major 
role in the municipality's political life, although councillors have their share in the small role 
the municipality does play in the provision of education.
The concept of political localism as formulated by Page (1992), which has been 
identified in other Brazilian state capitals, took on a particular feature in Salvador. Both forms 
of political localism could be identified in the city polity, namely a direct relation with national 
politicians and officials and Salvador’s participation as a member of the two national 
organisations in charge of defending the demands of the state capitals. However, the city's 
financial weakness constrains its politicians' choices to the will of social and political actors 
who do not have an elected mandate to govern the city, e.g. Bahia's governors, the building 
industry and even a newspaper. In Salvador political and financial decentralisation were not 
enough to decrease the influence of those actors. The case of Salvador displays that there are 
political and economic factors influencing the outcomes of decentralisation, thus exposing the 
limits of decentralisation on policy results.
7.2 The Case of Cama?ari
Until the 1970s Cama9ari was an isolated and poor municipality with few economic 
and physical links with Salvador and the other cities of the SMR. Four events greatly changed 
the city's political, social, financial and economic features. First, the decision to set up in the 
municipality the country's second petrochemical park, COPEC. Located in Cama9ari's 
hinterland, COPEC radically changed the city's and the state's economic basis. Second, the 
construction of a road, the Estrada do Coco, connecting Salvador to Cama9ari's vast coastal 
area, which transformed it into the main resort for tourism and for second-residence houses 
for the middle classes of Salvador and Bahia. Third, in 1972 the municipality was considered 
by the military as an area of'national security1. This fact brought to the mayoral position an
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outside figure, Humberto Ellery, who governed the city for eleven years. Fourth, the planning 
of the industrial and urban areas and the building of COPEC's infrastructure were delegated 
to the state government, who became responsible for taking decisions in the name of the 
municipality.
In 1991 Cama9ari had 108,865 inhabitants. Physically, the city shows the 
contradictions and the lack of links between its different urban occupations. Part of it is 
occupied by industry, the coast by big and comfortable houses, and a third part by a poor 
population of unskilled workers who arrived in the 1970s to build the factories. These three 
different 'cities' are not visible to each other, making Cama9ari a territory of estranged and 
contradictory worlds. In COPEC there are highly technological and sophisticated industries, 
which provide the state and the municipality with their main revenue. These factories employ 
skilled and well-paid workers, who live in Salvador because of its urban and cultural 
attractions and because it is near: 41 km away. Since 1986 Cama9ari, meaning the COPEC 
area, has been listed among Brazil's 500 most developed and better infrastructured 
municipalities for business (Dirigente Municipal, 1985 to 1990). On the coast there are large 
estate developments, comfortable houses and good infrastructure used only during the 
summer. In the city’s residential and administrative area 52% of the economically active 
population are employed in petty-production. For those who have a regular job, either they 
have a low-paid job in the municipality or they work for companies hired by COPEC for non­
specialised services. In 1988 the city had forty shanty towns, 90% of the population had as 
a maximum income three minimum wages per month, and 90% were either illiterate or had 
not completed secondary school (Prefeitura Municipal de Cama9ari, 1992).
7.2.1 Political Resources
Three mayors governed Campari during the decade. Humberto Ellery until 1985; Luiz 
Caetano, from 1986 to 1988; and Jose Tude from 1989 to 1992. Ellery is a former member 
of the military who managed to be appointed as Cama9ari's mayor for two and a half terms. 
He was the mayor when Campari underwent changes in its economic basis. His past 
experience was evaluated by him as
promoting a distorted vision of society and its problems. I  used to think only about planning 
and technocratic measures, without caring about the opinion o f the community. We built a 
coach station where there were no passengers only because it was in the plan. It was like a 
pilot commanding the passengers [3 Dec. 1992].
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The relationship between the mayor and the legislative chamber was easy because 
during the military regime the councillors only had one task: to approve the budget [Ellery, 
3 Dec. 1992]. Ellery stated that COPEC's managers, whose role was described in Chapter 6, 
used to ignore the problems of the dty and its inhabitants because they did not even cross the 
city:
COPEC's elite would only remember the city existed when the community created some 
problem, though conflicts were few because people were passive and anaesthetised, but 
Caetano changed their mentality. Today they confront COPEC managers and the 
bureaucracy [3 Dec. 1992].
Caetano's election for the 1986-88 period with 39.6% of the votes was a surprise to
politicians and COPEC managers alike. His political career started in COPEC's labour union.
He became the first communist mayor in the country, although he was affiliated to the PMDB
because communist parties were still illegal However, Caetano never hid his affiliation to the
maoist PC do B. His campaign was based on accusations regarding Ellery's irregularities and
on the need to free Cama9ari from the military's influence. The Caetano administration
transformed the city into chaos. This has been partially recognised even by himself According
to him, he adopted a mistaken strategy for confronting COPEC managers, whom he called
entrepreneurs. Caetano reasoned that because
Camaqari was the first leftist mayoral experience. We did not know how to administer a city 
and we could not count on enough professionals. Another obstacle was the vague view that 
the bourgeois state had to be destroyed, in which 1 believed; 1found out that this required a 
concrete formulation [13 Dec. 1992].
Caetano was also penalised by the media. He cited that the daily A Tarde stated that
his accounts had been rejected by the Tribunal of Accounts, which was not true. He never
persuaded the daily to rectify the information [Caetano, 13 Dec. 1993]. His relationship with
the legislative chamber was tense. A former senior official, stated that only three councillors
supported Caetano and that
the councillors adopted a strategy of confrontation, blocking everything, including 
authorisations for loans. Negotiations with the chamber had to be on an individual basis and 
the councillors asked for two things: jobs and material to build or to make little 
improvements in peoples' huts [Issa, 15 Dec. 1993].
As expected, Caetano was not successful in having his candidate elected. The 
following mayor was Tude, from ACMs group, who counted on COPEC's financial backing. 
According to Caetano, one of the reasons behind Tude's victory was the image sold by him
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that it was important for the city to be governed by someone close to the state governor. In 
Caetano's words,
the 1988 Constitution was about to be promulgated transferring resources to the 
municipalities, Camaqari had always enjoyed plenty o f resources but people still voted 
according to the old model that the levels of government above the municipality are the ones 
which provided resources to the city [13 Dec. 1992].
Tude's campaign was based on the reconstruction of the city after Caetano's chaos. 
According to him, his main words were 'progress and development' [2 June 1993]. He is said 
to have changed the clientelistic way in which politics were carried out, based on promising 
jobs to Cama9ari's unskilled population. In his words,
we set aside the politics of clientelism to introduce programmes giving people an opportunity 
to have an activity, especially to set up their own businesses 16 [2 June 1993].
However, as mentioned by Issa, Carnahan's clientelism had two fronts: jobs and
personal financial help. Tude confronted the latter, but he did not despise the importance of
job provision. It was reported that he hired more than 2,000 civil servants during his term.
Tliese employees were fired by the following administration on the grounds that the city hall
was bankrupt (A Tarde, 1993). As the figures of the city’s finances show, Tude prioritised
investment. His main achievement was the construction of the new city hall headquarters,
which contrasts to the poverty of the neighbourhood.
Despite opinion polls showing that Tude was going to have his candidate elected, the
winner was Ellery, now in the PMDB, supported by an alliance of nineteen parties. Among
his mam supporters was Caetano, who left the PC do B for the socialist PSB. Ellery credited
his victory both to Caetano and to ACM, lighting one candle to God and another to the devil:
Caetano's work in forming and strengthening grassroot organisations made people more 
conscious; they do not sell their votes any more. Popular participation must be credited to 
redemocratisation, which we owe to ACM; without him the transition would still be on [3 Dec. 
1992].
The alliance between two old enemies, Ellery and Caetano, was based on the need to 
defeat Tude and ACM*s candidate. As in state-level politics, the only way to overcome the 
power of ACM’s group was to build a broad local alliance which put together politicians with 
different ideologies and political backgrounds. Here again pragmatism played its role when
16 When asked how successful was this policy in a city inhabited by a poor and illiterate population, Tude did 
not answer.
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it came to the winning of power.
7.2.2 Financial Resources
In Brazil most of the municipalities have as their main resource the transfer of the 
federal fund FPM, except the state capitals and municipalities which shelter industries like 
Cama^arL C an aan  is a financially wealthy municipality encompassed by a poor population 
as its regular residents. The main source of revenue is transfers of ICMS because of COPEC's 
industries. The FPM represented in 1991 only 10% of the transfers, while the ICMS 
represented 90% 17. In contrast to Salvador, C anaan  has been able since the promulgation 
of the 1988 Constitution to increase its own revenue, which moved from 21% of total revenue 
in 1985 to 36% in 1991, while transfers from federal and state governments accounted in 
1985 for 74% of the city's revenue, although decreasing to 59% in 1991. This increase was 
made possible by a steady policy of levying the ISS, the municipal tax on services, on 
COPEC's industries. The increase in fiscal revenue followed a trend in big municipalities of 
increasing their own revenue and becoming less dependent upon federal and state transfers. 
However, given C anaan 's other dependence, namely upon COPEC's activities, the 
restructuring of these industries mentioned in Chapter 6 affected Campari's revenue structure. 
In 1993 own revenue went down to 22.5% of total revenue and transfers from the ICMS and 
FPM went up to 71% 18.
Cama9ari is a wealthy municipality by Brazilian standards. In 1993 per capita total 
revenue was $406, vastly different from Bahia's $160 and to Salvador's $106. Despite being 
a financially privileged municipality, Cama9ari's budget presented a deficit in six years of the 
decade analysed. The fiscal imbalance was pushed by an aggressive policy of investment, 
which accounted for 54% of total expenditure between 1989 and 1991, shown in the 
municipality's balance sheets. Fiscal imbalance was also pushed by payroll expenditure. In 
1993 the municipality had an estimate of 5,000 civil servants, ie. 4.6% of the city's 
population, as opposed to Salvador's 1%. The average salary was $300, similar to that of 
Salvador and Bahia 19.
17 Although the FPM has little impact on Cama9ari's revenue, the city enjoys the second highest FPM s quota 
among Bahian municipalities because of the size of its poor population (Diario Oficial da Republican 1993).
18 1993 figures provided by official Jose Pinheiro.
19 Figures provided by C an^ari's official Paulo Silva.
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7.2.2.1 Public Expenditure
Table 7.4 shows the political priorities of Cama9ari's mayors in the decade. The 
municipality was not an exception in increasing resources to the Legislature. Expenditure on 
Administration & Planning has decreased in the last two years. Given that municipalities which 
are not state capitals have less room for postponing the payment of interest, the decrease in 
the percentage spent on that item means the municipality has been borrowing less. After five 
years of relatively low expenditure on education, the Caetano administration increased by 
almost 50% the amount spent on it, a trend which was afterwards kept constant. Expenditure 
on Housing & Urbanisation shows the same trend as in Salvador: they rise exponentially 
before elections. Health & Sanitation also increased significantly during Caetano's term but 
decreased in 1991. The figures for Welfare & Pensions show a radical decrease, especially 
after 1988. This decrease could be misinterpreted as a radical change in the municipality's 
pension scheme or even as the disappearance of most of its pensioners. The figure was then 
checked with an official of the municipal Secretariat of Finance, Mr Paulo Silva. According 
to Silva the decrease was due to a technical mistake made by the accountants, who were 
improperly classifying expenditure on pensions under the item for Administration & Planning. 
The other reason was that, as mentioned above, the electorate ask their politicians for two 
things: jobs and financial help to build or to improve their huts. The way the city hall used to 
provide help for the huts was through a donation of public resources to individuals. This 
donation was classified under the item for Welfare & Pensions [Silva, 30 Nov. 1992]. Tude 
did change that practice by hiring small building firms instead of making individual payments.
In contrast to Salvador, Camafari's expenditure has been relatively constant, with a 
few exceptions. This stability shows that there is a pattern of expenditure not affected by the 
nature of the political regime or by changes in the political groups which governed the city in 
the decade. Financial decentralisation and the re-introduction of popular elections have 
substantially increased expenditure on education and health, therefore accomplishing the 
commitments of the 1988 Constitution and ofredemocratisation.
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Table 7.4 Camagari: Expenditure by Function as a Percentage of Total Expenditure, 1981-1991
Function 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985* 1986 1987 1988* 1989 1990 1991
Legislature 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.6 2.7 1.2 n.d** n.d** 3.2 3.8
Administration & Planning 54 .6 49.8 46 .6 39.1 39.2 41.8 35.5 37.1 44 . 0 31.1 34 . 0
Agriculture 0.5 0.8 1.5 2.2 1.4 2.6 1.2 1.2 0.1 0.7 2.0
Education & Culture 16 .2 15.5 13 .8 14 .1 13 .3 24 .0 22 .5 23 .7 19 . 9 18 .0 22 . 0
Housing & Urbanisation 4.2 6.3 4.8 14 .7 18 .1 8.8 17.5 14.7 10.5 4.3 3.5
Industry, Commerce & Service 0 . 0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.1 0.6 0.3 1.9
Health & Sanitation 6.3 4.4 2.9 5.4 4.5 5.8 ■ 8.1 10.2 13 .2 11.6 6.8
Employment 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.4 0.1 0 . 0 0 . 0
Welfare & Pension 5.8 7.5 12 .8 14 .4 17.1 11.2 9.9 7.8 2.9 1.7 1.1
Transport 10.8 14 .3 15.4 7.6 4.8 3.1 2.8 3.8 8.7 29.1 24 . 9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 . 0 100. 0 100.0 100.0 100. 0 100 . 0 100 . 0
Source: Balance Sheets.
Notes: (*) Local elections.
(**) According to official Paulo Silva, the legislature did not send their accounts to the city hall because 
of divergencies between the mayor and the president of the legislative chamber [30 Nov. 1992].
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7.2.3 Expenditure on Education
Reliable figures on educational performance are scarce in Cama9ari20. According to 
the records, the total number of students in schools provided by the municipality was 34,949 
in 1989; 33,039 in 1990; and 30,734 in 1992. In 1993, Santana and Vieira (1994: 44) found 
that Carnahan had 25,300 registered students. If these figures are correct, they are intriguing 
considering that the population of the municipality has increased. The number of teachers was 
said to be 1,407 in 1991 and 1,090 in 1992. Table 7.5 pictures the disaggregation of 
expenditure on education. The table shows that, in contrast to Salvador, payroll expenditure 
has decreased in the decade. During the last administration there was a clear tendency to
prioritise consumption and investment at the expense of teachers' salaries.
Table 7.5 Camagari: Items of Expenditure as 
Expenditure on Education, 1981-1991
a Percentage of Total
Year Consumption Payroll Investment Total
1981 2.4 91.9 5.7 100.0
1982 2.3 85.6 12.1 100.0
1983 2.6 96 .5 0.9 100.0
1984 9.7 83 .2 7.1 100 . 0
1985* 21.4 77 .1 1.5 100 . 0
1986 15 .4 75 .1 9.5 100 . 0
1987 11.3 87 . 0 1.7 100.0
1988* 6.0 86 .9 7.1 100 . 0
1989 19.2 60.7 20.1 100.0
1990 12 .1 55.3 32 .6 100.0
1991 23 .8 42 .1 34 .1 100.0
Source: Balance Sheets.
Note : (*) Local Elections.
According to Normando, the issue of education in Cama9ari
is a personal struggle. Education is not a priority for the poor because their struggle for 
survival comes first When the administration o f1989 took office the conditions o f the schools 
were very precarious. We invested a lot in construction and repairs, but often the community 
destroys the buildings and steals school materials. The places where we keep school 
materials look more like jails and we need to ask the police for help to protect the materials 
and the buildings. Parents do not attend meetings and show no interest. It is very difficult 
for a mayor to keep a commitment to education. Clientelism and paternalism also play a role 
in blocking educational policies. Managers are complacent with demands coming from low- 
paid teachers, who generally belong to low-income groups, differently to the past [30 Nov.
20 During the fieldwork several visits were made to the Secretariat of Education but the data available were not 
organised in terms of reliable forms of collection and processing. The reason seemed to be simply a lack of 
organisation. Data on the number of students outside school, the number of illiterates, the relationship between 
those who start the first year of elementary school and the first year of secondary school were not available. The 
data were provided by official Sonia Diniz.
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1992],
Normando's vision is shared by ex-mayor Caetano:
The demands of the community are the following by order o f priority: food, jobs, freedom, 
participation, housing and health. Education is not a demand they make [13 Dec. 1992].
In contrast to Salvador, C an aan  has a major role in the provision of elementary 
education. Also in contrast to Salvador, the municipality helps the state government to 
maintain its schools, generally providing them with teachers and school materials, because 
Cama9arihas a good financial position [Normando, 30 Nov. 1992].
Despite the indifference of the poor towards education mentioned by the interviewees, 
after Caetano's term expenditure on education until 1990 became the second major item of 
expenditure. A survey from a sample of municipalities found out that Camafari is the 
municipality in which annual expenditure per student is the state's highest by far: $759, 
whereas the state's average was $200. Carnahan's average surpasses the minimum value of 
$300 recommended by international organisations (Santana and Vieira, 1994: 44). Given that 
the city's inhabitants do not see education as a priority, why does the municipality spend a 
relatively high amount of resources on education? The answer rests with the need to 
accommodate the demands of the poor through the provision of jobs for low-income groups 
through hiring low-paid teachers.
To sum up, the size of Camahari's poor population makes it difficult for their 
politicians to give up their role as job providers and to make education a priority. As Caetano 
put it,
people get close to politicians to getjobs. Hunger and misery lead to two alternatives: getting 
close to politicians for a job or going into a criminal life. Solutions are individual because 
political and social institutions are weak [13 Dec. 1992].
Caetano's view is shared by his opponent Tude, who himself said to be deeply disappointed 
with local politics. In Tude's words,
Locally we can do nothing about unemployment and hunger but people expect us to do 
something; this is why they distrust local politicians [2 June 1993],
The lack of solutions for the tackling of poverty in Brazil promotes a vicious cycle
which keeps the poor dependent upon governments to provide them with their basic needs for
survival As government resources are limited and not everyone can have access to public
jobs, clientelism makes the selection.
271
7.3 Conclusions
Two puzzles were introduced by the cases studied. In Salvador the city’s political 
strength was not enough to free its politicians from dependency on other levels of 
government, and later, on the building industry. In Campari the city’s financial strength was 
not enough to free the municipality from its major role as a job provider for its poor 
population. Although Brazil is a country of contrasts, the experiences of the two different 
municipalities have some common patterns. Common patterns were found in economic 
aspects, in policy priorities, in intergovernmental relations, in clientelist practices, in the effects 
of decentralisation on expenditure patterns and in the way the political system operates.
Economically, both cities have benefitted from economic deconcentration from the 
South-East in general and from Sao Paulo in particular. They have received a high amount of 
public and private investment in the last two decades: Cama5ari benefitted from the 
establishment of COPEC, and Salvador from its role as an urban centre for business and 
skilled workers. Therefore, economic modernisation did occur, a significant number of jobs 
were created as compared with the past, a middle class emerged in Salvador, and public 
finances improved. Nevertheless, these changes were not enough to cope with the size of the 
population which has historically been cut off from the benefits of economic development. The 
gap between economic results and the conditions of the majority penalises the poor but also 
limits local governments' action. They have to give up their role in improving the living 
conditions of the population in the long-term in order to provide the poor with conditions for 
short-term survival
In policy priorities, the common aspect was that as mayors have to mark their 
administration with some achievement, they opt for projects with short-term political pay-offs, 
generally a large and visible public work, such as Cama9ari's new headquarters and Salvador's 
large avenues and viaducts. Education was not a priority, despite Campari's decision to 
increase the amount spent on it. Both cases show that when localities are inhabited by a very 
poor population, education is not their top demand. Therefore, the assumption that education 
plays a central role in the development process, in building citizenship and in promoting social 
mobility cannot be tested in localities which shelter the very poor. Their demands are for 
survival, leaving local politicians in a puzzling position: they can do nothing to promote jobs 
in the economy or to directly tackle poverty; therefore they have to invest resources to 
provide the poor with jobs and to improve their housing conditions, even if their personal
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commitment is to education.
In intergovernmental relations, the state government has always had a strong financial 
and political presence in both cities, being, for most of the time, the major decision-maker. 
However, as a branch of the literature on local government suggests, local politicians are 
closer to the communities' needs. As the municipalities analysed are constituted basically of 
poor, illiterate and unskilled constituents, mayors become responsible for providing their 
means of survival and not their access to public services, whereas the state government 
provides the infrastructure for economic development. Therefore, access to local public 
services is in a governmental limbo. Although having an influence on the national decision­
making arena in aspects affecting the municipalities, the role of Salvador and C anaan 's local 
politicians in the intergovernmental game is limited by political and economic interests not 
directly related to these municipalities. Salvador's dependency upon the building industry, 
Campari's need to provide the means for survival to its poor and both cities' dependence upon 
the higher territorial spheres of government are a feature of both cities' polity.
As for clientelism, the phenomenon does not play a major role in mediating access to 
education, given that the major battle field rests on the provision of basic needs for survival. 
This does not mean that clientelism in education has perished, but that, as in the state, the 
patron-client relationship in education is left to less important politicians.
With regard to the effects of decentralisation on expenditure patterns, although 
Cama9ari has increased expenditure on education, overall allocations have not changed much. 
Local public expenditure is more likely to be affected by competitive elections and by short­
term political pay-offs than by commitments to improve the provision of the social services 
to the population, especially the provision to education.
In the operation of the political system three characteristics were found. First, local 
politicians have little control over the city's destiny either because they are prisoners of other 
institutions or because the local population is so poor that the only policy they can adopt is 
that of providing people with the means to survive. Second, politics is seen by the population 
as belonging to the territory of the state, yet the population expect local politicians to sort out 
their problems of unemployment and poverty. Third, the most important political actor in the 
local scene is ACM, meaning that state and national games are reflected locally, leaving the 
mayors little room to launch their own political agenda. As in the state, ACMs presence 
requires the building of broad coalitions to win local elections or a submission to his will
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These three characteristics explain why mayors and the population saw the mayors more as 
managers than as politicians: they have little chance to act as political leaders and to tackle 
their cities' social conflicts. Despite ACM’s strength, the electorate of both municipalities have 
tried to overcome it, but financial and social weaknesses jeopardise the effort. These features 
sustain the argument developed elsewhere (Medeiros and Souza, 1993) that the SMR is 
marked by contradictions between a 'new' and an ’old’ rationality. A new balance of power has 
been emerging but financial weakness and economic poverty act against it.
Both cases show the difficulties of extracting patterns of political behaviour discussed 
in previous chapters. Is the local political system fragmented? Does it operate more through 
persuasion than control? Is there a 'paralysed competitive arena' game in course? Did both 
municipalities disintegrate 'old' political coalitions? Does the media play any role in shaping 
political changes or in strengthening the status quol As opposed to the national and the state 
scenes, clear answers are difficult to extract in these two local systems. What is clear is that 
local politics are deeply influenced by political, economic and financial events which happen 
outside the local level, leaving little room for local politicians to introduce their own political 
agenda, either because they depend upon external actors or because they are limited by the 
demands of the poor.
Data and findings in this chapter show that although decentralisation fosters 
democracy by broadening the number of participants in the local political arena, there are 
political and economic factors influencing its outcomes. This assumption applies to levels of 
government which have either a large poor population or are without an important economic 
activity. This chapter has also shown that conflicts between expenditure allocations are a 
reflection of other conflicts in society, especially in cases where there was no social consensus 
on what was to be achieved by decentralisation. This finding confirms the theoretical 
formulations developed in Chapter 1 about how the paths of a decision-making process of a 
given reform. Le. the decision to decentralise, influence the type of conflict surrounding its 
implementation. Thus because decentralisation was an uninformed decision, it did not change 
previous patterns of expenditure followed by each municipality to a large degree.
Financial decentralisation and redemocratisation were commended by the politicians 
to the people as ways to improve their access to social services. However, evidence in this 
chapter shows that the demands of the very poor are for other things This finding challenges 
the assumption that the need for education is a general wish which cuts across the social
classes. To what extent the need for education is more of a middle-class demand is a point for 
future scholarly research. What is true is that local governments and their politicians have little 
room to improve the social services when their constituencies, despite their political or 
financial importance, shelter the very poor. This finding stresses the limits of decentralisation 
in countries cut across by intra- and inter-regional and social inequalities, showing that there 
are unresolved problems which need to be tackled outside the local level before mayors can 
play an active role in improving their constituents' living conditions.
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Chapter 8 Conclusion: Intergovernmental Relations, Decentralisation, 
and Federalism in a Fragmented Polity
A federal system is neither a tidy set of separate governments performing separate 
functions in isolation from each other, nor a hierarchical arrangement in which the federal 
government dominates the states, and the states dominate the municipalities. Rather, the 
system is composed of multiple centres of power, overlapping responsibilities, several routes 
for influencing or vetoing policies, all in constant change according to the federation's political 
and economic momentum This apparently confusing feature provides the basis for the 
exercise of different forms of intergovernmental relations, for different weights of the 
decentralisation-centralisation continuum and for adaptations and changes within the 
federation. This framework was the basis of this study and has guided the development of its 
main argument. This study has argued that since the political opening there has been an 
enduring tension between national and sub-national interests, with the prevalence of the latter 
without the relinquishment of the former. This tension has created a 'peripheralised federalism1 
in which sub-national interests prevail over national ones, and a 'paralysed competitive arena', 
in which decisions and players cancel each other out. Nevertheless, national issues polarise 
the political agenda, and policy results at the sub-national level are generally ignored by 
scholarly works and by the political actors.
In the foregoing chapters the study discussed the tension between national and sub­
national interests within the analytical frameworks of intergovernmental relations, 
decentralisation and federalism and applied them from the perspective of a country which has 
been redemocratised and decentralised. The study focused on the tensions ranging across 
political and financial decentralisation and identified patterns of political behaviour seeking 
to influence and to veto policies and to shape policy results. This chapter re-examines the 
study’s findings in the light of the analytical frameworks previously discussed, by summarising 
and integrating the analysis and the partial conclusions developed throughout the previous 
chapters. It aims to shine some light on frameworks of analysis of the relationships between 
political arrangements in a fragmented polity and its consequences for policy results.
In searching for an answer to the puzzle of how and why a country facing issues that 
needed to be tacked nationwide chose to decentralise political power and financial resources 
when it moved from military rule to redemocratisation, and to whether decentralisation has
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changed the allocation of public expenditure at sub-national level, especially to education, the 
study analysed through empirical evidence the decision to decentralise in Brazil and the 
outcomes of decentralisation at the sub-national level.
This study has indicated that three different concepts are useful in understanding the 
nature and functioning of the Brazilian political system under a fragmented and decentralised 
muhgurisdidonal system of governance. These three concepts are intergovernmental relations, 
decentralisation, and federalism. Thus the study for its theoretical support enquired into:
(i) in its intergovernmental dimen sion, - the patterns of interaction between the three 
levels of government which have, since 1988, guided the resolution of conflicts and 
tensions between different levels of government;
(ii) in its decentralisation dimension, - how the continuum centralisation- 
decentralisation evolves to change policies, and how to link the conflicts involving 
policy decisions to its implementation;
(hi) in its federalism dimension, - how federalism influences a country’s experiment on 
consodational democracy, and which are the political values sustaining current federal 
arrangements.
8.1 Intergovernmental Relations
Relations between levels of government in a federation reflect alliances, conflicts and 
tensions between national and sub-national political interests. The Brazilian case shows that 
these relations are conflict-ridden and are more likely to fit into a framework that considers 
sub-national governments as polity vehicles rather than as administrative units or as subjected 
to the rules of a centre-periphery relation. Since 1988 the relationship between levels of 
government in Brazil has changed from a pattern of interdependence to another in which 
there is an enduring tension between them to upgrade and/or to keep their position. Because 
political power and financial resources have been decentralised, the federal government has 
to play the intergovernmental relations' game differentljffrom the past. Its need to address 
national issues is counterbalanced by the needs of sub-national spheres to keep the status quo 
as designed by the 1988 Constitution. That is not to say that the federal government is isolated 
or that it plays a minor role in intergovernmental relations. On the contrary, it has been able 
to react and to get most of its proposals passed, but a wide range of compromises and quasi- 
institutional, extra-constitutional and extra-parliamentarian mechanisms have to be triggered 
at each level of government to address their conflicting needs.
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If in the past many lamented sub-national governments' financial and political 
weakness, the 1990s inverted the signs, and concerns about the weakness of the federal 
government within the federation and in the intergovernmental relations game were heard. 
This study has shown, however, that since the 1930s no level of governance in Brazil has had 
a weak role in its political relationship with the other levels. Despite attempts by the 
authoritarian regimes to decrease the states' power, and despite increases in the local finances 
promoted by both authoritarian and democratic regimes to decrease the municipalities' 
dependence upon the states, the three levels of governance have always enjoyed room for 
manoeuvre. Although the existence of room to voice their demands has not always been 
channelled in democratic and legitimate ways, the three levels of government remained as 
powerful institutions in the Brazilian federation.
What is different since 1988 is that the three levels of government are, for the first time 
in Brazilian history, experiencing a real power-sharing relationship in a democratic 
environment, in which the federal government cannot take decisions about national issues 
without negotiating with the sub-national spheres. Although decentralisation has been on its 
way since the beginning of the political opening, its effective momentum came with the 
promulgation of the 1988 Constitution. Decentralisation was a reaction against the centralised 
authoritarian project which began with Vargas under the Estado Novo and was re-built by 
the 1964 military regime. The adoption of decentralisation and the strength of sub-national 
governments do not mean, however, that Brazil has partly returned to the ways of the Old 
Republic, in which the regional interests of a few states prevailed over the entire country. 
Between the Old Republic and post-1988 Brazil, the country became an urbanised society and 
an industrial economy, although agrarian and 'parochial' interests are still strong but they are 
no longer under the command of the old coroneis. The political and the electoral systems are 
more democratic and competitive and forms of horizontal solidarity are entrenched in society.
The power-sharing relationship set up since 1988 does not imply that every state or 
every municipality enjoys the same amount of power, but there are several unequal but 
competing power centres which have a voice in deciding on or in vetoing national policies. 
The existence of several power centres does not mean that the ways used by the states and 
the municipalities in their intergovernmental relations are the same. This study has argued that 
each of these sub-units follows different routes in their intergovernmental relations. The states 
have created several quasi-insdtudonal, extra-constitutional and extra-parliamentary structures
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and processes in their intergovernmental relations. These structures and processes can assume 
different forms. In their relationship with the federal government, structures and processes are 
developed by the states in the following ways: (i) by the influence governors exert over the 
states' delegation in Congress and over Congress's Budget Committee; (ii) by appointment to 
positions in the federal government's governing coalition; and (iii) by putting pressures on 
Ministers when their proposals hurt the states' interests. The states' relationships with the 
municipalities have tended to develop in two main ways: (i) the provision of infrastructure to 
the municipalities; and (ii) the provision of clientelist resources to local politicians.
The case of Bahia, which is centred on the figure of a politician who has managed to 
survive and to increase his importance during different political regimes, displays the 
extensive use of extra-constitutional and extra-parliamentary structures and processes to play 
the intergovernmental game. The history of ACM and Bahia's political, social and economic 
trajectory show the upgrading of a less developed state to a position of influence and veto on 
the national scene. During the authoritarian and the democratic regimes Bahian politicians had 
room to insert the state's demands into federal decisions and policies.
On the other hand, local politicians do not establish their relationships with the other 
spheres in an isolated and more independent way as the governors do. They influence and/or 
veto national decision-making arenas by (i) establishing a direct relationship with their elected 
representatives in Congress and officials, the latter especially with the federal government; and
(ii) creating or supporting organisations to channel their demands. The latter is exercised 
either directly through associations of mayors and municipal secretaries of finances, or 
indirectly through supporting private institutions committed to local demands.
On the federal government's side the mechanisms used by sub-national politicians tend 
to set the basis for negotiations, compromises and bargaining. Because the federal government 
was left with a web of unresolved issues whose solutions the political system has historically 
been postponing, its position is more delicate. This study has shown that problems of inflation, 
public deficit, public debt, fiscal predicament, social and regional inequality, the 
accomplishment of new social rights and the search for a new economic paradigm have been 
on the political agenda for a long time. The conflicts faced by the Constituent National 
Assembly and the results of the 1988 Constitution made the national agenda even more 
congested by imposing upon the federal government the burden of finding solutions for old 
and new social and regional issues. Tackling all of these problems and promoting changes
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requires difficult trade-offs, especially in a milieu of fragmented power where the political 
elites have been amplified by the nature of Brazilian transition. Addressing these problems 
means affecting the political and financial strength achieved by the sub-national governments 
as a result of the 1988 Constitution. However, this study has shown that the federal 
government, although facing increasing constraints, has its own mechanisms to allow for 
negotiations with sub-national governments and their representatives in Congress. The use of 
politically-appointed positions and of negotiated grants, postponements in making sub­
national governments pay their debts to the federal government and the manipulation of 
financial resources are some of the means found by the federal government to negotiate with 
sub-national governments.
To sum up, intergovernmental relations in Brazil since 1988 have two mam 
characteristics. First, the strength given by the 1988 Charter to sub-national politicians and 
governments, and, therefore, to local and regional interests, as a result of redemocratisation, 
as a way of legitimising the new regime and of correcting the excessive centralism of the 
previous authoritarian regimes. Second, the fact that the military regime and the 1988 
Constitution left to the federal government the burden of finding solutions to an over- 
congested agenda. These two events worsened distributive cleavages between levels of 
government because there are fewer resources available to the federal government to enable 
sharing, transference of resources and bargaining with sub-national spheres.
8.2 Decentralisation
In this study decentralisation is seen in three dimensions: how it was set in the political 
agenda; how its decision-making process was; and how it affected the allocation of public 
expenditure at the sub-national level Hence the study concentrates on different momenturns 
of decentralisation and follows the theoretical formulation which argues that the 
characteristics of particular reforms determine the type of conflict and opposition that 
surround their decision and their implementation. Therefore, the conflicts which have 
surrounded the decision to decentralise were likely to be echoed in the implementation of 
decentralisation.
The analysis of decentralisation's first momentum showed the decision appeared on 
to the political agenda as a response to different issues. First, as a reaction against 
centralisation. This reason is more likely to be at the basis of such a decision in a country like 
Brazil, not cut across by ethnic, religious or linguistic cleavages or by threats of territorial
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disaggregation. Second, as a,result of redemocratisation, given that in Brazil decentralisation 
and democracy have always been associated. Third, as a search for 'efficient' government and 
for allowing citizens' demands to be channelled through sub-national spheres, in line with the 
normative promises of development theories. Fourth, as a response to the lack of federal 
government involvement in several sensitive topics that were discussed in the constitution- 
making process.
However, the decision to decentralise showed the intense intersection of conflicting 
interests among regions and between the states and the municipalities, becoming therefore a 
critical aspect in explaining why decentralisation occurred to such an extent. The decision­
making process reflected the complex nature of political decisions and policy-making when 
taken in the context of the turmoil of regime changes. Because of those characteristics the 
decision to decentralise was largely uninformed, that is to say, the decision preceded 
discussion and evaluation of its consequences and the trade-offs it would involve. Because the 
decision was largely based on the need to legitimise the new democratic order, there was no 
room to build up a social consensus on what was to be achieved through decentralisation. 
Although many today blame the lack of a clear definition of the responsibilities of the sub­
national governments to justify the federal government's predicaments, decentralisation was 
endowed with a certain degree of flexibility that rejected the rigid idea that governmental 
functions must be irrevocably assigned to one level of government or the other. This flexibility 
provides more room for regional demands to come to the fore.
That the decision was taken by Congress highlights decentralisation as a political 
process. Otherwise, why would elected representatives bother with it? Although the decision 
was taken by the constitution-makers, pressures from sub-national governments and from 
regions were voiced. They also influenced and vetoed the details of how decentralisation 
would operate and how far decentralisation would go. These forays inside the decision­
making process of the Constituent National Assembly show the intersection of conflicting 
interests. Conflicting interests became an important variable in explaining the reason for the 
extent of the decentralisation adopted in Brazil The view of policy making and policy change 
as conflict-ridden arenas allows a better understanding of the decision to decentralise in Brazil 
when the political actors decided to promote a breaking away from the country's recent past 
of financial centralisation.
The other momentum of decentralisation, Ie. its inpact on sub-national expenditure,
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especially on education, is linked to the assumption that the features of a particular decision, 
especially one which affected Brazil's territorial balance of power, determines the type of 
conflict that follows its decision and influences its implementation. Because there was a lack 
of social consensus on what was to be achieved by decentralisation, sub-national governments 
showed no great commitment to improving the educational conditions of their populations, 
with the exception of the state capitals. However, although not totally fulfilling a role in the 
provision of social services, sub-national governments are replacing the federal level as 
investors and consumers.
Because decentralisation was implemented in the milieu of a consociational 
democracy, both the new and old political elites are involved with its implementation. This 
fact, plus the conflicts raised during the decision-making process, characterises the way 
decentralisation is being implemented and highlights the importance of political forces in the 
implementation of any given policy. Thus, commitment to the implementation of 
decentralisation may differ deeply, reinforcing the argument that the outcomes of 
implementation efforts are highly variable. Furthermore, those outcomes are affected by the 
arena in winch responses to implementation take place. Because there are traces of both the 
new and old ways of dealing with politics, education is used by politicians as a tool to cement 
clientelism. The implications of clientelism forpolicy results is that the state apparatus to deal 
with it is deeply affected by its existence, which means that tackling the problem of education 
requires the existence of an apparatus outside that of the traditional bureaucracy.
Another feature of Brazil's decision to decentralise is linked to the country's 
historically deep regional inequalities. As discussed in Chapter 2, Brazilian federalism was 
bom under the aegis of financial concentration in a few states and with little concern for the 
country's regional inequalities. Although many measures have been introduced since the 1930s 
to cope with regional inequality, the issue has never been Brazil's outstanding priority. The 
smuggle among regions recounted in Chapters 3 and 4 showed how deep the problem is, thus 
the impact of decentralisation on policy results discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 shows how the 
effects of decentralisation may be highly limited by regional and social inequalities.
By incorporating into the analysis of Brazil's experience on decentralisation the state 
and the local levels, the study suggests the importance of taking into account both spheres of 
governance when analysing the implementation of a given policy in federal states, especially 
in those where jurisdictions are interwoven. The case studies showed how different both
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spheres are in tackling the same problem and how their political structures are subjected to 
different pressures and demands. The case of Bahia, although considered by the study as 
Brazil's most noticeable example of how redemocratisation and decentralisation did not 
disintegrate the old political coalitions, shows the strength of a political leader who survived 
all changes of political regimes. ACMs long-lasting hegemony in the state's political life has 
assured Bahia a certain degree of political and economic continuity. His hegemony, however, 
has not prevented the emergence of more democratic political actors and institutions. Bahia 
should be seen as a state in political transition, where ACMs power is smaller in electoral 
terms than is thought by his opponents and publicised by his allies. Despite accusations that 
ACM dominates Bahian politics, new forms of societal and political organisations, although 
still few and as yet in their infancy, are finding their way into the political arena.
The case of Bahia shows how disappointing the results of decentralisation on 
expenditure on education were and how clientelism continues to capture decisions on the 
provision of social services, including education. It suggests that economic modernisation and 
clientelism can survive in the same political structure and that clientelism can be a way used 
by the political system to cope not only with demands coming from their clienteles but also 
to accommodate the demands of the poor. Through the Bahian case it was also possible to 
assess how state-level politicians assumed political control of the media, which, in a certain 
way and for certain politicians, plays a similar role to that played in the past by clientelism. On 
the other hand through the Bahian case it was possible to argue that at the state level the 
political system can develop mechanisms to counterbalance the country's fragmented polity, 
therefore suggesting that the correlation between political fragmentation and the incapacity 
to implement policies is not automatic.
The study of the two Bahian municipalities highlighted the dilemmas and limited 
choices which local politicians confront in governing their constituencies. Those dilemmas are 
critical to understanding the effects of policy change on policy results. Although 
decentralisation positively affected the finances of Salvador and Cama^ari, it was not enough 
to free their politicians from dependence upon other institutions. Redemocratisation and 
decentralisation produced a new balance of power in which patterns of a more democratic 
society began to emerge. However, neither phenomenon proved to be enough for local 
governments to improve their constituents' educational skills. The reason is that local 
governments and their politicians have little room for improving social services when their
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constituencies, despite their political or financial importance, shelter the very poor.
The findings, on Brazil's experience in a decade of political and financial 
decentralisation, show that although decentralisation fosters democracy, there exist various 
political and economic factors influencing its outcomes, thus exposing the limits of 
decentralisation in the following aspects. First, the limits of financial decentralisation in 
countries cut across by regional inequalities and in levels of government with a large poor 
population or with no important economic activity. Second, the limits of political 
decentralisation when there is no disintegration of old political coalitions, and clientelism still 
plays a role in influencing policies. Third, the limits of decentralisation on policy results when 
there is a lack of social consensus on what is to be achieved by decentralisation. The latter 
aspect is particularly important in countries such as Brazil that have a congested agenda of 
unresolved issues. These conclusions help our understanding as to why decentralisation has 
generally promised more than it has delivered, both in the political system and in policy 
results, emphasising the view that decentralisation is not the panacea promised by its 
advocates, and that its results are influenced by political and economic factors.
Furthermore, a decade of political opening has proved to be time enough to assess the 
impact of decentralisation on political institutions but it is maybe not enough to evaluate its 
impact on deeper patterns of policy results, given that a generation of politicians and officials 
brought up under the aegis of democratic rules has yet to come. Those factors shape the 
nature and scope of conflict surrounding efforts to introduce changes after decentralisation 
has occurred. This conflict is as it is because decentralisation, intergovernmental relations and 
federalism do not evolve in a void but are rather part of a preexisting context, especially in 
Brazil where decentralisation emerged as a result of the search to legitimise a democratic 
order without rupture.
8.3 Federalism
The literature on territorial politics emphasises that different territorial arrangements 
influence the outcomes of the political system. Federalism as a value reflects interests which 
shape the federation, intergovernmental relations and the decentralisation-centralisation 
continuum in different forms according to the federation's needs at a given time. This study 
argued that the driving force of Brazilian federalism is the need to accommodate the demands 
of conflicting elites and to cope with the country's deep regional inequalities. Although the 
Brazilian federation has experienced several changes, federalism has remained one of the most
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important mechanisms of political negotiation in accommodating the country's regional 
inequalities. Regional interests have always enjoyed political salience in Brazil. Those interests 
have historically been voiced not only by the state and local-level politicians but also by 
Congress. Throughout Brazilian history Congress, not just the Senate, has incorporated and 
acted to shield a range of economic, political and socio-cultural attributes and to produce 
compromises in Brazil's complex patterns of divergent interests and regional disparities. The 
Brazilian Congress became an important element in the conflict-pacification equation 
regarding the regional question, thus keeping it on the political agenda even when 
authoritarian regimes intended to ignore it.
On the other hand, and as suggested by the literature in which this study found its 
foundations, federalism and consociational democracy share the characteristic of being 
mechanisms which allow for the existence of conflicting interests in a political whole. 
Following this line of reasoning, this study has argued that, although Brazil does not fulfil all 
the requirements of a consociational democracy, there are many elements of that model which 
have always existed in Brazil and which have been expanded with redemocratisation. One of 
the main differences between a stable consociational democracy and Brazil after 
redemocratisation is the lack of adequate counterweights for dealing with the ensuing 
fragmentation and blockades. This is why the study has labelled the Brazilian national political 
system a 'paralysed competitive arena'. However, the strength of sub-national interests cannot 
be taken as the only element of this 'paralysed competitive arena'. Congress's increasingly 
assertive role and the strength of the Judiciary are important elements in fostering power 
fragmentation.
The Brazilian case showed that both federalism and the political pacts which reflected 
the political ideology sustaining Brazilian federalism are different from that they were. As in 
the political transition to democracy, Brazilian redemocratisation is still confusing and 
experimental; old issues such as fiscal predicament, regional inequality and the lack of 
commitment by the governing elites to education have not yet been addressed. What is new 
is that, for the first time, the states have assumed a financial importance equivalent to their 
political importance. Throughout Brazil's history, but particularly since 1988, several unequal 
but competing power centres, especially those of state-level politicians in executive positions, 
have the strength to participate in the decision-making process. In a milieu of weak political 
parties in which parliamentarians are more loyal to their constituencies and to their governors
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than to their parties, and in which individual players are more important than collective opes, 
those actors provide the federal government with the conditions to govern. However, they 
also act as veto players when a federal decision might affect their regional and local interests. 
This experiment with power-sharing makes Brazil a good 'test' for two assumptions in the 
literature on federalism: the interdependence of local, regional and national interests, and that 
conflicts must be recognised as inherent to the federal setting.
This apparently confusing and experimental redemocratisation made Brazil more 
federal and more democratic by decentralising power and financial resources to sub-national 
governments and to the two other branches of the State, namely the Legislature and the 
Judiciary. It pushed the federal government to incorporate regional and local demands into 
its congested agenda. This experience produced a 'peripheralised federalism'. The review of 
both features of the Brazilian national political and federal systems, Le. its 'paralysed 
competitive arena' and its 'peripheralised federalism', is on the political agenda and has been 
the baas of attempts to review the 1988 Constitution since its promulgation. Instead of seeing 
these features of the Brazilian federation and of its political system as drawbacks, this study 
argues that they should be seen more as improvements in the country's polity and federalism 
than as obstacles to the country's needs to face old and new issues.
This is not to say that tensions and conflicts will not emerge or that they will not be 
intensified. However, whether or not the constraints on the federal government brought about 
by the ‘paralysed competitive arena' and by the 'peripheralised federalism', as well as the slow 
path that negotiations in such circumstances require, will evolve to keep the political system 
as it was designed by the constitution-makers remains to be answered through and by the 
political process itself This study has shown that despite the limits to decentralisation and its 
implications for the federal government, the tensions surrounding the Brazilian federation and 
its intergovernmental relations lie more in historical problems, in regional and social inequality 
and in a congested agenda of social and economic problems which have not been addressed 
by previous regimes, rather than on the strength of sub-national governments per se.
This study examined a political process undergoing contrasting, conflicting, and 
sometimes paradoxical developments. Politically, fiscally and constitutionally, the political 
system moved to more federalism and to more democracy. From the viewpoint of the federal 
government those movements are forcing it to incorporate local and regional issues in its 
decision-making process on national issues. This assumption calls for suggestions of further
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studies to refine this research's findings. This study has indicated the need for future scholarly 
works to fill the blanks not considered within the thesis's scope. Those works should go in 
three directions. First, there is the need to expand the case studies to other Brazilian states and 
municipalities in order to look for similarities to and differences in the patterns found in Bahia, 
Salvador and Cama9ari Of particular importance is the investigation into whether there is a 
correlation between expenditure patterns at sub-national levels and the type of political 
arrangement within each state and its main municipalities. There is a fertile topic for 
scholarship in understanding why some state capitals are more committed to the provision of 
education than others. There is need also to build comparisons aiming at explaining why some 
local leaders are expelled from elected positions after they become mayors, as happens in 
Salvador, and others are able to broafaitheir leadership from the local to the regional sphere, 
as in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Curitiba and Vitoria. On the other hand, why 
some regional leaders with different political backgrounds are well accepted by the electorate, 
such as ACM in Bahia and the political groups in Ceara and Parana, while others leave office 
in great discredit.
Second, there is the need to develop sharper questions to guide studies able to capture 
the historical and current reasons for Brazil's regional inequalities beyond the traditional views 
that over-emphasise the economic and cultural aspects. This line of research should also 
answer why some poor states and municipalities in the North-East have been able to achieve 
good governmental and fiscal performances whereas in some better-off areas their 
governments free financial constraints.
Third, there is the need to understand how policies and decisions become part of 
Congress's agenda and how regional disputes influence Congress's decision-making process. 
This study has shown those disputes at a time of deep political change. However, new lines 
of inquiry should be opened up, especially the examination of how regional disputes are dealt 
with in Congress's daily routine. The relationship between Congress, on the one hand, and 
governors and mayors, on the other, deserves the same scholarly attention enjoyed by studies 
on the relationship between Congress and the federal Executive. This effort should search for 
answers to how governors' extra-parliamentary and extra-constitutional representations are 
triggered, and how Brazil's high degree of political localism operates in Congress. Our 
knowledge of the existence of a web of relationships encompassing all of these actors and 
institutions has to be deepened by mapping how conflicts and negotiations are dealt with
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between Congress and local and regional interests and bow they influence the federal 
Executive.
No matter how the trends in the Brazilian federation discussed in this study are 
described in shorthand terms, either as a 'paralysed competitive arena' or as a 'peripheralised 
federalism', they represent prominent and potent decentralising forces. Solutions to any given 
set of political and financial problems such as those discussed in this study are not obvious, 
because their impact cannot be known in advance. The choices involve uncertainty and risk. 
Federal pressures to change the status of sub-national governments have occurred frequently. 
However, the reshaping, rebuilding, or repositioning of the entire federal arrangement may 
occur as a result of shifting forces and factors that do not directly alter the keystone position 
of the importance of local and regional issues in the type of federation onto which Brazil has 
embarked.
What is certain is that after the military regime came to an end, Brazil not only began 
a transition to a civilian form of government, but went far beyond that: a process of profound 
political change has subjected the political system, intergovernmental relations and the 
federation to unprecedented novelties, pressures and disturbances. Such a process of 
redemocratisation boosts the number of players, exacerbates class and regional conflicts, and 
intensifies the awareness of disparities, thereby making consensus difficult to achieve. This 
kind of change does not occur in an orderly, Cartesian, rational, monolithic manner; rather, 
its course is sometimes destabilising and unpredictable. Some might prefer a strictly controlled 
process conducted by a small pro-modernisation elite or, to take up a once fashionable term, 
a 'sequencing' after the Asian or the Mexican models, in which economic modernisation 
precedes political participation and diffused power. In this sense Brazil's experience is almost 
unique.
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